The American Political Science Review

000407

Articles by Philip D. Stewart, Robert L. Arnett, William Ebert, Raymond E. McPhail, Terrence L. Rich and Craig E. Schopmeyer, Paul Abramson, Charles S. Bullock, III, John L. Sullivan, Herbert F. Weisberg, David Adamany, Alan C. Isaak

FEB 15 '73
TREASURY DEPARTMENT

Thomas W. Robinson
The Sino-Soviet Border Dispute

W. Phillips Shively
Voting Stability and the Nature of Party Attachments in the Weimar Republic

Wallace Mendelson
From Warren to Burger: The Rise and Decline of Substantive Equal Protection

Robert S. Erikson, Bruce W. Robeck
Malapportionment

John L. Sullivan and Robert E. O'Connor
Electoral Choice and Popular Control of Public Policy

TREASURY DEPARTMENT
FEB 15 '73
000408

Published Quarterly by

The American Political Science Association

Vol. LXVI December 1972 No. 4

NEW perspectives on political science . . .

STRUCTURE AND PROCESS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

RAYMOND F. HOPKINS and RICHARD W. MANSBACH

Based on the latest empirical research, this book on international relations blends historical and case study materials within a well-defined, theoretical framework. The book begins with important considerations in analysis, including the nature of influence, the choice of levels of abstraction, and the use of theory to explain and predict. Among the major topics covered are the development of the international system; the nature of world structure; the links between individual, state, and international behavior; the role of governmental and nongovernmental international actors; strategies of bargaining and conflict; and policy mandates for the future. Tentative: 576 pp.; $12.00. February, 1973.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

A General Theory and a Latin American Case Study

HELIO JAGUARIBE

Using material from various social sciences, this treatise advances a number of original contributions to the field, including new approaches to society and the polity, a cost-benefit analysis of elites, a theory of political models, an operational analysis of political models, a discussion of the operational conditions for promoting development, and an analysis of the present interimperial system. Successively, the book offers a theoretical and methodological introduction to society and change, provides a broad review of the specialized literature and formulates a comprehensive theory of political development (historical case studies are employed), and presents an in-depth Latin American case study. Tentative: 512 pp.; $13.00. January, 1973.

New volumes in
HARPER'S COMPARATIVE GOVERNMENT SERIES
Michael Curtis, Advisory Editor:

IDEOLOGY AND CULTURE

An Introduction to the Dialectic of Contemporary Chinese Politics

JOHN BRYAN STARR

Offers the student with no previous exposure to Chinese politics a frame of reference for its study. Providing specific facts with interpretations, the book is based on the assumption that in order to understand Chinese political life it is necessary to employ both the models of Western political science and those implicit in Chinese political thought. Tentative: 265 pp.; $3.50: paper. March, 1973.

NIGERIAN POLITICS

JOHN M. OSTHEIMER

This text applies the important hypotheses of the comparative approach to the case of Nigeria. The development of this emerging nation's political attitudes, pressure groups, and military government, as well as its policies of the 1970's, are the foci of concentration. Tentative: 192 pp.; $3.95: paper. January, 1973.

FRENCH POLITICS AND POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS

Second Edition

ROY PIERCE

Extensively revised and thoroughly updated to cover events through the spring of 1972, the Second Edition offers a new final chapter which shows how French political problems are the product of her unique political experience, her location and traditional position as a major European nation, and modern industrial society. Tentative: 320 pp.; $3.50: paper. March, 1973.

. . . from HARPER & ROW

10 East 53d Street, New York 10022

The American Political Science Review

Vol. LXVI December 1972 No. 4

CONTENTS

1172 Editorial Comment

1175 The Sino-Soviet Border Dispute: Background, Development, and the March 1969 Clashes — Thomas W. Robinson

1203 Voting Stability and the Nature of Party Attachments in the Weimar Republic — W. Phillips Shively

1226 From Warren to Burger: The Rise and Decline of Substantive Equal Protection — Wallace Mendelson

1234 Malapportionment, Gerrymandering, and Party Fortunes in Congressional Elections — Robert S. Erikson

1246 Legislative Partisanship, Constituency and Malapportionment — Bruce W. Robeck

1256 Electoral Choice and Popular Control of Public Policy: The Case of the 1966 House Elections — John L. Sullivan and Robert E. O'Connor

1269 Political Mobility and the Soviet Political Process: A Partial Test of Two Models — Philip D. Stewart, Robert L. Arnett, William Ebert, Raymond E. McPhail, Terrence L. Rich and Craig E. Schopmeyer

1291 Intergenerational Social Mobility and Partisan Choice — Paul Abramson

1295 House Careerists: Changing Patterns of Longevity and Attrition — Charles S. Bullock, III

1301 A Note on Redistributive Politics — John L. Sullivan

1306 Scaling Models for Legislative Roll-Call Analysis — Herbert F. Weisberg

1316 Communications

1321 Book Reviews and Essays
    The Political Science of E. E. Schattschneider: A Review Essay — David Adamany
    The Grassroots of a Discipline: A Review of Some Introductory Texts in Political Science — Alan C. Isaak

1423 Index to Volume LXVI

Office of publication: Curtis Reed Plaza, Menasha, Wisconsin.
Foreign Agent: P. S. King and Staples, Ltd., Great Smith Street, Westminster, London.
Second class postage paid at Washington, D.C., and at additional mailing offices.
Printed in the United States of America by George Banta Company, Inc., Menasha, Wisconsin.
Copyright, 1972, by The American Political Science Association

ARTICLES

1175 **The Sino-Soviet Border Dispute: Background, Development, and the March 1969 Clashes.** Sino-Soviet border fighting in early 1969 had many causes. The two Damansky Island incidents, moreover, were quite different in level of conflict and outcome. Only an investigation of the details of the incidents, together with a composite analysis of domestic, foreign policy, and international political variables suffices to determine what actually happened and why. Fitting the pieces together reveals that the Chinese caused the March 2 incident, while the Russians initiated fighting on March 14. The first incident involved only local forces; the second included regular army forces of several thousand and heavy equipment.

The history of the border conflict since 1954 is traced and found to have entered a critical stage in 1966, with the outbreak of the Cultural Revolution and increased Soviet military readiness. The 1964 border negotiations aborted because the Chinese wished no agreement then; but no insurmountable obstacles stand in the way of a definitive border agreement. A combination of local excesses, regional power struggle, and national-level policy changes motivated the Chinese to initiate action on March 2. The Soviets caused the March 14 incident primarily for revenge and as the opening move in forcing the Chinese into new border talks.

By Thomas W. Robinson, Visiting Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations.

1203 **Party Identification, Party Choice, and Voting Stability: The Weimar Case.** The stability of voting for subsets of the Weimar population distinguished by sex, religion, and urban-rural residence is estimated: (1) by means of ecological regression, for the period 1924–1928; (2) by an examination of net changes, for the period 1928–1933.

The major conclusion is that party identification was not an important factor in the Weimar Republic. Instead, voting seems to have been channeled largely by social and economic structures. Subsidiary conclusions are that uneven distribution of information affected the stability of voting and that most of the Nazi gains from 1928 to 1933 apparently did not come disproportionately from among previous nonvoters.

By W. Phillips Shively, Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Minnesota.

1226 **From Warren to Burger: The Rise and Decline of Substantive Equal Protection.** Substantive due process is the classic, if temporary, achievement of judicial activism. The Roosevelt Court destroyed it out of respect for the democratic processes. Mr. Justice Black's "incorporation" ploy was calculated to forestall backsliding by equating the Fourteenth Amendment with the Bill of Rights. But the Bill of Rights, after all, is quite old fashioned. It does not cover many matters deemed crucial in our day, e.g., poverty. To fill this "gap" the Warren Court used "equal protection" as "actively" as the pre-Roosevelt Court had used "due process." Obviously inspired by the Black incorporation principle, the early Burger Court is doing to substantive equal protection what the Roosevelt Court did to substantive due process. A generation ago we called it a "return to the Constitution," now it is called strict construction. If in time the full Nixon Court succumbs to the magic of power and imposes *its* ideals upon the nation, some of us may find embarrassment in our quondam efforts to convince ourselves that judicial activism (it used to be called judicial supremacy) is a proper handmaiden of democracy.

By Wallace Mendelson, Professor of Government, University of Texas at Austin.

1234 **Malapportionment, Gerrymandering, and Party Fortunes in Congressional Elections.** This paper explores the relationship between the partisan division of the northern vote in U.S. House elections and the partisan division of northern House seats. From at least 1952 through 1964, there was a noticeable pro-Republican bias to northern districting, in the sense that the Republicans consistently won about ten per cent more of the seats than the Democrats could obtain from the same percentage of the vote. Following the 1964 election, this partisan inequity has disappeared, but the evidence suggests that this change is only temporary. The normal pattern of a Republican advantage in northern House elections is produced by a Republican gerrymander of *accidental* origins: the tendency of Democratic voters to cluster in heavily Democratic areas where their votes for Congress go "wasted." Neither malapportionment nor *deliberate* partisan gerrymandering appears to have played a major role in distorting the outcomes of House elections.

By Robert S. Erikson, Assistant Professor of Government, Florida State University.

1246 **Legislative Partisanship, Constituency, and Malapportionment. The Case of California.** Two principal problems were analyzed in the study: (1) the impact of malapportionment on party voting, and (2) the influence of constituency on legislative partisanship. The California Senate was used as a test case because it was generally considered to deviate from the pattern of party voting found in other two-party states, and because it was the most poorly apportioned upper chamber in the nation. It was found that the proportion of party votes in the Senate increased significantly after reapportionment, and gross malapportionment may have inhibited a trend toward more party voting. It was also found that there was a much stronger association between political and socio-economic constituency variables and an index of partisan voting following elections in reapportioned districts.

By Bruce W. Robeck, Assistant Professor of Political Science, Texas A&M University.

1256 **Electoral Choice and Popular Control of Public Policy: The Case of the 1966 House Elections.** This paper examines two neglected conditions of the linkage process between public opinion and public policy, in an effort to evaluate an explanation, other than voter apathy and ignorance, of why the linkage appears to be so weak. These conditions are: (1) Opposing candidates for the same elective office must differ in their issue-related attitudes. (2) The winners' subsequent behavior vis-à-vis public policy must be consonant with their pre-election issue-related attitudes.

By the use of data collected before the 1966 House election, the amount of choice, or issue-related differences between candidates for the same House seat, is examined in all 435 Congressional districts. Sufficient differences were found in three policy areas—foreign affairs, civil rights, and domestic welfare—to imply that the electorate was given the opportunity to determine the direction of public policy.

Adding data collected on the roll-call behavior of the 435 winners allowed us to examine the second condition. Although in some cases there were substantial differences between pre-election attitude and postelection roll-call behavior on the same issue, this is clearly the exception rather than the rule. As a generalization, the second condition appears to be true.

By John L. Sullivan, Assistant Professor of Political Science, Indiana University and Robert E. O'Connor, Assistant Professor of Political Science, Pennsylvania State University.

1269 **Political Mobility and the Soviet Political Process: A Partial Test of Two Models.** This article provides a partial test of the rational-technical model and of the patronage model of political mobility in the Soviet Communist Party. Two major hypotheses are examined: 1) the greater the number of patron client ties acquired by regional Party secretaries, the greater the probability of their upward mobility, and 2) the better the economic performance of the regions for which secretaries are responsible, the greater the probability of their upward mobility. Multiple regression analysis indicates only very weak support for these hypotheses for the 1955–1968 period in the RSFSR. Considerably greater support for the hypotheses is found when the following variables are controlled: level of economic development, political regime, and Party cohort. Changes in the level of policy conflict within the central elite are found to account for much of the variation over time in the explanatory power of the two models.

By Philip D. Stewart, Associate Professor of Political Science, Ohio State University; Robert L. Arnett, Graduate Student in Political Science, Ohio State University; William T. Ebert, Raymond E. McPhail, Terrence L. Rich and Craig E. Schopmeyer, United States Armed Forces, formerly Graduate Students in Political Science, Ohio State University.

1291 **Intergenerational Social Mobility and Partisan Choice.** David E. Butler and Donald E. Stokes have collected the best available data about the political effects of intergenerational social mobility in Britain, but they are wrong in their conclusion that "social mobility can make only a small contribution to the fact that more than a quarter of British electors fail to vote in accord with their class." They have defined social mobility too narrowly. My reanalysis of their data shows that over a third of those Britons who do not support the predominant party of their class are intergenerationally mobile. The upwardly mobile constitute 12 per cent of the Labour party electorate, and 75 per cent of the middle-class Labourites.

By Paul R. Abramson, Associate Professor of Political Science, Michigan State University.

1295 **House Careerists: Changing Patterns of Longevity and Attrition.** During the last 60 years, the proportion of careerists (congressmen elected ten or more times) has risen from 2.8 per cent to 20.0 per cent. The greatest increase occurred in the mid-1950s. The proportion of Southern Democrats numbered among the careerists has consistently been disproportionately large, with the number of Northern Democrats increasing, while Republican careerists have become relatively fewer. Fluctuations in the number of senior congressmen is not strongly influenced by national electoral patterns.

The most frequent cause of careerists' leaving the House has been retirement. During the last decade the incidence of defeats in primaries and general elections has increased; the greater susceptibility of careerists to rejection by the electorate coincides with reapportionment and the involvement of new groups in the electorate interested in new issues.

By CHARLES S. BULLOCK, III, Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Georgia.

1301 **A Note on Redistributive Politics.** Fry and Winters, in a recent article in this journal, concluded that political variables are more important than socioeconomic variables in terms of redistributive policies. They based their analysis, however, on twelve political but only six socioeconomic variables. This research note re-examines these relationships, utilizing twelve political and twelve socioeconomic variables. The findings are strikingly reversed, whether one considers all twenty-four variables or the best five political and the best five socioeconomic variables. However, these findings reflect a shotgun approach, simply more and more variables added to a regression equation. To reduce and clarify the analysis, two criteria are suggested for selecting independent variables: the size of the zero-order correlations, and the degree of multicolinearity among the independent variables. When three political and three socioeconomic variables are compared using these criteria, the results are once again inconsistent with those reported by Fry and Winters.

By JOHN L. SULLIVAN, Assistant Professor of Political Science, Indiana University.

1306 **Scaling Models for Legislative Roll-Call Analysis.** Guttman scaling is the usual procedure for scaling legislative roll-call votes. This paper calls attention to an alternative scaling model—the proximity model. Under this model, legislators approve a consecutive set of items on the scale, without the cumulation required by the Guttman scale. Circumstances under which proximity voting is likely are discussed. Congressional voting on the Compromise of 1850 is analyzed in detail to illustrate the proximity model and to emphasize the possibility of obtaining faulty inferences if one uses the Guttman scale model when it is incorrect. Guttman scaling has been successful for contemporary Congresses, but the proximity model is seen to underlie some issues in the early 1970s. Proximity scaling is not limited to the legislative realm; it can be used in survey analysis and in attitudinal research more generally.

By HERBERT W. WEISBERG, Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Michigan.

1316 COMMUNICATIONS
From Thomas Hone, Terry M. Perlin, W. Lee Johnson, Jr., Richard M. Merelman, Humbert S. Nelli, Edgar Litt.

1172 EDITORIAL COMMENT

1321 BOOK REVIEWS AND ESSAYS
1321 **The Political Science of E. E. Schattschneider: A Review Essay.**
By DAVID ADAMANY, Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Wisconsin at Madison.
1336 **The Grassroots of a Discipline: A Review of Some Introductory Texts in Political Science.** George Beam, *Usual Politics;* Robert Dahl, *Modern Political Analysis;* Robert E. Murphy, *The Style and Study of Political Science;* D. A. Strickland, L. L. Wade and R. E. Johnston, *A Primer of Political Analysis;* Phillippa Strum and Michael Shmidman, *On Studying Political Science;* Thomas Landon Thorson, *Biopolitics;* Glenn Tinder, *Political Thinking.*
By ALAN C. ISAAK, Associate Professor of Political Science, Western Michigan University.

1341 **Political Theory, History of Political Thought, and Methodology**
Charlot, Jean, ed., *Les Partis Politiques.* Kay Lawson, p. 1341
Elton, G. R., *Political History, Principles and Practice;* and Postan, M. M., *Fact and Relevance, Essays on Historical Method.* W. B. Gallie, p. 1342
Garvey, Gerald, *Constitutional Bricolage.* Samuel Krislov, p. 1343
Hance, William A., *Population, Migration and Urbanization in Africa.* Ann Seidman, p. 1344
Jones, Grace, *The Political Structure.* Geoffrey K. Roberts, p. 1345
Korsch, Karl, *Marxism and Philosophy.* Louis Dupré, p. 1346

Laumann, Edward O., Siegel, Paul M., and Hodge, Robert W., eds., *The Logic of Social Hierarchies.* Anne Foner and Matilda White Riley, p. 1347
Marcuse, Herbert, *Five Lectures;* and Vivas, Eliseo, *Contra Marcuse.* Stanley Rosen, p. 1348
Marshall, Geoffrey, *Constitutional Theory.* David Fellman, p. 1351
Moore, R. Laurence, *European Socialists and the American Promised Land.* William O. Reichert, p. 1352
Pattanaik, Prasanta K., *Voting and Collective Choice: Some Aspects of the Theory of Group Decision-Making.* Gordon Tullock, p. 1354
Pipes, Richard, *Struve, Liberal on the Left, 1870–1905.* George Fischer, p. 1354
Postan, M. M., *Fact and Relevance, Essays on Historical Method;* and Elton, G. R., *Political History, Principles and Practice.* W. B. Gallie, p. 1341
Rose, Richard, *People in Politics: Observations Across the Atlantic.* James B. Christoph, p. 1356
Servan-Schreiber, Jean-Jacques, *The Radical Alternative.* Keith R. Legg, p. 1357
Vivas, Eliseo, *Contra Marcuse;* and Marcuse, Herbert, *Five Lectures.* Stanley Rosen, p. 1348
White, D. J., *Decision Theory.* Peter A. Lupsha, p. 1358

1359 American Government and Politics
Bartley, Numan V., *From Thurmond to Wallace, Political Tendencies in Georgia, 1948–1968.* J. David Palmer, p. 1359
Berman, William C., *The Politics of Civil Rights in the Truman Administration;* and Wolk, Allan, *The Presidency and Black Civil Rights.* James C. Harvey, p. 1360
DeVries, Walter and Tarrance, V. Lance, *The Ticket-Splitter: A New Force in American Politics.* Richard W. Boyd, p. 1361
Dolbeare, Kenneth M., and Hammond, Phillip E., *The School Prayer Decisions: From Court Policy to Local Practice.* Lief H. Carter, p. 1363
Hawke, David Freeman, *Benjamin Rush: Revolutionary Gadfly.* Harold M. Hyman, p. 1364
Manley, John F., *The Politics of Finance: The House Committee on Ways and Means.* Randall B. Ripley, p. 1365
Pechman, Joseph A., *Federal Tax Policy.* Lawrence C. Pierce, p. 1366
Schlesinger, Arthur M., Jr., ed., *The Coming to Power: Critical Elections in American History.* Nelson W. Polsby, p. 1367
Urofsky, Melvin I., *A Mind of One Piece: Brandeis and American Reform.* Mary Cornelia Porter, p. 1368
Weber, Ronald E., *Public Policy Preferences in the States.* Ira Sharkansky, p. 1369
Wolk, Allan, *The Presidency and Black Civil Rights;* and Berman, William C., *The Politics of Civil Rights in the Truman Administration.* James C. Harvey, p. 1360

1370 Comparative Government and Politics
Abu-Lughod, Ibrahim, ed., *The Transformation of Palestine: Essays on the Origin and Development of the Arab-Israeli Conflict.* Samir N. Anabtawi, p. 1370
Allworth, Edward, ed., *Nationalities of the Soviet East: Publications and Writing Systems;* and Allworth, Edward, ed., *Soviet Nationality Problems.* Violet Conolly, p. 1371
Ayoob, Mohammed, Gupta, Anirudha, Khan, Rahmatullah, Deshpande, G. P., Narayanan R., and Gupta, Sisir, *Bangla Desh, A Struggle of Nationhood;* and Moraes, Dom, *The Tempest Within: An Account of East Pakistan.* Wayne Wilcox, p. 1391
Brown, R. G. S., *The Administrative Process in Britain.* Michael Gordon, p. 1372
Cappelletti, Mauro, *Judicial Review in the Contemporary World.* Henry J. Abraham, p. 1373
Clements, Frank, *Rhodesia: A Study of the Deterioration of a White Society.* Lewis H. Gann, p. 1375
Curtis, Gerald L., *Election Campaigning Japanese Style.* Akira Kubota, p. 1375
Deshen, Shlomo A., *Immigrant Voters in Israel: Parties and Congregations in a Local Election Campaign.* Jacob M. Landau, p. 1377
Devillers, Philippe, *What Mao Really Said.* George P. Jan, p. 1378
Dowse, Robert E., *Modernization in Ghana and the U.S.S.R.: A Comparative Study.* Heidi Schuhr Erlich, p. 1379
Fireside, Harvey, *Icon and Swastika: The Russian Orthodox Church under Nazi and Soviet Control.* Guenter Lewy, p. 1380
Graham, Loren R., *The Soviet Academy of Sciences and the Communist Party, 1927–1932.* Eugene Rabinowitch, p. 1381
Issawi, Charles, ed., *The Economic History of Iran: 1800–1914.* Sepehr Zabih, p. 1383
Landsberger, Henry A., ed., *The Church and Social Change in Latin America.* Richard A. Johnson, p. 1384
Krupskaya, N. K., *Reminiscences of Lenin;* and Lenin, V. I., *Lenin on the United States: Selected Writings by V. I. Lenin* (Compiled by C. Leiteizen). Abraham Ascher, p. 1386
Lenin, V. I., see Krupskaya, N. K.
Liew, Kit Siong, *Struggle for Democracy: Sung Chiao-jen and the 1911 Chinese Revolution.* Marius B. Jansen, p. 1388
MacEoin, Gary, *Revolution Next Door, Latin America in the 1970's;* and Petras, James F. and LaPorte, Robert, Jr., *Cultivating Revolution; The United States and Agrarian Reform in Latin America.* Robert H. Dix, p. 1393

Maddick, Henry, *Panchayati Raj: A Study of Rural Local Government in India.* Harry J. Friedman, p. 1388
Mallin, Jay, ed., *"Che" Guevara on Revolution.* Francisco José Moreno, p. 1390
Moraes, Dom, *The Tempest Within: An Account of East Pakistan;* and Ayoob, Mohammed, Gupta, Anirudha, Khan, Rahmatullah, Deshpande, G. P., Narayanan, R., and Gupta, Sisir, *Bangla Desh, A Struggle of Nationhood.* Wayne Wilcox, p. 1391
Pang, Cheng Lian, *Singapore's People's Action Party: Its History, Organization and Leadership.* C. Paul Bradley, p. 1392
Petras, James F. and LaPorte, Robert, Jr., *Cultivating Revolution; The United States and Agrarian Reform in Latin America;* and MacEoin, Gary, *Revolution Next Door, Latin America in the 1970's.* Robert H. Dix, p. 1393
Schubert, Glendon and Danelski, David J., eds. *Comparative Judicial Behavior: Cross-Cultural Studies of Political Decision-Making in the East and West.* Herbert Jacob, p. 1394
Spitzer, Alan B., *Old Hatreds and Young Hopes: The French Carbonari Against the Bourbon Restoration.* Howard C. Payne, p. 1395
Stacey, Frank, *The British Ombudsman.* William B. Gwyn, p. 1396
Touraine, Alain, *The May Movement: Revolt and Reform.* Bernard E. Brown, p. 1397
Woodcock, George and Akumovic, Ivan, *The Anarchist Prince: A Biographical Study.* Giovanni Baldelli, p. 1398

1399 International Politics, Law, and Organization

Astiz, Carlos A., ed., *Latin American International Politics: Ambitions, Capabilities and the National Interest of Mexico, Brazil and Argentina.* Evelyn P. Stevens, p. 1399
Cable, James, *Gunboat Diplomacy: Political Applications of Limited Naval Force.* Jack M. Schick, p. 1400
Carey, John, ed., *When Battle Rages, How Can Law Protect?* Working Paper and Proceedings of the Fourteenth Hammarskjöld Forum. G. Schwarzenberger, p. 1401
Chmielewski, Edward, *The Polish Question in the Russian State Duma.* Hans Rogger, p. 1402
Clemens, Diane Shaver, *Yalta.* John Lewis Gaddis, p. 1402
Dommen, Arthur J., *Conflict in Laos: The Politics of Neutralization.* David A. Wilson, p. 1404
Gannon, F. R., *The British Press and Germany, 1936–1939.* Robert J. Lieber, p. 1404
Gibson, Charles, *Foreign Trade in the Economic Development of Small Nations: The Case of Ecuador.* Martin C. Needler, p. 1406
Harriman, W. Averell, *America and Russia in a Changing World, A Half Century of Personal Observation.* Naomi B. Lynn, p. 1407
Hirschmann, Ira, *Red Star Over Bethlehem: Russia Drives for the Middle East.* David P. Forsythe, p. 1408
Hudson, W. J., *Australia and the Colonial Question at the United Nations.* William S. Turley, p. 1409
Macauley, Neill, *The Sandino Affair.* William Kamman, p. 1410
Maritano, Nino, *A Latin American Economic Community: History, Policies and Problems.* Philippe C. Schmitter, p. 1411
Penrose, E. R., Lyon, Peter, and Penrose, Edith, eds., *New Orientations: Essays in International Relations.* Alan James, p. 1412
Pisar, Samuel, *Coexistence and Commerce: Guidelines for Transactions Between East and West.* Ernest H. Preeg, p. 1413
Service, John S., *The Amerasia Papers: Some Problems in the History of U.S.-China Relations.* John K. Fairbank, p. 1415
Stupak, Ronald J., *The Shaping of Foreign Policy: The Role of the Secretary of State as Seen by Dean Acheson.* David S. McLellan, p. 1416
Van Dyke, Vernon, *Human Rights, The United Nations and World Community.* Moses Moskowitz, p. 1417
Varma, S. P. and Misra, K. P., eds., *Foreign Policies in South Asia.* D. E. Kennedy, p. 1418
Whetten, Lawrence L., *Germany's Ostpolitik: Relations Between the Federal Republic and the Warsaw Pact Countries.* J. L. Richardson, p. 1420
Windsor, Philip, *Germany and the Management of Détente.* Elke Frank, p. 1421

About the American Political Science Review

The American Political Science Review, published quarterly during the months of March, June, September, and December, is supplied to all APSA members. Membership dues are charged according to the following schedule:

Membership Category	*Dues*
Regular	
Annual income	
Under $12,000	$20
$12,000–$15,000	$25
Over $15,000	$30
Student and Retired	$10
Family	$5
Life	$1000
Institutional (includes *APSR* and *PS*)	$35

Student memberships are limited to five years per person. Foreign currency at the official exchange rate will be accepted for foreign subscriptions and foreign membership fees. The equivalent of $1 for additional postage should be added for foreign subscriptions.

Current issues are priced at $7.50 per copy; for *back issues prior* to 1968 address Johnson Reprint Corp., 111 5th Ave., New York, N.Y. 10003; for issues 1968 and later send request directly to the American Political Science Association.

Applications for membership, orders for the *Review,* and remittances should be addressed to the Executive Director, The American Political Science Association, 1527 New Hampshire Ave., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036. *Notices of changes of address* should be received in the Washington office by the 25th day of the months before publication.

INSTRUCTIONS TO CONTRIBUTORS

Address correspondence about contributions to the *Review to* Nelson W. Polsby, Department of Political Science, University of California, Berkeley, Berkeley, California 94720. Each manuscript should be accompanied by an abstract of up to 200 words briefly describing the article's contents. All manuscripts and abstracts should be submitted IN DUPLICATE. They should be double-spaced and may be in typed, mimeographed, hectographed, or other legible form. Footnotes should appear at the end of the manuscript, not at the bottom of the page, and should also be doubled-spaced. Manuscripts that do not follow this format will be returned to the authors for retyping.

Since manuscripts are sent out anonymously for editorial evaluation, the author's name and affiliations should appear only on a separate covering page. All footnotes identifying the author should also appear on a separate page.

Address books intended for review to Philip Siegelman, *American Political Science Review,* 210 Barrows Hall, University of California, Berkeley, Berkeley, California 94720. Information, including News and Notes, for the Association's newsletter, *PS,* should be sent to 1527 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036; advertising, reprint and circulation correspondence should be sent to the Executive Director at the Washington office. Advertising information and rates are available from Nancy Edgerton, Adv. Manager, APSA, 1527 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036.

Articles and notes appearing in the *Review* before the June, 1953 issues were indexed in *The Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature.* Current issues are indexed by *The International Political Science Abstracts* and the *Social Sciences and Humanities Index.* Microfilm of the *Review,* beginning with Volume 1, may be obtained from University Microfilms, 313 North First Street, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106. A *Cumulative Index* of the *Review,* Volumes 1–62: 1906–1968, may also be obtained from University Microfilms. Articles appearing in the *Review* are listed regularly in *ABC Pol Sci* and *Current Contents: Behavioral, Social & Management Sciences.*

The American Political Science Review

Department of Political Science, University of California, Berkeley 94720

EDITORIAL BOARD: Nelson W. Polsby, *Managing Editor, University of California, Berkeley;* Philip Siegelman, *Book Review Editor, California State University, San Francisco;* Shlomo Avineri, *The Hebrew University of Jerusalem;* Brian Barry, *Nuffield College, Oxford University;* Richard A. Brody, *Stanford University;* Edith T. Carper, *The Aerospace Corporation;* Samuel D. Cook, *Duke University;* S. Rufus Davis, *Monash University;* Robert C. Fried, *University of California, Los Angeles;* Arthur S. Goldberg, *University of Rochester;* Morton H. Halperin, *The Brookings Institution;* Nannerl O. Keohane, *Swarthmore College;* Peter Laslett, *Trinity College, Cambridge University;* Dale Rogers Marshall, *University of California; Davis;* Russell D. Murphy, *Wesleyan University;* Joan M. Nelson, *Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars;* H. Douglas Price, *Harvard University;* Robert D. Putnam, *University of Michigan;* Douglas W. Rae, *Yale University;* Austin Ranney, *University of Wisconsin;* Giovanni Sartori, *University of Florence;* Michael J. Shapiro, *University of Hawaii;* Stephen V. Stephens, *The Johns Hopkins University;* George E. Von der Muhll, *University of California, Santa Cruz;* Richard A. Watson, *University of Missouri.* **MANUSCRIPT EDITOR:** Ellen Y. Siegelman. **EDITORIAL ASSISTANTS:** Barbara Kelly, Norma Minor. **EDITORIAL INTERNS:** Gerald Clayton, Dorothy Clayton, Craig Garrett, Yvonne Jones, Beverly Kearns, Sam Kernell, David Laitin, William M. Lunch, Jesse McCorry, Dan Metlay, Alex Radian, Byron Shafer, Harry Williams.

EDITORIAL COMMENT

Relax. By the time this issue of the *Review* is mailed to readers, and they can read this comment, the *Review* office will have already received galley proofs for our next issue and distributed copies to authors for corrections, and manuscripts for the issue following that one will have been mostly edited and sent off to the printer. We will also be fairly certain of the contents of the two issues beyond that. Operating, as we do, with such formidable time lags makes it difficult for us to move quickly even when we want to. Because our authors are scattered all over the map, we have to schedule slow turn-around times for galley proofs. A speeded-up high quality job from a printer would greatly increase our printing bill—and so we have decided to try for high quality rather than top speed.

We know this annoys some people. Consider the author of a scholarly book. This person wants to see it reviewed sometime soon after publication. Instead he waits. And waits. Why? A review arriving today is usually scheduled for the next issue—but the next issue for us in the editorial office is not the one you are holding in your hand or even the one after that, but rather the one that will come out six months from now. And there are often vicissitudes before a publishable review arrives on our doorstep. First we must receive the book. Then we must find a reviewer—which means asking possible reviewers one at a time until somebody says yes. Then we must pause to give the reviewer a chance to read the book, and write his review, and get it typed up, and send it to us. Then we must read his review, and edit it, and possibly send it back to the reviewer to see if our editorial job is satisfactory. Then we must get the review back. And then we schedule it for that "next" issue, six months hence.

Why are we telling readers all this? It is because the modern world is too hectic. Too many political scientists have lost touch with the stately rhythms of nature, and of that child of nature, *The American Political Science Review.*

Idiots. Irate author writes in and wants to know what recourse he has when the managing editor picks idiots to referee his manuscript and they don't like it and on their advice the managing editor turns the manuscript down. Our view is that this is a real problem. We hereby state categorically that we make every effort to find referees who are not only not idiots but if possible themselves scholars of standing in the field to which a manuscript is addressed. If Homer occasionally nodded without the stimulus of a prospective *APSR* manuscript, we must be ready to concede that even highly qualified readers may sometimes fail to see the merits in a meritorious piece of work. Or we may have made a mistake in sending it out or in reading the comments as they come back to us. Thus sometimes a well-timed and well-reasoned gripe will win a rehearing for a manuscript, if an author is willing to invest some more patience with us. There is, however, a small but irreducible number of manuscripts for which the following statements are all true: the referees have said they don't like it, the managing editor is persuaded by the referees, and the author *thinks* the referees and the managing editor are simply wrong.

One author has suggested that such cases go to arbitration, but this strikes us as a very unwieldy process, since at a minimum there would be the problems of picking arbitrators satisfactory to author and editor alike, and of agreeing on criteria that would inform their judgment, and of making sure these criteria were followed.

Happily, there is a better way. It is provided by the existence of other political science journals of high repute, each managed by its own board of editors. An author who finds his work unappreciated here may try elsewhere and indeed may succeed. If his faith in his work is justified and it is printed elsewhere and subsequently acclaimed, it is of course the *Review* that suffers rather than the profession at large or the author.

Another check on ineptitude or idiosyncracy in these precincts is of course the custom we have latterly adopted of periodically changing the management. We believe this is a wise policy. Like some of our readers and disappointed prospective authors, around here we are keeping one eye on the calendar.

Articles Accepted for Future Publication

Herbert B. Asher, Ohio State University, "The Learning of Legislative Norms"

Louis P. Benson, Kent State University, "A Research Note on Machine Politics as a Model for Change in a Philippine Province"

Harry W. Blair, Bucknell University, "Minority Electoral Politics in a North Indian State: Aggregate Data Analysis and the Muslim Community in Bihar, 1952–1972"

Bernard H. Booms, Pennsylvania State University and James R. Halldorson, F. W. Woolworth Co., "The Politics of Redistribution: A Reformulation"

David W. Brady, Kansas State University, "A Research Note on the Impact of Interparty Competition on Congressional Voting in a Competitive Era"

Michael Brecher, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, "Images, Processes, and Feedback in Foreign Policy: Israel's Decisions on German Reparations"

Eric C. Browne, University of Georgia and Mark N. Franklin, University of Strathclyde, "The Perquisites of Government: Aspects of Coalition Payoffs in European Parliamentary Democracies"

Chong Lim Kim and Donald P. Racheter, University of Iowa, "Candidates' Perceptions of Voter Competence: A Comparison of Winning and Losing Candidates"

Andrew T. Cowart, University of Oslo, "Electoral Choice in the American States: Incumbency Effects, Partisan Forces, and Divergent Partisan Majorities"

Peter K. Eisinger, University of Wisconsin, Madison, "The Conditions of Protest Behavior in American Cities"

John Ferejohn, California Institute of Technology and Talbot Page, Resources for the Future, "A Note on Voting or a Price System in a Competitive Market Structure"

Bernard Grofman and Edward N. Muller, State University of New York at Stony Brook, "The Strange Case of Relative Gratification and Potential for Political Violence: The V-Curve Hypothesis"

Richard S. Katz, Yale University, "The Attribution of Variance in Electoral Returns: An Alternative Measurement Technique"

Fred Kort, University of Connecticut, "A Theoretical Relationship for the Application of Multiple Regression Analysis to Discriminant Analysis"

Carl H. Landé, University of Kansas, "Networks and Groups in Southeast Asia: Some Observations on the Group Theory of Politics"

Richard M. Merelman, University of Wisconsin, Madison, "The Structure of Policy Thinking in Adolescence: A Research Note"

Lawrence B. Mohr, University of Michigan, "The Concept of Organizational Goal"

Sarah McCally Morehouse, Manhattanville College, "The State Political Party and the Policy-Making Process"

Walter Odajnyk, Columbia University, "The Political Ideas of C. G. Jung"

Bradley M. Richardson, Ohio State University, "Urbanization and Political Behavior: The Case of Japan"

William H. Riker, University of Rochester, "The Paradox of Vote-Trading"

Howard Rosenthal, Carnegie-Mellon University and Subrata Sen, University of Chicago, "Electoral Participation in the French Fifth Republic"

Lester M. Salamon, Vanderbilt University and Stephen Van Evera, University of California, Berkeley, "Fear, Apathy, and Discrimination: A Test of Three Explanations of Political Participation Among the Poor"

Lawrence A. Scaff, University of Arizona, "Max Weber's Politics and Political Education"

Donald D. Searing, Joel J. Schwartz, and Alden E. Lind, University of North Carolina, "Political Socialization and Political Belief Systems: An Essay on the Theoretical Relevance of Some Current Research"

A. H. Somjee, Simon Fraser University, "Caste and the Decline of Political Homogeneity"

Richard Stillman, II, California State College, Bakersfield, "Woodrow Wilson and the Study of Public Administration: A New Look at an Old Essay"

Michael W. Suleiman, Kansas State University, "Arab Elite and Palestine-Israel"

Peter J. Taylor, University of Newcastle-upon-Tyne, "A New Shape Measure for Evaluating Electoral District Patterns"

Edward R. Tufte, Princeton University, "The Relationship Between Seats and Votes in Two Party Systems"

Susan Welch, University of Nebraska, "The Impact of Party on Voting Behavior in a Nonpartisan Legislature"

Eugene R. Wittkopf, University of Florida, "Foreign Aid and United Nations Votes: A Comparative Study of Aid Allocations and Voting Agreements"

Donald A. Wittman, University of California, Santa Cruz, "Parties as Utility Maximizers"

The Sino-Soviet Border Dispute: Background, Development, and the March 1969 Clashes*

THOMAS W. ROBINSON
Council on Foreign Relations, New York

Introduction

On the morning of March 2, 1969, an armed incident took place along the Sino-Soviet border on a disputed, usually uninhabited island in the Ussuri River. Soviet authorities admit several score of dead and injured, and the Chinese mentioned an undetermined but high number of casualties. Another incident occurred at the same spot on March 14–15, and disturbances later spread along the length of the Sino-Soviet border.

A new phase in Sino-Soviet relations thus began. How and why did it come about? What are the merits of the case on each side, and can we determine the facts in the border dispute? Finally, what is the most reasonable explanation for the outbreak of fighting? These questions will be considered if not definitively answered in this article. After outlining Sino-Soviet border relations to March 1969, the study describes the March 2 and March 15 clashes on Damansky Island. It then attempts to explain why these incidents occurred, examining local, regional, national, and international variables.

Aside from ascertaining the facts of the two March incidents and explaining the policies of the Soviet Union and China as they relate to their common border, the article was written with several other purposes in mind. First, there is explicit concern with the linkages between the domestic politics and foreign policies of these two states. The study demonstrates that those interconnections are complex, reciprocal, and knowable. Second, the inquiry shows that to understand specific foreign policy events it is necessary to grapple with details at many different levels of generality and of political administration, and that only a thoroughly interdisciplinary approach will succeed in providing a properly integrated analysis. Third, methodologically, the article represents an attempt to push to its limits the qualitative content analysis approach to political inquiry. As such, the bonds with quantitative content analysis—as well as the boundary between the two approaches—become clearer.

Sino-Soviet Border Relations to March 1969

The Basis of the Sino-Soviet Dispute. The clash at Damansky Island[1] ushered in a new phase of Sino-Soviet relations, threatening for the first time open war between the two Communist giants. However, this particular border clash was not unusual except in its violence. There had been other incidents, some even at the same spot, and though they apparently increased in frequency immediately preceding March, border relations in general had been growing more tense for at least a decade. More important, the decline in amity with respect to the border closely paralleled the downward course of Sino-Soviet relations as a whole.[2]

---

* The author wishes to acknowledge the helpful advice and assistance of Charles Cooper, Lilita Dzirkals, Anna Ford, Oleg Hoeffding, Arnold Horelick, Fred Ikle, Paul Langer, Michel Oksenberg, Allen Whiting, and especially Robert North; also the participants in the Social Science Research Council Conference on Chinese Foreign Policy, Las Corabas, Puerto Rico.

[1] The Russian name of this island (and other disputed islands) rather than the Chinese name (Chenpao, "Treasure" Island), is used for convenience only.

[2] I have abstracted from a number of long-term parametric variables which, because of their constant presence, are difficult to specify as developmental factors (i.e., those influencing the history of Sino-Soviet relations since, say, 1956) or immediate background factors (i.e., elements which seem to have been the short-term causes of the two March incidents). Nonetheless, such parameters must be kept in mind, because they have shaped historic Sino-Soviet relations and still affect the attitudes of Soviet and Chinese decision makers. They include: the ancient Chinese view of China as the "Middle Kingdom," that is, the center of the world around which all other states must revolve as satellites or tributaries; the historic Russian urge to expand into Siberia and its hinterland and to find outlets on the Pacific; Chinese awareness of periods of past weakness, exploitation, helplessness, and frustration; Chinese recollections of Stalinist manipulations of the Chinese Communist movement and Stalinist errors in the 1920s; the Russian view that the Soviet Union is the rightful hegemon in the world Communist movement and will not tolerate an attempt by China to challenge its pre-eminence; and the vague Russian fear of the "yellow peril."

Another set of factors relates to the way self-perceived Great Powers conduct their policies. Established Great Powers tend to be sensitive to challenges from aspiring Great Powers; competing Great

Overt Sino-Soviet difficulties originated during the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in February 1956, when First Secretary Nikita Khrushchev read the secret Central Committee report on Stalin's "crimes."[3] This started a train of events that led to the Hungarian Revolution later that year and caused the Chinese to look suspiciously on Soviet de-Stalinization efforts. From this point until late 1960 the two parties engaged in an increasingly pointed campaign of mutual criticism on almost all topics of concern to the international Communist movement and to international politics in general.[4] A period of much more direct criticism began in 1960, when the Soviets, having earlier unilaterally denounced the "atomic bomb treaty" of 1957, now decided to call back the large number of economic, technical, and scientific specialists who had been aiding the Chinese for some years. This period, during which the two parties directly referred to each other for the first time as adversaries, lasted until the dismissal of Khrushchev in October 1964.[5] With Khrushchev's ouster, the Soviets (but not the Chinese) ceased open polemics and tried to outdo the Chinese through appeals to rationality rather than ideology. Competition for the favor of other parties continued, however, and the range of divisive issues broadened to include state as well as party matters.[6] This situation continued until the beginning of the active phase of the Cultural Revolution, after the August 1966 plenum of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). From then to March 1969, Sino-Soviet relations shifted with the twists and turns of the Cultural Revolution. The Chinese used the Soviets as a *bête noire* and, to change the metaphor, as a convenient lightning rod to direct energies away from insoluble domestic problems during times of high tension. The Soviets, unable to resist the tempting target presented by the excesses of the Cultural Revolution, resumed and expanded their range of criticism.

In the Cultural Revolution, Chinese leaders launched an attack against followers of the "bourgeois reactionary line," purged the Party, and began to reconstruct it along presumably more Maoist lines. Naturally, this altered the character of the Sino-Soviet dispute and ushered in a new phase in Sino-Soviet relations, but the precise manifestations of the change, which might have been revealed at the Ninth CCP Congress in April 1969, were obscured in the wake of the border clashes a month earlier.

The frequency and severity of Sino-Soviet border difficulties parallel the decline in friendly relations between the two parties and states. For several hundred years, border problems often occupied the forefront of Sino-Russian attention.[7] But the post-1949 era is unique in that for the first time a relatively strong, dynamic, and centralized Chinese state faced a Russian government having the same qualities.

Powers often find that intersecting spheres of influence and common boundaries become sites for conflict; a state that perceives general hostility from (or expresses hostility toward) the outer world often feels encircled; and a state acquiring the sinews of modern industrial might may be perceived as a threat to its neighbors, no matter what the state's actual policy or the real relation of forces is.

[3] See especially Zbigniew Brzezinski, *The Soviet Bloc,* Revised and Enlarged ed. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1967), pp. 180–184; Wolfgang Leonhard, *The Kremlin Since Stalin* (New York: Praeger, 1963), pp. 167–192; and Donald Zagoria, *The Sino-Soviet Conflict, 1956–1961* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962). Chaps. 1–7.

[4] Zagoria, Chaps. 8–17; G. F. Hudson, Richard Lowenthal, and Roderick MacFarquhar, *The Sino-Soviet Dispute* (New York: Praeger, 1961); Michel Klochko, *Soviet Scientist in Red China* (New York: Praeger, 1963); Brzezinski, Chaps. 12 and 15; David Floyd, *Mao Against Khrushchev: A Short History of the Sino-Soviet Conflict* (New York: Praeger, 1963).

[5] See Alexander Dallin, Jonathan Harris, and Gray Hodnett, eds., *Diversity in International Communism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963); Adam Ulam, *Expansion and Coexistence: The History of Soviet Foreign Policy* (New York: Praeger, 1968), Part XI, Chap. 2; Edward Crankshaw, *The New Cold War: Moscow vs. Peking* (Middlesex, England: Penguin Books, 1963); Chu-yuan Cheng, *Economic Relations Between Peking and Moscow* (New York: Praeger, 1964); William E. Griffith, *The Sino-Soviet Rift* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1964), and idem., *Albania and the Sino-Soviet Rift* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1963).

[6] William Griffith, *Sino-Soviet Relations. 1964–1965* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1966); U.S. House of Representatives, Subcommittee on the Far East and the Pacific, *Sino-Soviet Conflict* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1965); and Leopold Labedz and G. R. Urban, *The Sino-Soviet Conflict* (London: The Bodley Head, 1965).

[7] See, for instance, Klaus Mehnert, *Peking and Moscow,* trans. Leila Vennewitz (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1963). Chap. 10; Henry Wei, *China and Soviet Russia* (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand, 1956); Tien-fang Cheng, *A History of Sino-Russian Relations* (Washington, D.C.: The Public Affairs Press, 1957); Harry Schwartz, *Tsars, Mandarins, and Commissars: A History of Chinese-Russian Relations* (Philadelphia and New York: Lippincott, 1964); Victor A. Yakhontoff, *Russia and the Soviet Union in the Far East* (New York: Coward-McCann, 1931). The Soviet view is summed up in M. S. Kapitsa, *Sovetsko-kitaiskie otnosheniia* [*Soviet-Chinese Relations*] (Moscow: State Publishing House for Political Literature, 1958), Part I, and Chiang Kai-shek's *Soviet Russia in China* (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Cudahy, 1957) puts forth the Chinese Nationalist (and, to some extent, the Communist) case.

For nearly a decade after the formation of the Chinese People's Republic, border relations with the Soviet Union were amicable. The two states by and large lived up to the commitment to respect each other's territory that was formalized in a Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance, signed in 1950, as well as agreements concerning civil aviation, mineral resources, shipping and railroads, and Soviet naval bases.[8] These treaties were modified, however, in 1952: the joint stock companies formed in 1950 for economic development were transferred to exclusive Chinese ownership, while the naval bases were returned in 1954.[9]

These modifications had the outward effect of normalizing Sino-Soviet relations for the next two years, but Mao brought up the question of the Outer Mongolian border at a meeting with Khrushchev during the latter's 1954 visit. Although the Russians refused to discuss the matter, according to Chou En-lai's later testimony, this represented the earliest known Chinese initiative to revise the borders.[10] The next Chinese initiative seems to have been in January 1957, when Chou En-Lai met Khrushchev during Khrushchev's second trip to Peking. Chou "could not get a satisfactory answer from him then."[11]

Border Incidents and Negotiations. Incidents along the border itself began as early as 1959 and matched step-by-step the general decline in relations.[12] Indeed, in retrospect, it is apparent that border difficulties were an indicator of that decline and an important factor in Sino-Soviet relations as a whole during the next decade.[13] Both sides acknowledge sporadic border incidents. The Soviets charge that the Chinese initiated skirmishes in 1959, stepped up their frequency in 1962, and further increased them during the Cultural Revolution. Evidence suggests that the Chinese were not always to blame for the border flare-ups before 1969, nor were they following some preconceived plan in those they did perpetrate. Despite Soviet protestations of innocence, the Russians were probably responsible for some incidents.

In a series of articles in *Pravda*, Konstantin Simonov, a Soviet novelist and sometime correspondent, wrote about the first of the border incidents: "Border guards told me . . . in 1959 about the first intrusions across our frontiers . . . in the Tien Shan mountains where China borders upon Kirgiziya."[14] Beginning in June

---

[8] The English texts of these treaties can be found in Max Beloff, *Soviet Policy in the Far East, 1944–1951* (London: Oxford University Press, 1953), pp. 260–266. The Russian texts are reprinted in I. F. Kurdiukov et al., *Sovetsko-kitaiskie otnosheniia, 1917–1957* (Moscow: Eastern Literature Pub. House, 1959), pp. 217–229. The Chinese texts are found in *Chung-Hua Jen-min Kung-ho-kuo Tiao-yueh-chi,* Vol. 1, 1949–1951, pp. 3–5. See also Howard L. Boorman, "The Borderlands and the Sino-Soviet Alliance" in Howard Boorman, Alexander Eckstein, Philip E. Mosely, and Benjamin Schwartz, *The Moscow-Peking Axis* (New York: Harper and Bros. for the Council on Foreign Relations, 1957), pp. 142–197. Mao Tse-tung, upon his arrival in Moscow in December, 1949, for negotiations leading to the Sino-Soviet treaty, stated that no more unequal treaties existed between the Soviet Union and Communist China. See Kapitsa, *Sovetsko-kitaiskie otnosheniia*, pp. 216–217; *Pravda*, December 16, 1949; and *Jen-min Jih-pao*, December 17, 1949. The Soviets depend heavily on this statement to counter Chinese arguments concerning "unequal" treaties.

[9] See Boorman et al., *The Moscow-Peking Axis*, pp. 2–53, and Kapitsa, *Sovetsko-kitaiskie otnosheniia*, pp. 299–307. The Chinese press at the time was full of complaints against Soviet "extraterritoriality." In the post-1963 series of accusations against the Soviet Union, the Chinese charged the Russians with "large-scale, subversive activities in Chinese frontier areas. . . ." ("Letter of the Central Committee of the CPC of February 29, 1964, to the Central Committee of the CPSU," *Hung Ch'i*, No. 6, 1964, pp. 12–18, and *Peking Review*, No. 19 [May 8, 1964], pp. 11–19).

[10] See "Chairman Mao Tse-tung Tells the Delegation of the Japanese Socialist Party that the Kuriles Must be Returned to Japan," *Sekai Shuho*, August 11, 1964.

[11] Interview with Premier Chou En-lai by Okada [Haruo], a Socialist member of the Japanese Diet, *Asahi Shimbun*, August 1, 1964.

[12] Dates and descriptions of incidents are found in the following sources. On the Soviet side, Moscow Radio to China, March 6, 1969; Moscow Radio to South Asia, March 25, 1969; B. Pavlov, "Preposterous Ambitions," *New Times*, No. 12 (March 26, 1969), pp. 8–10; "Statement of the USSR Government," *Pravda*, March 30, 1969, (translation in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press* [*CDSP*], Vol. 21, No. 13 [April 16, 1969], 3–5); Yuri Dmitriyev, "Far Away on the Border," *Trud*, March 16, 1969, (translation in *CDSP*, Vol. 21, No. 11 [April 2, 1969], p. 4); and Konstantin Simonov, "Thinking Out Loud," *Pravda*, May 3, 1969. On the Chinese side, "China Lodges Strong Protest with Soviet Government." *New China News Agency (NCNA)* and *Jen-min Jih-pao*, March 3, 1969; Report on Border Film, NCNA Domestic Radio, April 18, 1969; "Statement of the Government of the PRC," *NCNA* and *Jen-min Jih-pao*, May 24, 1969.

[13] Many Russian and Chinese sources cited below make this point explicitly.

[14] Simonov, "Thinking Out Loud." During the Hundred Flowers Campaign in China in 1957, a number of Chinese intellectuals openly questioned Soviet occupation of "Chinese" territory, including the Amur River region, the Maritime Province east of the Ussuri, Sakhalin, and areas in Central Asia and Kazakhstan. But contrary to current Soviet allegations, the official Chinese press has repudiated these charges. See Pavlov, "Preposterous Ambitions," p. 8. For translations of anti-Soviet remarks during the Hundred Flowers episode, see Roderick MacFarquhar, *The Hundred Flowers Campaign and the*

1962, with "systematic provocations," the Russians allege that the number of border violations increased.

> In various places masses of Chinese soldiers and civilians crossed over. They tried to put up buildings, farm, dig canals, and fish in Soviet territory.[15]

> At first there were small, minor violations of existing border regulations and were as a rule committed by the civilian population or, at any rate, by people not wearing military uniform. In certain areas Chinese servicemen attempted an ostentatious violation of the Soviet Union's state border.[16]

> Then suddenly the Chinese side, contrary to the traditional agreement, refused to let our specialists make water fences on their sectors of the Amur. . . . Then they interfered with the work of our fishermen and the navigation of Soviet ships.[17]

It is against this background that we should consider the public charges on the subject traded between Russia and China after late 1962, as well as the then-secret border talks conducted during 1964.

With one exception, China has always initiated public confrontation over the border, while the Russians have defended the *status quo*. The exception occurred when Khrushchev, replying to Chinese charges of Soviet "adventurism" and "capitulationism" in the Cuban missile crisis, applied these same terms to China's border policy toward Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan. Soviet criticism in turn gave China the opening it sought, and, foreshadowing its argument in 1969, China declared that the border treaties signed between Tsarist Russia and Ch'ing Dynasty China were "unequal" and hence subject to revision. The Chinese statement, published on March 8, 1963, concluded with the now famous query: "In raising questions of this kind, do you intend to raise all the questions of unequal treaties and have a general settlement? Has it ever entered your heads what the consequences will be?"[18] After this date public reports and charges of border violations began, and secret border negotiations were initiated.[19] The most important Chinese border statement of the time was made by Mao Tse-tung himself. In a Peking interview with visiting Japanese Socialist Party members on July 10, 1963, Mao stated:

> About a hundred years ago, the area to the east of Baikal became Russian territory, and since then Vladivostok, Khabarovsk, Kamchatka, and other areas have been Soviet territory. We have not yet presented our account for this list.[20]

This statement, the accuracy of which was verified by Chou En-lai on July 19, could only confirm the worst Soviet fears concerning Chinese intentions.[21] Manifesting their anxiety, the Soviets cited a Chinese map of 1954 listing these claims (and Mongolia) among China's "lost" territories as proof of what the Chinese were after. From that time they took the ideological offensive and began to strengthen their border defenses.[22] *Pravda* printed a long polemical editorial on September 2, 1964, charging the Chinese with Hitler-like expansionist plans to acquire *lebensraum* in Soviet territory, while Khrushchev challenged the Chinese title to Mongolia, Tibet, and especially Sinkiang.[23] The

---

Chinese Intellectuals (New York: Praeger, 1960), p. 50, p. 163; and Dennis Doolin, ed., *Communist China: The Politics of Student Opposition* Hoover Institution Studies, 2 (Stanford: The Hoover Institution, 1964). The Chinese press was filled during the early 1950s with refutations of anti-Soviet feelings expressed by apparently large numbers of Chinese citizens. What was contrary to policy but widely felt during the 1950s became official policy during the 1960s.

[15] Moscow Radio in English to South Asia, March 25, 1969.

[16] "Statement of the USSR Government," *Pravda*, March 30, 1969.

[17] Dmitriyev, "Far Away on the Border."

[18] "A Comment on the Statement of the Communist Party of the USA," *Jen-min Jih-pao* editorial, March 8, 1963. The same editorial declared that existing boundary treaties perpetuated Russian occupation of Chinese territories.

[19] See especially the series of reports translated in Dennis J. Doolin, *Territorial Claims in the Sino-Soviet Conflict*, Hoover Institution Studies, 7 (Stanford: The Hoover Institution, 1965), pp. 31ff. These include Chinese charges and Soviet denials of Soviet subversion in Sinkiang; Soviet charges of border violations; feelers on both sides about border talks; reports of the beginnings of border talks; and various Soviet initiatives in the United Nations on the inviolability of state boundaries. Most of the developments that were hinted at in 1964 have been substantiated by subsequent Russian and Chinese testimony.

[20] "Chairman Mao-Tse-tung Tells . . . that the Kuriles Must Be Returned to Japan."

[21] *Asahi Shimbun* interview of Premier Chou En-lai, see above, fn. 12.

[22] The map is in Liu P'ei-hua, ed., *Chung-kuo Chin-tai Chien-shih* [A Short History of Modern China] (Peking: I-Ch'ang Shu-chu, 1954), following p. 253. It is also reproduced in Doolin, *Territorial Claims*, pp. 16–17. The map was never intended by the Chinese to be used as a basis for claims on Soviet territory. It was reprinted from a Nationalist Chinese secondary school history text and circulated for teaching purposes only.

As for changes in Soviet and Chinese troop dispositions, the annual *The Military Balance* (London: Inst. of Strategic Studies), 1963–1968, shows only minor order-of-battle changes along the border through 1966, intended to improve the readiness of existing units as well as their logistics and equipment.

[23] See *Pravda*, September 2, 1964, for a major statement rebutting previous Chinese charges and referring to the 1954 map. This editorial appears to be the first

situation might well have become more dangerous—indeed, in his interview Mao had charged that the Soviets were concentrating troops along the border—had not Khrushchev been removed in October from his post as First Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party.

As the Chinese publicly attempted to humiliate the Soviets in this manner and the Russians defended themselves from what they probably considered Chinese imperialism, the two states initiated secret "consultations" on February 25, 1964.[24] The initiative apparently came from the Soviet side. The Russians claim to have suggested the talks on May 17, 1963 (just after the border issue came into the open following the Cuban missile crisis exchange reported above), with the intention of preparing the way for a "precise" determination of the boundary. The Soviet side was represented by P. I. Zyryanov, a Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Chinese by Tseng Yung-chuan, of similar rank. Apparently it was felt that if enough progress was made at this "consultation" level, negotiations could proceed to the "talks" stage. According to the Russians, agreement was reached "in principle" after several meetings stretching over six months, and the Soviets proposed that "talks" begin in Moscow on October 15. At this point, according to the Russians, the Chinese rejected the idea, making no reply to the Soviet note of September 26, 1964. There matters stood for more than five years, until the Damansky incidents compelled the two powers to meet again in Peking on October 20, 1969.

Since many of the same arguments reappeared after March 1969, a review of the 1964 events helps in assessing prospects for the more recent round of negotiations. Soviet and Chinese documents make both negotiating positions clear. The Soviets: (1) expressed willingness to sign a new, comprehensive border treaty that would abrogate the old treaties which the Chinese considered "unequal," as long as the new treaty would "strengthen" existing borders, i.e., maintain the *status quo* in all essential respects; (2) were willing to, and apparently did, make detailed proposals concerning certain unspecified sections of the border, proposals that would, "on the basis of mutual concessions," protect Chinese economic interests along the riparian boundary and accurately delineate the border; (3) to this end, submitted a copy of the map that accompanied the 1860 Treaty of Peking defining the Russo-Chinese border along the Amur and the Ussuri Rivers, on which a red line was drawn denoting the boundary the Soviets considered a valid starting point for any marginal changes; (4) refused in every case, however, to scrap the old treaties before signing a new one. (This would have destroyed their legal position by admitting the veracity of the Chinese contention that those treaties were "unequal.")

The Chinese advanced five points: (1) They challenged the validity of all Russo-Chinese border treaties made before 1917, concluded when power "was not in the hands of the people" and hence unequal. (Soviet acceptance of this point would have destroyed their entire case and opened almost all of Siberia east of Lake Baikal and the Soviet Far East to renegotiation.[25]) (2) The Chinese did not expect the

---

instance of the Soviet tactic of fighting fire with fire: if China claimed that certain areas of the Soviet Union do not, because of "historical circumstances," "belong" to that state, the Russians would then claim that certain areas of China were historically non-Chinese and disputed by more than one state. Hence, Chinese title to those areas is open to question. This line of argument, essentially a debating point, was elaborated in a Soviet statement to the PRC of June 13, 1969 (text in *Pravda,* June 14, 1969).

[24] This analysis relies on the following Soviet and Chinese sources. On the Soviet side: interview with Major-General of Border Troops A. N. Anikushin, "The USSR Borders Are Inviolable," *Sovetskaia Rossiia,* March 19, 1969; Moscow Radio to South Asia, March 25, 1969; Pavlov, "Preposterous Ambitions"; "Statement of the USSR Government," *Pravda,* March 30, 1969; "Note of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the CPR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, April 11, 1969," *Pravda,* April 12, 1969; O. Borisov and B. Koloskov, "The Anti-Soviet Course of the Mao Tse-tung Group," *Kommunist.* No. 7 (May 6, 1969), pp. 86–97; and the Soviet Government *Statement, Pravda,* June 14, 1969. On the Chinese side: Information Department of the Chinese Foreign Ministry, "Chenpao Island Has Always Been Chinese Territory," *NCNA* and *Jen-min Jih-pao,* March 10, 1969; *NCNA* report on border film, April 18, 1969; and "Statement of the Government of the People's Republic of China," *NCNA* and *Jen-min Jih-Pao,* May 24, 1969.

[25] The Soviets have failed to point out an obvious contradiction in the Chinese argument. On the one hand, the Chinese claim the treaties are unequal because they were signed when "power was not in the hands of the people." But if the Tsarist government was nondemocratic, so was the Ch'ing government, being feudal in the Chinese Communist lexicon. Treaties signed between governments that are both nondemocratic can hardly be termed unequal by successor governments. The question is irrelevant, and either all old treaties should be regarded as having ceased effect (international law gives no credence to that argument, however: treaties are signed between states, not governments), or new treaties should be signed. But the Chinese have accepted the old treaties as continuing in effect, both *de facto* and *de jure.*

On the other hand, the Chinese contend that the treaties are unequal because the Ch'ing government allegedly was forced to sign them under duress. But if the Communist government of China is complaining of this alleged treatment of a previous Chinese government, then it is defending that government's integrity, which it need not do if "power was not in the

Russians to accept this contention without reservation. Thus (and this remains their central point, aside from the unequal treaties claim), the Chinese were willing to take the nineteenth-century treaties as the basis for boundary determination and revision. There could be "necessary readjustments" at particular localities "by both sides on the basis of the treaties and in accord with the principles of consultation on an equal footing and of mutual understanding and mutual accommodation." (3) The Chinese proposed that border questions should be solved through negotiation, with the *status quo* maintained in the meanwhile. If, however, the Soviets did not admit the unequal nature of the old treaties and also refused to take those treaties as the basis for settlement, i.e., if the Soviet state "perpetuated in legal form its occupation of Chinese territory by crossing the boundary line defined by the unequal treaties," then the Chinese side "would have to reconsider its position as a whole." (4) The Chinese totally rejected the Soviet-submitted map of the Treaty of Peking. Such a map could not possibly be used to determine ownership, since, as "the Soviet representative had to admit," a scale of 1: 1,000,000 was far too small to determine details with accuracy. Rather, the proper mode of determining both boundary lines and river island ownership was the center line of the main river channel, "something to which the Soviet representative could not but agree." (5) If this principle were followed, then 600 of the 700 islands in the river systems forming the present boundary would be Chinese. The Chinese delegation submitted a larger-scale map of the border to support this contention.

The two sides agreed on three points. First, both acknowledged the necessity and desirability of a new, comprehensive border treaty. Problems concerned only its content and procedures for arriving at settlement. Second, both concurred that ancient rights, old treaties, and associated historical practices should stay in effect until a new treaty was negotiated. Thus, the *status quo* would have to be maintained until a legal change was agreed upon. Finally, both sides agreed that the degree of adjustment necessary was relatively small, mainly affecting riverine islands. In contrast to the present negotiations, the 1964 talks apparently did not raise the question of the Central Asian (i.e., Sinkiang) border.

The main points of disagreement in the 1964 border negotiations concerned, first and foremost, a difference in procedures advocated. The Chinese apparently wanted the Soviets to admit the inequality of the old treaties *before* agreeing to sign (or perhaps even to negotiate seriously on) a new treaty. If the Russians would do so, the Chinese would then move rapidly to conclude a new treaty, taking the old treaties as a basis for negotiation. The Soviets, not trusting the Chinese to fulfill the latter half of their promise, proposed simultaneously (i.e., as part of the same document) to bring into existence the new treaty and annul the old ones. If both parties were really serious about settlement, this proposal should have been acceptable: the Chinese would still have extracted Soviet admission of the "unequal" nature of the old treaties.

But there were other, more substantive, differences. The Chinese based their case squarely upon the invalidity of the unequal treaties. The Soviets rejected this, pointing to the international law of treaties and to the historic practice of the inhabitants of the area. In international law terms, it was thus a case of *rebus sic standibus* (conditions have changed and the old treaties are thus no longer valid—the Chinese contention) versus *pacta sunt servanda* (treaties retain their validity until explicitly altered by the treaty signatories—the Soviet argument). In law, the decision always goes to the latter contention, but in practice, the exigencies of power politics often allow the former argument to prevail.[26]

Furthermore, the Chinese claimed, according to the Thalweg argument (i.e., riverine bounda-

---

hands of the people" then. Further, international law does not recognize this argument. Treaties signed under duress are as legal as treaties signed in other circumstances; examples are peace treaties and terms of surrender. Without such a provision, the fabric of international law would be even more tattered than it already is. It is true that law is intimately related to politics, and hence to power, in international relations, but the line must be drawn somewhere, and it has been a long-standing rule that states adhere to treaties even when conditions have changed since their signing. See, for instance, Herbert W. Briggs, *The Law of Nations* (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1952), Part XI, "Treaties and Other International Agreements," pp. 836–946; Charles DeVisscher, *Theory and Reality in Public International Law* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957); and Hungdah Chiu, "Communist China's Attitude Toward International Law," *American Journal of International Law*, 60, No. 2 (April, 1966), pp. 245–267.

[26] See Briggs, *The Law of Nations*, pp. 917–918 for arguments against *rebus sic standibus*. The standard work on the subject is Chesney Hill, *The Doctrine of "Rebus Sic Standibus" in International Law*, University of Missouri Studies, No. 11, 1934, which concludes (p. 78) that "customary international law lays down the rule that a party who seeks release from a treaty on the grounds of a change of circumstances has no right to terminate the treaty unilaterally." This holds true even if a change occurs in the type of state (e.g., from a colony to a state), much less if in the form of government.

ries must follow the deepest point of the river channel)[27] most of the riverine islands belonged to China, and Soviet occupation was therefore illegal. This, of course, the Russians denied outright. Finally, there was the question of whether the Russians relied on the small-scale map of 1860 to obscure necessary details (however legal the map) or whether the Chinese large-scale map was anything more than an illustration of their claims.

On balance, points of agreement seemed to outweigh substantive differences. If, for instance, the Chinese had given way on the Thalweg argument, the Russians might have compromised on what map to use as a basis of settlement. The two states could then have bargained for ownership of the disputed islands and a new treaty could have been written. But since negotiations never even got to the point of specific bargaining and perhaps never past agreement on the agenda, it must be concluded that failure stemmed from lack of procedural agreement or from lack of desire for an overall settlement by either state or both. Soviet testimony seems to indicate Chinese unwillingness to come to terms procedurally. It is also possible that China, on the offensive ideologically in 1964, did not then want a border settlement, which would have tended to set an end-point to the deterioration of relations. Keeping border tensions high might also have forced Soviet concessions in other areas. As long as the Russians did not take military retaliatory measures that China could not handle, postponement of a border settlement would not hurt. Mao may also have thought he had the Russians "on the run" ideologically and that time was on his side. If differences with the Russians were to assume the character of a protracted, guerrilla-like war, he should avoid settling a major issue at the outset. Hence the Chinese may have decided to break off the talks when it appeared either that the Russians would not give in on all points or that, more likely, negotiations were about to move to the "talks" stage where a definitive settlement would be harder to avoid.[28]

The border issue was not again aired publicly until the Chinese promulgated a set of "Regulations Governing Foreign Vessels on Rivers on the National Boundary," in April 1966.[29] For the previous decade, the Soviet Union and Communist China had cooperatively developed the Amur, Argun, and Ussuri River regions and had signed a number of relevant treaties and agreements.[30] The 1958 Treaty of Commerce and Navigation in fact represents the closest the two powers have come to specific contractual border arrangements.[31] The 1966 "Regulations," however, signify the collapse of the previous apparently cordial relationship. From this point, we can date with assurance increasing hostility along the river boundary and the Soviet buildup of forces.

---

[27] *Thalweg* is the German word for "channel course." i.e. the deepest part of the river, not necessarily its center.

[28] It is intriguing to speculate whether any connection exists between the Chinese decision to terminate negotiations in September, 1964 and the removal of Nikita Khrushchev in October, 1964. Were Sino-Soviet relations heading for a showdown, as Harold Hinton argues in *Communist China in World Politics* (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin Co., 1966), pp. 469–488? Unfortunately, evidence either way is lacking and Hinton's argument is, for the most part, unconvincing.

[29] The Chinese did keep the border issue public through such occasional remarks as those uttered by Foreign Minister Ch'en Yi. Before a group of Scandinavian journalists, May 17, 1966, he declared that: China is willing to negotiate with the Soviet Union on the basis of modifications in the present series of treaties; the Russians have refused to negotiate on these terms; the Chinese have kept and will keep the *status quo* along the border, but the Soviets violate the border constantly—5000 violations since 1962; the Soviets occupy regions far beyond what the old treaties themselves lay out, provoking internal strife in China; and there is no truth to the charge that China wishes large areas of Soviet territory to be returned. See Joint Publications Research Service (*JPRS*) 36,136, *Translations on International Communist Developments*, No. 852, June 23, 1966, especially pp. 13–14.

[30] These include: (1) a 1951 Soviet-Chinese agreement on navigation along the Amur, Ussuri, Argun, and Sungari Rivers and on Lake Khanka (an agreement alleged by the Soviets, in their defense against Chinese charges, to be explicitly based on historic Russo-Chinese boundary treaties). Unfortunately, the text of this treaty seems not to have been published. It is referred to in a Soviet Government Statement of March 29, 1969 (*Pravda*, March 30, 1969); (2) joint investigation of the Argun River, completed August 19, 1956, *Survey of China Mainland Press* (*SCMP*) 1355 (August 22, 1956), p. 49; (3) Sino-Soviet Agreement On Heilungkiang Prospecting, *SCMP* 1355 (August 22, 1956), p. 49, and *Peking Review*, August 19, 1956; (4) Sino-Soviet Agreement on Commercial Navigation on Common Rivers and Lakes, December 21, 1957, *NCNA*, December 22, 1957, *SCMP* 1679 (December 27, 1957), p. 40, *Jen-min Jih-pao*, December 23, 1957, *Izvestiia*, December 22, 1957, and *United Nations Treaty Series (UNTS)*, No. 305, p. 215; (5) Treaty of Commerce and Navigation Between China and Soviet Union, April 23, 1958, *NCNA*, April 23, 1958; *SCMP* 1760 (April 29, 1958), p. 29; *UNTS*, No. 313, p. 142; (6) Plan for Shipping and Waterway Maintenance Along the Amur River for 1959, *NCNA*, No. 1975 (March 18, 1959), p. 47; (7) Sino-Soviet Agreement on Scientific Research Along the Amur River, August 18, 1956 (report of Committee Session of 1959), *NCNA*, April 17, 1962, *SCMP* 2724 (April 25, 1962), pp. 36–38; (8) Sino-Soviet Mutual Agreement on Survey and Classification of Ships, May 7, 1962, *NCNA*, May 16, 1962, *SCMP* 2743 (May 22, 1962), p. 30, *Jen-min Jih-pao*, May 17, 1962, and *Jen-min Shou-tse*, 1962, p. 106.

[31] This treaty does not mention boundary settlement per se, and merely grants each state's vessels and

The degree of Sino-Soviet enmity along the river frontier at the time is reflected in the severity and provocative nature of the "Regulations."[32] Why they were ever promulgated is mysterious, for if the Soviet Union had acceded to them, it would automatically have lost all sovereignty along its riverine borders with China. The regulations were probably never fully carried out, but their very existence explains some of the Russian acts about which the Chinese later complained, and increased Soviet use of late-model river gunboats.

Apparently border relations became much worse in 1967. There were reports of a "clash" along the Ussuri River in January 1967, and the Soviets accused the Chinese of wildly provocative behavior in connection with the excesses of the Cultural Revolution.[33] Border guards reported incidents on December 7–9 and 23, 1967, and in late January 1968 along the Amur and the Ussuri Rivers.[34] Such incidents apparently continued up to the March 2, 1969 clash, and the Soviets gradually evolved a nonviolent procedure for dealing with them. This procedure was in effect at Damansky in March.

The Chinese roster of Soviet border violations begins with a complaint about an "intrusion" on January 23, 1967, at Damansky Island. The Chinese claimed that between that date and March 2, 1969, Soviet troops intruded sixteen times onto Damansky (eight times during January and February 1969); eighteen times onto Chili Ching Island, north of Damansky; and on "many occasions" onto Kapotzu Island, south of Damansky, using "helicopters, armored cars and vehicles." The Chinese accuse the Russians of "ramming Chinese fishing boats, robbing Chinese fishing nets, turning high-pressure hoses on Chinese fishermen . . . kidnapping Chinese fishermen," assaulting and wounding Chinese frontier guards and seizing arms and ammunition, and violating Chinese air space by overflights.[35] Further, the Chinese

---

products most-favored-nation status while in the territory of the other. But throughout it refers to the "territory of the other party," and the parties would be expected to have reached accord on the location of boundaries in order to have agreed on shipping and navigation practices.

[32] The text of the 1966 "Regulations" was published in *NCNA*, April 19, 1966. Article Two states, "All foreign vessels entering or leaving rivers and ports on the national border [China's riverine boundary is shared only with the Soviet Union] shall abide by these regulations." Article Three provides for the installation of "harbor superintendents" on each port and river, who would oversee the examination of ships, the approval of applications for entry and departure, mandatory pilotage, the maintenance of order and safety of navigation, and the investigation of maritime accidents. Article Four states that only countries that have signed commercial navigation agreements with China (as had the Soviet Union in 1958) may traverse these rivers, but their vessels would still have to obtain Chinese permission for each voyage. Article Six specifies the information to be given the Chinese concerning the vessels in question—in effect, everything about the ship, its crew, and its cargo. Article Seven stipulates that on sailing vessels through these rivers and in Chinese ports, "a CPR flag shall fly at the top of the foremast." (That would be tantamount to admission of Chinese sovereignty over the entire river boundary and the midriver islands.) Article Eight prohibits use of firearms except in distress. Article Nine requires vessels to obtain permission to enter and leave ports. The other articles are similar, though less peremptory.

[33] Dmitriyev, "Far Away on the Border," quotes border guards as saying the Chinese "made attempts to provoke brawling and fighting," drove ostentatiously across Soviet territory in buses, cars, and trucks, "tried to run our border guards down and waved sticks and carbines," offered vodka to Soviet border guards, waved Mao-quote books and chanted phrases for hours, "pushed our border guards, tried to grab the lapels of their coats and urged our soldiers to disobey the officers."

For long periods during the Cultural Revolution, the central leadership in Peking was not unified. From January 1967 on, many State Council officers and ministries were disorganized, policies radicalized, and the voices of moderates unheard. In the spring and summer of 1967 the Foreign Minister was under Red Guard attack and the Foreign Ministry controlled by the Red Guards during parts of July and August. In such an atmosphere, border incidents could easily have been perpetrated without the knowledge or against the policy of the Peking leadership. Red Guards, not local residents, may have been behind many of the border incidents about which the Soviets complained. From January 1967 the militia was dominated by the Red Guards, and until late summer the Army was forbidden to interfere in Cultural Revolution activities except under the direction of local Red Guard-revolutionary rebel leftist forces.

British experience in Hong Kong in 1967 is germane: it was quite clear that local Red Guards were initiating outbreaks of violence along the border and in the city. The Soviets may, like the British, have recognized the border incidents as Russian-baiting by Cultural Revolution extremists rather than as deliberate policy from the center, and decided to put up with the temporary annoyance. Still, Russian nerves must have become frayed after two years of such antics.

[34] Dmitriyev, "Far Away on the Border."

[35] "Soviet Revisionist Renegade Clique Directs Soviet Frontier Guards Flagrantly To Intrude into Areas of Chenpao Island, Heilungkiang Province, China, and Open Fire, Killing and Wounding Chinese Frontier Guards," "Note of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China to the Soviet Embassy in China," *NCNA*, March 3, 1969, *Jen-min Jih-pao*, March 4, 1969, (translation in *SCMP* 4372 [March 10, 1969], pp. 19–20); *NCNA* report on border film, April 18, 1969; "Statement of the Government of the People's Republic of China, May 24, 1969"; and "Down with the New Tsars!." *Jen-min Jih-pao*, March 3, 1969 (translation in *SCMP* 4373 [March 11, 1969], pp. 17–19). The Chinese claimed, in the April 18 *NCNA* report and elsewhere, that the Soviets' "intrusions" occurred during the ice-bound winter months. Sixteen intrusions over a period of about two years

charged, the Soviets sent tanks, armored cars, and boats onto Chinese territory, drove out "many Chinese inhabitants by force, demolished their houses and destroyed their means of production and household goods."[36]

Finally, the Chinese charged that the Soviets "provoked" a total of 4,189 border incidents from the breakdown of border negotiations on October 15, 1964, to the March, 1969 incidents.[37] Most of these charges refer to Soviet border patrol and reconnaissance and efforts to evict Chinese from "Soviet" areas without taking lives. The picture that emerges shows not much more than minor harassment between two unfriendly powers who disagreed upon some specifics of border demarcation and who found the border a convenient place to express the general tension. But each side may have taken the other's activities more seriously over time and a vicious circle of tit-for-tat reprisals may have begun after early 1967. The testimony of the disputants indicates increasing border tension beginning with the "January Revolution" phase of the Cultural Revolution and extending to the very end of that period.

The Soviets state (the Chinese appear not to have declared themselves on the subject) that they had long allowed Chinese border residents to use river islands for economic purposes—haying, fishing, and logging—and to drive livestock (and presumably vehicles) across Russian territory from one point in China to another.[38] The Soviets' legal case for title to Damansky is, in fact, based partly on their allegation that the Chinese periodically made application for use of that island for such purposes.[39] After the Cultural Revolution began, however, and as ideologically based incidents began to occur regularly, the Soviets saw that new procedures had to be worked out, not to the benefit of the Chinese but in opposition to them.

> This is the situation [quoting Vitaly Bubenin, commander of the border guards at Damansky]: A fisherman comes, sticks a pole with Mao's portrait on it in the snow and begins to dig a hole. We explain that it is forbidden to cross the border. We escort him back. The next day 20 fishermen come. Three have nets and each one has a booklet of quotations. They wave them around so that the fishing will be better. We escort them back to the border. About 500 people are brought to the border. They organize a rally and beat drums. They are loaded on trucks and head for the Soviet shore. Our fellows stand in a chain. The trucks race at them, intending to frighten them. Nothing happens, and they go away. They come with streamers: Quotations are attached to sticks, and there are iron pipes on top of the sticks. Again our men form a wall. Their people put the quotations in their pockets and start swinging the sticks. Never mind, we drove them away. Pvt. Lavrov was sent to the hospital. . . .
>
> [On another occasion on Damansky before March 2]: Sr. Lieutenant Strelnikov ordered the men to protect themselves from the blows of the Chinese with the butts of their machine guns.[40]

Diposition of Military Forces Along the Border. The "traditional," i.e., long-term, disposition of Soviet and Chinese forces along the border was roughly balanced in numbers of men.[41] The Chinese had an edge near Manchuria, and the Soviets had an edge in the Sinkiang area. But the Soviets surpassed the Chinese in weaponry and logistics support. During the decade of relative Sino-Soviet friendship, the Chinese neither worried about the disparity nor were in a position to challenge it and the Soviets never made much of it. In the early 1960s, when the two parties came to ideological separation, dispositions of forces on both sides remained de-

---

would give an average frequency of less than one a month. The Chinese also claimed that from January through February 1969, Soviet forces entered Damansky *eight times. This would imply that the Soviets* ordinarily stayed off the island for most of the year, leaving it to the Chinese for economic purposes.

[36] *NCNA*, May 27, 1969.

[37] "Statements of the Government of the People's Republic of China, May 24, 1969."

[38] Aleksandr Anikushin (Major-General of Border Troops), "Again Damansky Island," *Sovetskaia Rossiia*, March 19, 1969, (translation in *CDSP*, Vol. 21, No. 12 [April 9, 1967], p. 3); V. Fomenko, "Far But Near," *Pravada Ukrainy*, April 2, 1969; and "Statement of the USSR Government," *Pravda*, March 3, 1969, (translation in *CDSP*. Vol. 21, No. 13 [April 16, 1969], pp. 3–5). That the border is fraught with potential conflict at many strategic points can be seen from a map of the Khabarovsk area. Just west of the city, a "winter road" (i.e., over the ice) originates on Soviet territory, and continues along the middle of the Amur River, cuts directly across Hsin hei tzu Island (parts of which the Soviets have long claimed as theirs and occupied), and reenters Soviet territory some miles distant.

[39] S. Kosterin, V. Mikhaylov, and P. Troyanovskiy, "Frontier Post on the Ussuri," *Sovetskaia Rossiia*, May 7, 1969, quoting a Chinese request to procure hay on Damansky Island. The article says the Soviets had maintained a frontier post in the area after 1922 but had abolished it in 1950 when the Chinese People's Republic was formed.

[40] Yuri Apenchenko and Yuri Mokeyev, "Report from Far Eastern Frontiers," *Pravda*, March 12, 1967, (translation in *CDSP*, Vol. 21, No. 11 [April 2, 1969], p. 3). Similar reports of Soviet nonviolent repressive tactics are in Fomenko, "Far But Near" and Konstantin Osanin, "Duplicity Chinese Style," Moscow Radio, March 29, 1969. As we shall see below, the Chinese, on March 2, took advantage of the Soviet practice of strapping their weapons to their chests when first meeting Chinese "intruders."

[41] Information on this topic is scanty and inconclusive. Here we rely mainly on The Institute for Strategic Studies' *The Military Balance*, 1960–1969 annual issues.

fense oriented. The Soviets continued to direct most of their attention and military investment to Western Europe, the United States, and the strategic arms race. After 1960, the Chinese renewed their faith in guerrilla tactics and defense in depth. For some years they had stationed around 14 infantry divisions in the Northeast (Manchuria), 5 divisions in Inner Mongolia, and 5 more in Sinkiang. Additionally, in the latter two areas there were 2–3 division-equivalents of border guards, a regiment of artillery attached to each division, and other support elements. The Chinese supplemented these groups with the well-known Production and Construction Corps, paramilitary units of military-age youths (mostly Han males)[42] concentrated chiefly in Sinkiang and, more recently, in Inner Mongolia. This would give the Chinese a total of 35–40 division-equivalents in the military districts along the border, or 380,000–480,000 men, figuring 11,000–12,000 men per average division.[43]

It is not difficult to understand the rationale for this disposition of forces. The Chinese have kept a sizable defensive force in the Northeast because there are large population concentrations in the area, because the capital, Peking, is one of the Military Regions in the Northeast sector, and because Manchuria is China's major industrial base. Moreover, the unsettled nature of the Korean conflict militates for a sizable backup force in the region. Finally, 14 or more divisions in the Shenyang (Mukden) Military Region, backed up when necessary by part of the forces stationed in the Peking Military Region, give the Chinese strategic flexibility: they can easily move these forces east to the Ussuri River, north to the Amur River, and west to Mongolia. The transportation net in this region is the most highly developed of any in China. But considering the numbers of men that had to be kept on the Fukien front across from Formosa (28 divisions on the coast and another 28 farther inland in reserve), the requirements for garrison duty (especially during and after the Cultural Revolution) in a huge country, and the limited number of men whom the nation can afford to equip and keep under arms (somewhat more than two million, or 120 divisions in the People's Liberation Army), only small numbers would be available for duty in Inner Mongolia and Sinkiang. This is understandable. With a population of only one million and without a Soviet presence, Mongolia is no military threat to China. Inner Mongolia, furthermore, is sparsely populated. In Sinkiang, which has strategic resources, nuclear test facilities, and a not very friendly local minority population with a history of rebellion, there is reason to station more troops. But Sinkiang is mostly empty space (desert and mountains) and troops thus must be concentrated in important locations. The Production and Construction Corps, furthermore, provides a first line of defense against possible Soviet incursions.[44]

As for the Russians, the Soviet Far East is a long way from Europe, where Soviet foreign policy has traditionally focused. Because of this, and because China traditionally presented no significant strategic threat, having been either weak, friendly, or neutral, the Soviets have maintained only a thin line of regular Red Army divisions east of Lake Baikal. Until recently, that line consisted of 15–17 regular divisions (of which 10 were in a state of high combat-readiness, the remainder in a lower category, capable of full combat deployment in 30 days), supplemented by contingents of nondivisional forces and border guards. This would give a sizable edge in numbers to the Chinese, since the emplaced Russian forces would not number more than 250,000–300,000 men, figuring 12,000 men per division and a total of 20–24 division-equivalents. But the Soviet logistical picture is much more favorable, despite long lines of communication. The Trans-Siberian railway parallels, or shoots spurs toward, the Soviet-Chinese border for its entire length. Except in the Northeast, the Chinese have no comparable rail line. Major Russian military and air bases and sizable cities are found along the length of the railroad.[45] Again, this is not true in China. Furthermore, the Soviets have always had an edge in equipment. Not only do they have absolute superiority in numbers and quality of aircraft, tanks, artillery, armored cars, and personnel carriers, but their excellent surface and air mobility means they can concentrate large forces at a given spot much more quickly than the Chinese, who still depend largely on transportation by foot.[46] Finally, if the two powers were to do battle on a large scale and the weight of Chinese numbers began to tell, the Soviets could transfer reinforcements from bases in European, Central and Southern Russia, and have a mobilization potential that is probably as high in fully equipped and trained soldiers as the Chinese.

---

[42] For a study of the Production and Construction Corps, see George Moseley, *A Sino-Soviet Cultural Frontier: The Ili Kazakh Autonomous Chou* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1966), pp. 35–41. On March 4, 1969 (two days after the first Damansky Island incident), Inner Mongolian Radio announced the formation of the Inner Mongolian Production and Construction Corps of the Peking Military Region. Its purpose, according to an editorial in the *Inner Mongolian Daily,* May 8, 1969, is essentially similar to that of the Sinkiang Corps—border defense and military-directed construction of bulwarks, waterworks, and agricultural reclamation projects—and its personnel similarly include demobilized army men and students (e.g., Red Guards). For an informative article, see Wu Yun-kwang, "Peiping's Military Region," *Chung-kung Yen-chiu* (Taipei), Vol. 3, No. 6 (June 1969), pp. 4–8.

[43] An issue of some importance is which troops within a given military district are actually earmarked for border defense, which actually guard the border, and which work exclusively at such other tasks as garrisoning interior regions. For instance, by no means all of the troops assigned to the Shenyang Military District guard the borders. Moreover, what percentage of troops in the Peking Military Region have been assigned to border duty? Even though the Peking Military Region does not border directly on the Soviet Union, its proximity to that frontier means that some troops some of the time must train as defenders of the state boundary. Likewise, in the Inner Mongolian and Sinkiang Military Districts, garrison duties divert troops who otherwise would be assigned to border defense. The same factors operate on the Soviet side of the border.

These variances render it extremely difficult to estimate precisely the disposition of forces in the frontier region, to say nothing of calculating tradeoffs in equipment, logistics, and strategy. Nonetheless, we have arbitrarily chosen to regard *all* forces in the Chinese military regions bordering the Soviet Union as working exclusively on border defense.

[44] *The Wall Street Journal,* January 2, 1968, reported that in Sinkiang the Chinese authorities had replaced all Uighurs and Khazaks within 15 to 30 miles of the Soviet border with Chinese, equipped with rifles as well as plowshares. "Further back, Chinese army construction units are building roads and waterworks, and perhaps military bunkers as well. Further back still . . . are villages now inhabited by Chinese ex-soldiers still subject to militia duty. Only past these villages are minority-group members permitted to farm."

One would think that both powers would have increased their forces in proportion to the frequency, location, and severity of border incidents. But available information indicates no large-scale buildup, at least before 1967, by either side.[47] Around early 1966 (or perhaps late 1965), however, both states began to bring their existing forces to greater combat-readiness, to equip them with more and better weaponry, and to augment their numbers, if only marginally. The Soviets seem to have been the more active party in this process.[48] In 1966, first reports appeared of the transfer of highly trained Soviet forces from East Europe to the Far East. Although probably as many soldiers were sent back to the West as arrived in the East, the combat potential of Soviet troops along the Chinese border probably increased. Then the Russians began equipping their Far Eastern forces with missiles, including surface-to-surface nuclear-tipped rockets. They were also said to have moved in additional regular and border troops, although not in substantial numbers. Some reports spoke of 7–8 divisions in Central Asia (part of 30 divisions located in the southern Soviet Union) earmarked for eventual duty east of Lake Baikal. Soviet media began to emphasize the importance of paramilitary training by citizens in border regions. Finally, the Soviets signed a new defense agreement with Mongolia that reportedly allowed the Soviets to station troops and maintain bases in that country.[49]

On the Chinese side, nothing of a similar scale seems to have been done. The Chinese were then in the throes of a debate about what military strategy to pursue in face of the American intervention in Vietnam.[50] This, together with the power struggle preceding the Cultural Revolution, resulted in purges among Army officers, notably Chief-of-Staff Lo Jui-ch'ing, and may have weakened the Army somewhat, despite Lin Piao's efforts to induce greater military efficiency. By 1965 the Chinese were said to be capable of producing most armaments (except some types of aircraft and sophisticated communications equipment) in sufficient quantity to supply the regular PLA forces. This capability may have prevented a more than minimal decline in Chinese military efficiency.[51] But the Vietnam war and American intervention meant that Chinese military attention had to be directed primarily to its southern, not its northern and western, flanks. Thus, the Chinese probably could counter the Soviet border buildup only marginally, if at all.

---

[45] See Harrison Salisbury's article on Soviet airfields in *The New York Times*, May 24, 1969. By contrast with the Chinese geopolitical situation, the Russians have fewer points of population concentration and less of a hinterland into which to retreat. Few Russian settlements exist north of the Trans-Siberian railway. Were the Soviets to lose the railway and the land to its south, there would be no place for them to go. For this reason, the Soviets probably maintain a higher proportion of their available forces close to the border than do the Chinese, and at specific points they may outnumber the Chinese.

[46] *The Military Balance*, 1960–1969 annual issues, reported that the Soviets completely re-equipped their military forces, sometimes twice over, with the latest equipment. The Chinese, on the other hand, not only did not, until at least 1965, have the knowledge and industrial base to do so, but the withdrawal of Soviet aid in 1960 seriously crippled the Chinese military machine, especially those units dependent upon advanced weaponry, for several years.

[47] *The Military Balance* figures vary only slightly up to that time. This estimate is suggested by that of Malcolm Mackintosh's article, "The Soviet Generals' View of China in the 1960s," in *Sino-Soviet Military Relations*, ed. Raymond L. Garthoff (New York: Praeger, 1966).

[48] Information about the Soviet buildup in the Far East in 1966, aside from that contained in *The Military Balance* for that year, can be found in: *The Washington Post*, December 11, 1966; *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, December 29, 1966, and *The New York Times*, August 17, November 22, December 11 and 29, 1966, and January 11, 1967.

[49] The twenty-year "Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Aid Between the USSR and the MPR" was signed with great fanfare in Ulan Bator on January 15, 1966. It replaced a similar treaty signed in 1946. The earlier treaty made explicit the Soviet right to station troops on Mongolian soil; the 1966 treaty did not, although several of its articles could be construed as implying that right. Text in *Pravda*, January 18, 1966 (translation in *CDSP*, Vol. 18, No. 3 [February 9, 1966], pp. 7–8).

[50] For an interesting, although admittedly speculative, account of that debate, see Uri Ra'anan, "Peking's Foreign Policy Debate, 1965–1966," in *China in Crisis*, ed. Tang Tsou, Vol. 2 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968), pp. 23–27.

During 1966 and 1967, Chinese-initiated border incidents (which we have associated with the Cultural Revolution) seemed increasingly provocative to the Soviets.[52] In response the Russians continued the East Europe-Far East troop rotation plan and apparently stepped up the size of the border guard force by possibly 20,000.[53] These moves were sizable enough to cause a public complaint from Chinese Foreign Minister Ch'en Yi.[54] The Russians, moreover, began a campaign to explain Sino-Soviet differences to the Soviet citizenry, while high military officials toured Far Eastern troop contingents.[55] They continued to stress the aid that paramilitary groups were giving to border guards along the Chinese frontier.[56] The major aspect of the Soviet buildup, however, seems to have been the decision to station strong military units on Mongolian soil. This deployment, seems to have begun sometime after the signing of the defense pact with Mongolia, and went into high gear in 1967.[57] By November 1967, enough Soviet troops (including tank and missile units) were reported to be in Mongolia to prompt rumors that several divisions were occupying permanent bases there.[58] On November 7, Soviet units took part in a parade in Ulan Bator celebrating the Bolshevik Revolution.[59]

By the summer of 1968, the Russians conducted their first large-scale maneuvers in Mongolia. Rail lines had been built between Chita, a major Soviet military base, and Choibalsan, Mongolia's second largest city, where a new Soviet base was established. One estimate of Soviet strength inside Mongolia was six divisions, including one tank division.[60] By 1969, this was said to have increased to 8–10 divisions.[61] The magnitude of this buildup apparently upset the balance of power between the two forces. It is unclear whether the Chinese were then in a position to redeploy their own forces in retaliation. Non-Communist Chinese sources in Hong Kong reported that after the Soviet-Mongolian maneuvers, several Chinese divisions were redeployed to the Soviet-Mongolian border and that significant numbers of artillery pieces were being withdrawn from the Fukien region, ostensibly for shipment to the Soviet border region.[62]

---

[51] *The Military Balance, 1966–1967.*

[52] An Austrian correspondent's account of a trip through Soviet Central Asia during 1967 conveys some interesting information. First, the Soviets were constructing a barrier of the Iron Curtain type along the Sinkiang border. Second, the Russians described the public Chinese execution of Chinese citizens along the Amur and Ussuri Rivers, on one occasion witnessed by 20,000 people, and another incident near Chita, where 30,000 elderly were allegedly pushed over the border by Chinese military authorities. Third, in September 1966, Moscow was said to have delegated responsibility and authority for handling border incidents to local commanders. That arrangement was said to hold two advantages for Moscow: it could repudiate the local commander if he failed to maintain order, and it enabled him to move promptly and independently when necessary. See Hugo Portisch, in the Vienna *Kurier* (translated in *Atlas*, Vol. 14, No. 3 [September 1967], pp. 15–19).

[53] *The Military Balance, 1965–1966* and *1966–1967*, reports an increase in border troops from 230,000 to 250,000. It is difficult to say exactly where most of these additional men were assigned, but the increase coincides with reports of increased Soviet border patroling activity.

[54] See above, footnote 30. Also in *The New York Times* and *The Washington Post*, December 11, 1966.

[55] *Krasnaia zvezda*, February 15, 1967.

[56] See *Krasnaia zvezda*, January 11, February 15, and March 10, 1967, for typical articles, and *The New York Times*, January 21, 1967. This emphasis continued throughout 1968, as reported, for instance, in *Krasnaia zvezda*, July 31, 1968, and *Dal'nii Vostok*, No. 1, 1968.

[57] Major floods in Mongolia in 1966 ripped out large stretches of railroad and, for a time, isolated Ulan Bator. The Soviets repaired the railroad connections with the Trans-Siberian but allowed the link between Ulan Bator and the Chinese border to remain in disrepair. The floods, however, probably set back the Soviet military construction schedule in Mongolia so that not until 1967 do we hear of Soviet troop presence and plans for military construction there. See articles by Harrison Salisbury in *The New York Times*, August 17, 1966, and May 24, 1969.

[58] *The New York Times*, January 3, 1969.

[59] *Novosti Mongolii*, November 11, 1967.

[60] *Los Angeles Times*, July 10, 1968. Available information does not allow us to judge whether or not these maneuvers actually took place on Mongolian soil.

[61] *The New York Times*, May 24, 1969.

[62] See Chiang Yi-san, "Military Affairs of Communist China, 1968," *Tsu Kuo*, No. 59 (February, 1969), pp. 20–36. This article quotes *Sing-tao Jih-pao*, August 3, October 7, and December 9, 1968. Additionally, *Communist China 1967* (Kowloon: Union Research Institute), pp. 230–231, reports that at the end of 1967 China had completed transfer of 200,000

Finally, the Chinese again began to stress the importance of the Production and Construction Corps. With the Cultural Revolution drawing to a close, Peking rounded up many youths who had returned to the cities from these units during the turmoil of the previous two years and also evicted several million middle-class citizens from the cities and sent many to the frontiers.[63] Indications point to an enhanced Chinese capability in the Northeast and in Inner Mongolia of 4 or 5 divisions (for a total of 40 in both areas, as compared with 35–36 divisions formerly).[64] The Chinese were also said to have tightened border security in response to similar Soviet moves.[65]

Bloodshed on the Ice: Sino-Soviet Military Clashes on the Ussuri

The Setting. Damansky Island is situated on the Ussuri River, which forms the boundary between the Soviet Union and China.[66] Located at 133°51′E longitude and 46°51′N latitude, it is about 180 miles southwest of Khabarovsk. The nearest Soviet settlement is Nizhne Mikhailovskiy, about 5 miles south, and the nearest Chinese settlement is Kungszu, just south of the island. The Chinese claim the island was once a part of the Chinese bank, became separated by erosion of the river, and during low water in late summer can be reached on foot from the Chinese shore. Maps of the area indicate that the main channel passes east of the island; this fact (if it is indeed that) forms the basis of the Chinese case for ownership. The river at this point, as at many others, is wide, and the river-arm (as the Chinese describe it) or channel (the Soviet term) appears from photographs and maps to be nearly as wide, and may be as deep at high water, as the channel on the east. From the location of navigation markers on the two shores and the curvature of the river, it appears that ships traverse the eastern channel. The island itself is, by testimony of both sides, uninhabited, although Chinese fishermen apparently use it for drying their nets, and both nationalities may do some logging on it. About one mile in length, about one-third mile wide, it is flooded during the spring thaw.

The Soviets maintain two border outposts in the area, one just south of the island, which until March 2 was commanded by Senior Lieutenant Ivan Ivanovich Strelnikov, and the other just to the north, commanded by Senior Lieutenant Vitaliy Dmitriyevich Bubenin. The southern post has the disadvantage that its line of sight does not include the island itself (although the river-arm and the Chinese bank can be seen) and thus on-the-spot patroling is necessary to determine Chinese presence on the island. The Chinese border post, named Kungszu after the local Chinese settlement, appears to be located on a hillock directly across from the island. There is extensive marshland on the Soviet, but not on the Chinese, side of the river, in winter forcing vehicles to detour about two miles before they can move onto the ice toward the island. In March the river is frozen nearly solid, so it is possible to drive multi-ton vehicles over the ice.

The March 2 Incident. What happened on March 2? Unfortunately, no observers other than the participants were at the scene of battle, and most of them are dead. Further,

---

additional troops to the Soviet frontier, bringing the total to 600,000. This would be about 50 division-equivalents, which accords with earlier estimates. Two hundred thousand men were said to be in Sinkiang and 400,000 in Inner Mongolia and the Northeast. One of the Institute's sources was *The Japan Times*, Tokyo, March 19, 1967. But the limitations noted in footnote 43 would still apply.

[63] See, for instance, Lin Piao's July 1968 directive to the Peking Military Region, which mentions "the need of engineering endeavors for national defense, and specifically to construct defenses around desert areas" and the necessity of physical fitness of the construction corps; and the speech of Wang En-mao (then political commissioner of the Sinkiang Military Region) on October 8, 1968, in which he stated that "Sinkiang is the front line of our struggle against imperialism and revisionism" and that China was "vigorously strengthening war preparedness and border defense" there. Cited in Chiang, "Military Affairs."

[64] *The Economist*, March 22, 1969, states that the Soviets at that time had 300,000 men along the border (25–27 divisions, as compared with 15–17 divisions before) and that the Chinese had 500,000 men (40 divisions) in the same region. The latter figure probably excludes the Production and Construction Corps. *Le Monde*, April 14, 1969, quotes "informed Austrian sources" as saying that symbolic contingents of Warsaw Pact troops would soon be on their way to the Soviet-Chinese frontier. If these figures are not entirely erroneous, Chinese reinforcements have not kept pace with Soviet deployments: a ratio of 5 to 3 in men does not overcome the Soviet preponderance in weaponry, air power logistics, and capacity to reinforce quickly.

[65] *The New York Times*, March 30, 1969.

[66] Primary sources for this section are maps of the area and W. A. Douglas Jackson, *Russo-Chinese Borderlands* (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand, 1962); Theodore Shabad, *Geography of the USSR, A Regional Survey* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961); idem, *China's Changing Map* (New York: Praeger, 1956); George B. Cressey, *Land of the 500 Million: A Geography of China* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1955); and Erich Thiel, *The Soviet Far East: A Survey of Its Physical and Economic Geography* (London: Methuen, 1947). Secondary sources are those cited in footnotes 67 and 68 below.

only the Soviets have given a detailed view of the events, gleaned from testimony of survivors and from a special investigative team. Because almost no factual reports are available from the Chinese, this analysis is likely to be slanted toward the Soviet side. Despite these limitations, it is possible to reconstruct what probably went on.[67]

On the night of March 1–2, about 300 Chinese troops (a mixed group of frontier guards and regular PLA soldiers) dressed in white camouflage crossed the ice from the Chinese bank to Damansky Island, dug foxholes in a wooded area overlooking the southernmost extremity, laid telephone wire to the command post on the Chinese bank, and lay down for the night on straw mats. Sometime early in the morning, the man on duty at Strelnikov's outpost reported activity on the Chinese bank. Around 11:00 a.m., a group of 20 or 30 Chinese began moving toward the island, shouting Maoist slogans as they came. Seeing them, Strelnikov and an undetermined number of his subordinates climbed into two armored personnel carriers, a truck, and a command car, and set off for the southern extremity of the island to meet the Chinese. Arriving on the island (or perhaps remaining on the ice covering the river-arm to the west of the island) a few minutes later, Strelnikov and seven or eight others, including his deputy, Senior Lieutenant Buinevich, dismounted and moved out to warn the oncoming Chinese, as they had several times previously. Following a procedure developed for such occasions, the Russians strapped their automatic rifles to their chests (reports differ: some say they left their weapons behind). The time was now about 11:15 a.m. The Russians linked arms to prevent the Chinese from passing. Chinese reports imply that an altercation took place. The Chinese now arrayed themselves in rows and appeared to be unarmed. But when the Chinese had advanced to about 20 feet from the Russian group, the first row suddenly scattered to the side, exposing the second line of Chinese, who quickly pulled submachine guns from under their coats and opened fire on the Russian group. Strelnikov and six of his companions were killed outright. Simultaneously, from an ambush to the Russians' right, the 300 Chinese in foxholes also opened fire, catching the entire Russian unit by surprise. Mortar, machine gun, and anti-tank gunfire also commenced at that moment (it was now between 11:17 and 11:20 a.m.) from the Chinese side. The Chinese apparently then charged the Soviets, and hand-to-hand fighting ensued. The Soviet unit was apparently overrun, and the Chinese (according to Soviet charges) took 19 prisoners and killed them on the spot. They also carried away Soviet equipment, which they later put on display. Evidently the Russian survivors were able to fight back, however, now under the command of Junior Sergeant Yuri Babinski.

Seeing the battle, Senior Lieutenant Bubenin and nearly his entire border post north of Damansky set out for the scene. Racing up in an armored car, he succeeded in gaining the right flank of the Chinese and thus forced them to divide their fire. But he also found himself in the middle of the island and in the middle of the ambush that the Chinese had prepared for Strelnikov (the latter had not proceeded that far). Bubenin's vehicle was hit and disabled, and he himself was wounded and shell-shocked. He managed to get into another armored car and direct the battle from it. A series of melees ensued, with charges by both sides. Finally, the Russians state, they pinned down, for a time surrounded, and then forced the remaining 50 to 60 Chinese to retreat to their side of the bank. The Chinese took all their wounded with them, although they left behind some equipment. The entire battle lasted about two hours, and the Russians were so short-handed that civilians had to be pressed into service as ammunition bearers. Although both sides claimed victory, neither Russian nor Chinese forces remained permanently on the island after the battle was over, although the Soviets periodically moved off and on at will.

---

[67] In this section, the following sources were used. On the Soviet side: "Note of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the CPR," March 2, 1969, Moscow Domestic Radio, March 3, 1969; Yuri Dmitriyev, "Dangerous Provocations," *Trud,* March 5, 1969 (also TASS of the same day), "Provocative Sally of Peking Authorities," *Pravda,* March 8, 1969 (translation in *Information Bulletin,* Vol. 7, Nos. 5–6, 1969, pp. 66–70, and *CDSP,* Vol. 21, No. 10 [March 26, 1969], pp. 3–4); Moscow Radio to China, March 6, and March 9, 1969; Tanyug (Belgrade) Radio, March 8, 1969; "Press Conference in the USSR University of Foreign Affairs," *Pravda,* March 8, 1969 (translation in *CDSP,* Vol. 21, No. 10 [March 26, 1969], pp. 4–5); Val. Goltsev, "What Happened on Damansky Island," *Izvestiia,* March 8, 1969 (translation in *CDSP,* Vol. 21, No. 10, pp. 6–7); S. Kosterin and V. Anikeyev, "How It Was," *Sovetskaia Rossiia,* March 9, 1969 (translation in *CDSP,* Vol. 21. No. 10, pp. 7–8); TASS Radio, March 12, 1969; "The USSR Borders are Inviolable," interview with Major General of Border Troops A. N. Anikushin, *Sovetskaia Rossiia,* March 19, 1969 (translation in *CDSP,* Vol. 21, No. 12 [April 9, 1969], p. 31); "Statement of the USSR Government," March 29, 1969, TASS and *Pravda,* March 30, 1969 (translation in *CDSP,* Vol. 21, No. 13 [April 16, 1969], pp. 3–5); Yuri Apenchenko and Yuri Mokeyev, "That's How It Is on the Border," *Pravda,* March 12, 1969 (translation in *CDSP,* Vol. 21, No. 11 [April 2, 1969], p. 3); Col. S. Barents, "This Happened at the Ussuri," *Krasnaia zvezda,* April 2, 1969; Konstantin Simonov, "Thinking Aloud," *Pravda,* May 3, 1969, and May 4, 1969; and Mikhail Demidenko, "A Night on the Ussuri River," *Literaturnaia gazeta,* May 21, 1969, p. 13.

On the Chinese side: NCNA Radio and *Jen-min Jih-pao,* March 3, 1969; "Note of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China to the Soviet Embassy in China, March 2, 1969," NCNA Radio, March 3, 1969 (translation in *SCMP* 4372 [March 10, 1969], pp. 18–19); "Down with the New Tsars," *Jen-min Jih-pao* and *Chieh-fang-chün Pao* joint editorial, March 4, 1969 (translation in *SCMP* 4373 [March 11, 1969], pp. 17–19); *Jen-min Jih-pao,* March 19, 1969, six photographs on p. 4; NCNA Domestic Radio, April 18, 1969, describing the film, "Anti-China Atrocities of the New Tsars"; and "Statement of the Government of the PRC," May 24, 1969," *Jen-min Jih-pao,* May 24, 1969.

The March 15 Incident. The battle on March 15 was different from that of March 2nd in several ways.[68] Preparations on both sides were much more complete, forces were much larger, losses were higher, and the engagement lasted much longer. There was also no element of suprise. In contrast to the encounter on March 2, it is not clear who began the battle on the 15th: Soviet and Chinese sources differ, of course, and the Soviet documentation is again much more voluminous. This time the Russian case is much less convincing, and the moral overtone present in reports of the earlier battle is muted, if not entirely absent. Both sides probably had built up their forces in the intervening fortnight, intending to wrest permanent control of the island away from the other or, failing that, to deny the other side its unhindered use.

Apparently the Russians increased the frequency of their patrols of the island after March 2. They still did not station a permanent force on the island, however, lest the Chinese zero in on them with artillery and mortar fire. A small scouting party did spend the night of the 14th–15th on the island, and it is possible that this group was used as bait to lure the Chinese into a frontal attack. The Chinese say that the other side sent "many" tanks to the island and to the river-arm ice about 4:00 a.m. on the 15th, attacking Chinese guards on patrol. It is not clear why such a large force would be needed to attack a patrol. The Soviets state that their own early-morning patrol, consisting of two armored cars led by Senior Lieutenant Lev Mankovsky, discovered a group of Chinese lodged on the island, apparently having sneaked over the previous night. Whatever the initial cause, the battle began in earnest around 9:45 or 10:00 a.m., with mortar and artillery from the Chinese bank and, by 10:30, according to Soviet accounts, heavy fire from three points on the Chinese bank.

The Chinese now threw more than a regiment (around two thousand men) of infantry into the fray, charging across the ice and gaining possession of at least part of the island. The Russians, seeing this wave of Chinese, sought to block their advance with fire from machine guns mounted on armored personnel carriers, but moved back, either entirely off the island or to its eastern extremity, when they realized that the Chinese had a clear superiority in men. (Russian accounts speak of a ratio of ten Chinese to every Russian.) The Chinese directed intense artillery fire not only at the Soviet troops but also at the eastern channel of the river separating the island from the Soviet bank, evidently in the hope of slowing or stopping the movement of heavy vehicles over the ice. The Russians, adopting tactics used by the American army in the Korean War, allowed the Chinese to advance and then counterattacked with large numbers of tanks, armored cars, and infantry in armored personnel carriers. Soviet artillery, brought in since the March 2 incident, launched a fierce barrage at 1:00 p.m., raking Chinese positions as far inland as four miles. Three such attacks were launched, each breaking through the Chinese positions. The first two faltered when ammunition was expended. The third apparently broke the Chinese position on the island, and the Chinese retreated to their own bank, taking their dead and wounded. The Soviets state that they did not follow up the Chinese retreat with large-scale garrisoning of the island, although they continued intense patroling. The battle was over at 7:00 p.m., having lasted more than nine hours.[69] Sources state that the Russians lost about 60 men (including the border post commander, Colonel D. I. Leonov) and the Chinese 800.[70] (The number of Soviet casualties was lower probably because the Soviets had an advantage in tactics and armament.)

---

[68] The main sources for this section are, on the Soviet side: "Statement of the Government of the Soviet Union to the Government of the People's Republic of China," TASS, March 15, 1969, and *Pravda*, March 16, 1969 (translation in *CDSP*, Vol. 21, No. 11 [April 2, 1969], pp. 3–4); TASS Radio, March 15 and 16, 1969; interview with Major General Lobanov, *Pravda*, March 17, 1969; Moscow Radio to East Africa, March 18, 1969; Moscow Radio Peace and Progress to China, March 17, 1969; "The USSR's Frontiers are Sacred and Inviolable," *Pravda*, March 17, 1969; Yuri Apenchenko and Yuri Mokeyev, "They Have Defended With Their Hearts! A Report From the Far East Frontiers," *Pravda*, March 17, 1969; TASS Radio, March 20, 1969; Major Yuri Kuvshinnikov, "Report on Damansky," *Krasnaia zvezda*, March 20, 1969; Lt. Col. B. Prichkin and Major I. Dynin, "Three Attacks," *Krasnaia zvezda*, March 20, 1969; "Provocateurs Rebuffed," *Pravda*, March 17 (translation in *CDSP*, Vol. 21, No. 11 [April 2, 1969], pp. 5–6); Budapest Domestic Radio, April 21, 1969; and a series of eight articles, "Frontier Post on the Ussuri," *Sovetskaia Rossiia*, May 7–17, 1969.

On the Chinese side: "Note of the Foreign Ministry of the PRC to the Soviet Embassy in Peking," *NCNA*, March 15, 1969; NCNA Radio, March 16, 1969, also in *CDSP*, No. 4381, March 21, 1969, pp. 26–27. Additional sources are cited in footnote 67, above.

Accounting for the Fighting

It does not seem possible to settle upon a single set of reasons for these incidents. The data necessary for such a precise determination are not at hand and are not likely to be so for a long time, if ever. Nonetheless, it is possible to set forth several explanations, match them with other known facts, note their mutual consistency or inconsistency, and thereby narrow the spectrum to several "most plausible" cases. One caveat: The data do not permit us—nor do I feel called upon—to explain in all possible detail why the incidents themselves occurred at Damansky and not some other place, why at the exact times they did, and so forth. The aim of this section is to explain policies or decisions more than specific occurrences.

In regard to both incidents, explanatory possibilities seem to resolve into three clusters. First, there are rationales which flow from the local situation. A second cluster concerns national domestic politics in China and the Soviet Union. Finally, several possibilities derive from the foreign policies of the two states, both toward each other and toward third states and parties.

The March 2 Incident

Local Initiative. The first possibility is that standing orders from Peking or Moscow may have given local commanders enough latitude to initiate military action if growing border tension seemed to warrant it. If this was the case, study of the outbreaks should focus on the chain of command, the policies behind such orders, and their probable content, rather than on the competing cases for ownership of Damansky Island. (See the discussion below of domestic Soviet and Chinese politics.)

Soviet border commanders apparently did have wide latitude, delegated on the theory that in an emergency they would not have time to cable Moscow for instructions. The possibility that they would exceed their authority was balanced by their having to answer to the center for all actions.[71] This is not an unreasonable administrative device for policing a very long border at a great distance from high-level decision makers.

Chinese border authorities may have had similar rights and duties, but in China the administrative situation is less clear. Regular border troops may have been supplemented by People's Liberation Army units and the Heilungkiang Production and Construction Corps.[72] If one or both of the local border commanders decided that unless he took action his patrol and construction operations would be so severely impaired as to threaten the safety of his men or the border security in his area, he would feel it his duty to draw the line firmly at some geographical or psychological point. Even so, he would be expected to communicate with his superiors, and they, at some level between the local and the political center itself, would have to approve or disapprove his proposals. (Again, this possibility is elaborated below.)

Chance may have played a greater part than Soviet and Chinese sources lead us to believe. Although our reconstruction discounts this possibility, both sides may have put their "best" interpretation on the March 2 "ambush," which in reality may have been a local firefight between ordinary patrols that happened to meet at the southern tip of the island. In the Soviet case, the "best" interpretation would be to claim an ambush in order to cover the fact that they lost the battle. The Chinese would say nothing (aside from charging the Russians with trespassing) in hopes that the Russians would not retaliate or escalate. This explanation does not necessarily conflict with the interpretation of local initiative, of increasing border tensions leading to greater military readiness, or of explanations arising from domestic politics. But were chance the main element precipitating the battle, the Chinese should have given a more convincing and detailed account, while the many Soviet sources should have shown less moral outrage and less consistency.

---

[69] Russian sources are themselves inconsistent. They all state that the battle began around 10:00 a.m. and was finished by 7:00 p.m., an elapsed time of nine hours. Yet they also say the battle lasted seven hours. The Chinese, however, agree with the Soviet end points.

[70] The breakdown between dead and wounded is not clear in the statistics of either side. Surely the Chinese figure, even if accurate, represents both dead and wounded.

[71] Portisch, see fn. 52. Soviet border troops, being a functional subdivision of the Committee of State Security (KGB), would not necessarily report first to local Red Army units. Although the information is somewhat dated, at the time of the German invasion in 1941, MVD border units reported vertically to Moscow and not horizontally to local army units or to the military district. In this regard, see A. M. Nekrich, *1941 June 22* (Moscow: Nauka, 1965), pp. 111–112.

If the same sorts of arrangements were in effect on March 2, 1969 (Soviet sources speak only of border troops involved at Damansky), the Soviets either were surprised by the Chinese, or the clash followed from a meeting of patrols, for it is unlikely that a local Soviet commander would have had the numbers of men and amount of matériel necessary to assure victory over the size of force—more than 300 men—reportedly deployed by the Chinese.

[72] The Heilungkiang Production and Construction Corps was founded sometime in April 1968 and by March 1969 was several tens of thousands strong. Their arrival on the scene undoubtedly caused administrative confusion, which may have added to any latitude that local commanders already possessed. See Heilungkiang Provincial Broadcasting Station broadcasts of June 14, July 1 and 20, August 11, September 18, October 8, and November 11 and 23, 1968.

It was Soviet and Chinese policies enacted above the local level that made such an outbreak likely in the first place. Interpretations based on initiative by Chinese regional authorities fail to be convincing, although in the context of regional Cultural Revolution disorders they should not be abandoned entirely. It is possible, for instance, that differences of opinion or failure of communication occurred between the Heilungkiang Revolutionary Committee and the Shenyang Military District command. The Cultural Revolution in the Northeast saw great disorder and factionalism, but observers agree that the head of the Military Region was the commanding voice and dominated the Revolutionary Committee.[73] Differences of opinion or breakdowns in communication also may have existed between either or both of these two bodies and the central leadership (if indeed it was a singular entity) in Peking. This is more likely. One can conceive of regional authorities misinterpreting or changing standing orders concerning the handling of border incidents in order to demonstrate zealousness in guarding against Soviet revisionism. Ch'en Hsi-lien, the Shenyang Military Region commander, may have wanted to demonstrate his importance to Lin Piao (Ch'en appeared as one of the 25 members of the Politburo at the close of the Ninth Party Congress) and edge out P'an Fu-sheng, the Heilungkiang Provincial Revolutionary Committee Chairman, for this honor.[74] Other than this, available evidence does not substantiate the explanation of regional initiative. In any case, possibilities of regional-center differences cease to be relevant after the March 2 incident, for once apprised of it, Peking asserted strict control over the frontier.

On the Soviet side, the First Secretary of the Maritime Territorial Party Committee, V. Ye. Chernyshev, was "promoted" out of the region (to the CPSU Central Committee's Party Control Committee) shortly after the second March incident, on March 18.[75] Major General of Border Troops Aleksandr Anikushin and Chief of Troops of the Pacific Border Military District Major General V. F. Lobanov were authoritative voices in describing the Damansky situation and denouncing the Chinese.[76] It is impossible to say whether Chernyshev's concurrent "promotion" and Lobanov's and Anikushin's prominence are anything but accidental.

National Politics

Chinese Domestic Politics. Here, the range of possibilities opens up. Factionalism was rife in China at the end of the Cultural Revolution. Indeed, the political history of the Cultural Revolution can be told in terms of groups and factions competing for power. By the Twelfth Plenum of the Eighth Central Committee, October 16–31, 1968, many of these groups and individuals had either been eliminated as contenders or had been brought under control by the central leadership. Factions remained in Peking, however, jockeying for power as the important Ninth Party Congress, April 1969, approached. Between the Twelfth Plenum and the Ninth Congress, the main factions—the ideologues of the Cultural Revolution Group under Chiang Ch'ing, the bureaucracy led by Chou En-lai, the military led by Lin Piao, the mass revolutionary organs, the provincial revolutionary committees, and Mao himself—attempted to maximize their positions. It was the military, however, supported by a very small number of other political leaders, that dominated the country and hence determined the course of future political life in China. But this group did not seem to have been plagued by factionalism that could have affected Chinese decisions concerning border strategy, nor is there evidence of a debate over how to deal with the threat posed by the massive Soviet deployments to the Sino-Soviet border region.[77] The dearth of authoritative articles, editorals, and speeches by central leaders on international or military issues from the Twelfth Plenum to the Ninth Congress may signify that a debate was under way within the highest chambers. But on previous occasions when China faced a foreign threat,[78] such debate was evident (although only faintly reflected in the open literature). With regard to Sino-Soviet border relations, only near the end of July 1969 does one begin to pick up echoes of a debate.[79] Thus, at least until further information comes to light, it does not seem that military problems with the Soviet Union engendered a factional debate among China's top leaders or that factionalism at the center was severe enough to cause a faction to use a particular strategy toward the Soviet Union as a weapon with which to attack its opponent.[80]

---

[73] For evidence of such disorders, see Heilungkiang Provincial Broadcasting Station, 1968 broadcasts of March 1, 3, 4, and 24; April 2, 3, 7, 8, 9, 10, 15, and 21; May 1, 14, 24, 28, and 29; June 1, 17, 20, and 22; July 10, 14, and 27; August 18, 27, and 29; September 14, 17; November 30; December 1, 2, 6, and 16; and almost continually during the first three months of 1969.

The Cultural Revolution saw much friction between the Military Region and Peking and even outright disobedience of the center. The most notable instance was the Wuhan incident of July-August 1967, when both provincial political authorities and the local military conspired (in Peking's eyes) against the center. The continuing disorganization and factionalism at all levels in China more than a year after Wuhan make it possible to accept an explanation based on intraregional or regional-center disagreement or failure of communications.

[74] This competition may have been reflected in the kinds and number of appearances of the two men during the period from the close of the Twelfth Plenum, October 31, 1968, to the March incidents. P'an appeared eleven times and Ch'en five times: the one who is behind in the race has to run faster. Ch'en reserved his appearances for the more important occasions.

[75] See *Izvestiia,* March 19, 1969, p. 3.

[76] See TASS, Vladivostok, March 16, 1969; *Pravda,* March 17, 1969; and *Sovetskaia Rossiia,* March 19, 1969.

One curious development in Chinese foreign policy of this period does support the hypothesis of a debate over what to do about the Soviet buildup. Chinese declaratory policy toward the United States suddenly changed in the period from Nixon's election as President to the cancellation of the Warsaw talks on February 20, 1969. Until the end of the Twelfth Plenum, Chinese comments about the United States were standard, hard-line fare, stressing the twin themes of the insolubility of American domestic problems and worldwide collusion with the Soviet Union against China and other "revolutionary" peoples. For about a month and a half thereafter, however, the anti-American tone of Peking pronouncements was muted, and in fact positive overtures to the United States seem to have been made. On November 3, 1968, *Jenmin Jih-pao* published without comment President Johnson's speech announcing a bombing halt over North Vietnam, surprising many observers not only because of its very publication but also because no adverse comment was appended. The first *NCNA* comment on Richard Nixon's election as the new President, November 8, although not friendly, was still muted and did not mention Nixon's strong anti-Communist background. This trend culminated in a Chinese declaration, November 25, which included a proposal to resume the Warsaw talks with the United States on February 20, 1969.[81] Although the Chinese declaration tried to blame the United States for the previous postponement of the talks, it also demanded that the five principles of peaceful coexistence (along with, to be sure, settlement of the Taiwan question on Chinese terms) be made the basis for Sino-American relations in the future. This could be considered an invitation to settle differences with the United States in the face of the growing Soviet threat.[82]

---

[77] Our survey included a study of articles and editorials in the central press and the public statements of the following individuals: Mao Tse-tung; Lin Piao; Chou En-lai; Ch'en Po-ta; Chiang Ch'ing; Yao Wen-yuan; Ch'en Yi; Hsieh Fu-chih; Huang Yung-sheng; Hsü Hsiang-chen; Yeh Chien-ying; Nieh Jung-chen; Wu Fa-hsien; and Su Yu.

Of the foregoing persons, only Lin Piao, Ch'en Yi, Huang Yung-sheng, and Wu Fa-hsien spoke at length on public occasions. None of them wrote authoritative articles in the press. Only Huang Yung-sheng's two speeches in Albania in early December 1968 could be interpreted as more rabidly anti-Soviet than the pronouncements of the others, and this can be rationalized by the necessity to please his Albanian audience. Of the 34 major reports, editorials, and speeches noted between October 31 and March 1, almost all are standard, relatively undeviating anti-Soviet polemics. If there were debates or differences of opinion as to how to handle the Soviet Union (as is possible), they were thus kept quiet. The very absence of indicators might itself be taken as an indication of a debate. But this does not seem to accord with the pattern of known previous debates.

[78] For example, the summer of 1965 (American intervention in Vietnam), the summer of 1958 (Quemoy crisis), and early fall 1950 (Korean War).

[79] Nanch'ang (Kiangsi) Provincial Broadcasting Station on July 31 reported, "Some time ago, some PLA personnel failed to understand clearly the relationship between preparedness against war and the task of 'three supports' and 'two militaries' [the ideological expression of military rule at the local level and correct popular attitudes toward it], thinking that in the face of major enemies, these tasks should be suspended." Others, the broadcast reported, "felt that since our country was so powerful, the imperialists, revisionists, and reactionaries would not dare to invade China and there would be no war."

[80] This does not exclude, of course, the possibility of non-Sino-Soviet related factionalism at the center. Many of the 34 statements referred to above spoke of differences, reluctance, misunderstandings, ideological deviations, and shortcomings on a wide variety of domestic issues. Differences on some of those issues might have masked, or included, differences on relations with the Soviet Union. But evidence is lacking.

[81] *NCNA*, November 25, 1968.

[82] The other possibility, of course, is that the Chinese overture was designed to deter the Russians from taking military action against China. It is doubtful, however, whether the Chinese would want to make

Nor does it seem coincidental that at just this time Chinese propaganda attacks against the Soviet Union abated. The most striking evidence that a new balance of power policy was being evolved and that more moderate elements within the Chinese leadership were gaining ascendancy (many cite Chou En-lai and Ch'en Yi) is the republication on November 25, 1968 of Mao Tse-tung's speech of March 5, 1949.[83] The speech seems to have been a surrogate for Mao's (as yet unpublished) speech at the Twelfth Plenum that had just ended. Although dealing mainly with domestic political and economic questions, it contained two locutions that are surprising, considering China's policy toward the Soviet Union (and, for that matter, toward the United States). First, the speech called for negotiations with the enemy: "We should not refuse to enter into negotiations because we are afraid of trouble and want to avoid complications, nor should we enter into negotiations with our minds in a haze." This statement hints that Mao did not want war with the Soviet Union and was opposed in that desire. If this is so, then the central Peking leadership either did not order the Army to initiate action on March 2, or there was a change in policy between late November and March. Second, the speech contained the phrase, "the world anti-imperialist front headed by the Soviet Union." This phrase leaps out as the only example in years of a favorable word about the Soviet Union in an official Chinese Communist publication. Leaving it in the text (the speech was doctored at a number of other points) would seem to indicate Chinese willingness, in late November, to settle differences with the Soviet Union peacefully.

Another possible explanation is that the Chinese Maoist leadership perpetrated the March 2 incident as a means of diverting attention from tensions built up during the Cultural Revolution, and that it planned to use the resulting war scare as an incentive to carry through reforms that had run into popular opposition.[84] In addition, the military dominated and then began to dissolve the "mass organizations," as the Red Guards and their revolutionary rebel allies were now called. Increasingly open resentment was being expressed against the severity of these measures and against military rule at all levels. The collective weight of these tensions by the end of the year may have frustrated the determination of provincial and central authorities to push through the Cultural Revolution and make it impossible, once and for all, to prevent a "restoration of capitalism" in China.

Popular resistance and resentment would have been expressed first against provincial revolutionary committees who, knowing that their political influence at and beyond the upcoming Ninth Party Congress was dependent upon their success in carrying out the Maoist line, were confused as to what to do. Knowing that the popularly resisted reforms might not work, and realizing that the Soviet border threat was increasing, some may have urged that domestic strictures be relaxed and that the Army be

---

too much of such an argument, even if implied: the possibility of backfire was too great.

[83] See *Jen-min Jih-pao*, November 25, for the speech and the joint editorial with *Hung Ch'i (Red Flag)* and *Chieh-fang-chün Pao (Liberation Army Daily)*, "Consciously Study the History of the Struggle Between the Two Lines"; translation in *Peking Review*, No. 48 (November 29, 1968). The 1949 speech also stressed the diplomatic, not military, struggle against the enemy. For later pronouncements that indicate a renewed hard-line attitude toward the United States, see *NCNA*, December 11, 1968; January 16, 20, 22, and 30, and February 8, 1969; and *Jen-min Jih-pao*, January 27 and February 2, 4, and 18, 1969.

[84] Changes instituted about the time of the Twelfth Plenum included the permanent relocation of several tens of millions of urban residents to the countryside; reform of the medical system through the "barefoot doctors" campaign, which, although it extended rudimentary medical services to the lowest levels, also disrupted the medical system and temporarily lowered medical standards and impeded disease control; the reform of the educational system, to put production teams in charge of staffing and financing basic education (where the state had helped before); and the militarization of industry and education, by elevating "worker-peasant propaganda teams" to leadership positions and by installing military leadership and organization, ending hopes of putting the economy on a rational basis.

The relocation campaign may be traced in *Jen-min Jih-pao*, October 5, 1968, and January 16, 1969; *Chieh-fang-chün Pao*, October 5 and 9; *NCNA*, October 12, 13, 18, and 21; Radio Honan, October 20 and 22; Radio Hunan, October 23; Radio Hupeh, October 12, 15, 21, and 23; Radio Canton, October 7, 23, and 25; Radio Szechuan, October 13, and 24; Radio Anhwei, October 11; Radio Heilungkiang, October 7 and 11; Radio Kiangsi, October 12; Radio Kweichow, October 12, 22, and 25, and November 1; and Radio Wuhan, February 3, 1969.

See Radio Harbin, June 26, *Jen-min Jih-pao*, July 9 and 22, and Radio Canton, November 6, 1968, for information on medical problems.

For educational reforms, consult *Hung Ch'i*, Nos. 3 and 4, 1968; *Jen-min Jih-pao*, July 22, August 25, September 11, October 18, 21, 26, 27, and 31; November 14, 15, 17, 19, 21, 23, 24, and 25; and December 2, 5, 6, 10, 12, 16, and 27; *NCNA*, October 12, 13, 18, and 21; *Wen Hui Pao*, December 24; Radio Honan, October 20; Radio Hunan, October 23; Radio Hupeh, October 12, 15, and 23; Radio Canton, October 25; Radio Szechuan, October 13, Radio Anhwei, October 10 and 11; and Radio Kiangsi, October 9, 1968.

For developments in industry, see *Jen-min Jih-pao*, August 26, October 22, and November 15; and *Kuang-ming Jih-pao*, October 30, 1968.

shifted from civil administration to military activities and preparations. Others, knowing that if this were done the Cultural Revolution would have failed, and wishing to cast their lot with the Maoist leadership to maximize their power, may have argued for continuing the program with redoubled effort. These counterpressures were probably the major reason for the continual postponement of the Ninth Congress, which was to ratify these changes and set the framework for the future political and economic life of the country.[85]

Mao (the Maoists?, Lin Piao?), seeing this threat to the success of the Cultural Revolution and the future, may have resolved to break the impasse by a sudden and spectacular move. A surprise attack on a Soviet border outpost might do the job, not only because the resulting war scare would overcome popular resistance to the Maoist reforms and the reluctance of many Congress delegates to give Mao and Lin a blank check for China's future,[86] but also because popular enmity toward the Soviet Union would insure the banishment of "capitalist" and "revisionist" influence from China for some time to come. The counterargument that the Soviets' superior force would overwhelm a Chinese attack was possibly met with the assertions that the communist movement in China has faced such situations before and had won; that the Soviet Union is a "paper tiger" who would not retaliate in a manner that could not be handled at the border; and that such incidents could only be useful to China in teaching "by negative example" the nature of Soviet "social imperialism." Hence, this argument concludes, Mao sent out the signal to perpetrate an incident, the exact location and timing of which was left to military commanders.

This argument possesses the virtue of joining a large number of domestic political considerations with foreign policy developments. Its defect is that it is entirely circumstantial; we have no factual evidence to confirm or deny such an interpretation.[87]

Chinese Foreign Policy. Three possible explanations for Chinese actions flow from Chinese foreign policy considerations. Their plausibility derives from their presumed persuasiveness to the Maoist leadership in light of the Soviet "paper tiger" thesis, the political machinations associated with the approaching Ninth Party Congress, and the hope of circumventing popular opposition to Cultural Revolution reforms by invoking a war scare. One explanation is that the Chinese leadership, noting the Soviet military buildup and the increasingly aggressive Russian border stance, decided that further Soviet moves would have to be met head-on. Thus Peking decided to "draw the line" against the Russians, ordered border patrols to increase the frequency of their movements, and, when the Russians stepped out of what the Chinese defined as their proper place, countered the Soviets with force. While this argument's weakest point is the obvious disparity of total power in favor of the Russians, along the frontier itself the balance may have been more even and in some places in China's favor. This seems to have been the case in the vicinity of Damansky. The chance that the Russians would retaliate in a major way would have to be taken, with the presumption that they would not so retaliate.

A second possible explanation is the "preemption" argument, which stresses Chinese recognition of the need to do something about the increasing disparity of forces in border military districts. Concluding that a clash was inevitable unless the Russians were thrown off balance, Peking may have decided to initiate action in an area where the Soviets were comparatively weak, hoping to convince the Soviet Union not to proceed further in its plans.

---

[85] The arguments developed here are entirely heuristic; no factual evidence is available to support them. The Ninth Congress had, during early 1968, been termed "imminent." Later that word was dropped. In early 1969, indications pointed to a March 1 opening date, then March 15. The Congress finally opened April 1.

[86] The 1968 draft Party constitution contained many provisions that would be seriously questioned by many Chinese. For example: Lin Piao is specifically named as Mao's only successor; Mao's Thought alone is placed at the center of Marxism-Leninism in the present era; improved living standards are no longer mentioned as the goal of the Party; class struggle is stressed to the extreme; the previous warning against great-Han chauvinism is dropped; the united front policy of cooperation with other parties is abrogated; the policy of peaceful coexistence is replaced by one of outright enmity toward the Soviet Union and the United States; the section on rights of party members is truncated; election of party organs by the membership is replaced with vague wording suggesting appointment from the top down; the length of tenure of office in central party organs is not specified; power is specifically concentrated in the Politburo, with a concomitant downgrading of the Central Committee; the Secretariat is not mentioned, nor are the control organs of the party; and no room is made for an Honorary Chairman, meaning that Mao will retain his present position for life.

[87] On the other hand, it is surprising that in his major report to the Ninth Congress, Lin Piao devoted disproportionate space (for a report of that nature) to his handling of Kosygin's telephone calls concerning the incident of March 15. If Lin felt constrained to speak in such detail to justify his actions at that juncture, it is possible that the entire Maoist anti-Soviet policy was under attack at, and presumably before, the Congress.

A third foreign policy explanation, the "dragon's teeth" argument, presumes that Mao was in full control of politics and that his policy continued to be based upon his view of the Soviet Union as the hated and feared revisionist "enemy within" the world Communist movement. In this explanation, Mao feared that despite the overall success of Cultural Revolutionary struggle against revisionist influences in China, the possibility remained of reimpregnation of the revisionist virus, both internally from within the Chinese body politic and externally through Soviet influence. A vaccination was needed against revisionism that would hold its potency well beyond Mao's own demise. If the Chinese people could be convinced, once and for all, of the threat of Soviet revisionism, they might not be tempted again by the "bourgeois revisionist line." Perhaps Mao hoped that permanent national hatred for the Russians would follow a serious military clash, properly exploited in the press, and that anti-Soviet demonstrations held throughout the country would serve to drive the point home. Hence, this argument concludes, the Damansky incident was staged to sow "dragon's teeth" between China and Russia.

Soviet Domestic Politics. The general atmosphere of Soviet domestic politics from late fall of 1968 to the March 2 incident, was, of course, quite different from that in China. In the Soviet Union, policy disagreements tended to reflect differences of emphasis, and were argued out within a relatively stable sociopolitical framework by participants with more or less common goals. A survey of the two central newspapers, *Pravda* and *Izvestiia,* important periodicals and the translation journal *Current Digest of the Soviet Press,* from October 1968 through February 1969, reveals trends, to be sure, but none that shows causative buildup toward either of the Damansky incidents.[88] On no issue was there evidence of fratricidal conflicts or disorders whose effects might spill over into foreign policy.[89]

Were there differences among the Soviet ruling elite that might relate directly to the border clash? Soviet leaders may have debated alternative policies toward China and decided to "get tough" with the Chinese beyond merely increasing Soviet military strength in the Far East. Evidence for such a resolution would take two forms: (1) a noticeable change in Soviet propaganda toward China, and (2) changes in the composition of the Soviet leadership as a result of displacing the opposition.[90]

A survey of 306 periodical articles and radio broadcasts from October 1, 1968, through the end of February, 1969,[91] reveals four general categories of Soviet comments on China: (1) criticism of Chinese internal politics during the Cultural Revolution;[92] (2) rejection of the Maoist ideological line;[93] (3) opposition to Chinese foreign policy toward both "socialist" and "capitalist" countries;[94] and (4) defense of

---

[88] The periodicals surveyed were *Kommunist; Partinaia zhizn'; Voprosy filosofii; Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i pravo;* and *Mirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia.* The reportage showed the Soviet Union to be experiencing the problems of advanced industrialization and the increasingly apparent contradictions between the concomitants of economic progress—easier communication, social mobility, more bureaucracy, and higher education levels—and the Party's desire to preserve monolithic rule by a tiny percentage of the population. There was also evidence of continuing differences over agricultural policy in the debate over the proposal to institute "mechanized links" at the lowest rural administrative level.

[89] The only exception is the rise of local nationalist sentiment in Central Asian Soviet republics, which the Soviets increasingly repressed after March 2 by appeals to pan-Soviet nationalism in the face of the border crisis.

[90] A methodological note is in order. Nearly every major decision of the Soviet Politburo (or Presidium) in the past has been accompanied by either or both of these indicators. See, in this regard, Leonhard, *The Kremlin Since Stalin;* Robert Conquest, *Power and Policy in the USSR* (New York: Harper and Row, Torchbooks ed., 1967); and Michel Tatu, *Power in the Kremlin* (New York: Viking, 1969). But often some time must pass before evidence of intra-elite dissension or struggle appears in any but the most esoteric manner. Propaganda change, on the other hand, is a more reliable short-term indicator of unannounced policy changes. Thus, absence of detectable leadership changes in the short run does not necessarily indicate absence of a change in policy, but absence of propaganda changes in the same period would indicate absence of policy change.

[91] Based on the following Russian sources: *Pravda, Izvestiia,* TASS, *Kommunist, Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil,* Radio Moscow (Domestic and International), Radio Peace and Progress, *Komsomol'skaia pravda, Literaturnaia gazeta,* Radio Tashkent, *Sovetskaia Rossiia, Pravda Ukrainy, Krasnaia Zvezda, Trud,* and *International Affairs.*

[92] The following subthemes are included: the Maoist "military-bureaucratic dictatorship"; the revolutionary committees as Mao's personal political machine; Mao's overreliance on the PLA; worker-peasant-student-soldier resistance to Mao; repression of national minorities; and great-Han chauvinism.

[93] Including: Maoist betrayal of the principles of Marxism-Leninism; diminution of the leading role of the Party; syndicalist, anarchist deviations; and Maoist subversion of Marxist-Leninist principles of armed struggle and national liberation.

[94] Includes charges that: anti-Sovietism is the main content of Chinese foreign policy; China provokes border disputes with the Soviet Union; China tries to sow dissension in the socialist camp and is thus anti-proletarian internationalist; anti-Sovietism acts to consolidate Mao's dictatorship and channels domestic discontent away from the leadership; Maoist China is like traditional China—imperialist and hegemonic; and China is in collusion with "capitalist" countries,

Soviet policy toward China and other areas.[95] Two general conclusions emerge. First, with one significant exception, the frequency, volume, and intensity of these themes varied little throughout the period.[96] Second, there was almost no change in emphasis throughout the period between themes or subthemes. The overall impression is one of invariability of policy, as reflected in overt propaganda directed at both the Soviet and Chinese populations.

As for the composition of the Kremlin leadership, clearly there was intramural pulling and hauling behind the scenes. Some attempted to enhance the status of Leonid Brezhnev as general secretary of the Party; others opposed these efforts. The general picture is of the ups and downs of Brezhnev's status, with a slow but perceptible increase. Shelepin's status continued to slip. The Ukrainian and Belorussian presses differed from each other and from Moscow in their treatment of the central leadership. A possible ideological rift that emerged in February 1969 between Moscow and Leningrad may have reflected policy differences.[97] But none of these veiled developments seems serious enough or sufficiently connected, even indirectly, with Sino-Soviet relations to warrant the hypothesis that after a certain date the presumed debate was resolved in favor of one group (and hence policy) over another.

Differences between the Soviet Party and the Red Army, if they existed and are detectable, could have influenced Soviet activities along the frontier. Perhaps the Army had a more militant (or a less militant) attitude toward Chinese border "provocations" than the Party, and this difference may have affected military postures and tactics. Such differences are possible but extremely difficult to discover, since the empirical evidence is not available.

A survey of *Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil,* a major Soviet military publication, was undertaken to discover evidence of top-level policy disagreements on strategic matters and in regard to China, and to learn whether the "Brezhnev doctrine," enunciated in 1968 in connection with the Czechoslovak crisis, had been applied to China.[98] (The latter would indicate whether the Russians were planning a tougher

---

as seen by common policies on the Vietnam and Czechoslovak questions.

[95] For example, protestations of solidarity and friendship with the Chinese people, as opposed to the Maoist leadership; invocations of Soviet defense of "proletarian internationalism" and world socialism; and explanation and defense of the "Brezhnev doctrine" justifying Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia.

[96] The one significant exception occurred in treatment of the border issue. Only from October 2 to 31 did Soviet sources mention the problem of the Sino-Soviet border. From then until the March 2 incident there was total silence on the issue. See Moscow Radio, October 1, 2, and 7; Radio Peace and Progress, October 21; and the Soviet note to the Chinese Foreign Ministry of October 31 (rebutting the Chinese charge of border provocations in a note of September 16); *Pravda,* November 1. See also *Izvestiia,* November 2, for an interview on the subject with the Deputy Chief of Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, and Chou En-lai's Albanian banquet speech of September 29, 1968, *Jen-min Jih-pao,* September 30.

We can speculate on explanations for Soviet silence on the border issue after October. It might signify resolution of a difference within the Soviet leadership on the matter or actual power changes in the Kremlin. Perhaps the Soviets dropped the subject, intending "negative conditioning" (allowing a hiatus so as to take up another issue). Third, Soviet propaganda on the border may have so irked the Chinese that they threatened punitive action if the Russians continued it. This seems highly unlikely, given the Soviet military buildup along the frontier. On the other hand, with the end of the Cultural Revolution in sight and foreseeing Mao's resumption of control over Chinese politics, perhaps the Soviets were hesitant to provoke just the kind of violent incident that finally took place in March. Finally, cessation of propaganda can be taken as a signal to the Chinese of Soviet desires to settle the border dispute, now that the Cultural Revolution had subsided and the "professionals" were presumably back in control of Chinese foreign policy. Unforunately, the opposite interpretation is possible: with troops moving eastward and rumors sure to flow through the Soviet populace about the buildup, perhaps the Russians did not wish to alert the Chinese or cause concern among Russians regarding Soviet intentions. In any case, it seems likely that a decision was indeed made after a certain date (early November 7) to speak with acts, rather than words, about the border dispute. Half of the new policy involved frequent and intensified patrolling by newly stationed troops. The other half, visible after late October, was cessation of propaganda related to the border problem. This seems to be the most likely and consistent evaluation of Soviet intentions.

[97] On Brezhnev's varying status, compare *Pravda,* September 13, 1968, p. 6, with *Izvestiia,* September 15 (the latter article slighted Brezhnev's war role); see *Izvestiia,* October 25, p. 3, extolling his war role (*Pravda* did not carry a similar story); compare *Pravda,* December 11, p. 1, showing Katushev, Brezhnev's protégé, in an unusually prominent place, with *Pravda,* December 19, p. 1, where Katushev's title was conspicuously lowered from Secretary *of* the Central Committee to Secretary *under* the Central Committee; and compare the doctoring of Brezhnev's Belorussian liberation anniversary speech in *Pravda,* December 28, with the speech as carried on Moscow Domestic Radio, December 28.

[98] *Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil (KVS)* is a semi-monthly journal published by the Main Political Administration of the Armed Forces. Our survey covered issues from October 1968 to March 1969, and sought statements about China, border problems, and general strategic policy. A survey of *Krasnaia zvezda (Red Star),* the daily military newspaper, from October 1968 to February 1969, was not fruitful, and the other major military journal, *Voennaia mysl' (Military Thought)* was impossible to obtain because its circulation is restricted to the Red Army command staff.

military stance toward China.) During the six months before March 1969, there were differences between the Party and the Army on strategic issues and over such perennial issues as the military's relative independence from the Party and the nature and kinds of war in the contemporary era. Articles in *KVS* take a harder position than the traditional Party view of these subjects. Previously military preparedness was stressed as a way of preventing the universal destructiveness of nuclear war; articles in the period surveyed now also declared it the duty of the Soviet Union to make long-term political changes if war were to begin. For instance, Colonel V. Larionov states that the "international duty" of the Soviet state is to actively support armed proletarian struggles in civil wars abroad and to stop foreign interference in the internal affairs of other countries.[99] The Larionov article is one of several in which we can trace the outlines of a debate over military independence from Party control,[100] but evidence is lacking that such differences concerned policy toward China or resulted in actions before March that could have contributed to the Sino-Soviet border clash.[101]

Nevertheless, *KVS* does indicate a military attitude toward China that holds implications for border policy. There was an attempt, for instance, to tar Maoist China with the imperialist brush, so that arguments against "imperialism," the main external enemy of the socialist "commonwealth," might also be used against China.[102] More important, there was an attempt to extend the Brezhnev doctrine to deal with "leftism," the main enemy inside the camp. The Brezhnev doctrine can be stated positively, neutrally, or negatively, depending on the degree of threat to the "gains of socialism" one sees in a given country.[103] When a "direct threat" to the gains of socialism exists, action must be taken to restore the *status quo ante*. Although the doctrine usually referred to the Czechoslovak case, several of the *KVS* articles either mentioned China in the same context or implied that the doctrine in its negative sense must be applied to China.[104] Since Maoist policy has brought a threat to socialist gains in China,[105] it might be necessary to "extirpate" such "leftist" deviationists.[106] This is particularly true when the "imperialist" enemy without allies itself with the deviationist enemy within.[107] One must then eliminate the latter in order to block attack from the former.

---

[99] "The Political Side of Soviet Military Doctrine," *KVS*, No. 22 (November, 1968), pp. 11–18. In advocating opposition to "imperialism" by more direct means, this article seems to have been a new departure from the prevailing Party opinion.

[100] In October 1968, Colonel A. Babakov, in "The Unity of Science and Policy in the Military Activity of the CPSU," *KVS*, No. 19, pp. 61–67, wrote of the necessity for Party control over military thought and operations, particularly over the scientific-technical aspects of the modern military machine. The Larinov article in November dissented from this somewhat by stressing the "military-technical" factor. Although this "side" of Soviet military doctrine was still dominated by the political, the author's use of the term "side" signifies an enhanced view of the nonpolitical elements of warfare.

The hints thrown out by Larionov were explicitly developed in a major article by Lieutenant Colonel V. Bondarenko a month later. ("The Contemporary Revolution in Military Affairs and the Combat Readiness of the Armed Forces," *KVS*, No. 24 [December 1968], pp. 22–29). Bondarenko argued expressly that "the military field is a relatively independent area of social life" and hence "has its own logic of development." True, science, economics, and politics (i.e., Party policy) all influence military doctrine and developments (and Party policy directs the development of the first two); but within each, including military affairs, there is a relatively independent development, and external sources (politics being external to military affairs) can only "facilitate or hinder the process which has objectively matured and is developing directly."

As if to emphasize the point, he stated, p. 24, that "In some studies, the sole cause of the revolution in military affairs is declared to be politics, and sometimes individual political organizations alone, or even just their leaders."

[101] Strategic weapons arguments could have been used in regard to China since it now possesses a nuclear capability. But they are much more likely to have been used in the debate over the strategic balance with the United States. Further, if China policy figured in a debate over military investment, we would expect to see arguments about the relative weight to be accorded conventional versus nuclear weapons. Such arguments do not appear in the sources consulted.

[102] See Captain 2nd Rank A. Skryl'nik, "The All-Conquering Force of Lenin's Ideas," *KVS*, No. 24 (December, 1968), pp. 14–21, and Captain 1st Rank B. Demidov, "For the Unity of Action of Communist and Worker Parties." *KVS*, No. 3 (February 1967) pp. 18–25.

[103] Thus, in the positive sense, "the Soviet Union, as *the most powerful socialist state, in carrying out* its internationalist duty, gives and will give all that is necessary for the strengthening of the socialist system as a whole and each of its links taken separately." (N. Korolev, "V. I. Lenin on Social Democracy and Proletarian Internationalism," *KVS*, No. 2 [January 1969], p. 14.) See also M. Parnev and T. Ermakova, "The Most Influential Political Force of the Present," *KVS*, No. 4 (February, 1969), pp. 20–26.

Neutrally, "*internationalism cannot remain indifferent* to the fate of socialism in fraternal governments. . . . The defense and consolidation of the gains of socialism in fraternal countries is the sacred international duty of communists." (Korolev, p. 13.)

And negatively, "the negation or denigration of the leading role of the party leads to the deformation of socialist democracy, and creates a direct threat to the gains of socialism." (Korolev, p. 12.)

[104] See Korolev, p. 12; "Editorial," *KVS*, No. 3 (February, 1969), pp. 3–8; Demidov, and Parnev and Ermakova.

[105] F. Khrustov, "V. I. Lenin's Works on the Socialist State," *KVS*, No. 23 (December, 1968), p. 19.

[106] M. Abdrakhmanov, "V. I. Lenin on the Strategy

Thus Soviet military writers set the theoretical stage for military action against China. Since their articles antedated the first March incident, it is possible that some sectors of the Soviet armed forces, in alliance with some Party officials, were pushing for a showdown with China.[108] Whether or not this affected the events leading to the first violent outbreak, it undoubtedly did contribute heavily to the Soviet initiative on March 15 (the danger posed by China having by then been "proved") and to the new Soviet policy after the border clashes.

Soviet Foreign Policy. Does the tenor of Soviet foreign policy during this period substantiate hints of a planned showdown with the Chinese? Major Soviet foreign policy pronouncements lead us to the reverse conclusion. From the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968 through February 1969, the Russians were preoccupied with Eastern European problems and the Arab-Israeli conflict. Strategic issues, too—arms limitations talks and the anti-ballistic missile question—were matters of concern. The September and November Budapest meetings of the Preparatory Committee for the long-postponed International Communist Conference claimed some attention, as did treatment of Communists in Indonesia, NATO and sea power in the Mediterranean, and Yugoslav revisionism. But the Berlin question, which erupted again in late February, worried Moscow less than did similar previous events.[109] Judging from the public media, then, the Chinese question seemed to rate no more concern than did these other problems.

While it is thus highly unlikely that the Russians took pre-emptive action and initiated the March 2 incident, it is not implausible that the Russians, like the Chinese, decided to draw the line and that a battle therefore became inevitable. This explanation is supported by the increase in Soviet troop and equipment transfers to the Far East and accords with the possibility that Moscow ordered local commanders to toughen their border patrols. It also allows for the contingent element in explanation which, in historical writings, looms ever larger as time passes. This explanation does not accord, however, with other developments in Soviet domestic politics and foreign policy. The Soviet Union can probably still disguise basic shifts in foreign policy for some months after the basic decision has been made. The absence of border propaganda after the beginning of November enhances the probability that such a basic decision was made after that date. But the other indicators discussed above would be expected to have signified a policy change. They did not. And though Soviet military writing indicated a growing hard-line attitude toward China, that interpretation is inferential and still tenuous.[110]

Summary

Despite the fact that the Chinese "caused" the March 2 incident by carrying out an ambush, in a larger sense both sides must be held "responsible" for it. Chinese developments on several levels—local, domestic, and foreign policy—combined to precipitate the incident. Although evidence is lacking, the local Chinese border commander probably took the initiative in response to changes in standing orders from Peking. At the national level, the October-November 1968 softening of propaganda attacks and diplomatic treatment of the United States and the Soviet Union indicates differences about how to approach the two superpowers. The restoration of hard-line propaganda toward both after late November indicates a decision to remain "tough" with the Russians along the frontier. This development dovetails with the argument concerning Peking's awareness of popular resistance to post-Cultural Revolution reforms and the need to rally the populace. These developments in turn accord with the three plausible foreign policy arguments: a new policy of drawing the line; sowing "dragon's

---

and Tactics of World Communists," *KVS,* No. 3 (February, 1969), p. 10.

[107] Demidov, p. 20, and Skryl'nik, p. 19.

[108] Several options present themselves: Army-Party differences, each institution taken as a whole; intra-Army debates; intra-Party debates; or an alliance of subgroups within each. The last is most probable, because of the difficulty of debates on these subjects taking place within only one of the concerned institutions, and because *KVS* is a creature of the Party within the Army.

[109] The Soviets claimed after the March 2 incident that the Chinese had stabbed them in the back by attacking while their attention was taken up with the Berlin mini-crisis. This claim strains credulity, since no one, including the Russians, thought the Berlin problem would develop any threat proportions. The claim was a formal exercise, and the Soviets as much as told Washington so.

[110] It was easy for Soviet military writers to arrive at those conclusions, given the anti-China atmosphere in the Soviet Union. That such conclusions were not openly expressed in print probably means either total control over every written expression on the subject or a policy that did not recognize overt military action against China as a viable alternative. The former is possible; the latter is more probable.

teeth"; and using pre-emption as a local tactic to throw the Soviets off balance and deter larger blows.

On the Soviet side, the most plausible explanations approximate a mirror image of those on the Chinese side. Stronger standing orders were probably sent from Moscow to local border commanders, resulting in more frequent and aggressive patroling. The Russians probably thought that when the Chinese became aware of this step-up and of the Soviets' intensified border fortification, they would be awed into staying in line. The conjunction of this Soviet policy with the local Chinese policy of enhanced border patroling and a strategy of pre-emption of what they saw as an increasingly certain Soviet attack made the Damansky clash inevitable. Although arguments concerning the general trends of domestic politics, war scare, and "dragon's teeth" are absent on the Soviet side, there is evidence of some sort of change in foreign policy after November 1968. Apparently, after a debate, the Brezhnev-Kosygin leadership decided that it would have to deal much more firmly with China. Once that decision was taken, it was merely a matter of time before an incident occurred.[111]

Finally, we have rejected as without empirical foundation the following possibilities. On the Chinese side, a regional initiative stemming from differences between Heilungkiang Provincial Revolutionary Committee and Shenyang Military Region; factionalism in Peking (other than the evidence noted in connection with the October-November change in propaganda toward the United States and the Soviet Union); and, at the most local level, chance as a cause of the outbreak. On the Soviet side, chance is also rejected, together with: regional initiatives; the need for a foreign diversion from the effects of domestic sociopolitical developments; differences within the Kremlin leadership over China policy (except for the evidence from cessation of border propaganda, which seems to indicate an *agreed* policy change); the general trend of Soviet foreign policy; and the possibility of Soviet preemptory attack.

The March 15 Incident. Explaining the March 15 outbreak is somewhat easier: the interval between the two incidents is short; the motives of the two parties are much more obvious; and what took place is fairly well documented.

The March 2 incident brought the Sino-Soviet border issue to the center of attention in Moscow, and a major change was wrought in Soviet policy toward China. Evidently the Soviets decided henceforth to pursue a dual strategy. Diplomatically, the Russians moved to convince the Chinese of the necessity to settle the border problem definitely through a new and comprehensive border treaty. Pressure for talks was to be applied by constant, aggressive border patroling, willingness to engage in firefights and other battles with Chinese military personnel, and possibly even initiation of border incidents at strategic moments. On the military front, additional troops and equipment were immediately sent to the frontier in anticipation that the first strategy might not work and, therefore, that the Soviet Union might have to undertake major military action.[112]

The March 15 incident was the beginning of the Soviet dual strategy. Hence, that strategy was the major "cause" of the second Damansky incident. Essentially, the strategy was to pursue two lines simultaneously without having to choose between them until forced to. The Soviets hoped that giving the Chinese periodic bloody noses would convince them of the wisdom of border settlement along the lines of the 1964 Soviet proposals. If this did not work, then direct action might have to be taken. And if the latter alternative were "forced" upon the Russians, then they would have to decide either to gird for prolonged military conflict with China or attack in a quick, pre-emptive strike.

Given the nature of the Soviet system, the conclusion that the Soviets adopted a new strategy is a matter of inference rather than of direct evidence. Supporting this inference and explaining the Soviet part in the March 15 event are the following: the Soviet handling of the March 2 incident; a desire for revenge; local pre-emption; desire to protect Soviet standing in the international Communist movement; and Soviet nationalism.

Revenge seems to have been a primary motive on the Soviet side. Considering that the

---

[111] Whether or not the Soviets had thought out the second half of the decision, namely, that such a policy might lead to war, the outlines of a "dual policy" came into clearer focus after the post-November decision.

[112] Various stages of increasing violence can well be imagined: division-sized temporary incursion across the border; more than temporary occupation of small portions of Chinese territory; pinching off a chunk of Sinkiang and providing a Soviet-installed "autonomous" government; conventional attack against Chinese nuclear installations; nuclear attack against Chinese nuclear installations; turning Sinkiang into an Outer Mongolia; frontal attack at several points along the border, i.e., extending the range of large-scale hostilities to Inner Mongolia and Manchuria; and all-out attack with the goals of partitioning China, overthrowing the Maoist leadership, and installing a government in Peking favorable to the Soviet Union.

Chinese carried out a premeditated, treacherous attack, the Soviets felt that the Chinese should be made to pay for the Soviet blood expended. This motive stands apart from arguments, surely made, about the necessity to defend every inch of Soviet soil from foreign attack. Soviet domestic propaganda from March 3 to 15 bears out the theme of revenge.[113]

Local pre-emption would have been a factor if the Soviets noted a Chinese military buildup near Damansky after March 2, sensed an attack coming, and decided to attack first themselves. Indeed, the Chinese may have attacked first, as the Russians claim. But the Russians readied themselves for a fight, and had every intention of answering any Chinese initiative in full.

No doubt a factor in Soviet calculations was the fear that a weak response to the first Damansky incident would impair Soviet standing in the international Communist movement. A weak response, they figured, would neutralize the gains made in recouping prestige lost during Khrushchev's regime. It would also hinder the ongoing Soviet effort to convene an international Communist conference on the same scale and with the same ideological authority as the 1960 conference in Moscow.[114] Weakness might also have convinced many nonruling (as well as some ruling) parties that Soviet strictures on the dangers of China, and possibly on other issues as well, should not be taken seriously. Since a major Soviet goal at the upcoming conference was to gain *de facto* condemnation of the Chinese (if not to elicit anti-Chinese declarations), the Russians could ill afford not to take action.[115]

Soviet domestic propaganda played heavily upon the theme of Soviet nationalism during the time between the two incidents. Demonstrations were staged in many Russian cities.[116] Russians have historically exhibited extreme nationalism in times of military crisis affecting Soviet territory. The appeal to nationalism benefited the Brezhnev-Kosygin leadership, which had been plagued with increasing, local, anti-Great Russian nationalist sentiment.[117] The leadership thus probably found the effects of the Damansky Island incidents not entirely unwelcome in submerging if not eradicating a dangerous tendency.

Since it was the Russians, not the Chinese, who initiated action on Damansky Island on March 15, Chinese motivations are less important than Soviet ones.[118] Nonetheless, it is useful to record the Chinese reaction to the March 2 incident, for it gives clues about continuing Chinese attitudes toward border problems. Demonstrations in Peking began within 24 hours of the incident and spread rapidly throughout the country. The Soviet embassy in Peking was besieged for the fourth time since the Cultural Revolution began. Every group in the country was called on to issue anti-Soviet statements, and the press and radio gave extensive coverage. Demonstrations continued through March 15, and Peking claimed that more than 400 million people (over half the entire population of China) had marched at one time or another.[119]

---

[113] Official Soviet reports and eyewitness accounts of the March 2 events, as well as the mass meetings held throughout the country after March 7, called for revenge.

[114] The Soviet Communist Party had been working with non-pro-Chinese branches of the movement for over four years to schedule the conference. At the meetings of the Preparatory Committee in Budapest in September and November 1968, member parties had finally agreed to hold the conference in May 1969. For documentation of these meetings, see *CDSP*, Vol. 20, No. 40 (October 23, 1968), pp. 10–11, and Vol. 20, No. 47 (December 11, 1968), pp. 3–5. The Soviets had the remaining task of ensuring the attendance of the signatories to the Budapest Declarations and enticing other Communist parties, particularly the Italian and Rumanian, to the meeting.

[115] On the other hand, too severe a Russian action might have driven the Italians and the Rumanians away from the May meeting. These parties opposed the Russian efforts to turn the conference into an anti-China diatribe. The Soviets therefore had to modulate carefully their response at Damansky on the 15th, being less severe with the Chinese than they otherwise might have been. As it was, the May meeting had to be postponed to June because of the border outbreak, and the Rumanians and the Italians agreed to attend only if no adverse mention of the Chinese was made in the official declarations of the conference.

[116] The few meetings held immediately after the March 2 event did not swell to any climax. Only when the Russians were certain that the March 2 attack was not part of a larger military operation did they turn on the propaganda machine in earnest. Massive demonstrations and commentaries began on March 7, five days after the initial announcement of the fighting and the exchange of diplomatic notes, reached a peak on the 8th, and declined to a constant, low-keyed effort by the 14th. A demonstration at which ink bottles were thrown was held in front of the Chinese embassy March 7 and demonstrations spread to major Soviet cities during the week of March 4–11.

[117] On nationalism in the Soviet Union, see "The Soviet Moslem World," *Studies on the Soviet Union* (Zurich), Vol. 7, No. 4 and Vol. 8, No. 1, 1968 (entire issues); Richard Pipes, "The Solution of the Nationality Problem," *Studies on the Soviet Union*, Vol. 6, No. 3, 1967, pp. 35–47; and P. Urban, "A Soviet Discussion of the Concept of Nationhood," *Bulletin of the Institute for the Study of the USSR* (Munich), Vol. 14, No. 5 (May 1967), pp. 37–48.

[118] It is possible, but not probable, that the Chinese did begin action on the 15th as well as on the 2nd of March. If they did, the reason was simply a desire to gain a tactical advantage over the Russians. In other words, the Chinese may have attempted to forestall the expected Russian attack. The difference between the two incidents then would lie in the relative success of the Chinese: this tactic worked in the first instance but not in the second. The reason, of course, was that the Russians were ready for them the second time and by then had a clear local superiority in equipment, if not in men.

Several reasons can be given for the extreme reaction of the Chinese. First, to Maoists, who denied Chinese initiation of the March 2 incident, it was final proof of the iniquity of the "social imperialism" of the "new Tsars" in the Kremlin. What Mao had been telling the Chinese people about "modern revisionism" could now be seen in fact. The incident thus demonstrated the link between Soviet ideological deviations and foreign policy, and it showed what could happen to a formerly socialist state that had "changed color." In a sense, the March 2 incident as a Soviet attack justified the Cultural Revolution (which by then needed more than ever to be justified to the Chinese people).

More important, the demonstrations helped the leadership push through the reforms of the preceding several months. As we have seen, many of these had not met with popular acceptance, and the Maoists seized upon the Damansky incident to create a work incentive. Many of the propaganda statements also urged the people to work even harder in "grasping revolution and promoting production," the overall slogan for the various reform campaigns.

Finally, the demonstrations served an important foreign policy goal: to convince the Soviets of the unity of the Chinese body politic, ready and able to repel any Russian attempts to take more general military action in retaliation for Damansky. This probably was convincing to the Soviets, although they had no intention of escalating the Damansky conflict. The ploy did not work at Damansky itself, however, and the difference in Chinese reaction to the second incident (there were very few demonstrations and of short duration only) shows that the Chinese leadership had hoped that the magnitude of the propaganda response would keep the Russians from even local military action.

Conclusion

Several conclusions emerge. First, border problems did not occupy a major place in either state's attitude toward the other until relations began to deteriorate for other reasons. Once the question of the border was brought up, however, it tended to take on a life of its own. Second, the 1964 effort to solve the problem before it became serious was not successful, chiefly because the Chinese, again for reasons unconnected with the border itself, did not wish it to be settled. But in theory there are no insurmountable obstacles to a final settlement of the issue. Third, the controversy became serious with the beginning of the "active phase" of the Cultural Revolution in mid-1966. Both parties are to be blamed for the ensuing situation. The Chinese apparently allowed extremist partisans of the Cultural Revolution to cross at will over the border, causing the Russians to worry about allegedly irrational Chinese behavior and conjuring up old fears about large numbers of Chinese sweeping in from the East to settle like locusts upon Soviet soil. The Russians, for their part, overreacted to Cultural Revolution incursions by fortifying their border forces much beyond the level necessary to cope with propaganda demonstrations by unruly Chinese crowds and by policing the border with an iron hand (although, to their credit, adhering to procedures designed to prevent bloodshed).

As for the two border incidents themselves, their causes differ considerably. The more important March 2 incident seems on balance to have been "caused" by the Chinese, who fired the first shots and organized the ambush on Damansky Island. A basic explanation for Chinese actions depends upon the complex interplay of historical, local, national, personality, and foreign policy forces. No single explanation suffices, and it is difficult even to establish priorities among those that do not conflict. The attempt to assign relative weights to the above factors and arrive at a composite explanation does point up, however, the close linkage between Chinese domestic politics and foreign policy, a connection that always exists but is rarely made explicit. The March 15 incident is harder to describe than it is to explain. The Russians either pulled the trigger first or led the Chinese into a trap. Once again, the search for the explanation reveals a complex of motivations deriving from the interplay between Soviet domestic politics and foreign policy.

The importance of the two March incidents lies not merely in their being the first military clashes between the two major Communist powers. The events also punctuated a phase in Sino-Soviet relations and began a new trend that culminated in the agreement to renew border negotiations in October 1969. In retrospect, the Damansky events may have marked a turning point in Sino-Soviet relations, if border negotiations succeed in producing a document that will authoritatively delineate the border. Such an agreement might well set a limit below which Sino-Soviet relations cannot fall and might even symbolize a partial return to the close cooperation that marked their relations in the years immediately after 1950. Hence, early March 1969 may come to be regarded as the nadir of Sino-Soviet relations. Even if the Peking negotiations fail—either through the breakdown of negotiations and the possible resumption of fighting, or through *pro forma* prolongation of negotiations merely to avoid the consequences of failure—the two March incidents will have exerted a major influence on long-term Sino-Soviet relations and hence on world politics.

---

[119] See especially NCNA Domestic Radio, March 4; NCNA International Radio, March 3; joint *Jen-min Jih-pao* and *Chieh-fang-chün Pao* editorial, "Down With the New Tsars," March 3; Budapest MTI Domestic Radio, March 3; NCNA International Radio, March 5 and 6; Kweiyang Radio, March 5; Chengtu Radio, March 5; Kunming Radio, March 5; Chengchow Radio, March 5; NCNA International Radio, March 6 and 7; Budapest MTI Domestic Radio, March 6; NCNA International Radio, March 7, 8, 9 and 10; *SCMP* 4373 (March 11), pp. 18–20; *SCMP* 4374 (March 12), pp. 20–27; *SCMP* 4375 (March 13), pp. 26–33; *SCMP* 4376 (March 14), pp. 18–20. *Current Background,* No. 876 (April 11, 1969), gives 50 pages of translations of reports on the demonstrations.

Party Identification, Party Choice, and Voting Stability: The Weimar Case*

W. PHILLIPS SHIVELY

University of Minnesota

The tragic and dramatic voting changes which took place in Germany from 1928 to 1933 have often attracted the attention of political analysts.[1] In terms of the number of lives they affected, they may comprise the most momentous electoral change to have occurred in any country at any time. Inasmuch as they pose a challenge to theories of viable democracy, these changes have also been of considerable theoretical interest to political scientists.

In this paper I shall try to identify some of the sources of electoral stability and instability during the Weimar Republic, in the hope of contributing to general theories of electoral change and to understanding the particular tragedy of Weimar as well. Although this paper includes other aspects of stability and instability, it centers on the question of whether or not party identification was an important factor in Weimar voting. The most important current theory of voting stability is what I shall call the "party identification theory of electoral stability." According to this theory, to the extent that voters have acquired enduring psychological attachments to existing political parties, electoral change will be muted; in particular, sudden bursts of votes for "flash parties" will be less likely.

Dennis and McCrone state the theory:

> Party system stability, in the sense of a persisting configuration of organized partisan competition, is a function of how widely rooted in mass public consciousness is the sense of identification with the parties. Two aspects of mass identification are important: (a) the extent of partisan identification as measured by the proportion of the general public who identify themselves psychologically with one or another of the parties, however intensely; (b) the intensity of party affiliation, seen as the percent of identifiers who have a strong (and thus, more enduring) sense of commitment to one of the parties.[2]

Philip Converse states it:

> While there is undoubtedly a variety of indicators of this habituation [to democracy], the one most noteworthy in our eyes is the progressive "binding in" of popular loyalties to one or another of the traditionally competing political parties. Where these loyalties have not yet had time to develop, it seems likely that electoral support will have numerous capricious overtones, and that in times of severe distress nontraditional and antidemocratic parties may find ready support. When in an intermediate stage they become at least moderately developed, such probabilities may decline quite visibly although it may remain a frequent strategy of political dissent to launch a new political party in hopes of striking sufficient popular support to become viable. When these loyalties become still further developed, however, even such a strategy comes to seem forbidding in the extreme and is rarely entertained for any purpose more serious than short-term maneuver.[3]

The theory as it is stated in these two examples compares nations (or the same nation at different points in time) having different overall levels of party identification. It also implies a difference among subgroups of a population,

---

* I should like to thank Walter Dean Burnham, Richard Rose, Loren K. Waldman, and my wife, Barbara, for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper, and the Social Science Research Council and the Yale University Concilium on International and Area Studies for their support at the time I was working on it.

[1] For example: Reinhard Bendix, "Social Stratification and Political Power," in *Class, Status, and Power*, ed. Reinhard Bendix and Seymour Lipset (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1953), pp. 596–609; Karl D. Bracher, *Die Auflösung der Weimarer Republik* (Villingen: Schwarzwald, 1960); Walter Dean Burnham, "Political Immunization and Political Confessionalism," delivered at the 1970 meeting of the International Political Science Association, Munich, 1970; Philip Converse, "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics," in *Ideology and Discontent*, ed. David Apter (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1964), pp. 252–254; Rudolf Heberle, *From Democracy to Nazism* (Baton Rouge, La.: Louisiana State University Press, 1945); Seymour Martin Lipset, *Political Man* (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1960), 140–154; Werner Kaltefleiter, *Wirtschaft und Politik in Deutschland* (Köln: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1968), pp. 13–94; Karl O'Lessker, "Who Voted for Hitler? A New Look at the Class Basis of Naziism," *American Journal of Sociology*, 74 (July, 1968), 63–69; Loren K. Waldman, *Models of Mass Movements: The Case of the Nazis*, Ph.D. thesis, University of Chicago, 1972.

[2] Jack Dennis and Donald J. McCrone, "Preadult Development of Political Party Identification in Western Democracies," *Compartaive Political Studies*, 3 (July, 1970), 247.

[3] Philip E. Converse, "Of Time and Partisan Stability," *Comparative Political Studies*, 2 (July, 1969), 141–142.

with those at the lower levels of party identification contributing disproportionately to whatever shifts and surges occur. The latter version of the theory has been tested experimentally by Dean Jaros and Gene Mason, using American subjects.[4]

Comparative Studies of Party Identification

Party identification theory, from which the party identification theory of electoral stability derives, was developed from American studies.[5] But it has been applied to quite general comparative questions, as in the two examples cited above. The justification for doing this appears to be that party identification has seemed to develop in much the same way in most western electorates. In a number of studies, for instance, levels of party identification similar to that found in the United States have been indicated by responses to "party identification" questions patterned on those used in the American studies.[6]

Exceptions to this—such as the low levels of partisanship observed in France and Italy—might have cast doubt upon the value of applying party identification very generally, if they could not be accounted for.[7] It would have seemed risky to extend party identification comparatively—and especially to extend it to historical cases such as the Weimar Republic—if national levels of party identification had to be treated as chance occurrences. But Converse has developed an ingenious theory which accounts for the low partisanship of electorates such as those of France and Italy, and which indicates that they, along with the electorates of other countries. are progressing towards a roughly similar equilibrium level of aggregate party identification—approximately that observed in the United States and Britain today.[8]

To paraphrase his theory:

(1) The strength of an individual's party identification increases as a function of how long he has been voting for a party. It does not increase as a function of his age except indirectly through this relationship.[9]

(2) If an individual's father identified with a party, that individual may be expected to have a stronger party identification than if his father did not identify with a party.

(3) Combining (1) and (2), the longer an individual's father had been able to vote, the stronger the individual's party identification will be. If his father had been able to vote for a relatively long period, he will be more likely to have developed a party identification to pass on to his child.

(4) From (1), the strength of the individual's party identification is a function of the individual's age (which determines how long he has physically been able to vote), and of the history of suffrage extension and restriction in his country (which determines how long he has legally been able to vote). From (3), the strength of the individual's party identification is a function of the history of suffrage extension and restriction in his country (which determines how long his father had legally been able to vote).

Converse's theory accordingly combines individuals' ages and the history of suffrage in their countries to predict the level of their party identification. A French woman aged sixty, who in 1958 had only been able to vote for 13 years (having gotten the vote in 1945), could be expected to identify more weakly with a party than an American woman aged sixty, who in

---

[4] Dean Jaros and Gene L. Mason, "Party Choice and Support for Demagogues: An Experimental Examination," *American Political Science Review*, 58 (March, 1969), 100–110. The introduction to their paper provides an excellent review of the party identification theory of electoral stability.

[5] Especially Angus Campbell, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald E. Stokes, *The American Voter* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1960).

[6] See, for example, Angus Campbell and Henry Valen, "Party Identification in Norway and the United States," in *Elections and the Political Order*, Angus Campbell, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald E. Stokes (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1966), pp. 245–268; David Butler and Donald Stokes, *Political Change in Britain* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1969), pp. 55–61; and the data on various countries (including data from the Almond and Verba study), presented in Dennis and McCrone, cited above.

[7] Converse and Dupeux found that in France 45 per cent of respondents, as compared with 75 per cent of American respondents, expressed a sense of identification with some party. Philip E. Converse and Georges Dupeux, "Politicization of the Electorate in France and the United States," in *Elections and the Political Order*, Campbell et al., p. 277; working with the Almond and Verba data, Converse found that the average strength of party identification in Italy was well under half that in Britain and the United States. Converse, "Of Time and Partisan Stability," p. 151.

[8] Converse, "Of Time and Partisan Stability."

[9] This assumption is particularly important to Converse's theory, and for what follows in this paper. There is evidence for the assumption from the United States (*American Voter*, p. 163) and Britain (Butler and Stokes, pp. 55–57). In both cases, the strength of an individual's identification increases as he grows older, but this is a function solely of how long he has identified with the party, not of his age *per se*. If the length of time that individuals have identified with the same party is held constant, the relationship between age and the strength of identification disappears. In other words, we might expect a voter aged fifty, who had initially acquired an identification with a party ten years before, to show roughly the same strength of identification as a thirty-year-old voter who had initially acquired his party identification ten years before. This, despite the fact that we would generally expect fifty-year-olds to identify more strongly with a party than thirty-year-olds.

1958 had been able to vote for at least 38 years. Italian men aged fifty who in 1958 had been able to vote at most one time before 1945 and whose fathers had only rarely voted, could be expected to show lower levels of party identification than French men of the same age. And so on. According to the theory, if all countries continued to hold elections in an unbroken series, they would tend to reach roughly the same equilibrium level of party identification within a few generations.

The theory is attractively simple. It uses only two independent variables—individuals' ages, and the history of suffrage—though it combines these in rather complex ways. Using the data from the Almond and Verba study, Converse was able to put his theory to a stiff test and was relatively successful at predicting the level of party identification for age and sex cohorts in all five countries. The correlation between his predictions of the average strength of party identification in specific cohorts—say, Italian men aged 50 to 60—and the actual average values for the cohorts is an impressive .93. Even when he allows for variation within the cohorts and predicts the strength of individuals' party identification from his theory, he achieves a .46 correlation.[10]

This is an elegant theory, which—together with the high levels of partisan attachment that have been observed in a number of countries—would seem to provide a strong basis for treating American levels of party identification as the norm, and applying party identification theory in a general, comparative way.

Confusing Partisan Choice and Party Identification

On the other hand, evidence has gradually accumulated that "party identification" in Europe may be different from the psychological attachment found in the American electorate. The European version appears to be much less stable over time than American party identification, and it seems to refer more often simply to the party the respondent intends to vote for, rather than one he feels an enduring attachment to. There is evidence for this in at least three studies:

(1) The first example is a panel study of German voting, 1967 to 1969, conducted by Max Kaase and Uwe Schleth.[11] The questions used in the two waves of this panel are not fully comparable. In 1967, respondents were asked their party identification, in a question which included a list of the main parties. In 1969, the question did not cue the respondents with the names of the parties. As a result, the per cent of respondents expressing an identification dropped from 52.0 per cent in 1967 to 28.9 per cent in 1969.[12] The panel does allow one measure of the stability of party identification, however. Of those respondents that reported an identification in response to the harder question in 1969, only 65 per cent repeated the same identification they had given twenty months before.[13] At the same time, their reported party identifications correlated closely with immediate party preferences. The respondents were asked in 1969 to rank the five parties by preference. Of those who were willing to rank the parties, 100 per cent of the strong CDU/CSU identifiers in that year, and 95 per cent of the weak CDU/CSU identifiers, ranked that party first. Ninety-eight per cent of strong SPD identifiers, and 94 per cent of weak SPD identifiers, ranked that party first. Apparently what was tapped by the party identification question was not a lasting attachment, but the respondents' immediate party preference.

(2) David Butler and Donald Stokes have shown that party identification in Britain differs from American party identification in much the same way.[14] Comparing their threewave panel

---

[10] Converse, "Of Time and Partisan Stability," pp. 161–163.

[11] The results which I discuss are reported in Max Kaase, "Determinanten des Wahlverhaltens bei der Bundestagswahl 1969," *Politische Vierteljahresschrift* 11 (March, 1970), 46–110.

[12] The questions were: 1967, "Ganz allgemein gesprochen—betrachten Sie sich als CDU-Anhänger, als SPD-Anhänger, als FDP-Anhänger, als NPD-Anhänger, als Anhänger einer anderen Partei oder fühlen Sie sich keiner Partei besonders verbunden? (Do you generally think of yourself as a supporter of the CDU, the SPD, the FDP, the NPD, or some other party, or do you not feel particularly tied to any party?); 1969, "Ganz allgemein gesprochen, betrachten Sie sich als Anhänger einer bestimmten politischen Partei, oder fühlen Sie sich keiner Partei besonders verbunden?" (Do you generally think of yourself as a supporter of a particular political party, or do you not feel particularly tied to any party?).

[13] Kaase, p. 82. The Survey Research Center's American panel from 1956 to 1960 provides two comparisons with the German figure. Of those who identified with a party in 1958, 82 per cent reported the same identification they had given in 1956; of those who identified with a party in 1960, 88 per cent reported the same identification they had given in 1958. The difference between the American and German results is a conservative one, for two reasons: (1) twenty-four months intervened between questioning in the American study, compared with twenty months in the German study; (2) the American identifiers were isolated by means of an "easier" question than the Germans (the American question cued the names of the parties), and thus should have been a less firmly partisan group than the German identifiers. Source: SRC American Panel Study: 1956, 1958, 1960 (SRC S440, ICPR 7252).

[14] Butler and Stokes, pp. 40–43.

for 1963–64–66 with the Survey Research Center's American panel for 1956–58–60, they found that for Americans, a change in party identification was accompanied by a change in voting 75 per cent of the time, while a change in voting was accompanied by a change in party identification only 27 per cent of the time. In other words, a change in reported party identification appeared to produce a changed vote, but a changed vote definitely did not produce a change in reported party identification.

Among their British respondents, on the other hand, Butler and Stokes found that a change in party identification was accompanied by a change in voting 76 per cent of the time, but that a change in voting was accompanied by a change in party identification 62 per cent of the time.[15] There is an element of enduring attachment to parties in this finding—i.e., a change in voting is less likely to be followed by a change in party identification than *vice-versa*. But the difference is much smaller than in the American case. It appears that more often than in the American study, what is measured as "party identification" is not a lasting attachment transcending particular elections, but rather an expression of immediate voting intention.

(3) Finally, though it cannot provide as definite evidence as the German and British panels, the study of Norwegian party identification by Angus Campbell and Henry Valen provides some evidence that in Norway, too, "party identification" is more nearly an expression of voting intention than is true in the United States.[16] Campbell and Valen found that in the 1957 Storting election only 6 per cent of Norwegian party identifiers identified with a party other than the one for which they voted; by contrast, in the 1958 Congressional election in the United States, 14 per cent of party identifiers identified with a party other than the one for which they voted. Thus, reported party identification appears to coincide more perfectly with voting in a particular election in Norway than in the United States, though without a panel study we cannot tell whether this simply means that Norwegian elections are more related to party than are Congressional elections in the United States.

To sum up the problem: A good deal of evidence suggests that party identification theory can be widely applied. Converse's successful general application of the theory to the five nations in the Almond and Verba study is particularly compelling. It is tempting to generalize from the theory to cases such as that of the Weimar Republic, with which this paper will be concerned.

On the other hand, there is some convincing evidence that what has been measured as "party identification" in Europe is often different from "party identification" in the United States. In particular, if it is not a learned, enduring attachment transcending particular issues and events, then it cannot insulate an electorate against sudden changes as the party identification theory of electoral stability suggests it can.

Testing for Party Identification in the Weimar Republic

Given the status of comparative party identification theory, as sketched above, it seems worthwhile that a dominant concern of this paper should be to assess the party identification theory of electoral stability in the Weimar case. From the theory we should expect to find that instability in Weimar in general, and Hitler's electoral support in particular, was based on those portions of the Weimar electorate whose level of party identification was relatively weak. The instability of Weimar voting, and the magnitude of the move to Hitler, could then be attributed to the overall level of party identification in the Weimar electorate. Presumably we would find—or guess—that this level was fairly low compared with levels in other countries. Converse implies such an extension of the theory to Weimar when he points out, in presenting his theory of the development of party identification, that Germany in 1933 could be expected to have had an aggregate party identification of about 1.05 on his scale, compared with 1.80 for a "mature" electorate such as that of the United States.[17]

It should appear particularly likely that the theory applies to Hitler's electoral surge, since earlier studies of his support have suggested that he did unusually well among rural voters and previous nonvoters.[18] These are portions of the population among whom—on the basis of studies of electorates in other places and at other times—we might expect party identification to have been particularly weak.[19]

---

[15] These figures are calculated from Butler and Stokes, Tables 2.6 and 2.7, pp. 41–42.

[16] Campbell and Valen, "Party Identification" in *Elections and the Political Order*, Campbell et. al., pp. 245–268. The figures used here are calculated from Table 13–5.

[17] Converse, "Of Time and Partisan Stability," p. 166.

[18] See particularly Heberle, Lipset, and O'Lessker, cited above.

[19] The relationship between nonvoting and party identification in the United States is demonstrated in *The American Voter*, pp. 96–101. For the lower party

In order to see whether the party identification theory of electoral stability can apply to Weimar elections, we must decide to what extent party identification was a factor in Weimar voting. The problem is to sort out party identification (an enduring, learned psychological attachment to political parties) and immediate party choices (bound to the particular moment). It is not easy to do this. Since direct measurement is impossible, any test must be an indirect one. We must predict some effect of the presence of party identification which can be measured, and then see to what extent that effect is observed in Weimar voting.

Party identification should differ from immediate party choice in one way which may help us to infer its relative importance during the Republic. Since an identifier's party attachment is a learned attitude, its strength should be a function of the length of time the individual has been able to exercise it—that is, a function of the length of time he has been able to vote.[20] The particular choice of party in an election, however, should not necessarily show such an effect.[21]

Therefore, if an electorate had achieved an appreciable level of party identification, we would expect a group to whom the vote had just been extended to act as Converse predicts. Starting back at time zero in learning an identification, the new group would have weaker party identification in general than their more experienced fellows, and we would expect their voting behavior to be less stable than that of the rest of the electorate. But if the voting decisions of the electorate were generally based on things other than party identification, we would not expect the voting of the new group to be any less stable than that of the rest.

In the Weimar Republic, women comprised such a group of new voters. They were first able to vote in 1919, whereas men in the Empire had enjoyed full and uninterrupted suffrage since 1871. In 1933, the year of Hitler's final electoral victory, women had only been voting for 14 years. A woman who was 60 years old in 1933, for example, had first been able to vote when she was 46. Theories of party identification as an enduring attachment to parties would predict that these women should have had much lower levels of party identification than men, and accordingly should have been more erratic in their party support at the polls than men.

By using an unusual body of data on Weimar voting, which I shall describe below, we can estimate how stable the voting of men and women was during the relatively quiet "golden years" of the Republic, from 1924 to 1928. And we can also look at net changes among a more restricted group of men and women voters from 1928 to 1933. This will allow us to infer whether or not party identification was present among Weimar voters. At the same time, by comparing urban and rural voters and Catholic and non-Catholic voters in the same way, we shall develop a more general picture of some of the sources of stability and change in Weimar voting.

Stability of Voting in the Mid-'twenties: Method

In the mid-'twenties, a number of districts in Germany tabulated the votes of men and women separately, which gives us the handle we need for this analysis. For the elections of May, 1924, December, 1924, and 1928, a total of 187 districts separated their votes in this way in at least two of the elections. We can treat each of these districts in effect as two "districts," or aggregations of voters—one consisting of all the men eligible to vote in the district, and one consisting of all the women. Thus for each of the three pairs formed by these elections there are close to 374 aggregations for which we know the percentage of registered voters voting for any given party. In addition, these aggregations show a spread on some important background variables. Half are totally male and half totally female. They range from rural (no towns with population greater than 2,000) to cities like Köln and Berlin. They also vary in percentage of Catholics, which seems relevant for this analysis; and fortunately, there is wide variation in the percentage of Catholics. Of the 374 aggregations, 260 are less than 20 per cent Catholic and 62 are more than 80 per

---

identification in the rural portion of the American electorate, see *The American Voter*, p. 409; for France, see Sidney Tarrow, "The Urban-Rural Cleavage in Political Involvement: The Case of France," *American Political Science Review*, 65 (June, 1971), 341–357.

[20] See footnote 9 above.

[21] The finding of Butler and Stokes that the duration of present party tie accounts for approximately *all* of the relationship between age and party identification in Britain (Butler and Stokes, pp. 56–58) is puzzling, and seems to weaken my interpretation of British voting. If it is true that British party identification is to a greater extent than American party identification an expression of immediate partisan choice, one would expect either that the age-party identification relationship would be weaker than in the United States (which is not the case) or that it would be less fully accounted for by the duration of the party tie. The Butler-Stokes table is not strictly comparable to the *American Voter* table (p. 163 of *The American Voters*), and it is possible that if the two tables were set up in a comparable way, the second expectation would be confirmed. But it is a puzzle.

cent Catholic. This convenient characteristic of the aggregations is a result of the exclusive geographic distribution of religious affiliation in Germany, particularly before the population movements of World War II.

The most unsatisfactory characteristic of the aggregations is that there are none that are rural and Catholic. Nor do they comprise a systematic sample of Germany. The choice of whether or not to tabulate the votes of the sexes separately was apparently up to local electoral administrators, and in general, cities and towns are overrepresented in the sample. This does not cause serious difficulty, since, in the present study areas of different population were examined separately through the use of dummy variables and interaction terms in the regression equations. The most such overrepresentation might have done is raise the standard errors of estimates for rural areas, because of the low variation in the dummy variable "rural/nonrural." But even this did not turn out to be very serious; the standard errors associated with this variable were not uncomfortably high.

A more serious problem is that the sample is not representative regionally. The Catholic districts seem to be spread satisfactorily across the Catholic areas of Germany (except for the Polish areas in the East, which are not represented). But the Protestant districts are strongly skewed to south-central Germany. About two-thirds of them, including all of the rural ones, are in Thüringen, a mixed-industrial province centering on the city of Weimar.

These data were analyzed by multiple "ecological" regression, taking the percentage of registered voters voting for a party in the second of a pair of elections as the dependent variable.[22] The independent variables, analyzed separately for each party, were: (1) proportion of registered voters voting for the party in the first of the elections; (2) proportion female (either zero or one in all districts); (3) proportion Catholic; (4) dummy variables for population: "under 2,000/not under 2,000"; "2,000–5,000/not 2,000–5,000"; "6,000–15,000/not 6,000–15,000"; and (5) all first-order interactions among these variables.

For instance, to estimate the proportion of Catholic/female/Socialist voters living in towns of 6,000 to 15,000 population, who repeated a vote for the Socialists in the second of two elections, the intercept of the equation for the Socialists was added to the slopes for "proportion voting Socialist, election 1," "proportion Catholic," "proportion female," "dummy '6,000–15,000,'" and the appropriate interactions. This sum estimated the proportion Socialist in the second election for a hypothetical town with population 6,000 to 15,000, composed solely of Socialist, female, Catholic voters; in other words, the proportion of such voters repeating a Socialist vote in the second election. The Appendix presents a brief discussion of such "ecological" inference, particularly as applied to the analysis in this paper.

The following procedure was observed: First, as noted, the sample did not include any rural, Catholic districts. To avoid collinearity problems, therefore, each analysis was run twice. To estimate the stability of Catholics, the analysis was run without the dummy variable "under 2,000," and all rural districts were dropped from the sample. To estimate the stability of Protestants, the analysis was run without the variable "per cent Catholic," and all districts with more than 12.5 per cent Catholic were dropped from the sample.

For each party, these equations were run from the first election to the second, for each of the three pairs of elections. Similar equations were also run *backward*, predicting to the vote in the first election from the vote in the second. This is a valid operation, since causality is not posited in either case; the aggregate vote at an earlier time does not cause the vote at a later time, any more than the latter causes the former; both are the result of economic, historic, and other characteristics of the district. It was necessary to run both "backward" and "forward" regressions, so that a party whose vote was declining during those four years (such as the Communists) would not appear to have less stable voters than a party which was on the upswing (such as the Social Democrats, who were recovering some of the votes they had lost between 1920 and 1924).[23] Unnecessary interac-

---

[22] "Ecological" regression is simply an interpretation placed on regression equations which use data on individuals grouped into aggregations, such as "per cent Nazi" or "per cent Catholic." There is an increasingly large body of literature on the technique. The best presentation is probably Donald E. Stokes's "Cross-Level Inference as a Game Against Nature," in *Mathematical Applications in Political Science,* ed. Joseph L. Bernd (Charlottesville, Va.: The University of Virginia Press, 1969), pp. 62–83.

[23] There are ways in which the aggregate vote in the first of two elections might serve as a cause of the aggregate vote in the second. The act of voting for a party in the first election (and the memory of having voted for it, when it came time to vote again) might lead people to repeat that vote. Repeating votes in this way might, for example, serve to maintain attitudinal balance for the voters. Again, the ardor of party workers might be affected by the results of the earlier election; this would affect the results in the second



Figure 1. Voting Stability, 1924–1928

tion terms were then eliminated, and the standard errors were checked for collinearity problems. This procedure yielded for each of the relevant subgroups six estimates of the stability of their members' votes for each party. These six estimates, were averaged to produce a single estimate of overall stability for each subgroup for the period 1924 to 1928.

Stability of Voting in the Mid-'twenties: Results

The results of this analysis are shown in the graphs in Figure 1. The most important observation is that women do not show up as less stable in their voting than men. On the contrary, for all parties but the Democrats, the estimate of stability for women is higher than that for men, though the differences in this direction are mostly small. The fact that women were apparently not less stable in their voting than men indicates that party identification in the American sense was not present among Weimar voters, and that Converse's theory in particular does not apply to the development of the German electorate. I shall present further evidence for this in the examination of voting changes from 1928 to 1933.

If variations in party identification—the

---

election. I have chosen to ignore these possibilities, however. The danger in doing so seems less serious than the distortion which would result from carrying the analysis only forward in time.



Figure 1 (Continued)

* Catholics are not included in the graphs for these two parties because, when the separate analysis with Catholics was run, the results differed from those of the simpler Protestant-only run. This could only have been due to faults in the more complex model, since all of the variables in the Protestant run were included in the broader one. Such faults may have been the existence of higher-order interactions which I had not included, or nonlinear relationships involving per cent Catholic. When I was unable to find the problems in the broader models, I discarded them. No Catholics are shown for the Peasant Party because it ran only in Thüringen, which was 2.8 per cent Catholic. No Protestants are shown for the Center Party because it received only trace support from among Protestants.

prime theoretical interest of this paper—cannot explain stability in Weimar voting, what other sources of stability and instability can we see in voting in the 'twenties? One group which shows up clearly as a source of stability in those years is the rural electorate. For all parties but the Center Party (for which voting stability in villages of less than 2,000 people could not be measured) and the People's Party, either rural voters or voters in towns of 2,000–5,000 people are the most stable group of voters. Though the difference for some parties is slight, for others it is rather high.

One possible explanation for the greater stability of rural voters and the (slightly) greater stability of women voters is suggested by Converse's "Information Flow and the Stability of Partisan Attitudes."[24] In this paper Converse demonstrates two bases for stability of attitudes in the American electorate in 1952: (1) the existence of previously formed opinions, which have been insulated fom the impact of new information, *or* (2) a lack of exposure to new information which might otherwise cause a

---

[24] Philip E. Converse, "Information Flow and the Stability of Partisan Attitudes," in *Elections and the Political Order*, Campbell et al., pp. 136–157. See also J. Merrill Shanks, "The Quality of Electoral Change: 1952–1964," paper delivered at the 1969 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, New York City, September 2–6.



Figure 2. Per cent of Registered Electorate Voting Nazi, by Place-size

voter to shift his vote. It is likely that within the Weimar population, women and rural voters were particularly isolated from flows of new political information, thus accounting for the greater stability of their voting. Further evidence of this stability can be found in the net voting changes from 1928 to 1933.[25]

---

[25] A third source of electoral stability which appears in the graphs does not seem to be of particular theoretical interest. For all five parties for which Catholics and Protestants are compared, Protestants are the more stable supporters. This is probably because a Catholic voting for any of these parties would have experienced a strong cross-pressure which none of his Protestant counterparts experienced—the influence of the Center Party, which was endorsed by the Catholic Church. This interpretation is strengthened by the fact that for all five parties, Catholic women, who might be expected to have felt this pull more strongly than men, were a trifle less stable relative to Catholic men that Protestant women were relative to Protestant men. (The differences are admittedly very slight.) This interpretation also is consistent with the fact that Cath-



Figure 3. Per cent of Registered Electorate Voting Nazi, by Sex

Shifts in Voting, 1928–1933

Data from this period of Nazi electoral surge are more fragmentary than for the mid-'twenties. In only nine districts were votes reported by sex after 1930, and all but one of these are large cities.[26] Also, votes were not reported separately by place-size for the two elections in 1932. Consequently, examining the variables I have stressed requires the use of even more isolated pockets of data than did the 'twenties, and because of the small number of cases, regression analysis is not feasible. On the other hand, simply examining net changes proves useful for this period in which parties' shares of the vote shifted so sharply.

Of the nine cities or towns for which votes were tabulated by sex, four have data available on both participation and party-votes in 1928, 1930, and 1933. These are Magdeburg and Leipzig (both almost wholly Protestant), and

---

olic women who voted for the Center Party were so much more stable than the men. The difference between men's and women's stability is greater for the Center Party than for any other.

[26] Initially, the failure to generate such data was due to the economic burden of separating the sexes in the midst of the Depression. Later, it was aggravated by the Nazi scorn for elections, which left unpublished some separate tabulations.

Köln and Regensburg (largely Catholic).[27] For these cities we can calculate the percentage of the registered electorate of either sex voting for each party.

In order to compare rural and urban voters, four provinces were chosen which represented the major regions of Germany and are at the same time homogeneously Catholic or Protestant. The four are: (1) Pommern, with a population in 1925 of 1.9 million, 3.5 per cent Catholic, located in the Junker domain in eastern Germany; (2) Thüringen, population 1.6 million, 2.8 per cent Catholic, located in the mixed industrial Protestant part of central Germany; (3) Niederbayern/Oberpfalz, population 1.4 million, 96.0 per cent Catholic, located in Bavaria; and (4) the administrative districts Aachen and Trier in southwestern Germany, which were combined for analytic purposes into one unit with a population of 1.2 million, 91.9 per cent Catholic. For the elections of 1928, 1930, and 1933, the votes within each of these provinces were separated into the four place-size groupings used in analyzing the 'twenties.

The rise of the Nazi vote among these groups is presented in Figures 2 and 3. Because the validity of the results is attested by the fact that the same pattern occurs in each of the provinces and cities, I have charted each of them separately.

Note in Figure 2 that compared to the urban population, rural voters initially moved only slowly to the Nazis, from 1928 to 1930. They then moved much more rapidly to the Nazis from 1930 to 1933. Although the differences between men and women are smaller than those between urban and rural voters, the pattern in Figure 3 is the same.[28] In all four cities, men got off to a quicker start from 1928 to 1930, but the women came on more quickly from 1930 to 1933—overtaking the men in the two Protestant cities, narrowing the gap in the two Catholic cities.[29]

This makes sense if we recall the different circumstances of 1930 and 1933. In 1930 the Nazis were only beginning the ambitious electioneering and propaganda effort which marked the period 1930–1933. They had not yet become powerful in the national government. Their membership in 1930 was about 400,000; by 1932 it was about 1,200,000.[30] In charting levels of violence in one small German town, Allen found that in 1930 there were four political fights reported in the press; in 1932 there were twenty-three, three of them "major battles."[31] In short, by 1930 Germany had not yet been flooded with information about the Nazi Party; by 1933 it had.

Figures 2 and 3 suggest that this difference in information flows affected the timing and source of surges of votes for the Nazis, in a way which is consistent with my interpretation of the sources of stability in the mid-'twenties. From 1928 to 1930, information flows in Germany were much the same as they had been in the mid-'twenties, and women and rural voters shared less in the dominant move (to the Nazis) during those two years than did their male and urban counterparts. From 1930 to 1933, information flows in Germany expanded dramatically. Women and rural voters now more than made up for their earlier lag. The combination of the stability of female and rural voting during the mid-'twenties, and the lag of these two groups in moving to the Nazis in the early 'thirties, strongly suggests that their earlier stability was due in part to a lack of exposure to political communication.

Of course, it is no news to students of elections that rural Germany went more heav-

---

[27] The figures for these cities are taken from Herbert Tingsten's *Political Behavior* (London: P. S. King and Son, 1937), pp. 28–29 and 51–58. The partial data he reports on five other cities or towns indicate the same patterns as those shown by these four.

[28] In the case of Regensburg, it is possible to carry the comparison of men and women voters beyond the Nazi take-over. Interestingly, even given the changed nature of elections, the same process continued. Women continued to narrow the gap between themselves and the men, and finally overtook the men in 1934:

	March 1933	Nov., 1933	Aug., 1934
% of registered men casting Nazi votes	30.7	91.1	82.6
% of registered women casting Nazi votes	25.3	89.6	83.3
Difference	+ 5.4	+ 1.5	− .7

Source: Bavaria. Statistisches Landesamt. Zeitschrift, vol. 65, p. 585; vol. 66, p. 250.

[29] The predominantly male vote for the Nazis in the early elections has sometimes been used as evidence of the special radical nature of the Nazi voters. As Seymour Lipset puts it:

> In the 1920s and 1930s the more conservative or religious a party, the higher, in general, its feminine support. The German National People's party had more female backing than any party except the Catholic Center party. The Nazis, together with the more liberal middle-class parties and Marxist parties, received disproportionate support for men.

Lipset, *Political Man*, p. 143. But the pattern as we see it here suggests that women did not really respond differently to the Nazis than did men. They lagged behind the men, but probably ended up ahead of them.

[30] See Maurice Duverger, *Political Parties* (New York: Wiley, 1954), p. 84.

[31] William S. Allen, *The Nazi Seizure of Power: The Experience of a Single Town, 1930–1935* (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1965), p. 296.

ily Nazi than did urban Germany. But it is interesting to see that those groups which added disproportionately to the Nazi gains in the early 'thirties were the ones that had been relatively stable in the more "normal" elections of the mid-'twenties.

The Contribution of New Voters to the Nazi Surge

One trend which many writers have associated with the rise of the Nazis is the increase in participation during this period. Lipset has argued that new voters figured importantly in the Nazi rise from 1930 to 1933, though not in the early increase from 1928 to 1930.[32] Karl O'Lessker, using a more precise correlation technique, argues that new voters figured heavily in the Nazi vote in both periods.[33] In a re-analysis of O'Lessker"s data, Schnaiberg finds that from 1928 to 1930 the Nazis did *not* gain more of their votes from among new voters than most of the other parties did.[34] His findings, and O'Lessker's, tend to re-establish Lipset's interpretation on a more solid basis. The general conclusion to be drawn from this literature is that the Nazi Party drew disproportionate support from the new voters who flooded into the participating electorate between 1930 and 1933. This result has held up rather well under repeated investigations.

All of the studies supporting the hypothesis, however, are based on some form of ecological correlation or regression, relating changes in the Nazi vote, by district, to changes in voting turnout. It is possible that recurring biases of estimation, because of the repetition of this design, have produced a result which is replicable but spurious. Complementary designs of inference can help us to see whether this is the case.

Table 1. Correlation by Sex Aggregations, Regensburg 1928–1930

	% Change in Participation	% Change in Nazi vote
F	+7.2	+ 8.1
M	+2.4	+11.9
r = −1.0		

In this section, I shall examine two such complementary designs.

(a) Sex-aggregation Analysis. It is possible to calculate an "ecological" correlation using aggregations other than geographic districts. The present study provides an example of such aggregations: The aggregation of all men living in a particular city, and the aggregation of all women living there. For these two aggregations, the correlation between change-in-participation and change-in-percentage-of-vote-Nazi can be calculated, just as it can be calculated for two or more geographic districts.

This association is illustrated in Table 1, showing the relationship between change in participation and change in the Nazi share of the vote for Regensburg, between 1928 and 1930. Note that since there are only two aggregations (males and females), the correlation can be only +1, 0, or −1. A regression line will always form a perfect fit with an N of 2; its slope will determine the sign of the correlation coefficient. In Regensburg from 1928 to 1930, the sex that showed the greater increase in participation was not the one that moved more strongly to the Nazis. Accordingly, the correlation in Table 1 is −1.0.

This procedure involves a risk of the ecological fallacy, just as geographic ecological correlation does. But because the aggregations are set

Table 2. Sex-aggregated Correlations Between Change in Participation and Change in the Nazi Share of the Vote for Reichstag and Presidential Elections

	9/30–3/32	9/30–7/32	9/30–10/32	9/30–3/33	3/32–7/32	3/32–10/32	3/32–3/33	7/32–10/32	7/32–3/33	10/32–3/33
Augsburg		1.0								
Hagen	1.0									
Köln	−1.0	−1.0	−1.0	1.0	−1.0	−1.0	−1.0	−1.0	1.0	1.0
Leipzig				−1.0						
Magdeburg	−1.0	−1.0	−1.0	−1.0	−1.0	−1.0	−1.0	−1.0	1.0	1.0
Regensburg	1.0	−1.0	−1.0	−1.0	−1.0	−1.0	−1.0	−1.0	1.0	1.0
Wiesbaden	1.0	−1.0	1.0	−1.0	−1.0	1.0	−1.0	0.0	1.0	−1.0

---

[32] Lipset, pp. 149–152.

[33] O'Lessker, "Who Voted for Hitler?" pp. 66–67.

[34] Allan Schnaiberg, "A Critique of Karl O'Lessker's 'Who Voted for Hitler?' ", *American Journal of Sociology*, 74 (May, 1969), 732–735.

up on a basis other than geographic contiguity, if this produces any biases they will be *different* from those produced by geographic ecological correlation.

For example, a plausible alternative explanation of the geographic ecological correlation between change in participation and change in the Nazi vote might be that in those districts in which the Nazis seemed to be advancing from one election to the next, voters for all parties (and the local workers for all parties) became unusually excited, and participation *by voters for all parties* rose. This upswing would suffice to produce correlations of the sort Lipset observed between changes in Nazi strength and changes in participation. It is plausible that Lipset's correlations might be due to this process, rather than to the presumed process in which, as new voters were drawn into participation, they came in as Nazis.

I have used this hypothetical process as an example, because in this particular instance, the ecological fallacy would not be manifest in ecological correlations based on sex aggregations. The two sex aggregations in any analysis live intermingled in the same geographic district. The extent to which the Nazis appeared to be advancing locally could not vary across the two aggregations. Thus, it could not act as a variable to produce the misleading correlation I have suggested above.

Sex-aggregated correlations, therefore, provide a complementary test of the hypothesis that new voters tended, more than other voters, to be Nazis. Table 2 presents sex-aggregated correlations between change in voting participation and change in the per cent of voters casting Nazi ballots, for the seven cities which reported votes separately by sex for two or more elections from 1930 to 1933.

In contrast to geographic ecological correlation, which produces positive correlations for every pair of elections between 1930 and 1933, this technique suggests that only in the last election—March, 1933—could the Nazis have drawn disproportionate support from among previous nonvoters.[35] Overall, only 14 of the 43 relationships in the table are positive. This negative result is statistically significant, with probability .016 of getting as few as 14 positive correlations in 43 tries, if in fact the correlations should be expected to be positive in a majority of cases. It does appear from the table that the 1933 election might fit the hypothesis. Of 17 relationships which involve the 1933 election, 8 are positive. This compares with 6 relationships positive of the 26 which do not involve the 1933 election.

(b) Analysis Over Time. A second alternative design is the analysis of a series of changes over time in turnout and the Nazi share of the vote, for any particular geographic unit. Indeed, a very simple analysis of this type has formed part of the evidence for the presumed strong relationship between earlier apathy and Nazi voting. If we look at changes over time in turnout and the Nazi share of the vote for the nation as a whole, using only Reichstag elections, we find a positive relationship, as shown in Figure 4(a).

But if we include land elections and the 1932 presidential election in such a series, the relationship disappears. In part (b) of Figure 4, such time series have been drawn for Hessen, Oldenburg, Lippe-Detmold, Hamburg, and the Vierlande district of Hamburg. The first four are the only districts in Germany in which at least two Land or local elections were held between the 1930 and 1933 Reichstag elections. The Vierlande district of Hamburg has been included separately in this treatment because it is a Protestant, rural district of the sort which furnished the richest source of Nazi votes. (Fifty-nine per cent of the male labor force were independent farmers in 1925.)

Though participation generally tended to rise during this period, along with the Nazi share of the vote, it does not appear from Figure 4 that the two trends were directly interdependent. If the two rose together because the Nazi vote was made up disproportionately of marginal voters, then we should expect that when participation dropped in a local election, the Nazi share of the vote would also drop. But this is never the case.[36]

As with the sex-aggregated correlation analysis, these time series leave open the possibility that in 1933 the Nazis did profit disproportionately from the influx of new voters. In each series, even when a local election falls in 1933, as is true of Lippe-Detmold, the two trends appear to coincide. At any other point in the various series, however, the trends appear to be, if anything, negatively related.

---

[35] A similar analysis for nine cities between 1928 and 1930 bears out Lipset's and Schnaiberg's finding of no relationship for that period. The coefficient is −1.0 for all nine cities.

[36] In West Germany today, the Christian Democratic vote, which consists disproportionately of marginal voters, has acted the way I have suggested the Nazi vote should have acted. One reason the Social Democrats were able to control as many state governments as they did during the period of Adenauer's popularity was that the Christian Democratic vote dropped off sharply in state elections. Compare R. J. C. Preece, *"Land" Elections in the German Federal Republic* (London: Longmans, Green, 1968), p. 33.

(a) Nation as a Whole, Reichstag Elections:



(b) Five Districts, Reichstag, Presidential, and Local Elections:



Figure 4. Electoral Turnout and Nazi Share of the Vote, 1930–1933

I believe that the general conclusion to be drawn from geographic correlations, sex-aggregated correlations, and time series is that during the great period of its growth, from 1928 to the end of 1932, the Nazi party did not draw unusual support from among previous nonvoters. The 1933 election may have been an exception, but the likelihood remains that the Nazi party essentially was not a party of new and marginal participants.

The Question of Party Identification

The stability of women's voting in the mid-'twenties provided evidence earlier in this paper that party identification as a learned, enduring attachment to parties was not important in the Weimar elections. An analogous examination of the net shifts in men's and women's voting from 1928 to 1933 provides further evidence of this.

Let us make the following assumptions (both

2. Oldenburg



3. Lippe-Detmold



4. Hamburg



Figure 4 (Continued)



Figure 4 (Continued)

of which have been discussed earlier):

(1) If party identification as an enduring attachment to parties was present in the Weimar electorate, then it was stronger among men than women. As was pointed out earlier, in 1928 German women had only had the vote for nine years; men had had the vote for 57 years.

As an additional basis for the assumption, we may note that women's participation was considerably lower than that of men throughout the Weimar Republic.[37] In the United States, participation has been found to increase with the strength of party identification.[38]

(2) By 1933 the German electorate had been nearly saturated with political information, so that support for a party resulted from preference for that party, rather than from not having been exposed to relevant information. The general surge in participation from 1928 to 1933 and the dramatic catching up in 1933 of groups that had apparently lagged in voting Nazi in 1930 because

Table 3. Net Shifts, 1928–1933, as Percentage of 1928 Vote

		Middle-Class Parties (%)	Social Democrats (%)	Nationalists (%)	Center (%)
Magdeburg	F	−89.1	−26.4	+ 3.1	*
	M	−88.0	−25.8	+28.8	*
Leipzig	F	−80.8	− 4.3	−21.5	*
	M	−80.4	− 6.0	− .4	*
Köln	F	−84.5	− 9.2	+42.6	+16.5
	M	−87.5	−26.3	+33.3	+12.3
Regensburg	F	−85.9	− 5.5	−37.1	+ 6.7
	M	−87.9	−14.8	−25.3	+ 4.8

* A negligible vote; but as in the Catholic cities, the party made greater gains among women than among men.

---

[37] Compare Herbert Tingsten, *Political Behavior*, pp. 27–29. Also Gabrielle Bremme, *Die Politische Rolle der Frau in Deutschland* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 1956), pp. 35–50; Hartwig, "Wie die Frauen im Deutschen Reich von ihrem politischen Wahlrecht Gebrauch machen," *Allgemeines Statistisches Archiv*, 17 (1928), 497–513; Hartwig, "Das Frauenwahlrecht in der Statistik," *Allgemeines Statistiches Archiv*, 21 (1931), 167–183. In general, women's participation lagged behind men's by several percentage points.

[38] Campbell et al., *The American Voter*, pp. 96–101.

of a lack of information—both of these suggest that virtually all of the population had been reached by political information by 1933. This should be particularly true for cities, such as the ones examined here.

Between them, these assumptions predict that in the 1933 election, women should have been less loyal than men to the parties for which they had voted in 1928. But this was not the case, at least in the four cities for which we have data tabulated separately by sex.

From Table 3 we can see that vote losses among men were no less than those among women for those parties which were stagnant or declining during this period. For the middle-class parties the two rates were about the same. And women voters were actually more loyal than men to the Social Democrats and the Center Party. Only for the Nationalists were the net shifts more negative for women than for men.

My analysis of the impact of previous nonvoters provides a second source of evidence that party identification as a lasting attachment was not present among the Weimar electorate. An interesting theory of American elections holds that the new voters in any election generally exaggerate the short-term shifts involved in the election.[39] New voters in 1956 went strongly Republican, in 1932 strongly Democratic, and so on.[40] This tendency occurs because the party identification of new voters is weaker than that of the population as a whole, and hence they are more susceptible to whatever short-term forces are at work in the election.

To turn this theory around, *if* the many new voters in the early 'thirties in Germany did not vote much differently from the rest of the voters, this suggests that the older voters did not have stronger party identification than the new ones, i.e., party identification was not widespread among either group.

Alternative Explanations of the Stability of Women's Voting

The argument that enduring party identification was not important in Weimar elections depends heavily on the finding that women's voting was not less stable than men's. At least three additional explanations can be advanced for the women's stability, however. Since none of these three implies an absence of learned party identification, we must consider them as alternatives to the interpretation I have advanced up to this point.

(1) The stability of women voters might have been due to their being older, on the average, than the men. Given the generally greater longevity of women, and a presumed general propensity to hold more stable opinions as one ages, this might be a reasonable expectation. Because of the high mortality of young men during World War I, however, the female electorate in Germany does not appear to have been older than the male electorate.

In the May, 1924, election, for instance, ballots were counted separately by both age and sex in four districts, one urban and three rural, covering the main regions of Germany. The average age of both men and women eligible to vote in those districts was the same—40.5 years.[41] The greater number of women at an advanced age in the districts was balanced by a great gap in men between the ages of 25 and 40.

(2) Alternatively, the stability of women voters might simply have been due to the fact that German women always voted as their husbands did, and thus repeated in a derivative way the stability of their husbands' votes. This explanation is not supported by further examination of women's voting. First of all, it cannot account for the fact that women were actually a bit more stable than men in the mid-'twenties. Derivative "stability" of the sort suggested here could only produce a level of stability approaching that of men, not exceeding it. Furthermore, the crossed lines in Figure 3 suggest that rather different processes of change took place for the two sexes from 1928 to 1933. This should not have been the case if women simply voted as their husbands directed. Finally, examination of simple voting results in a Catholic city such as Köln shows that the women were capable of voting quite differently from the men. In 1928, for example, 68.5 per cent of eligible men voted in Köln, but only 53.3 per cent of eligible women did so. In the same year, only 21.5 per cent of the men's votes were cast for the Center Party, compared with 37.8 per cent of women's votes; 45.5 per cent of the men voted for a Marxist party, compared with 32.0 per cent of the women.[42] These differences are simply too great to allow us to credit the alternative explanation of women's voting stability.

(3) As a final alternative, it could be argued

---

[39] Campbell et al., *The American Voter*, pp. 110–115, 154–155. See also Angus Campbell, "Surge and Decline," in *Elections and the Political Order*, Campbell et al., pp. 40–63. The *American Voter* findings deal with marginal voters in general, but they would seem to apply as well to new voters.

[40] This is illustrated below in Figure 5.

[41] *Statistik des Deutschen Reichs*, Vol. 315, No. 6, pp. 35–40. The averages I give are calculated from ages broken down to eleven categories.

[42] Tingsten, *Political Behavior*, pp. 29, 56.

that in the foregoing analysis of stability in the mid-'twenties, stability arising from party identification was confused with stability growing out of a lack of information. In the analysis of changes from 1928 to 1933, the effect of party identification was isolated from that of information flow, under the assumption that in 1933 every voter, male or female, had been reached by some information about the Nazis. Thus, if the level of stability of the two sexes was the same, this must have been because the sexes did not differ on the strength of party identification.

But in my analysis of the 'twenties, the two factors could not be isolated in this way. Might it be, then, that women were as stable in their voting as men in the mid-'twenties because substantially stronger party identification among men (causing them to be stable voters) was balanced by substantially less information flow to women (causing them also to be stable voters, but for a different reason)? If so, the overall conclusion would be left dependent on the 1928–1933 data, based on an N of just four cities.

I do not think, however, that the flow of information to women was sufficiently different from the flow to men to justify this alternative. The lags for women shown in Figure 3 are of theoretical interest, but their magnitude is really rather small. The differences between men and women in Figure 3 are slight compared to the differences between urban and rural residents in Figure 2. If the magnitude of that difference is a valid indicator of the difference in information flow to the two sexes, then women could not have been much less identified with parties than men were in the mid-'twenties and still have shown up, as they did, as the more stable voters.

The "Weimar System"

To sum up the discussion thus far of Weimar voting:

There is evidence that party identification in the sense of learned and enduring attachments to parties was not a factor in Weimar elections. Accordingly, the party identification theory of electoral stability apparently cannot help us explain Weimar voting.[43] Uneven and insufficient flows of political communication apparently did contribute to the stability of elections in the more quiet periods of the Republic. But this must have been an unreliable "stability." Those "politically outside" groups which were relatively stable in the mid-'twenties, and relatively late in moving to the Nazis in the early 'thirties, ended by outdoing the rest of the electorate in their Nazi support in the final elections.

Table 4. Percentage of Vote, January, 1919–May, 1924

Party	1919 (%)	1920 (%)	1924 (%)
Nationalist	10.3	15.0	19.4
Nazi	—	—	6.6
German Peoples'	4.5	13.9	9.2
German Democratic	18.5	8.3	5.6
Center	19.7	18.0	16.6
Social Democratic	37.9	21.7	20.6
Independent Social Democratic	7.6	17.9	
Communist	—	2.0	12.6

Were there then simply *no factors* tending to promote stability in Weimar voting? A look at net voting changes during the Republic might suggest this conclusion. The Nazi surge at the end of the Republic is rivaled in magnitude by various shifts that occurred in earlier years. For instance, from 1919 to 1920, the German Democratic Party dropped from 18.5 per cent of the vote to 8.3 per cent. From 1919 to May, 1924, the Social Democrats dropped from 37.9 per cent of the vote to 20.6 per cent, then climbed back up to 29.8 per cent in 1928. To illustrate the instability of voting in the earlier years of the Republic, Table 4 shows the percentage of the vote for each of the eight largest parties in the elections of 1919, 1920, and May, 1924.

A simple measure of overall net changes in voting from one election to another may be obtained by summing the absolute values of changes in all the parties' shares of the vote, and dividing by two.[44] By this measure, as shown in the first column of Table 5, overall net voting changes were often about as great at other times during the Republic as they were in the later years.

Much of the flux in Weimar voting disappears, however, if we group the voters of all parties into three blocs—voters of the Marxist

---

[43] The results of this study of Weimar do not *disprove* the party identification theory of electoral stability. Party identification appears to have been absent in the Weimar electorate, and Weimar voting was rather unstable. But the results do suggest that the theory's usefulness is limited. The theory presumably helps to explain why American voting (at least in Congressional elections) is more stable than Weimar elections were. But it cannot help us understand the more important questions of the development of the German electorate over time, or of variations within the German electorate, since party identification appears to have never been a factor in German voting.

[44] This measure would equal 100 per cent, for instance, if each party had either gained or lost all of its votes from the first election to the second.

Table 5. Levels of Overall Net Change, 1919–1933

Years	Net change, for all parties (%)	Net change, for blocks (%)	Net change, Protestant non-Marxist parties only (%)
1919–1920	28.1	5.6	12.9
1920–1924A*	27.9	9.8	12.5
1924A–1924B†	9.7	2.5	4.7
1924B–1928	12.7	5.3	9.0
1928–1930	19.7	2.8	15.7
1930–1932A	35.5	1.8	18.6
1932A–1932B	6.4	1.3	4.0
1932B–1933	10.6	7.7	6.9

* Earlier of two elections in the same year.
† Later of two elections in the same year.

parties, the Center Party (which represented the Catholics), and the Protestant/non-Marxist parties (including the Nazis). The strength of these blocs from election to election is shown in Table 6.

The second column of Table 5 provides measures of overall net changes in bloc support, comparable to the measures for parties in the first column. Though we would expect the figures for net change for any groupings of parties to be lower than net change for the parties themselves, the difference between these two columns is striking.

Such net changes may conceal all sorts of compensating or indirect movements of voters, of course. Still, these tables suggest that the "Weimar system" was one in which the level of support for the three large, socially based blocs was fairly stable, but in which the vote for particular parties could be quite fluid. It would appear that the movements of voters from one party to another occurred largely within the various blocs.[45]

This interpretation is enhanced by the unusual stability of the Center Party, the only party which had no rivals for the voters of its "bloc." From 1919 to 1933 the Center vote ranged only from 14.0 to 19.7 per cent of the vote. No other Weimar party approaches this level of stability.[46]

In this light, the shift of votes from the other Protestant/non-Marxist parties to the Nazis, although its results were monstrous, does not appear to have been such an exceptional event. From the third column of Table 5 we can see that, though the level of net change involving the Protestant/non-Marxist parties from 1928

Table 6. Percentage of the Vote, by Blocs

Bloc	Year								
	1919	1920	1924A	1924B	1928	1930	1932A	1932B	1933
Marxist	45.5	41.6	33.2	34.9	40.3	37.7	35.9	37.3	30.6
Catholic	19.7	18.0	16.6	17.4	15.1	14.9	15.7	15.0	14.0
Protestant/ non-Marxist	34.8	40.3	50.1	47.6	44.6	47.5	48.3	47.7	55.5

---

[45] Bo Särlvick describes a similar situation in Sweden. See his "Political Stability and Change in the Swedish Electorate," *Scandinavian Political Studies* (1966), pp. 188–222, esp. pp. 193–197.

[46] Some further support for this interpretation of Weimar voting is suggested in preliminary findings of a project in which I am seeking to measure "party distances" in voting during the German Empire, from 1871 to 1912. Two major gulfs in party distance appear to have determined voting during the Empire—that between the Center Party and all other parties, and that between the Social Democrats and all other parties. Distinctions among the remaining parties do form a third dimension, apparently along lines of the older urban-rural conflict over the constitution. But the distances separating these parties are relatively small. It may be that then, and later in the Weimar Republic, although the leaders of the various parties saw important differences among themselves, voters at the mass level saw essentially only Marxists, Catholics, and the parties of the Protestant bourgeoisie.

This interpretation fits quite well with the usual interpretation—presented in classic form by Lipset—of the Nazi Party as having been primarily a party of the Protestant bourgeoisie (Lipset, *Political Man,* pp. 134–152).

to 1930 and from 1930 to the first 1932 election is greater than for any other pairs of elections during the Republic, a good deal of net change involving these parties occurred at other times, too.

This interpretation of Weimar elections is consistent with the conclusion that learned identification with particular political parties was not a factor in Weimar voting. It would appear instead that Weimar voting depended on voters' sense of the social group to which they belonged (proletarian or Catholic or Protestant bourgeois), and of the political party or parties appropriate to that group. This hypothesis leads to further consideration of the general question of party identification in comparative electoral analysis.

A Problem, and a Possible Explanation

If party identification as a learned, enduring attitude was not significant for the Weimar electorate, this finding—combined with evidence from other studies cited earlier—presents a problem which has been implicit in this paper: Why is it that such party identification is widespread in America, considerably less so in Britain and West Germany, and apparently absent in the Weimar Republic?

Butler and Stokes suggest that the difference between Britain and the United States is due to differences in the way elections are run in the two countries:

> The more durable nature of the individual's party self-image when he is voting for the opposite party in America must largely be due to the different challenges faced by the elector in the two countries. On polling day the British electors vote only for a single office at a single level of government. The American has to cope simultaneously with a vast collection of partisan candidates seeking a variety of offices at federal, state and local levels: it is small wonder that he becomes conscious of a generalized belief about his ties to party, although some of his individual choices are not guided by it.[47]

One difficulty with this explanation is that in a certain sense British voters have until recently faced an even greater challenge in the polling booth than their American counterparts did. Until the practice was changed in 1969, a candidate's party did not appear on the ballot in Britain. For the British to have voted as much on the basis of party and government as they obviously have done, while faced with a ballot on which they found only the names of candidates whose party affiliation they had to recall, indicates a highly generalized view of parties. A second difficulty with the Butler and Stokes explanation is simply that it cannot account for the further case of Germany.

The "Weimar system," in which voters' choices appear to have been structured by social and economic cleavages, suggests an alternative explanation, which I shall frame here as an hypothesis:

> If the social or economic conflicts in which a voter is involved are sufficiently clear; and if the position of parties or groups of parties with regard to these conflicts is sufficiently clear; then there is no need for the voter to develop lasting ties to any party *per se,* and he will not do so.

This hypothesis stems from the notion, suggested by Anthony Downs and others, that voters learn to choose a particular party regularly as a way of avoiding the difficult, and in a certain sense "expensive," task of gathering enough political information to make their voting choice on some other basis.[48] Simply deciding that he will regard himself as a regular supporter of a particular party gives the voter an easy way to decide his vote at each election without seeking out other information. If other information intrudes—such as Kennedy's Catholicism, or a recession—he may vote in accord with that new information in the particular instance, but his party identification is always there to fall back on.

On the other hand, a voter who is a member of a clear and distinct social or economic group, for which he feels that some party or group of parties is the clear spokesman—a Catholic in the Weimar Republic, for instance, or a Welsh miner—may not need a further guide in voting. Since his social and economic position, coupled with the linkage of some party(ies) to that position, provides him with sufficient voting cues, he does not need to identify directly with a party. In other words, where clear social or economic position coincides with a clear choice of parties relative to that position, the voter is able to "place" himself easily, without going through the arduous and time-consuming job of developing a party identification.

If this hypothesis is correct, it would explain the widespread distribution of learned and lasting party attachments in the American electorate, and would at the same time suggest how unusual this must be from a comparative perspective. It would suggest that the widespread American attachments are simultaneously a result of two facts: (1) that some important social and economic cleavages, especially the cleavage based on social class, seem to be relatively less clear in America than in Europe; and (2) probably more important, that the American governmental system, with its focus on the single, indivisible office of president, makes it impractical for any party to serve as a clearly "appropriate representative" for nonmajority groups such as blacks, hardhats, or farmers, who might otherwise vote in the way suggested by the hypothesis.

---

[47] Butler and Stokes, *Political Change in Britain,* p. 43.

[48] Anthony Downs, *An Economic Theory of Democracy* (New York: Harper Row, 1957), esp. chap. 12. Actually, Downs takes a dim view of the rationality of choosing a political party as one's information-crutch, but the notion stems from his general discussion of the need to delegate the jobs of information-seeking and evaluation.

Since in most other countries there are important and intense social cleavages, and rather more opportunity than in America for nonmajority parties to operate, we might reasonably expect that in these countries, learned and lasting party identification would be less common than in the United States.[49]

Implications

The question of whether learned and lasting party identification such as that observed in the American electorate can be taken as the general norm for industrialized electoral states appears to be open. On the basis of the Butler-Stokes study of Britain and the Kaase-Schleth study of West Germany, as well as the present analysis of Weimar voting, I would suggest that such party identification must only rarely approach American levels and that what is often reported as "party identification" in other countries is simply an expression of immediate voting choice.

But it is hard to argue away the ingenious theory with which Converse absorbs even the apparently deviant cases of France and Italy, and the excellent fit to the Almond and Verba data which he achieves using that theory. Also, as noted above, the Butler-Stokes evidence that the strength of British party identification is a function of the length of time the voter has identified with the party, rather than of his age, appears to be inconsistent with the interpretation I have otherwise placed on their findings. Finally, my own study of Weimar is necessarily based on small numbers of observations on chance data.

Although there does not appear to be a clear balance of evidence on either side, it is worth considering the implications for comparative electoral studies and electoral theory if it *is* true that the American level of party identification is the exception rather than the rule:

(1) The messiest, though in some ways the most trivial, implication is in the problem of measuring party identification. If the same sort of question may call forth either immediate choice or an enduring attachment, we are in trouble. Perhaps the only solution is to use panels to look at patterns of change over time in votes and "party identification," as was done in the Butler-Stokes and Kaase-Schleth studies.

(2) Campbell's interesting "surge and decline" model, and the related hypothesis that new voters will exaggerate any shifts in the general vote, are presumably not exportable. Both theories assume that regular voters are more strongly identified with the parties they vote for than are new voters and are thus less likely to join the new voters in responding to current factors such as the state of the economy or the appeal of a particular candidate.

In this connection, Figure 5 draws a comparison between Britain and the United States. The votes of newly eligible young voters are compared with the votes of the total electorate, from 1935 to 1966 for Britain, and from 1924 to 1940 for the United States.[50] Note how much more the new voters exaggerate general trends in the United States. In Britain, where lasting party identification is presumably not as widespread as in the United States, the behavior of new voters is not particularly distinctive.

Other theories of elections which are based on an assumption of widespread, enduring party loyalties must also be more restricted to the United States than has been thought. For instance, the concept of a "critical" (or "realigning") election almost requires that an immediate political event such as the Civil War, or Bryan's candidacy, or the Depression, can put a stamp on a voter's behavior which will affect his vote for a series of elections following

---

[49] There is some evidence consistent with this interpretation in the Campbell/Valen and Butler/Stokes studies cited earlier. Campbell and Valen, for instance, were not certain whether party identification had an effect on Norwegians' voting independent of their social group identifications: "The Norwegian labor union member who is a member of the Labor Party may display a strong party attachment, but one wonders if this does not merely express in different form his basic identification with the working class" (Campbell and Valen, p. 268). And Butler and Stokes note the great impact that social class has in British voters' images of the parties, and in structuring switches in voting (Butler and Stokes, p. 89; pp. 298–303).

[50] The British first-vote figures are from Butler and Stokes, p. 54; the American figures are from Campbell et al., *The American Voter*, p. 155. In both cases, the "first votes" are based on respondents' later recollections of how they had voted in the first election in which they participated. Note that the British figures are the per cent of the vote for the two main parties.



Figure 5. Voting Trends Among New Voters

it.[51] The only mechanism likely to accomplish this is a learned, lasting attachment to particular parties. It may be that electoral changes in Europe cannot follow this pattern. Indeed, the steady and gradual growth of most European socialist parties in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries suggests this.

(3) The "freezing" of cleavages in Europe, which Lipset and Rokkan suggest occurred in the early part of the twentieth century, must be a result not so much of the political parties' binding of the voters' loyalty, as of some other process.[52] Thus, if lasting party attachments do not function as an intervening variable in Europe as they do in America, the exploration of bases of political cleavage, and their evolution through time, must be particularly important in studying European elections. It may be no accident that this focus increasingly characterizes the study of European elections.[53]

(4) The hypothesis I have suggested may give new meaning and dignity to the venerable concept of *tendance* in French voting behavior. Many writers have treated the French voter's support of a *tendance* (a broad political orientation such as "the Left," which might embrace a number of parties) as a weakly articulated party identification. It is possible, however, that to the French voter, espousal of a *tendance* represents a placing of himself in a system of blocs such as that which I have imputed to the Weimar Republic.

This could explain some peculiarities in French voting. Duncan MacRae, for example, was surprised to find that support for referenda in the Fourth Republic was closely correlated with support for political parties:

> It might be imagined that because the questions thus posed were not formally linked to party, some freedom from party dictates could develop. In actuality, votes on the referenda were closely linked to party, especially for the Communists and Socialists.[54]

If both party votes and votes on referenda were alternative expressions of a *tendance*, however, it would not be surprising that they were highly correlated. It is only surprising if one assumes, as MacRae did, that party loyalty is the only probable cause of a correlation between party choice and the vote on a referendum.

(5) The hypothesis I have suggested implies an interesting development of European voting behavior, by which it should tend in the future to be based more on party identification than it has been so far. Both of the factors I have taken as crucial—the existence of clear social and economic conflicts, and the existence of parties which are clearly identified with positions in these conflicts—appear to be declining in many European countries. "Umbrella" parties such as the Christian Democrats in Germany and Italy and the Gaullists in France tend to cross lines of social and economic conflict. And conflicts themselves are becoming less clear and static as the mobility of European populations increases. All this should

---

[51] This term was first used by Key (V. O. Key, Jr.), "A Theory of Critical Elections," *Journal of Politics*, 17 (February, 1955), pp. 1–18. See also Campbell et al., *The American Voter*, pp. 531–538.

[52] Seymour M. Lipset and Stein Rokkan, "Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, and Voter Alignment: An Introduction," in *Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-National Perspectives*, ed. S. M. Lipset and S. Rokkan (New York: Free Press, 1967), pp. 50–56. Lipset and Rokkan themselves stress the development of broad party organizations, rather than individual party identification, in the process of "freezing."

[53] For example, the papers in Lipset and Rokkan, *Party Systems and Voter Alignments*. Also, see Philip Converse and Henry Valen, "Dimensions of Cleavage and Perceived Party Distances in Norwegian Voting," *Scandinavian Political Studies*, 6 (1971), 107–152.

[54] Duncan MacRae, *Parliament, Parties, and Society in France, 1946–1958* (New York: St. Martin's, 1967), p. 243.

serve to make it more difficult for voters to "place" themselves without developing a party identification. Accordingly, we might expect to see Europeans more and more developing party identification in the American style.

(6) Finally, there are implications for the stability of elections, which bear particularly on the Weimar case. Suppose it is true in some countries, as I have speculated, that voters depend on a social group for their cues in voting, rather than on identification with a party. This must add a qualitatively different kind of fluidity to elections, since at any time another party may arise and establish a competing claim to the social group that one or more of the older parties represents. There must be limits to how often this can happen, of course, and under what circumstances it might happen, but when it does happen it should produce larger, more sudden shifts than we would expect in a system in which electoral change is slowed down by the presence of enduring attachments to particular parties. This, I have suggested earlier, is what happened at the end of the Weimar Republic.

Appendix

"Ecological" Inference

The sort of ecological inference used in the early part of this paper needs to be discussed, for in some circumstances it will give badly biased results. To keep things simple, consider a bivariate example, in which we wish to estimate the proportion of Socialist voters from the first of a pair of elections, who repeat a Socialist vote in the second election of the pair. We know the proportion Socialist in each election for districts of the country, but have no data on individuals directly. We wish to estimate the proportion of individual Socialist voters (P) who repeat a Socialist vote. As pointed out earlier, we can take the equation for the regression line predicting proportion Socialist in the second election from the proportion Socialist in the first election, and can then extrapolate along that line to the predicted proportion Socialist in the second election, in a hypothetical district composed entirely of Socialist voters from the first election. Since all the voters in such a district represent first-election Socialist voters, the proportion voting Socialist in the second election is the figure we are looking for.

Note, however, that this figure is a valid estimate of P only if the value of P from one district to another is independent of the value of the independent variable. For example, if P increases with the proportion voting Socialist in the first election, then when we extrapolate to a condition of 1.0 Socialist vote in the first election, we are extrapolating to a condition in which P is at its highest value and will overestimate P for the total population. On the other hand, if P is unrelated to proportion voting Socialist in the first election, then the expected value of P for the hypothetical, extrapolated district is the same as for all others, and will yield an unbiased estimate of P for the population.

This is not a trivial assumption to make, nor even a very safe one. The difficulties which many people have run into in using ecological regression, particularly its unfortunate penchant for giving estimates greater than 1.0, are probably due to violations of this assumption. There are some circumstances, however, under which the assumption is safe, and others under which, even if it is violated, the results are not too badly affected. Two of these circumstances, one of each type, are relevant for the present analysis.

First, if all of the districts are homogeneous (zero or one) on the independent variable, then the assumption is not necessary. In this case the regression line does not *extrapolate* to a hypothetical situation; it merely registers the average proportion of individuals having the dependent variable for those districts composed wholly of individuals having the independent variable. And similarly, where the condition of homogeneous districts is not completely met, but is approximated, violations of the assumption will not produce serious bias in the estimate of P. In the present analysis proportion female and the dummy variables for population are homogeneous. And proportion Catholic, which clusters near zero and one, approximates homogeneity. For these variables, therefore, the assumption seems reasonable.

The remaining variable, proportion voting for a party in the first election, requires a different justification. Fortunately, another characteristic of ecological inference is that if two variables are strongly related at the individual level, the estimate of P will not be badly biased by violations of the basic assumption.[55] This is probably true of the vote for the same party in two adjacent elections, especially in a relatively quiet period of politics, such as 1924 to 1928 in Germany.

Though ecological inference is always dangerous, it would seem to be relatively less dangerous under the circumstances of this particular study.

---

[55] W. Phillips Shively, "'Ecological' Inference: The Use of Aggregate Data to Study Individuals," *American Political Science Review*, 58 (December, 1969), pp. 1183–1196; esp., pp. 1191–1192.

From Warren to Burger: The Rise and Decline of Substantive Equal Protection

WALLACE MENDELSON
University of Texas at Austin

> We cannot have equal justice under law except we have some law.
> Robert H. Jackson

Substantive due process remains the classic—if temporary—achievement of judicial activism. Its demolition by the Roosevelt Court reflected an unmistakable mandate of the American people. "Equal protection" ran a similar course, reaching its zenith perhaps in the *Sewer Pipe Case*[1] (invalidating an antitrust law because it applied to business, but not to farm, operations), and *Truax* v. *Corrigan*[2] (invalidating a restriction on antilabor injunctions because it limited protection of some, not all, property). The Roosevelt Court's response to this mangling of the power to govern was revealed in *Kotch*[3] (nepotism is not forbidden in issuing river pilot licenses), *Goesaert*[4] (in granting barmaid licenses a state may favor wives and daughters of male bar owners), and *Lee Optical*[5] (sale of prescription eyeglasses by opticians may be regulated, though sale of ready-made glasses by others is not). Judges who found no unconstitutional discrimination in these cases could hardly be expected to find it in other non-race controversies. The Court's test was lenient:

> State legislatures are presumed to have acted within their constitutional power despite the fact that, in practice, their laws result in some inequality. A statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it. . . .[6]

Surely many legislators whose votes can be explained only in terms of pressure group realities must have been fascinated with the ingenuity of judges in conceiving grounds that might justify *Kotch*-like classifications. Seared by what had gone before, and confident that freedom to make mistakes is far too important to be left entirely to judges, the Roosevelt Court abandoned substantive equal protection, just as it abandoned substantive due process. Liberals now seem to have forgotten that from Jefferson's day until well into the Warren era liberalism on the bench meant keeping hands off legislation—except increasingly to protect Bill of Rights, or racial, freedoms. The rationale no doubt was that with special court protection for these basic interests, the people are quite capable of governing themselves, and must be permitted to do so. As a matter of statistics only two cases after the Roosevelt Court revolution (1937) until the middle years of the Warren era violated this precept.[7] One of them, *Morey* v. *Doud*,[8] involving economic interests, was plainly a sport. The other, *Skinner* v. *Oklahoma*[9]—the sterilization case—after lying dormant some twenty years, proved to be a viable seed in the Warren years.

A quasi blossoming came in the race cases beginning with *Brown* v. *Board of Education*.[10] Plainly they recognized that problems of racial differentiation were not to be resolved by the lenient standards that had prevailed in the *Kotch-Goesaert-Lee Optical* line of cases. Yet the new, obviously stricter, test could not—in view of the background and early interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment[11]—be deemed a typical activist exercise in judicial law-making. As Professor Philip B. Kurland put it:

---

[1] *Connolly* v. *Union Sewer Pipe Co.*, 184 U.S. 540 (1902).

[2] 257 U.S. 312 (1921).

[3] *Kotch* v. *Bd. of River Port Pilots Comm'rs*, 330 U.S. 552 (1947).

[4] *Goesaert* v. *Cleary*, 335 U.S. 464 (1948).

[5] *Williamson* v. *Lee Optical Co.*, 348 U.S. 483 (1955).

[6] This expression of the traditional view actually comes from Chief Justice Warren's opinion of the Court in *McGowan* v. *Maryland*, 366 U.S. 420, 425–426 (1961). It is an outline of an extended statement in *Morey* v. *Doud*, 354 U.S. 457, 463–464 (1957).

[7] Excluded here are cases in which state measures were stricken down because of their extraterritorial effects. These of course involve the old problem of "taxation [or regulation] without representation," and thus come within the Roosevelt Court's special concern for the processes of popular self-government. See, for example, *Southern Pacific* v. *Arizona*, 325 U.S. 761 (1945).

[8] Cited in fn. 6.

[9] 316 U.S. 535 (1942).

[10] 347 U.S. 483 (1954).

[11] For example, *Slaughter House Cases*, 16 Wall. 36 (1873); *Strauder* v. *West Virginia*, 100 U.S. 303 (1880).

ndeed, in a way, Chief Justice Warren was wrong when he suggested in *Brown* that the Court could not turn back the clock. For the Court was doing xactly that. It was returning to a recognition of he central purpose of the Equal Protection Clause, o protect Negroes from discrimination at the hands of legislative, administrative, and judicial bodies controlled by white majorities.[12]

Even so, Brown et al. may have stimulated a evival of substantive equal protection. The udges could hardly have failed to notice the highly verbal enthusiasm of their main constituency (the intellectual community) for the desegregation decisions as well as the earlier efforts to extend the Bill of Rights to the states. Then why not grant the same preferred treatment to other "fundamental" interests beyond civil liberties? Mr. Justice Douglas had been pressing in this direction for years, as Professor Kenneth L. Karst has demonstrated in an *admiring* (and thus misleadingly entitled) essay on 'Invidious Discrimination: Justice Douglas and he Return of the 'Natural Law-Due Process Formula.' "[13]

A small break came with *Griffin* v. *Illinois*[14] n 1954 when a majority coalesced on the proposition that a state's requirement of transcripts n *all* criminal appeals could not be permitted o block appeal by one too poor to meet the niform standard. This might well have been chieved via *procedural* due process—a relatively clear, narrow and therefore confining concept of ancient and honorable lineage. Indeed it was so achieved, but only in part. In a ive to four decision, Mr. Justice Black—who (except in some suffrage cases) consistently opposed both substantive due process and substantive equal protection—based his plurality pinion *partly* on the latter. How the Douglas nnovation worked its way into a Black opinion may some day be revealed; now it is a tantalizing mystery. Plainly, however, a majority could not be mustered to rest upon it alone! Some 64 years earlier procedural due process had served similarly to ease the way for substantive due process.[15]

Justices Reed, Burton, Minton and Harlan dissented, noting that the challenged measure did not (in any here relevant way) classify or differentiate. It applied equally to all who would appeal in criminal cases. Fate—not the state—had been less kind to some than to others.

Griffin was an intimation. The real break came with changes in personnel—Justices Frankfurter, Reed, Burton, and Minton (of the *Griffin* era) having been replaced by Justices Goldberg, Stewart, Brennan, and White. Thus in *Reynolds* v. *Sims*[16] the Court selected an interest (one-man-one-vote) which it deemed sufficiently "fundamental" to be protected by the new high standard explicit in the long dormant *Skinner* seed, and implicit in *Brown* and *Griffin*. There was no word whatsoever with respect to *Kotch*, *Goesaert*, etc. This is particularly interesting since in *Baker* v. *Carr*[17]—where some two years earlier the one-man-one-vote revolution began—the Court had insisted that apportionment did not present a political-question difficulty because "Judicial standards under the Equal Protection Clause are well developed and familiar. . . ." Moreover in a concurring opinion in *Carr* Mr. Justice Douglas had gone out of his way to make clear that only the traditional standard was called for: "Universal equality is not the test; there is room for weighting [of votes]." In short the Warren Court assumed jurisdiction of apportionment cases on the ground that there was an established, traditional standard to guide decision, and then in *Sims* abandoned that standard in favor of another. The new approach holds that, if the Court labels an interest "fundamental," any measure impinging upon it "must be carefully and meticulously scrutinized." What was implicit in this was later made explicit, namely; unless such scrutiny reveals a "compelling"[18] state interest in support of the impinging act, it would be held invalid. *The Warren Court never found a state measure sufficiently compelling to override anything it deemed fundamental*!

What growth potential was there in the new "rigid scrutiny" (i.e., upper level) standard for equal protection cases? In suffrage matters it proved to be substantial. Step by step one-man-one-vote was extended to all legislative bodies except (for obvious pragmatic reaosns) the United States Senate—as well as to special-purpose elections.[19] Similarly a number of voting-qualification and access-to-the-ballot measures fell by virtue of that strict scrutiny which is the heart of substantive equal protection.[20]

---

[12] *Politics, the Constitution, and the Supreme Court* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1970), pp. 110–111.

[13] UCLA LAW REVIEW 716 (1969).

[14] 351 U.S. 12 (1956).

[15] *Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co.* v. *Minnesota*, 134 U.S. 418 (1890) is generally considered the beginning of the flood of substantive due process cases. The Court's opinion rests in part on procedural considerations.

[16] 377 U.S. 533 (1964).

[17] 369 U.S. 186 (1962).

[18] See, for example, *Williams* v. *Rhodes*, 393 U.S. 23 (1968). For the Warren Court's own comparison of the traditional and the new tests, see *McDonald* v. *Bd. of Election of Chicago*, 394 U.S. 802, 807–809 (1969). The "careful scrutiny" rule is used also in case of "suspect classifications." See note 44 and related text, below.

How far beyond the franchise cases was the Warren Court prepared to go in finding "fundamentalness" in interests not secured in the Bill of Rights or elsewhere in the Constitution? *Levy* v. *Louisiana*[21] involved a typical wrongful-death statute which permitted legitimate, but not unacknowledged illegitimate, children to recover damages for the tortious death of a parent. Equating the interest here involved (the mother-child relationship) with the "fundamental" interests at stake in *Skinner, Harper,* and *Brown,* Mr. Justice Douglas, writing for the Court, struck down as irrational not the statute, but the exception.[22]

It is of course elementary that there is no common law right of recovery in such cases. That right comes as a matter of grace by statute, and Louisiana (with most other states) had chosen to define the class of proper plaintiffs in terms of their legal, rather than some other, relationship to the deceased. Thus, for example, wives and legitimate, as well as other acknowledged, children are in one category, mistresses and unacknowledged bastards are in another. The difference between the Court and the legislature seems simply a policy difference as to what kind of relationship—legal, economic, biological, emotional, for examples—should justify a tort action by the survivor. Justices Harlan, Black, and Stewart observed in dissent:

> The Court . . . rules that the State must base its arbitrary definition of the plaintiff class on biological rather than legal relationships. Exactly how this makes the Louisiana scheme even marginally more "rational" is not clear, for neither a biological relationship nor legal acknowledgment is indicative of the love or economic dependence that may exist between two persons.

Finally, in *Shapiro* v. *Thompson,* the Warren Court (but not the Chief Justice) found "the right to travel interstate" unduly impeded by a one-year residency requirement for welfare eligibility:[23]

> . . . the traditional [equal protection] criteria do not apply in these cases. Since the classification here touches on the fundamental right of interstate movement, its constitutionality must be judged by the stricter standard of whether it promotes a *compelling* state interest. Under this standard, the waiting period clearly violates the Equal Protection Clause.

Earlier in his opinion of the Court, Mr. Justice Brennan had intimated that "the ability of the families to obtain the very means to subsist" was constitutionally "fundamental." Apparently unable to pull a majority together on that proposition, he turned to the travel ploy.

Dissenting, Chief Justice Warren and his brother Black found that Congress could authorize under the Commerce Clause, and indeed had authorized, the travel restrictions in question. They also found the lower level equal protection standard relevant and satisfied. In a separate dissent, Mr. Justice Harlan reviewed the whole development of the new substantive equal protection gambit and what seemed to him its weaknesses.

The Burger Court—The 1969 and 1970 Terms

Drastic changes came with a new Chief, and later a new Associate, Justice. In an opinion by Mr. Justice Harlan, *Boddie* v. *Connecticut*[24] held that inability to pay ordinary court costs and related fees could not be permitted to bar an indigent's access to a divorce court. In contrast to *Griffin,* the decision turned not even in part on equal protection, but exclusively on the much more confining principles of *procedural* due process.[25] There was no dissent. Justices Douglas and Brennan sought to perpetuate the broader equal protection stance in a concurring opinion.

Labine v. *Vincent*[26] upheld a Louisiana inheritance statute that distinguished—as the *Levy* statute had—between illegitimate, and other, offspring. The Court, per Mr. Justice Black, found

---

[19] *Avery* v. *Midland County,* 390 U.S. 474 (1968); *Hadley* v. *Junior College District,* 397 U.S. 50 (1970); *Kramer* v. *Union Free School District,* 395 U.S. 621 (1969); *Cipriano* v. *City of Houma,* 395 U.S. 701 (1969).

[20] For example, *Carrington* v. *Rash,* 380 U.S. 89 (1965); *Harper* v. *Virginia Bd. of Elections,* 383 U.S. 663 (1966); *Williams* v. *Rhodes,* 393 U.S. 23 (1968).

[21] 391 U.S. 68 (1968).

[22] In *Connolly* v. *Union Sewer Pipe Co.* (cited in fn. 1) the "old Court" found invidious discrimination in a state antitrust law which covered businessmen but not farmers. It struck down not the "bad" exception but the whole measure! This and the opposite tactic in *Levy* demonstrate a crucial phase of judicial activism.

[23] 394 U.S. 618, 638 (1969).

[24] 91 S.Ct. 780 (1971).

[25] Prior to the new poverty-procedural-due-process approach in *Boddie,* the Burger Court unanimously invalidated on equal protection grounds two state laws which would incarcerate indigents (unable "forthwith to pay a fine in full") when others could escape that fate by virtue of fiscal competence. The first of these—*Williams* v. *Illinois,* 399 U.S. 235 (1970)— rested simply on *Griffin v. Illinois* (cited in fn. 14). The opinion in the second, *Tate* v. *Short,* 91 S.Ct. 668 (1971) was singularly laconic, marking presumably the soon to be accomplished transition to *Boddie.*

[26] 91 S.Ct. 1017 (1971).

> . . nothing in the vague generalities of the equal protection and due process clauses which empowers this Court to nullify the deliberate choice of the elected representatives of the people of Louisiana. [The] statute clearly has a rational basis in view of Louisiana's interest in promoting family life. . . .

Levy was neither overruled nor distinguished, though it is distinguishable. Plainly the Court was too divided to achieve a majority for either route. Yet it is noteworthy that the three dissenters in *Levy* (Justices Black, Stewart, and Harlan) now formed a majority with Chief Justice Burger and Mr. Justice Blackmun. Justices Douglas, Brennan, White and Marshall, dissenting, found in the Louisiana law only the "untenable and discredited prejudice of bygone centuries." Some may find in this an echo of the pre-1937 judicial intolerance that denied citizens the function of deciding for themselves what morality—be it laissez faire or paternalism—was, or was not, "untenable and discredited." The problem as usual is not what substantive conclusion is "correct," but who should make the choice.

A more obvious blow to Warren Court activism came in *Dandridge* v. *Williams*.[27] Applying the *traditional* test, a majority upheld a state AFDC program despite a maximum aid limit per family. It had been challenged for denying equal treatment for children simply because of the size of their families. The farflung importance of the case lay in the following repudiation of what the Warren Court had been hinting particularly in *Shapiro*:

> To be sure the cases cited [herein], and many others enunciating the traditional [i.e., lower level] standard under the Equal Protection Clause, have in the main involved state regulation of business and industry. The administration of public welfare assistance, by contrast, involves the most basic economic needs of impoverished human beings. We recognize the dramatically real factual difference between the cited cases and this one, but we can find no basis for applying a different constitutional standard.

The Court was careful not to repudiate, but to confine and clarify, substantive equal protection's new dual standard. Ignoring several recent decisions, the new majority limited high level review to racial classifications or those intruding upon "constitutionally protected freedom."

Mr. Justice Harlan, concurring, repudiated even the newly narrowed version of substantive equal protection:

> Except with respect to racial classification, to which unique historical considerations apply, . . . I believe the constitutional provisions assuring equal protection of the laws impose a standard of rationality of classification, long applied in the decisions of this Court, that does not depend upon the nature of the . . . interest involved.

Justices Brennan and Marshall dissented bitterly on Equal Protection and statutory-conflict grounds. Strangely a Douglas dissent rested only on the latter. There was one vacancy on the bench, the Fortas seat not yet having been taken by Mr. Justice Blackmun.

Dandridge is particularly interesting because, responding to Warren Court activism, it resorts to something quite like Mr. Justice Black's *Adamson*[28] device vis-à-vis the willfulness of the nine-old-men. That is, it would "incorporate" into the equality clause for special protection *only* those interests which have a foundation in the Constitution itself.

This means, for example, that a religious or racial minority is entitled to *extraordinary* court protection that a poverty minority cannot expect. Thus *James* v. *Valtierra*[29] upheld a referendum requirement for *low-rent* public housing projects. The Warren Court had vetoed a similar requirement vis-à-vis *open* housing.[30] In each case "special burdens" fell on a minority group. The differentiating factor for the new Court was that the Constitution outlaws state racism; it does not outlaw poverty. Justices Brennan, Marshall, and (interestingly) Blackmun dissented in *Valtierra*. Mr. Justice Douglas did not participate in the decision, nor had he reached the constitutional issue in *Dandridge*. Could it be that he was troubled? After all he had long fought for "incorporation," the heart of which is (or was) to deny special constitutional protection to judges' policy preferences that are unknown to the Constitution.

It is crucial that while the new Court denies indigents high-level equal protection, it has been strikingly sensitive to their claims in procedural due process matters. Paralleling *Boddie*, *Goldberg* v. *Kelly*[31] requires a hearing prior to termination of aid to welfare claimants. The rationale of course is that for judges to insist upon common procedural niceties is quite different from judicial interference with substantive policy.

Three decisions at the end of the 1970–71 term seriously undermined the Warren Court's position on voting rights. In *Whitcomb* v.

---

[27] 397 U.S. 471 (1970).

[28] *Adamson* v. *California*, 332 U.S. 46, 68 (1947).

[29] 91 S.Ct. 1331 (1971).

[30] *Hunter* v. *Erickson*, 393 U.S. 385 (1969).

[31] 397 U.S. 254 (1970).

Chavis[32] a three-judge federal District Court had found illicit gerrymandering in a multi-member district system which, it found, "operated to minimize and cancel out the voting strength" of a black ghetto in Indianapolis. The area in question—Center Township—plainly was large enough to have representatives of its own in a single member system. Its voting record was heavily Democratic. The multimember district (Marion County) in which it lay was highly Republican. The trial court found that the

> . . . proportion of legislators with residences in the ghetto elected from 1960 to 1968 was less than the ghetto's proportion of the population, less than the proportion of legislators elected from Washington Township, a less populous [relatively wealthy, white] district, and less than the ghetto would likely have elected had the county consisted of single-member districts.

Reversing an order that would have imposed single-member districts, the Supreme Court held that multimember districts are not invalid *per se,* and that there was no evidence of their improper use in this case:[33]

> Although we cannot be sure of the facts since the [trial] court ignored the question, it seems unlikely that the Democratic Party could afford to overlook the ghetto in slating its candidates. Clearly, in 1964—the one election which the Democrats won—the party slated and elected one senator and one representative from Center Township ghetto as well as one senator and four representatives from other parts of Center Township and two representatives from census tract 220, which was within the ghetto area described by plaintiff. Nor is there any indication that the party failed to slate candidates satisfactory to the ghetto in other years. Absent evidence or findings we are not sure, but it seems reasonable to infer that had the Democrats won all of the elections or even most of them, the ghetto would have had no justifiable complaints about representation. . . . If this is the proper view of this case, the failure of the ghetto to have legislative seats in proportion to its population emerges more as a function of losing elections than of built in bias against poor Negroes.

Plaintiffs had conceded "there was no basis for asserting that the legislative districts in Indiana were designed to dilute the votes of minorities." In short, the Court found no "invidious discrimination" *simpliciter*—as though it recognized no more than the traditional equal protection standard.

Of broader consequence was the rejection of the trial court's implicit view that "any group with distinctive interests must be represented in legislative halls, if it is numerous enough to command at least one seat and represents a majority living in an area sufficiently compact to constitute a single-member district."

> The short of it is that we are unprepared to hold that district-based elections decided by plurality vote are unconstitutional in either single- or multi-member districts simply because the supporters of losing candidates have no legislative seats assigned to them.[34]

The opinion suggests that to support a gerrymander finding, the trial court would have had to examine such matters as "the actual influence of Marion County's delegation in the Indiana legislature," and the possibility of "recurring poor performance by Marion County's delegation in the Indiana legislature with respect to Center Township ghetto" for the purpose of discovering whether "any legislative skirmish . . . would have come out differently had Marion County been [subdivided into] single-member districts."

Believing such matters entirely outside the competence of federal courts, Mr. Justice Harlan voted for remand and dismissal:

> The suggestion implicit in the Court's opinion that appellees may ultimately prevail if they can make their record in these and like respects . . . is . . . a manifestation of frustration by a Court . . . trapped in the "political thicket" and . . . looking for a way out.[35]

Justices Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall, in dissent, agreed with the trial court and acknowledged what no member of the *Sims* majority had ever so openly recognized: "The question of gerrymandering is the other half of *Reynolds* v. *Sims.*" In short, one-man-one-vote alone is about as functional as a bicycle without a second wheel. It requires merely that all gerrymandered (and other) districts be equal in size. This is no guarantee, and at best chance protection, against what the Warren Court called "diluted" votes.[36]

In this setting the dissenters came face-to-face with the majority's crucial problem. This they stated and "resolved" as follows:

> It is said that if we prevent racial gerrymandering to-day, we must prevent gerrymandering of any special interest group to-morrow, whether it be social, economic, or ideological. [We] do not agree. Our Constitution has a special thrust when it comes to voting; the Fifteenth Amendment says the right . . . to vote shall not be "abridged" on account of "race." . . .

The best then that the three heroes of the War-en era could do with what they recognized as the other half of "*Reynolds* v. *Sims*" was to permit all voting inequalities except that based on race. Thus gerrymandering that "dilutes" the votes of workingmen or students, for example, would be permissible—*the dissenters having dropped substantive equal protection* (the Fourteenth Amendment basis of *Sims*) in favor of the race-oriented Fifteenth Amendment. Allowing most, i.e., all but "colored," votes to be diluted" by gerrymander (while forbidding dilution by unequal numbers) is hardly the free choice of an ardent activist. It is imposed by his recognition that—except with respect to race and numbers—the problem is too politically complex for courts. Presumably because this compromise" entails gross discrimination against white voters, it was unacceptable to the majority. The crux of the difficulty is that interests are not homogenized. They are not spread uniformly thorughout a state. Some are geographically compact; some attenuated; some disconnected. They overlap here and there in multiple, crazy-quilt patterns that defy geographic rationalization. It follows that any districting "fair" to one group inevitably is "unfair" to some or all others.[37]

---

[32] 91 S.Ct. 1858 (1971).

[33] Pp. 1872–1874.

[34] P. 1878.

[35] P. 1883.

[36] See Ward Elliott, "Prometheus, Proteus, Pandora, and Procrustes Unbound: The Political Consequences of Reapportionment," 37 THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW 474 (1970); Wallace Mendelson, "Book Review," 58 GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL 435 (1969).

Whitcomb then comes to this. The more 'conservative" majority (Chief Justice Burger with Justices Black, Stewart, White, and Blackmun) still struggled in the well-known, yet intractable, thicket. Mr. Justice Harlan chided them for staying there. The activist dissenters (Justices Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall)—acknowledging in effect that Justices Frankfurter and Harlan were essentially right in the first place[38]—confined their efforts to that small part of the apportionment issue which can be identified by color or numbers. Let others speculate on whether Warren and Fortas, J.J., could have been induced to take this position! For the Chief it would have meant a kind of coming together of what he must believe were his two major decisions—*Brown* v. *Board of Education* and *Reynolds* v. *Sims*.

The Burger Court's willingness to recognize political realities—whether or not it could handle them—was further revealed in *Abate* v. *Mundt*[39] and *Gordon* v. *Lance*.[40] The former—over dissents by Justices Douglas and Brennan—upheld an 11.9 per cent population variation among county legislative districts because of the need for flexibility in local government, the interest in preserving the integrity of political subdistrict boundary lines, and long standing tradition. The Warren Court had ignored all such pragmatic considerations and denounced a 5.97 per cent variation among congressional districts as excessive.[41] *Lance*, relying heavily on antimajoritarian "federal analogy," upheld a law that gave opponents of school bond issues one-and-a-half times the voting power of proponents, since it discriminated merely against an abstract majority, not against any identifiable class.[42] Only Justices Brennan and Marshall dissented. It seemed to Mr. Justice Harlan that, abandoning the old regime's predilection for "majoritarianism as a rule of decision," the new Court ought to offer an alternative rationale—or retreat from the political arena.

Abate and *Lance* reject the Warren Court's simple arithmetic approach to complex political problems.[43] Relying on the more sophisticated mathematics of elementary probability theory, plaintiffs in *Whitcomb* offered "proof" of racial malapportionment. Finding this also ignored too many facts of political life, the Burger Court rested heavily on our long tradition of multimember districts and fear that "affirmance of the District Court would spawn endless litigation."

In several race and alienage cases, the Burger Court was *unanimous* in sustaining equal protection claims. Arizona and Pennsylvania had distinguished between citizens and aliens with respect to welfare benefits. Recognizing that "Under traditional equal protection principles, a State retains broad discretion to classify as long as its classification has a reasonable basis," the Justices repeated the *Dandridge* observation that this is so in the area of economics as well as in "social welfare" cases. "But the Court's decisions have established that classifications based on alienage, like those based on nationality, or race, are inherently suspect and subject to close judicial scrutiny."[44] Mr. Justice Harlan concurred, but only on the Court's "additional" ground of decision: conflict between state and national policy.

---

[37] Mendelson.

[38] See their dissenting opinions in *Baker* v. *Carr* (cited in fn. 17).

[39] 91 S.Ct. 1904 (1971).

[40] 91 S.Ct. 1889 (1971).

[41] *Kirkpatrick* v. *Preisler*, 394 U.S. 526 (1969). The Warren Court had said that justifiable deviations from mathematical equality would be permitted, but it never found any it deemed justifiable.

[42] Cf. the two-thirds majority requirement for impeachment and treaty ratification in the federal Constitution. The lower court had relied mistakenly, as it turned out, on *Gray* v. *Sanders*, 372 U.S. 368 (1963) and *Cipriano* v. *City of Houma*, 395 U.S. 701 (1969).

[43] This seems to be the new trend also among scholars. See, for example, Robert G. Dixon, *Democratic Representation: Reapportionment in Law and Politics* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1968), pp. 544 *et seq.*; Thomas R. Dye, *Politics, Economics and the Public* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966) p. 280; Elliott, "Prometheus . . ." (cited in fn. 36).

[44] *Graham* v. *Richardson* and *Sailer* v. *Leger*, 91 S. Ct. 1848, 1852 (1971). Cf. *Rogers* v. *Bellei*, 91 S.Ct. 1060 (1971).

One thought more on the Burger Court. Its position on school desegregation was plainly "high level" and unanimous in *Alexander* v. *Holmes County Board of Education*[45] (the "immediate" desegregation case) and in *Swann* v. *Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education*[46] (the busing case). No more (or less) could have been expected from the Warren Court. But, if the new regime did not retreat, neither did it advance to a new position on the race issue when invited to do so in *Palmer* v. *Thompson*.[47] When judicially ordered to desegregate its recreational facilities, Jackson Mississippi did so except with respect to its swimming pools. These it simply closed. The trial court found that the closing was "justified to preserve peace and order, and because the pools could not be operated economically on an integrated basis." The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit—which has a proud record indeed in race cases—sitting *en banc* sustained by a seven to six vote the decision below against judicial intrusion. An opinion of the Court by Mr. Justice Black upheld that position, finding no inequality of treatment:

> It should be noted that neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor any act of Congress purports to impose an affirmative duty to . . . operate swimming pools. Furthermore, this is not a case where whites are permitted to use public facilities while blacks are denied access.

The best that Mr. Justice Douglas could do in dissent was to fall back on the utter vacuity of the Ninth Amendment and his earlier "penumbra" doctrine.[48] Justices Brennan, White, and Marshall joined the Douglas dissent, but stressed another approach. Repudiating the trial court's finding, they saw racial motivation in the city's conduct, and deemed that sufficient to tip the equal protection scale.

Conclusion

The Roosevelt Court abandoned one form of judicial activism, and toyed with another. Demolishing substantive due process and equal protection, it (more accurately some of its members) instigated the slow movement for incorporation of the Bill of Rights. Their efforts blossomed in the Warren era. But the Bill of Rights, after all, is quite old-fashioned. It does not contemplate many things deemed crucial in our day: poverty, universal equal suffrage, and birth control, for examples. At least by contrast to the Fourteenth Amendment (for which Holmes saw only the sky as a limit), the Bill of Rights is confining—too confining in any event for today's judicial activists. They tried to expand it by the "penumbra" theory and by appeal to the absolute void of the Ninth Amendment.[49] These efforts did not thrive. Return to nonprocedural due process was unthinkable; its unhappy history is still too vivid. Finally they found in equal protection the same opportunity for judicial legislation that the "nine old men" had found in substantive due process. A reaction was inevitable.

Mr. Justice Black's role in all this was crucial. Indeed, in a most basic sense it is his story. He could not abide doctrines that allow judges to impose their own predilections upon a reluctant community. Thus no one surpassed his early efforts to destroy substantive due process and substantive equal protection. At the same time he led the movement to incorporate the Bill of Rights into the Fourteenth Amendment. Obviously these were complementary efforts directed at the same target: judicial free wheeling. Believing deeply in government by law and not by men, he would read all of the old judge-made accretions out of that most ambiguous of amendments, and replace them exlusively with the essence of the Bill of Rights. There his Fourteenth Amendment activism stopped. Indeed, for him, this was not activism.[50] For he had convinced himself, if few others, that a historic purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to impose Bill-of-Rights limitations upon the states.[51] In his view, those limitations—unlike the amorphous substantive due process and equal protection doctrines—provided "clearly marked . . . boundaries"[52] to guide decision and foreclose judicial fiat. Given this special court protection for the basic civil rights and civil liberties, he could find no other meaning in democracy than this: The people must be free to formulate their own policies on poverty, birth control,[53] and other social issues—however wise or unwise they may seem to judges. It comes at last to this: Courts must protect "fundamental" interests, but in determining what is fundamental they must look to the Constitution.

---

[45] 396 U.S. 19 (1969).

[46] 91 S.Ct. 1267 (1971)

[47] 91 S.Ct. 1940 (1971). See also *Griggs* v. *Duke Power Co.*, 91 S.Ct. 849 (1971). It is arguable that the Warren Court's position in *Griffin* v. *Prince Edwards County*, 377 U.S. 218 (1964) and *Orleans Parish School District* v. *Bush*, 365 U.S. 569 (1961), required a different result in *Palmer*.

[48] See his opinion in *Griswold* v. *Connecticut*, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965).

[49] *Griswold* v. *Connecticut*.

[50] He saw "incorporation" as an antiactivist device. Apart from the problem of racism, it was calculated to confine the Fourteenth Amendment to a Bill of Rights meaning.

[51] The literature on this problem is extensive. Some of it is covered in Wallace Mendelson, "Mr. Justice Black's Fourteenth Amendment," 53 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW 711 (1969).

[52] *FPC* v. *Natural Gas Pipeline Co.*, 315 U.S. 575, 601, note 4 (1942).

[53] The poverty cases are discussed above. As to birth

The subjectivity of the Warren Court's determinations in this area cannot be hidden. It used the stringent test in most suffrage cases,[54] but not vis-à-vis a statute that denied ballots to jailees; not vis-à-vis higher criminal penalties for habitual criminals than for others,[55] and not in a freedom of religion controversy.[56] Even Mr. Justice Black on occasion ran afoul of his own guidelines. A leader of the one-man-one-vote revolution, he dissented bitterly in the poll tax case (charging that the Court had returned to the old "natural law due process" formula). In short he accepted the high-level test in *Sims* and *Lucas*, but not in *Harper*.[57] A related difficulty of substantive equal protection, as its chief academic sponsor recognizes, is that "Since most legislation has differential effects on various groups, discrimination . . . can be found [or ignored] in almost anything the legislature does—or fails to do."[58] The courts then end up (as in the old days) with a general power to supervise virtually the whole sphere of government.[59] The result is likely to be what we had in the first third of this century: government by the judiciary, as one observer described it.

If the equality principle is to go beyond its historic purpose of protection against governmental racism, the traditional, single standard (in nonrace cases) seemed to the late Mr. Justice Harlan our best hope for equal application of the equal protection clause. It "reduces to a minimum the likelihood that the federal judiciary will judge state policies in terms of the individual notions and predilections of its members. . . ."[60] Mr. Justice Harlan perhaps had more reason than most of us to remember *inter alia* the blunder of the *Sewer Pipe Case*[61] in which his grandfather wrote for the Court—to say nothing of the first Mr. Justice Harlan's views in *Cumming* v. *Richmond*[62] and *Berea College* v. *Kentucky*.[63]

Remember too, no doubt, the early Burger Court—like the Roosevelt Court—repudiated much of the equal protection activism of its predecessor. Yet it went beyond Mr. Justice Harlan by recognizing a special status under the equality clause for constitutionally grounded interests, and only those interests. President Nixon's campaign for "strict construction" seems to have had some effect! So did President Roosevelt's similar efforts a generation ago. In those days, however, we spoke not of strict construction but of a "return to the Constitution."

The great question now is this: Will the full Nixon Court keep these early counsels of restraint? Or will it too succumb to the magic of power, and give high-level protection to interests which *it* deems fundamental? If the latter alternative is to be our fate, some of us may find embarrassment in our quondam efforts to convince ourselves that judicial activism (it used to be called judicial supremacy) is a proper handmaiden of democracy. We may even come to wonder—as liberals generally have until recently—whether there is any democratic justification whatsoever for a nonelected superlegislature that pretends to be a court.

In the year following the departure of Justices Black and Harlan (and the writing of the above) the Court seems to have adopted a new tack. At least when "constitutionally grounded freedom" is not at stake, recent equal-protection decisions suggest a balancing of interests approach that necessarily rejects both the Roosevelt Court's "abdication" in nonrace cases and the "activism" of the Warren era. See particularly, *Weber v. Aetna*, 92 S. Ct. 1400 (1972); *Lindsey v. Norment*, 92 S. Ct. 862 (1972); *Reed v. Reed*, 92 S. Ct. 251 (1971).

---

control, see his biting dissent in *Griswold v. Connecticut* (cited in fn. 48).

[54] See cases cited in fns. 16, 18–20.

[55] *Oyler* v. *Boles*, 368 U.S. 448 (1962); *McDonald* v. *Bd. of Election Comm'rs*, 394 U.S. 802 (1969).

[56] *McGowan* v. *Maryland*, 366 U.S. 420 (1961).

[57] The crux of Mr. Justice Black's problem was that his dedication to democracy dictated special court protection for the suffrage, though suffrage is not covered in the Bill of Rights. Writing the Court's first one-man-one-vote opinion he carefully avoided reliance upon equal protection. *Wesberry* v. *Sanders*, 376 U.S. 1 (1964). Then he silently, and no doubt painfully, went along with the Court's substantive equal protection approch in *Sims et al.* In *Harper* he returned to type, but it was too late. *Griswold* a few months earlier had already emasculated his quarter century effort to tame the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court's effort in that case to tie birth control into the Bill of Rights, if designed to placate the Justice, can only be deemed an insult to his intelligence. As he forcefully pointed out, the Court had simply put new garments on the old due process wolf. For Mr. Justice Black the lesson of *Sims* must have been this: The role of demi-virgin is not easily maintained.

[58] Karst, "Invidious Discrimination . . . ," p. 740.

[59] Including, as Karst would have it (see quotation at note 58, above) governmental nonaction. Since equal protection is included in the Fifth Amendment (at least for some purposes, *Bolling* v. *Sharpe*, 347 U.S. 497 [1954]), the supervisory power would extend to the federal government as well as to the states.

[60] Mr. Justice Harlan dissenting in *Harper* v. *Virginia Bd. of Elections* (cited in fn. 20) pp. 681–682.

[61] Cited in fn. 1, above.

[62] 175 U.S. 528 (1899).

[63] 211 U.S. 45 (1908).

Malapportionment, Gerrymandering, and Party Fortunes in Congressional Elections

ROBERT S. ERIKSON

Florida State University

The number of congressional seats either the Democrats or the Republicans win in national elections depends not only on the party's share of the aggregate vote but also upon how the party's supporters are distributed among congressional districts. If there is a systematic tendency for a party's voters to reside in overpopulated districts (malapportionment) or in districts where their votes go "wasted" (gerrymandering), then the party will win less than its "fair" share of seats. Of course, given single-member district elections, we cannot expect that a party's proportion of the seats should be its proportion of the vote. But one reasonable standard of "fairness" is that the party with the majority of the votes should also be the party with the majority of the seats. Moreover, an equitable arrangement would provide that the relationship between the two-party division of the vote and the partisan seat division be symmetrical: that is, if one party wins *y* seats for *x* per cent of the vote, the other party should also win approximately *y* seats for *x* per cent of the vote.

This paper examines the effect of congressional districting on the partisan distribution of northern seats in the U.S. House of Representatives over the period from 1952 through 1970. Nationwide, the Democrats are the party most likely to win a majority of the seats with only a minority of the votes, because the low turnout rate in the traditionally Democratic South allows the Democrats to win many seats (often uncontested) with relatively few votes.[1] But for the North alone, there has been a strong pro-Republican bias in congressional districting up until at least the most recent congressional elections. This Republican advantage can be seen from a glance at Table 1. This table presents both the aggregate two-party vote division and the resultant partisan seat division in the North, for each congressional election from 1952 through 1970.[2] Some simple comparisons indicate that the Republicans had once been able to win more northern seats than the Democrats could with the same proportion of the northern two-party vote. For example, in 1960 the Democrats won a slight majority of the northern two-party vote yet obtained only a minority (45 per cent) of the northern seats; in contrast, in 1954 and 1962, respectively, the Republicans translated slim vote majorities into 65 per cent and 54 per cent of the seats. Similar comparisons can be made between the results in 1956 and 1958 and between the results in 1952 and 1964. These comparisons indicate that over the 1952–1964 period, the Republicans were able to win about ten per cent more of the northern seats than the Democrats were able to when the polarity of the aggregate vote division had been reversed. Only after 1964 does the appearance of partisan equity emerge. In 1966 and 1968, the Republicans won slight majorities of both the northern votes and the northern seats; when the Democrats won a slight majority of the northern votes in 1970, they also won a slight majority of the northern seats.

In Figure 1, the data of Table 1 are presented graphically. The solid regression line is based on the seven observations from 1952 through 1964 (the solid dots). The partisan inequity during the 1952–1964 period is revealed by the fact that according to the regression estimate, the Democrats had to win almost 52 per cent of the vote in order to expect even half the seats. Moreover, had the aggregate vote division been a 50–50 partisan split, the Democrats could have expected to win only about 44.6 per cent of the seats instead of the "fair" value of 50 per cent. Two of the three 1966–1970 observations (the hollow dots) depart appreciably from the regression line based on the earlier elections. Although the

---

[1] Andrew Hacker, *Congressional Districting* (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1963), p. 45; the most thorough examination of the nationwide relationship between the popular vote and the partisan seat division is found in James G. March, "Party Legislative Representation as a Function of Election Results," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 21 (1957–1958), 521–542.

[2] For the measure of election results for Table 1, and in the subsequent analysis of this study, slight adjustments are made for uncontested seats and at-large seats. These adjustments are discussed in the Appendix. Throughout this study, the "North" is defined so as to exclude from analysis those districts in the former Confederate States and in the Border States of Kentucky, Maryland, Missouri, Oklahoma, and West Virginia.



Figure 1. Relationship between the Democratic percentage of the northern two-party vote and the Democratic percentage of northern seats, 1952–1970

1952–1964 regression line "predicts" the 1970 results with reasonable accuracy, it underestimates the proportion of Democratic seats in both 1966 and 1968 by about 9 per cent.[3] For reasons that will become clear, it makes more sense to treat all three post-1964 observations as manifestations of a new pattern rather than to treat the 1966 and 1968 results as temporary aberrations. Consequently we draw a new regression line (the broken line) through the 1966–1970 observations. This 1966–1970 regression line departs from the 1952–1964 regression line in two ways. First, it is less steep, which indicates that partisan swings of the aggregate vote produce smaller shifts in the partisan distribution of northern seats than before. Second, according to the 1966–1970 regression line, the expected vote division when the votes are split 50–50 is now virtually an even partisan split (49.4 per cent Democratic). This implies that the relationship between the partisan vote division and the partisan seat division has become "fair," in the sense that each party now can expect to win the majority of seats when it wins the most votes.

Figure 1 poses two puzzles. First, why was there a pro-Republican imbalance or advantage during the 1952–1964 period? Second, why did the relationship between votes and seats change between 1964 and 1966 in a way that reduced the pro-Republican imbalance? The Republican imbalance could have been caused by malapportionment in favor of Republican areas, by a Republican gerrymander, or by some combination of these two factors. If the pattern of malapportionment had discriminated against the Democratic party, then the most Democratic districts would have tended to be the most populous districts. If, on the other hand, a gerrymander had been responsible for the Republican imbalance, it would be evident from an examination of the way the two-party vote division had been distributed across districts. Before looking at the gerrymandering possibilities, let us see whether Democratic areas had been underrepresented prior to reapportionment.

Malapportionment and Partisan Imbalance

A "malapportionment" explanation for the Republican imbalance and its decline is intuitively plausible. Prior to the extensive reapportionment on a more exact population basis in the 1960s, the state legislatures that drew congressional district lines were themselves often malapportioned in favor of rural Republican interests. Moreover, the timing of the decline in the Republican congressional advantage (1964–1966) coincides exactly with the period of greatest congressional reapportionment, as shown in Table 2. The major breakthrough in congressional redistricting occurred between the 1964 and 1966 elections, since this period saw the greatest dropoff both in the number of 1962 districts remaining, and in the standard

Table 1. Partisan Divisions of the Popular Vote for the U.S. House in the North[a] and of Northern House Seats, 1952–1970

Year	Popular Vote		Seats	
	% Dem.	% Rep.	% Dem.	% Rep.
1952	44.3	55.7	29.7	70.3
1954	48.4	51.6	35.4	64.6
1956	46.6	53.7	36.4	63.6
1958	52.8	47.2	51.4	48.6
1960	50.3	49.7	44.7	55.3
1962	49.7	50.3	45.7	54.3
1964	54.9	45.1	60.1	39.9
1966	48.1	51.9	47.4	52.6
1968	47.5	52.5	46.8	53.2
1970	51.6	48.4	50.5	49.5

[a] See the Appendix for adjustments made for uncontested seats.

---

[3] Given the close fit of the regression line to the 1952–1964 observations ($r = .97$, $\sigma_{y/x} = 2.6$ per cent), departures from the regression line as great as those for 1966 and 1968 should occur less than one time in 100.

Table 2. Evolution of Northern Congressional Reapportionment, 1962–1970

Election Year	Standard Deviation of Northern District Population (in thousands)	Percentage of 1962 Districts Remaining[a]
1962	87	100%
1964	73	86%
1966	43	42%
1968	34	15%
1970	33	11%

[a] Excluding at-large districts in states with one Congressman.

deviation (as an indicator of the range) of district population.

But despite the circumstantial evidence pointing to reapportionment as the cause of the decline in the Republican imbalance, a direct test forces us to reject this hypothesis. Table 3 shows the correlation between district population and the Democratic percentage of the two-party vote for two pre-reapportionment elections (1960 and 1962) and for two elections after reapportionment was well under way (1966 and 1968). As can be seen, the correlations between Democratic voting and district population were slightly negative for the pre-reapportionment years but virtually nonexistent for the two latter years. Thus, reapportionment corrected a very slight tendency for Democratic districts to be underpopulated and overrepresented.[4] Moreover, as Table 3 also shows, the correlations between the number of *actual voters* and the Democratic percentage of the two-party vote has been consistently negative, with magnitudes ranging from −.18 to −.39. The number of voters has therefore been consistently lower in the most Democratic districts—both before and after reapportionment. The reason appears to be that Republicans in the electorate vote more frequently than Democrats do, since in the four elections examined, the correlation between the Democratic vote and the turnout *rate* (percentage of eligible voters who vote) was in the range of −.4.[5]

The slight "overrepresentation" of Democratic voters because of the differential partisan turnout rate pushes the mean vote division per district about one percentage point more Democratic (on the average) than the partisan division of the aggregate popular vote. Thus the Democratic percentage of the vote is slightly larger when each *district* rather than each *voter* is given equal weight.[6] If the mean district vote division is now used as the measure of election results, the 1952–1964 Republican imbalance looms even larger. This difference is shown in

Table 3. The Relationship Between Constituency Size and the Partisan Vote Division in Northern Congressional Districts

	Correlation with the Democratic Percentage of the Two-Party Vote			
	1960 (N=291)	1962 (N=290)	1966 (N=290)	1968 (N=290)
Population	−.12	−.08	.03	.01
Number of Actual Voters	−.23	−.18	−.30	−.39

Note: Alaska and Hawaii are excluded because their voting age was under 21 years. See the Appendix for adjustments made for uncontested and at-large seats.

---

[4] This result corresponds with Hacker's earlier finding that northern districts categorized as "safe Democratic" tended to have slightly smaller populations than "safe Republican" districts. Hacker also found districts with "changing" partisan loyalties to be the most overpopulated. See Andrew Hacker, *Congressional Districting*, p. 79. The explanation for the absence of a Republican bias in congressional malapportionment is the familiar thesis that overrepresentation of rural Republican areas was offset by an underrepresentation of the suburbs rather than by underrepresentation of the central cities.

[5] For a discussion of the tendency for Democrats to vote less frequently than Republicans do, see Philip E. Converse, "The Concept of a Normal Vote," in Angus Campbell, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald E. Stokes, *Elections and the Political Order* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1966), pp. 9–39.

[6] The mean district vote division is what the vote division would be if every vote is assigned a weight in proportion to the "value" of the vote in the particular district, with the "value" of the vote determined by the ratio of the average number of voters per district to the number of voters in the particular district. For example, in a district with half the average number of voters, the "value" of the vote would be two, and each vote would have twice the average weight in the determination of the mean district vote division. For an analysis of the variability of the "value" of the vote in state legislative contests (but based on population rather than turnout), see Paul T. David and Ralph Eisenberg, *Devaluation of the Urban and Suburban Vote* (Charlottesville: Bureau of Public Administration, University of Virginia, 1962).



Figure 2. Relationship between the mean Democratic percentage of the two-party congressional vote per northern district and the Democratic percentage of northern seats, 1952–1970

Figure 2, which displays the relationship between the mean northern district vote division (rather than the popular vote division in the North) and the partisan distribution of northern seats. The regression of the seat division on the mean vote division for the seven 1952–1964 observations provides the estimate that had the mean district vote division been 50 per cent Democratic, the Democrats would have won only 42.1 per cent of the seats. This indicates a Republican imbalance of 7.9 per cent of the northern seats (i.e., 50.0 per cent minus 42.1 per cent), which is somewhat greater than the earlier estimate of 5.4 per cent made before the correction for the "overrepresentation" of Democrats.

Had the hypothesized overrepresentation of Republican areas been the cause of the Republican imbalance, the imbalance would have disappeared when the mean district vote is used as the measure of election results. Instead, because a differential partisan turnout rate causes an "overrepresentation" of Democrats, the imbalance increases when election results are measured in terms of the mean district vote. Therefore, we must look for a Republican gerrymander as the explanation for the imbalance.

Gerrymandering and Partisan Imbalance

A "gerrymander" is often defined as the manipulation of the boundaries of districts (which are not necessarily of unequal population) for partisan advantage. Here we will broaden this definition somewhat to include accidental gerrymanders caused by the natural geographic distribution of Republican and Democratic voters in addition to gerrymanders that are intentional creations. The optimum gerrymander for a party is the spreading of the opposition party supporters as thinly as possible across many districts where they cannot obtain a majority, with the remainder clustered in one-party districts. A good Republican gerrymander, for example, would have a majority of districts that are *minimally* safe for the Republican party and a minority that are *very* safe for the Democratic party. In short, the distribution of the vote across districts would be heavily skewed in the direction of the disadvantaged Democratic party so that the *mean* district vote percentage for the Democratic party is greater than its *median* vote percentage. Given such a distribution, when the mean vote division happens to be 50 per cent Democratic, less than half the seats would be won by Democrats. On the other hand, the perfect absence of a gerrymander would occur if the distribution of the vote across districts is symmetrical, such as with a normal distribution. If the distribution is symmetrical, so that the mean district vote division equals the median district vote division, then each party would win half of the seats when the mean district vote division is 50 per cent Democratic.[7]

Table 4 presents the distributions of the two-party congressional vote across congressional districts for each of the ten elections from 1952 through 1970. From 1952 through 1964, the distribution is skewed in the predicted pattern of a Republican gerrymander—with the greatest density of districts in the range about 10 per cent more Republican than the average, or with just enough Republican votes to be normally safe for the Republican party. But for the 1966, 1968, and 1970 elections, the previous form of skewness disappears and bimodal distributions of the vote emerge.

This reduction of the Republican gerrymander explains the change in the relationship be-

---

[7] Although the manner in which the two-party vote is distributed among congressional districts has received little scholarly attention, a discussion of how the distribution of the vote affects British elections can be found in D. E. Butler, *The Electoral System in Britain Since 1918*, 2nd ed. (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), pp. 198–199. Butler concluded that the British Labour Party has been electorally disadvantaged by the concentration of Labour voters in safe constituencies. For a rigorous mathematical presentation of how the distribution of the vote affects a legislature's party composition, see M. G. Kendall and A. Stuart, "The Law of Cubic Proportions in Election Results," *British Journal of Sociology*, 1 (September 1950), 183–197.

Table 4. Distribution of the Democratic Percentage of the Two-Party Congressional Vote Across Northern Congressional Districts, 1952–1970

Year	% Democratic (as deviation from the mean)[a]								Percentage of Districts More Democratic Than the Mean
	$\bar{X}-30$	$\bar{X}-20$	$\bar{X}-10$	$\bar{X}$	$\bar{X}+10$	$\bar{X}+20$	$\bar{X}+30$	$\bar{X}+40$	
1952	.000	.069	.333	.292	.168	.086	.041	.010	40.5
1954	.000	.062	.357	.278	.148	.096	.048	.010	37.5
1956	.000	.072	.347	.268	.169	.103	.034	.007	41.2
1958	.000	.089	.363	.209	.182	.116	.034	.007	40.8
1960	.000	.085	.355	.225	.167	.123	.041	.003	40.3
1962	.000	.116	.331	.191	.185	.136	.038	.003	45.1
1964	.007	.126	.307	.185	.205	.113	.005	.003	43.0
1952–64 Mean	*.001*	*.088*	*.342*	*.235*	*.175*	*.110*	*.042*	*.006*	*41.2*
1966	.024	.218	.167	.187	.208	.123	.068	.003	47.8
1968	.020	.198	.232	.143	.198	.140	.049	.017	47.8
1970	.038	.215	.192	.164	.123	.192	.061	.010	46.9
1966–70 Mean	*.027*	*.210*	*.197*	*.165*	*.176*	*.152*	*.059*	*.010*	*47.4*

[a] The categories $\bar{X}$, $\bar{X}+10$, etc. represent midpoints of class intervals; e.g., within 5% of the mean, between 5% and 15% more Democratic than the mean, and so on. Exact cutting points were determined by calculating the mean Democratic percentage to more than one decimal point.

Note: N=293 for all elections from 1960 on. For 1952 through 1956, N=291. For 1958, N=292. The discrepancy is due to the late admission of Alaska and Hawaii. See the Appendix for adjustments made for uncontested seats.

tween the partisan vote division and the partisan seat division. In pre-1966 elections, the average percentage of northern districts more Democratic than the northern mean was 41.2 per cent, a figure very close to the regression-based estimate of 42.2 per cent as the 1952–1964 percentage of the northern seats that would have been won by Democrats when the mean northern division was 50.0 per cent Democratic. Also, the average 1966–1970 percentage of districts more Democratic than the mean is 47.4 per cent, which is very close to the 1966–1970 regression estimate of the seat division accompanying an even partisan split in the mean district vote (48.1 per cent Democratic). Since the 1966–1970 percentage of districts more Democratic than the mean is still less than 50 per cent, the Republican gerrymander has not entirely been eliminated. But the impact of the remaining gerrymander is so slight that it does not even cancel out the impact of the small Democratic "advantage" in district elections that stems from the low turnout rate among Democratic voters.

Why Has the Republican Gerrymander Declined?

We have seen that the Republican imbalance had been a function of a Republican gerrymander. But why did the gerrymander decline as of 1966? Since the decline of the gerrymander in 1966 coincided with the major period of one man-one vote reapportionment, the gerrymander's decline could possibly have been a function of reapportionment. Plausible reasons for this explanation are that reapportionment may have made gerrymandering more difficult by the requirement of equally populated districts, and furthermore, in most states the reapportionment agent was a Federal court or a state legislature which was not under Republican control. If reapportionment had been responsible for the decline in the Republican gerrymander in 1966, the decline should be evident only among the districts in states that redistricted prior to the 1966 election. But instead, as shown in Figure 3, the 1964–1966 change in partisan distribution of the vote across districts was no less sharp in states where no redistricting occurred than in states where new districts were created. Thus, it was not reapportionment that produced the sudden decline in the Republican gerrymander between 1964 and 1966.

Another potential explanation that can be eliminated is that a post-1964 partisan realignment of voters created a shift in the relative voting habits of districts (relative, that is, to each other) which reduced the gerrymander.



Figure 3. Change, 1964–1966, in the frequency distribution of the congressional vote in northern districts: *within states that had redistricted between the 1964 and 1966 elections and within those that had not;* the mean vote divisions are calculated separately for the two types of districts.

Any such realignment would have been evident in presidential voting as in congressional voting, so that the distribution of the presidential vote division across congressional districts in the 1968 election would resemble the distribution of the congressional vote for that year. The distribution of the Democratic percentage of the three-party presidential vote in 1968, however, is found to be heavily skewed in the pattern of the strongest pre-1966 congressional gerrymanders, with only 39.6 per cent of the northern districts voting more Democratic than the northern average. Therefore, it appears that the underlying Republican gerrymander remains, modified only by some sort of change in the relative voting habits of districts in congressional elections alone.

Why, then, did the Republican gerrymander decline in the congressional vote but not in the presidential vote following the 1964 election? One clue is that in 1966 the Democrats were able to retain about half of the 43 new seats they had picked up in 1964. All but two of the freshman Democrats thrust into office with the help of the Democratic tide of 1964 ran again in 1966. Their newly won incumbency status gave many of these new Democratic Representatives the necessary electoral leverage for them to hold onto their seats in 1966 and thereafter, overcoming the receding Democratic tide. In the North between 1964 and 1966, the Republican gain was 6.8 per cent of the two-party congressional vote. If this vote swing had been uniform across all districts, the Democrats would have needed to win their newly captured districts with at least 56.8 per cent of the vote in 1964 in order to retain them in 1966. This 56.8 per cent margin in 1964 was attained by only two of the 41 Democrats who captured Republican seats and went on to contest the 1966 election. But instead of a mean loss of 6.8 per cent, these first-term Democrats lost an average of only 3.0 per cent of the vote between 1964 and 1966. (The mean loss was 2.9 per cent if the ten cases with a district boundary change are excluded.) As a result of this partial immunity from the Republican trend, in 1966 the Democratic party was able to retain twenty-one of its new seats instead of the "expected" handful. Moreover, veteran Democratic incumbents as well as first-termers were relatively immune from the 1964–1966 Republican tide. The average Republican gain against veteran Democrats with stable districts was only 4.0 per cent instead of the overall average of over six per cent. Thus a few more veteran Democratic Congressmen retained their seats in 1966 than expected if the partisan tide had been uniform. It follows that relatively weak Republican gains against Democratic incumbents were made up by unusually strong gains in 1966 by Republican Congressmen. Indeed Republican incumbents with stable districts gained an average of 9.9 per cent of the vote between 1964 and 1966. Thus the strong Republican gains in 1966 were concentrated in already Republican districts where the added Republican votes were "wasted."

The net effect of the Democratic tide in 1964 combined with the relative gains by incumbents in 1966 was the destruction of what had been an ideal Republican gerrymander. Among the

Table 5. Incumbency and the Vote Swing, 1960–1970

Election	Mean Vote Swing from Previous Election (as % Dem.)[a]	Deviation from Mean Vote Swing (as % Dem.)			
		Veteran Democratic Incumbents	Veteran Republican Incumbents	Freshman Democrats and Retiring Republicans[b]	Freshman Republicans and Retiring Democrats[b]
1960	−2.0	+0.1 (77)	−0.1 (100)	+1.5 (66)	−3.5 (22)
1962	−0.8	+1.6 (54)	−0.6 (46)	+0.5 (14)	−1.8 (25)
1964	+5.5	−0.8 (78)	+0.4 (95)	+1.5 (31)	−1.3 (25)
1966	−6.1	+2.2 (69)	−3.6 (53)	+5.0 (42)	−6.1 (7)
1968	+0.5	+1.1 (66)	+0.6 (41)	+10.3 (5)	−4.5 (33)
1970	+4.2	+1.5 (88)	−0.9 (101)	+3.6 (20)	−6.2 (19)
All Cases excluding 1966		+0.6 (363)	−0.2 (363)		
All Cases, 1960–1964				+1.4 (111)	−1.9 (72)
All Cases, 1966–1970				+5.0 (67)	−5.2 (59)

[a] Excluding districts with a boundary change from the previous election, districts with unopposed candidates and districts not classified as having a veteran incumbent, freshman incumbent, or retiring incumbent. All observations for this table are for districts without boundary changes since the prior election.

[b] Excluded are cases with an intervening by-election since the previous general election.

elections examined, only in 1966 did the average vote margins of each party's *veteran* incumbents depart more than trivially from what would be expected on the basis of a uniform swing of the vote from the prior election. The reason for the strong showing by incumbents in 1966 appears to be that the electoral advantage from being an incumbent simply increased suddenly with the 1966 election. The data of Table 5 support this explanation and can be interpreted in the following way. In each election from 1960 through 1970, first-term incumbents tended to win more votes, and replacements for retiring incumbents tended to lose more votes, than would have happened with a uniform swing of the vote from the prior election. But the magnitudes of these departures from the average vote swing were markedly greater in 1966 and thereafter than in the three earlier election years. Apparently in 1966 the gain to a candidate from running as an incumbent for the first time and the loss to a party when its incumbent retires increased from roughly two per cent to about five per cent of the vote.[8] This increase of about three per cent is also the average amount that was gained by veteran incumbents in 1966 beyond what they would have won had the vote swing been uniform. Since veteran incumbents seeking reelection had already gained about two percentage points when they had won their first race as an incumbent, the three per cent boost is what they needed to give them the same five per cent incumbency bonus that first-term incumbents were beginning to receive.

An increased incumbency advantage beginning in 1966 is not so mysterious as it may seem, since the timing of its occurrence coincides with that of the reported erosion of party identification as an electoral force in the late 'sixties.[9] Possibly the electorate's decreasing partisan loyalty, signaled by such indicators as the post-1964 surge in the number of Independent voters, is the cause of the apparent boost in the incumbency advantage. As voters display greater partisan ambivalence, a factor such as the incumbent's visibility is likely to tip the balance in a greater number of voter decisions.

The immediate effect of the 1966 incumbency boost on the distribution of constituency voting is shown in Figure 4, which superimposes the 1964 and 1966 distributions of the vote on one another. The greatest 1964–1966 change in the distribution was a marked decline in the number of districts in the partisan range where contests were close in 1964. Districts with close contests in 1964 would have been marginally safe for the Republican party in a more "normal" election. Those among them that were transferred to the Democrats in 1964 became relatively more Democratic in 1966, many beyond the reach of Republican recapture. The marginally Republican districts in 1964 became even safer for the Republican party in 1966 and thereafter. The net effect of the relative gains by each party's incumbents in 1966 combined with the Democratic tide in 1964 was the near destruction of the Republican gerrymander. Although the greatest density of districts had once been in the partisan range where they had been slightly safe for the Republican party, in 1966 this range contained only a scattering of districts.[10]

---

[8] Elsewhere I have argued that during the 'fifties, incumbency status was only worth about an added two per cent of the two-party vote to the congressional candidate. See Robert S. Erikson, "The Advantage of Incumbency in Congressional Elections," *Polity*, 3 (Spring, 1971), 395–405.

[9] Walter Dean Burnham, *Critical Elections and the Mainsprings of American Politics* (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1970).

The 1966 incumbency boost served to "lock in" the 1966 partisan distribution of seats. For example, the seats the Republicans won back in 1966 became even more safely Republican in 1968, as the new Republican incumbents gained the incumbency advantage. Even when the Democratic tide returned in 1970, the Republicans held onto all but one of the nineteen seats they had regained in 1966. Altogether, only eight northern Republican incumbents lost re-election bids in 1970. For comparison, the Republicans lost nine other northern seats between 1968 and 1970 following the retirement of the 1968 Republican victor. Meanwhile, the Democrats who were pushed into Congress with the 1964 tide and held on in 1966 became even more secure in 1968 and 1970. Only two of the nineteen survivors who sought reelection again in 1968 were unable to win. Perhaps because only the "fittest" candidates among the Democrats elected to previously Republican seats in 1964 were able to survive the 1966 hurdle, these Democratic survivors have since increased their vote margins even beyond what their incumbency advantage would allow. For example, the fourteen Democrats who won previously Republican seats in 1964 and survived to contest (and win) the 1970 election gained an average of 9.2 per cent of the vote over the six-year span. There was a quite different pattern in the five districts where a Democrat retired after taking a Republican seat in 1964 and holding on in 1966, as in each instance the district had reverted back to Republican control by 1970.

Interestingly, the 1966 incumbency boost helped the Democrats only because it followed



Figure 4. Frequency distribution of the Democratic percentage of the congressional vote in northern districts, 1964 and 1966. Observations are for class intervals four percentage points apart. Alignment of means is approximate, due to rounding of class intervals.

the Democratic election of 1964. Had voting in 1964 been "normal," the incumbency boost would merely have frozen the resultant distribution of seats, with its built-in Republican advantage. Had the Republicans been favored by the 1964 trend the 1966 incumbency boost would have given the Republicans some normally Democratic seats rather than the reverse. We may speculate that as the Democrats representing normally Republican districts retire or are defeated when the next strongly Republican election rolls around, something like the old Republican gerrymander pattern may return. If the gerrymander returns, it could take a stronger Democratic tide than the one in 1964 to dislodge it, for the reason that Republican incumbents would be better protected than in 1964. In short, the restoration of partisan equity in the relationship between the vote division and the seat division manifested in the 1966–1970 period may be shortlived.

Why a Republican Gerrymander?

Prior to 1966, the distribution of constituency vote divisions had been heavily gerrymandered in a pattern favorable to the Republican party. Because the gerrymander's decline had been "artificially" induced by an increase in the incumbency advantage following the 1964 election, the old gerrymander pattern still lurks beneath the surface. For example, as mentioned earlier, the distribution of district presidential voting in 1968 followed the old gerrymander pattern. Consequently the Republican gerrymander of northern congressional districts appears to be the "natural" state of affairs. Highly suspect as a cause of the Republican gerrymander is the tendency of Democratic voters to cluster together in large cities, which makes the creation of a large number of very safe Democratic districts difficult to avoid. But it is also possible that this accidental gerrymander has been intentionally reinforced by the districting plans enacted by northern state legislatures, which are more often controlled by Republicans than by Democrats. In the 'fifties, districts in ten of the eleven northern states which last redistricted after either the 1940 or 1950 census had been created by state legislatures under Republican control. Even though recent state legislative reapportionment may have corrected some of this Republican bias, as late as 1970 fourteen northern states (with 138 districts) had districting schemes in force that had been created by Republican legislatures, while only six (with 63 districts) had districts which were drawn by Democratic legislatures. Although occasionally modified by the veto power of a Democratic governor, this Republican advantage in state legislative control could be one source of the Republican's districting advantage *if* partisan legislatures do successfully implement intentional gerrymander.

---

[10] Because redistricting plans are often suspected of providing safe seats for incumbents, one might also suspect that the extensive shuffling of district lines in the late 'sixties was another source of insulation to incumbents, in addition to the electorate's increased propensity to vote for incumbents. But this did not appear to happen, as the gains of each party's veteran incumbents were about the same amount whether their districts' boundaries shifted or not.

We can test for the effectiveness of intentional partisan gerrymanders by seeing whether parties increase their seat holdings when they are in a position to manage the districting. The frequent redistricting in the 'sixties provides the data for such a test. For three elections—1962, 1966, and 1970—I examined the effects of new redistricting plans that had been enacted within the previous four years. The 1960 election was used as a baseline, so that for each of the three elections the partisan seat shifts since 1960 were examined to see how they varied depending on which party had controlled the recent redistricting. Redistricting was defined as "partisan" if (1) one party controlled both the legislature and the governorship or (2) the legislature controlled by one party was able to override the veto of the opposition's governor. Redistricting was defined as "bipartisan" if (1) party control of the state legislature was divided at the time of redistricting or (2) one party controlled the legislature but the opposition party's governor signed the redistricting bill into law.[11]

The data, shown in Table 6, offer only sligh and inconsistent indication of the effectivene of intentional partisan gerrymanders. In two o the three elections, the seat changes from 196 did vary somewhat in the predicted directio with the party controlling the redistricting. F example, the 1960–1966 seat shift was a 7. per cent Republican gain where Republica had redistricted, a 5.6 per cent Democratic gai where Democrats had redistricted, and n change where redistricting was a product of bipartisan plan. Between 1960 and 1962 th Republicans gained an additional 3.2 per cen of the seats in states where they had redis tricted, while there was virtually no net shift i states where bipartisan plans were put int effect. The biggest change was among the dis tricts the Democrats created for the 196 election (all in California)—a Democratic gai of 12.5 per cent of the seats. But for th 1960–70 comparison, there is no tendency fo parties to make their greatest gains where the managed the redistricting.

Special attention can be given to the sea shifts which followed when one party replace the opposition's districting scheme with one o its own. One such case was California's switc in 1962 from a Republican scheme (enacte after the 1950 census and then still in force) t a Democratic one. California's 1962 redistricting produced the previously mentioned Democratic gain of 12.5 per cent of California's seats between 1960 and 1962, despite the virtual absense of any statewide voting shift. Although this may be a good example of an effective intentional gerrymander at work, it was short-lived, for by 1966 the percentage of California's U.S. House seats under Democratic control had virtually returned to the 1960 level. In the only other instance of a complete reversal of partisan districting plans in the 1960s not even a short-run partisan shift in seats was produced: When New Jersey Republicans replaced a temporary Democratic districting scheme with one of their own for the 1968 election, the Republicans gained no seats—despite pre-election consensus that they would pick up at least two seats,[12] and despite a slight Republican voting trend in the state. Also only a few seats immediately changed party hands in the four instances where a partisan plan replaced a bipartisan one or vice versa.[13] On the

---

[11] The necessary information for categorizing the partisan nature of redistricting plans was obtained from *Congressional Quarterly* sources. Excluded are instances of "redistricting" involving the addition of one at-large seat, plans drawn by Federal Courts or nonpartisan legislatures, and the post-1962 "redistricting" in Rhode Island which amounted to the transfer of one small township when it was moved from one county to another.

[12] "Eastern States Roundup," *Congressional Quarterly* (October 4, 1968), 147–148.

[13] The four instances are Pennsylvania, 1960–1962 (Rep. to Bipartisan); California, 1966–1968 (Dem. to

Table 6. Post-1960 Partisan Seat Shifts as a Function of Partisan Control of Redistricting

Year	Partisan Control of Redistricting[a]	Democratic Percentage of Seats	Democratic Seat %, 1960	Change
1962	Republican (Ia., Kans., Me., N.Y., N.D.)	36.8% (57)	40.3% (62)	−3.2%
1962	Bipartisan (Ill., Mass., N.J., Pa.)	50.0% (78)	50.6% (83)	−0.6%
1962	Democratic (California)	65.8% (38)	53.3% (30)	+12.5%
1966	Republican (Colo., Id., Kans., Mich., O., S.D.)	26.8% (56)	34.5% (55)	−7.7%
1966	Bipartisan (Conn., Ill., Oreg., Pa., Wisc.)	50.7% (71)	50.7% (75)	0.0%
1966	Democratic (Ind., N.J., Utah)	50.0% (28)	44.4% (27)	+5.6%
1970	Republican (Ariz., N.H., N.J., N.Y., O.)	48.2% (85)	42.8% (84)	+5.4%
1970	Bipartisan (Calif., Mass., N.M.)	55.8% (52)	56.5% (46)	−0.7%
1970	Democratic (Hawaii)	Too Few Cases For Analysis		

[a] Includes only redistricting plans enacted within four years prior to the election.

average, the party that presumably should have benefited by such a districting change gained only an additional two per cent of the state's seats, whereas in all four cases there would have been no change had the original districts been retained and the statewide vote swing been uniform across districts.

Although the amount of evidence is slim, these few examples suggest that the partisan control of the districting scheme is not as important a determinant of partisan control of the state's congressional districts as might be thought. Consequently it appears that the tendency toward a Republican gerrymander in the distribution of the constituency vote is more an accident of geography than the intentional creation of Republican legislatures. Further evidence in support of this contention is the fact that even where the districting plan is bipartisan in origin, the Republican "gerrymander" is still found. For example, of the 78 districts in the four states where bipartisan redistricting followed the 1960 census, only one half went Democratic in 1962, even though the Democrats' mean share of the vote in these districts was 54 per cent of the two-party total. More tellingly, of the 164 districts in the eight states with bipartisan districting plans in force in 1968, the Democrats won a majority of the *presidential* vote in only 39 per cent, despite Humphrey's average of 50 per cent of the vote in these districts.[14]

Since the underlying Republican gerrymander persists even where this outcome was not the legislative intent, we must conclude that its major cause is simply that Republican voters are more efficiently distributed geographically than Democratic voters are. Figure 5 illustrates how this occurs. With 1968 presidential voting (a similar pattern could be shown with earlier congressional voting), the distribution of the Democratic vote across "metro" districts (i.e., districts with at least a majority of their population in metropolitan areas of over 600,000 population) and "nonmetro" districts (the remainder) are compared. The Democratic-leaning metro districts are a heterogeneous group, including some of the most Republican districts (essentially suburban) as well as virtually all of the most heavily Democratic districts in the North. On the other hand, the nonmetro districts cluster heavily in the moderately Republican range. Neither distribution by itself is heavily skewed. But when we combine them, we obtain the extreme skewness of a strong Republican gerrymander. To reduce the skewness of the overall distribution, the component distribution would have to be made uniform in spread—either by increasing the spread of the vote division across nonmetro districts or by decreasing the spread of the vote among metro districts. Probably only the latter alternative is even technically possible, and only by the deliberate creation of a series of strangely shaped but competitive districts stretching from the heavily Democratic cores of central cities through their more Republican suburban areas. Any such scheme would be unacceptable, for

---

Bipartisan); New York, 1966–1968 (Rep. to Bipartisan); and New York, 1968–1970 (Bipartisan to Rep.). Not included are instances of partisan change in the districting plan in which the initial plan was over ten years old at the time of change.

[14] The four states with bipartisan districting plans enacted for the 1962 election are Illinois, Massachusetts, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania. The eight states with bipartisan plans at the time of the 1968 election are California, Connecticut, Illinois, Massachusetts, New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin.



Figure 5. Frequency distribution of the Democratic percentage of the presidential vote in "metro" and "nonmetro" congressional districts, 1968

the reason that it would replace an accidental partisan gerrymander with an obvious racial and ethnic gerrymander that would deprive urban minorities further of their proper amount of representation.

Conclusion

From our attempt to explain the finding that the Democrats have won their "fair share" of northern seats only in the more recent congressional elections, the following conclusions are offered:

(1) Although the one-time malapportionment of congressional districts had no discernible partisan impact, a tendency persists for Democratic voters to be slightly "overrepresented" in congressional elections, in the sense that their low turnout rate makes the number of actual voters in Democratic districts lower than the number in Republican districts.

(2) The pre-1966 overrepresentation of northern Republicans in Congress resulted from a Republican "gerrymander": a pattern of marginally safe Republican seats and very safe Democratic seats. This gerrymander pattern declined considerably between the 1964 and 1966 elections, to the extent that the Republicans' remaining advantage from the distribution of voters is cancelled out by the Democrats' "advantage" from their "overrepresentation" due to the low Democratic turnout rate.

(3) The Republican gerrymander declined as marginal Republican seats became either safer Republican seats or marginal Democratic seats. This change apparently resulted from a heightened incumbency advantage combined with the Democratic landslide of 1964. As the incumbency boost counteracted the Republican trend, the Democrats were able to protect their new holdings following the 1964 election. Meanwhile the incumbency boost gave Republican survivors of the 1964 election even safer seats than before.

(4) The effect of partisan-inspired districting plans does not appear strong enough to permit the conclusion that the Republican gerrymander was the intentional creation of Republican state legislatures. Instead the Republican gerrymander appears to be largely the inevitable result of the way Democratic and Republican voters are geographically distributed.

It is particularly striking that neither malapportionment nor deliberate partisan manipulation of district lines played the major role in the creation of the one-time Republican advantage in congressional districting. Instead, the explanation seems to be that the Republicans are given the edge in the way Democratic and Republican voters are geographically distributed. Possibly the Republican gerrymander is now only in a temporary state of remission, to return once again, following the eventual retirement of the Democratic Congressmen who now survive in normally Republican districts with the help of their inflated incumbency advantage.

Because the Democrats normally control Congress with the help of their southern wing, the inability of the Democrats to win their fair share of northern seats generally escapes notice. But this partisan bias has undoubtedly produced some distortion in the House's "ideological balance," since the best predictor of the "liberalism" or "conservatism" of a northern Congressman is his party affiliation. Certainly the "natural" Republican gerrymander of northern congressional districts must be given consideration as one of the reasons why the House of Representatives has earned the reputation of being more conservative than either the Senate or the typical head resident of the White House.

Appendix

For the variables analyzed in this study, minor measurement problems are created by the existence of at-large seats and congressional contests in which the incumbent candidate is able to run without opposition from a major party candidate. At-large seats and uncontested seats were dealt with in the following way.

At-Large Seats

An at-large seat in a multidistrict state must necessarily inflate the population of the state's congressional districts. Consequently, the population and the number of voters in the districts of the states with at least one at-large seat and more than one Congressman were adjusted by the formulae:

$$\text{(at-large districts)}\quad C_{adj} = C/N$$

$$\text{(non-at-large districts)}\quad C_{adj} = C(N-1)/N,$$

where C is the district characteristic in question and N is the state's number of House seats.

Uncontested Seats

For uncontested seats, estimates are made of what the electoral results would have been if there had been a two-party contest. These estimates are based on the district's election results in surrounding congressional election years and the average interelection swings of the turnout rate and the vote division in the North. To estimate the hypothetical number of voters, partisan vote division, and turnout rate, the following formulae were used.

The hypothetical turnout rate is estimated by the formula

$$v_1 = v_0 + (v_1' - v_0'),$$

where v_0 is the turnout rate in the surrounding base year and the quantity $(v_1' - v_0')$ is the northern interelection swing of the turnout rate before adjusting for uncontested seats.

The hypothetical number of voters is estimated by the formula

$$V_1 = (v_1)(E),$$

where (E) is the number of eligible voters in the district.

The hypothetical Democratic percentage of the two-party vote is calculated by the formula

$$d_1 = d_0 + (d_1' - d_0'),$$

where d_0 is the Democratic percentage of the two-party vote in the base year and the quantity $(d_1' - d_0')$ is the northern interelection vote swing before adjusting for uncontested seats.

When a two-party contest is found for both surrounding congressional election years, the averages of the two sets of estimates are taken. (For 1952 and 1970 estimates, only 1954 and 1968 are used as base years.) When the district had no contested election in either surrounding congressional election year, the temporally closest contest election is used. In a few cases the usual estimation procedure could not be employed because of district boundary changes. In such cases the base year vote divisions in the Congressman's old (or subsequent) district were employed.

Legislative Partisanship, Constituency and Malapportionment: The Case of California

BRUCE W. ROBECK

Texas A&M University

Introduction

A continuing concern of political scientists has been the representativeness of legislative institutions in the United States. Criticisms (countered by defenses) have been leveled at almost every element of the legislative system from the electoral units to the internal distribution of power. While many aspects of the debates have been highly polemical, theoretical and empirical questions were raised which have stimulated a growing body of research literature on legislative behavior. Constituency influence on legislative partisanship[1] and the impact of malapportionment on party voting[2] are part of the debate on legislative representativeness which are examined in this paper. Although these two concerns have not often been tied together explicitly, there is good reason to link them.

Attempts to sort out the complex relationship between constituency, party and legislativ voting have produced few firm generalizations A simplified version of the many factors which are thought to influence party voting and party loyalty may be briefly stated.[3] When a politica party is made up of people with shared interests, and it is opposed by at least one othe party which represents a competitive set of interests, then the party members holding legislative office are likely to be aligned against each other in their voting positions. Party conflic may be encouraged when there are homogeneous electoral districts (social, economic and/or political factors) among legislators or the same party but heterogeneous constituencies between parties. Lewis Froman, for example, contends that ". . . differences between Democrats and Republicans are not merely a matter of party label or ideology . . . but are rooted in basic differences in the kind of constituencies from which Democrats and Republicans come."[4] The greater the socioeconomic gulf between the parties in the voter support base, the greater the conflict between parties in legislative voting. States which are relatively more urbanized and industrialized tend to have a higher proportion of opposed party majorities in legislative roll calls.[5] Thus, *interparty* differences can be partly explained by the diverse interests represented by each party.

Party loyalty, or *intraparty* conflict, is often explained with the same kind of constituency argument that is employed with *interparty* conflict.[6] Legislators with constituencies which are typical of their party's voter support base are more likely to be party loyalists than members with atypical districts. For example, if an electoral fluke resulted in a Republican victory in a normally Democratic district, the member would probably be less loyal to his party than would a party cohort from a normally Republican district.[7] Party loyalty may be greatest when party and constituency characteristics coincide;[8] conversely, when party and constituency are not mutually supportive, party loyalty may be weakest.

---

[1] A sample from the literature on both Congress and state legislatures includes: Julius Turner, *Party and Constituency: Pressures on Congress* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1951); Duncan MacRae, "The Relationship Between Roll Call Votes and Constituencies in the Massachusetts House of Representatives," *American Political Science Review*, 46 (December, 1952), 1046–1055: Lewis A. Froman, Jr., *Congressmen and Their Constituencies* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1963); Thomas A. Flinn, "Party Responsibility in the States: Some Causal Factors," *American Political Science Review*, 58 (March, 1964), 60–71; W. Wayne Shannon, *Party, Constituency and Congressional Voting* (Baton Rouge: The Louisiana University Press, 1968); Hugh L. LeBlanc, "Voting in State Senates; Party and Constituency Influences," *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, 13 (February, 1969), 33–57.

[2] Much of the research on the impact of malapportionment on political parties in legislative voting has been indirect, focusing on electoral competitiveness, and presuming an impact on party voting. Three of the better studies using this approach are: Thomas R. Dye, "Malapportionment and Public Policy in the States," *Journal of Politics*, 27 (August, 1965), 586–601; Richard I. Hofferbert, "The Relation Between Public Policy and Some Structural and Environmental Variables in the American States," *American Political Science Review*, 60 (March, 1966), 73–82; Allan G. Pulsipher and James L. Weatherby, Jr. "Malapportionment, Party Competition, and the Functional Distribution of Governmental Expenditures;" *American Political Science Review*, 62 (December, 1968), 1207–1219.

[3] These generalizations are drawn primarily from two discussions of state legislatures, but the summaries obviously are not unique to these sources. See Malcolm E. Jewell, *The State Legislature: Politics and Practice, 2nd ed.* (New York: Random House, 1969); and Wilder Crane Jr., and Meredith W. Watts, Jr., *State Legislative Systems* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1968).

[4] Froman, *Congressmen and Their Constituencies*, p. 89.

[5] See Jewell, *State Legislature*, p. 89; Malcolm E. Jewell, "The Political Setting," in *State Legislatures in American Politics*, edited by Alexander Heard (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1966), p. 90.

[6] Flinn argues that constituency differences help explain *intraparty* conflict but not *interparty* differences.

Some of the theoretical and empirical problems raised in the literature on party and constituency are also relevant to the debate about the impact of malapportionment on partisanship in state legislatures. "One of the most important consequences of reapportionment will be to accelerate changes that are already under way in the nature of partisan competition in the legislature."[9] Malapportionment may have distorted the party balance in some states so that one party was artificially advantaged; this would mean that statewide electoral totals were not adequately reflected in legislative seats, and partisanship was unrewarded at the polls. Distortions in the districts may have produced distortions in the strength of each party and reduced the potential party conflict.[10]

Malapportionment may have also altered the distribution of officeholders within a party so that they were not reflective of the party's voter support base in the whole electorate. Therefore, the *kind* of party member elected might shape the relevance of party as a reference for legislative behavior. Legislators who do not perceive their personal opportunities to be tied to their party's overall electoral strength may have little interest in intraparty cooperation.

If the natural balance of forces between parties or within a single party or both is modified as a result of a malapportioned districting system, then legislative partisanship might be modified because the correspondence between party and constituency had been warped. Thomas Flinn, in his study of party and constituency in Ohio, concluded that increased party responsibility in the states was dependent ". . . on the spread of party competition and upon a sorting out of legislative constituencies so that the districts represented by the respective parties are more homogeneous."[11]

Flinn's argument ties together the problem of legislative partisanship, constituency, and reapportionment. Reapportionment in some cases brought about a drastic change in constituent boundaries and provided a rare opportunity to test theories about constituency influence on legislative partisanship because the magnitude of change might have made visible some differences which would have otherwise gone undetected. Given a state with two-party competition at the electoral level, a small proportion of party voting in legislative voting, and a poorly apportioned legislature (one or both houses), reapportionment could bring about the "necessary" constituency influences for increased party loyalty. Stated differently, legislative partisanship may be encouraged by constituencies depending upon how accurately the district system represents the amount of party conflict found in the whole political system.

Of course, all of these generalizations are vague, in large part because the problem is complex and multivariate. What should be emphasized is that a variety of factors may influence legislative partisanship, and each must be evaluated carefully within the context of a given political system. More important, comparative studies must be supplemented by in-depth studies of individual state political systems, and special attention should be given to the "exceptions" which weaken theoretical generalizations. Close examination of the exceptions, especially over a long period of time, may improve the theoretical underpinning for both broadly based comparative studies and those focusing on single states.

Design and Method

The California Senate was chosen for study because it is characterized by competition among parties at the electoral level, it has the reputation of nonpartisanship in legislative voting, and until 1965 it was very poorly apportioned. A recently published study of party and constituency influences on voting in twenty-six state senates includes California among the less partisan senates; more specifically, it notes the exceptional quality of California's voting patterns compared to other urbanized and industrialized states:

---

[7] Party mavericks were found to be from marginal districts in Samuel C. Patterson, "The Role of the Deviant in State Legislative System: The Wisconsin Assembly," *Western Political Quarterly*, 14 (June, 1961), 460–472. A note of caution, however, is advanced by Wayne Shannon when summarizing research on Congress: ". . . although it would serve the purpose of neatness and theoretical nicety to be able to argue that constituency differences account for intra-party voting differences, evidence from the studies by Turner, MacRae, Truman, Froman, and the present author indicate only *some relationship at some times* between constituency characteristics and intra-party differences," (p. 155).

[8] See Julius Turner and Edward V. Schneier, Jr., *Party and Constituency: Pressures on Congress*, rev. ed. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1970), 220–221.

[9] Jewell, "The Political Setting," p. 75. For other discussion on the impact of malapportionment, see Gordon E. Baker, *The Reapportionment Revolution* (New York: Random House, 1966); Malcolm E. Jewell, ed., *The Politics of Reapportionment* (New York: Atherton, 1962).

[10] We recognize that malapportionment could also *increase* party conflict in different circumstances.

[11] Flinn, "Party Responsibility in the States," p. 71.

> Despite its large cities and industries, California has never exhibited high partisanship in its politics. . . . Although other states did not fit comfortably into the pattern, they did not display California's consistent departure from the hypothesized relationship in all of the comparisons made. . . .[12]

Such description of the California Legislature as a nonpartisan body is echoed in much of the literature on legislative behavior. Whether roll calls[13] or legislator interviews[14] constitute the data base, the results indicate that party affiliation does not go very far in explaining legislator behavior in California. Signs of change, however, were visible for several years prior to reapportionment. The Assembly, which was consistently better apportioned than the Senate, had a sharp increase in partisan voting as early as 1959. Party majorities were opposed to each other in close to half of the divided roll calls from 1959 through 1963,[15] a proportion which compares favorably to divided party votes in Congress during the same period. The Senate, although not studied as intensively as the Assembly, was reported to be only mildly affected by the partisan spirit which was growing in the lower house.[16] If the Assembly was more responsive to conditions favoring a new partisanship than the Senate, the difference in constituent base between the two houses may have been the intervening variable.[17]

Reapportionment brought a monumental shift in political power because the California Senate was the most poorly apportioned upper chamber in the nation.[18] Los Angeles County increased its share of senate seats from 2½ per cent (1 seat) to more than 35 per cent (14½ seats). The ten southern counties increased their representation from 10 to 23 members. The nine urban districts split into 25 new metropolitan and suburban districts after reapportionment. Clearly reapportionment caused a massive relocation of the constituent base in the Senate and therefore offered an excellent opportunity to assess the impact of both reapportionment and constituency on legislative partisanship.

To study the relationship between legislative partisanship and constituency with malapportionment as an intervening variable, the following two propositions were used as guiding assumptions.

> *Proposition I:* Malapportionment of California Senate districts reduced the amount of interparty conflict.

It was expected that interparty conflict would increase after reapportionment. If, however, it was found that party membership did not become more salient to legislative behavior in the Senate, that would mean that either the necessary conditions had not been present, or the districting system had not depressed party conflict. If it was found that party conflict increased, then one could determine whether constituency had been associated with the change.

> *Proposition II:* Malapportionment of California Senate districts decreased constituency support for legislative partisanship.

Some evidence from LeBlanc's study indicated that the more partisan state senates also tended to have higher correlations between partisanship and constituency variables.[19] Malcolm Jewell asserted that electoral competition was greater in metropolitan counties, and that reapportionment would result in greater party competition.[20] Thomas Flinn assumed that party responsibility was a consequence of party competition.[21] Therefore, it seemed reasonable to expect legislative partisanship to be more strongly correlated with constituency variables if party conflict had increased after reapportionment.

---

[12] LeBlanc, "Voting in State Senates," pp. 38–39.

[13] William Buchanan, *Legislative Partisanship: The Deviant Case of California* (Berkeley: The University of California Press, 1963).

[14] John Wahlke, Heinz Eulau, William Buchanan, and LeRoy Ferguson, *The Legislative System: Explorations in Legislative Behavior* (New York: John Wiley, 1962). Freshmen Assemblymen in 1967 ranked political parties eleventh out of 21 "input" factors to the legislative process. See Charles G. Bell and Charles Price, "Legislative Socialization of Freshman Assemblymen," (unpublished paper presented at the Western Political Science Association meeting, 1968), p. 6. But, in a questionnaire completed by more than 50 per cent of all legislators in January, 1967, 83 per cent of the respondents rated parties as "very important" or "important" as a source of legislative conflict. See Bruce W. Robeck, "The Impact of Reapportionment on the California Senate," (unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, University of California, Santa Barbara, 1968), pp. 44–49.

[15] Robert Keith Binford, "Party Cohesion in the California State Assembly, 1953–1963" (Unpublished M.A. Thesis, Stanford University, 1964), p. 35.

[16] Buchanan reported that the Assembly achieved a "moderate" level of partisanship on a substantial number of issues but the "Senate's partisan level did not increase much above that of 1957," p. 127. Also see, John R. Owens, Edmond Constantini, and Louis F. Weschler, *California Politics and Parties* (London: Macmillan, 1970), 316.

[17] Thomas R. Dye, "A Comparison of Constituency Influences in the Upper and Lower Chambers of a State Legislature," *Western Political Quarterly*, 24 (June, 1961), 473–480.

[18] Glendon Schubert and Charles Press, "Measuring Malapportionment," *American Political Science Review*, 58 (June, 1964), 302–327, and data corrections, same *Review*, 58 (December, 1964), 966–970.

[19] LeBlanc, "Voting in The State Senate," pp. 55–57.

Divided roll calls in all regular sessions from 1957 through 1969 were used as evidence of the member's legislative behavior.[22] These results were recorded for the five biennial regular sessions before new elections in reapportioned districts (1966) and the three annual sessions after 1966. The votes in each session were analyzed using programs to calculate an index of agreement between all pairs of senators and analyze each vote for party divisions.[23] Simple and multiple linear regression was calculated for the relationship between partisanship and constituency variables.[24]

An index of partisanship (IP—more precisely an index of Democratic support) was created for each senator for each of the eight sessions studied. The mean index of agreement score of each member (regardless of party) with all Republicans was subtracted from his mean index of agreement score with all Democrats, plus 100. A member who agreed, on the average, more often with Republicans than with Democrats would have an IP score less than 100 and more than 0. A member who agreed more often with Democrats than Republicans would have an IP score above 100 but not more than 200. The greatest range in IP scores in any session (1967) was 61.3 to 147.5.

Selected socioeconomic and political data were collected for each senatorial district. National party voter strength was measured by the percentage of Democratic votes in the two-party vote for president; state party voter strength was measured by percentage of Democratic votes in the two-party vote for governor and for state senator. Percentage Democratic two-party voter registration indicated either national or state party support.

The selected socioeconomic constituency variables were: percentage white population, median education, median family income, percentage of the adult civilian labor force in the Bureau of the Census first four occupation classifications, and percentage unemployed in the adult civilian labor force. Prior to 1965, the districts were composed of whole county units, but after reapportionment the district lines were within or crossing political subdivisions such as cities and counties. Most of the urban districts which were not coterminous with political subdivisions used for reporting purposes by the Bureau of the Census were compared with census tracts maps. Data from census tracts which were wholly or partly within the district's boundaries were summed and averaged for each district. Data are from the 1960 Census and may not accurately represent the composition of the districts for all sessions.[25]

Findings and Analysis

Table 1 presents data for both the Senate and the Assembly for all regular sessions from 1957 through 1969. The relative influence of party on legislative voting was evaluated by comparing the number of party votes and nonparty votes before and after reapportionment. These data confirm the expectation that party voting in the Senate would increase after reapportionment. There is a significant difference in the number of party votes in the Senate for the combined sessions before and after reapportionment ($\chi^2 = 42.542$ at df $= 1$ p $= <.001$). An exception to the pattern of the sum of combined sessions is the 1963 Senate with 40.1 per

---

[20] Jewell, "The Political Setting," p. 80.

[21] Flinn, "Party Responsibility in the States," p. 71.

[22] Divided roll calls were defined to include any distribution which had at least 10 per cent of the total membership (Senate, 40 and Assembly, 80) in the minority position, and votes on the same bill (Unamended) were included when there was a deviation of at least five per cent of the total house membership by legislators recorded on both votes. Assembly votes for 1957–1963 are from Binford, "Party Cohesion." p. 35.

[23] These computer programs were adapted from Lee F. Anderson, Meredith W. Watts, Jr., and Allen R. Wilcox, *Legislative Roll-Call Analysis* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1966.)

[24] The program was written by Jerry L. Oglesby, Institute of Statistics, Texas A&M University.

[25] Data for whole county units were drawn from U.S. Bureau of the Census, *U.S. Census of Population: 1960 General Social and Economic Characteristics, California*, Final Report PC (1)-bc (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1962). Other data were gathered from U.S. Bureau of the Census, *U.S. Census of Population and Housing: 1960 Census Tracts*, Final Report PHC (1)-(Different numbers for each SMSA), (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1962).

Two districts had split county lines which were not covered by census tracts. A small sliver of Fresno County (containing the residence of Assemblyman Charles B. Garrigus, who retired in 1966) was taken from the 16th and added to the 15th district. The 2nd district included a small corner of Solano County, but the bulk of the county population was in the 5th district. These small differences affected only four districts and were ignored in the analysis.

District boundaries crossed census tracts in 10 to 20 per cent of the cases. Split tracts were taken to be wholly within the district and became part of the totals. In some instances, therefore, the tract data were added to more than one district.

Table 1. Party Voting in California Legislature, 1957–1969

Sessions	Assembly			Senate		
	Total Divided Votes	Party Votes*		Total Divided Votes	Party Votes*	
	N	N	%	N	N	%
Before reapportionment						
1957	345	127	36.8	157	33	21.0
1959	509	242	47.5	184	43	23.4
1961	476	210	44.1	139	32	23.0
1963	311	161	51.7	182	74	40.1
1965	289	141	48.8	143	31	21.7
total	1930	881	45.7	805	213	26.5
After reapportionment						
1967	289	132	45.9	215	81	37.7
1968	319	130	40.8	254	117	46.1
1969	326	169	51.8	224	101	45.1
total	934	431	46.2	693	299	43.2

* Opposed party majorities

cent party votes. But the total number of divided votes in 1963 was not large, and observers have noted the exceptional quality of party politics in that year.[26]

Of course, factors other than reapportionment could have produced the difference in proportion of party votes. Comparisons with the Assembly can provide a rough control on other variables, especially ones related to a more partisan atmosphere in the state as a whole. Consequently, three other comparative tests were made of the total number of party votes in combined sessions: the Assembly before and after, the Assembly and the Senate before, and the Assembly and the Senate after reapportionment. There was a significant difference in the number of party votes between the Senate and the Assembly prior to reapportionment ($\chi^2 = 87.141$ at df = 1 $p = < .001$) but no significant difference between the houses following reapportionment ($\chi^2 = 1.202$). The number of party votes in the Assembly before and after reapportionment was not significantly different ($\chi^2 = .060$).[27]

Evidence presented in Table 1 confirms the research hypothesis that party voting would increase in the California Senate following reapportionment. The findings are strengthened when comparisons are made with party voting in the lower house. The Assembly's pattern of moderately high partisanship remained constant during the entire period, and the Senate achieved a comparable level of party voting only after elections in reapportioned districts.

Given increased partisanship in the California Senate, what is the relationship between party voting and constituency, and has the relationship changed after reapportionment? One would expect to find a closer association between constituency and partisanship after reapportionment if there were more districts with politically relevant characteristics which supported partisanship. Table 2 shows the average constituency variables by party for the 1965 and 1967 sessions. Comparing the net difference between district averages gives a rough measure of how reapportionment affected the constituency base of each of the legislative parties. Politically, the district averages after reapportionment showed a greater gap between the parties in presidential and gubernatorial vote, and in voter registration; less distance between parties was shown in state senate vote totals. Republican districts became "safer" politically after reapportionment, while districts controlled by Democrats were relatively less secure. Of course, the new districts may have been a gerrymander which concentrated the minority party in safe districts and spread majority party support thinly enough to produce the maximum number of victories.

---

[26] Owens, Constantini, and Weschler, *California Politics and Parties*, p. 302.

[27] Party votes in earlier Assembly sessions were: 31% (1949), 36% (1951), 25% (1953), and 22% (1955). See, Dean Cresap, *Party Politics in the Golden State* (Los Angeles: The Haynes Foundation, 1954), 51–52; Buchanan, *Legislative Partisanship*, p. 111, and Binford, "Party Cohesion" p. 35.

Table 2. Comparison of Average Political and Socioeconomic Constituency Variables by Party Before and After Reapportionment

istrict ariables	Before Reapportionment			After Reapportionment		
	1965 Session			1967 Session		
	Dem.	Rep.	Diff.	Dem.	Rep.	Diff.
olitical (percentage Democratic)						
residential Vote (1964, 1968)	63.8	57.2	− 6.6	56.1	42.7	−13.4
ubernatorial Vote (1962, 1966)	54.8	49.3	− 5.5	43.8	36.6	− 7.2
tate Senate Vote (1962/64, 1966)	68.7	41.6	−27.1	60.2	37.5	−22.7
oter Registration (1964, 1966)	62.6	56.7	− 5.9	65.6	52.1	−13.5
ocioeconomic						
ace (percentage white)	93.4	95.9	+ 2.5	88.5	95.4	+ 6.9
nemployment (percentage)	6.9	6.0	− .9	6.9	5.0	− 1.9
ducation (mean years)	10.6	12.4	+ 1.8	11.1	11.9	+ .8
ncome (mean dollars)	6020	6279	+ 259	6371.4	7042.3	+670.9
ccupation (percentage white collar)	26.4	31.0	+ 4.6	34.8	37.4	+ 2.6

The net difference between the parties after eapportionment was greater on the socioeco-omic variables of race, unemployment, and in-ome, while the difference between party dis-ricts was less for education and occupation. Democrats obtained new constituencies which were on the average more racially mixed, igher in occupational status and income, and he same in employment. Republicans after re-apportionment had constituencies with higher average income and occupational status, and less unemployment, less average education, and slightly more nonwhites.

The figures in Table 2 do not show a dramatic change in the average constituency characteristics associated with each of the parties. Post-reapportionment Republicans, with only two moderate exceptions, had districts which moved in the predicted direction of stronger Republican support. Democrats had new districts which showed a shift to a more urban based party, with higher relative averages in education, income, and occupation. Whether or not the observed changes in the constituencies were of sufficient magnitude to have had an impact on party conflict can be indirectly tested by comparing the association between partisanship and constituency characteristics in the nine sessions before and after reapportionment.

Table 3 shows the simple correlation coefficients of the partisan index with nine constituency variables for each regular session from 1957 through 1969. Turning to the socioeconomic variables first, only one significant correlation is observed among these variables in the five sessions before reapportionment, and it explains only 13 per cent of the variance in the partisan index. Following elections in reapportioned districts, significant correlations were found between partisanship and percentage white population (race), percentage unemployed, and median school years (education), while measures of constituent income and occupation were not generally significant. All of the correlations, except median school years in the 1957 Session, were in the predicted direction. As the proportion of whites and of higher status occupations increased, the lower the position on the partisan index, ie., the more pro-Republican the voting pattern. As the proportion of unemployment increased, the higher the position on the partisan index. While the direction of the correlations conforms to the expectation about the different voter support bases of the parties, it was only after reapportionment that the degree of partisanship was significantly correlated with several socioeconomic constituency variables.

Differences in the magnitude of the simple correlations in the sessions before and after reapportionment are rather dramatic. After reapportionment, all of the political variables correlated at less than .01. The lowest coefficient was .70 and the highest was .83; these explain, respectively, 49 and 69 per cent of the variance in the partisan index. The highest correlation on any of the variables before reapportionment was .54, which produces an r^2 of .29.

Political variables had consistently higher correlations with the partisan index in all eight sessions. At least one political variable was significant ($p \leq .05$) in every session, and registration and state senatorial vote were significant in each session for which data were available.[28]

---

[28] Votes in state senate contests could not be used for the 1957 session because about half of the members did not have general election opposition in 1954 or 1956.

The means of the correlations for political variables by session before reapportionment ranged from .26 to .50; after reapportionment the range was .75 to .77. The mean correlation for socioeconomic variables before reapportionment was .12 to .23; after reapportionment, it ranged from .39 to .43 (ignoring sign).

Based on examination of the table of simple correlations, the analysis to this point indicates that constituency variables are more closely associated with variations in an index of partisanship after reapportionment than before, and that political variables produced consistently higher correlations with partisan voting than did the socioeconomic variables. One may speculate that political variables show consistently higher correlations because they are more directly related to the index of partisanship than are the socioeconomic variables; political measures are a balance *between* two parties, but socioeconomic measures are the average of the whole district unit, and therefore, are somewhat less discriminating indicators of constituency characteristics.

These correlations tested the linear relationship between partisanship and nine constituency variables taken *individually*. But since legislators are probably reacting to a combination of constituency factors, an analysis which accounts for the combined effects of the independent variables may better represent political reality. Consequently, a multiple linear correlation analysis of the data was made with tl partisan index as the dependent variable (Y and the constituency variables as the indepe dent variables ($X_1 \ldots X_9$).

Table 4 presents the multiple correlations fc all variables by session, with separate runs c the political and socioeconomic variables. Fc all variables, a significant regression was foun only in the three sessions following reappo tionment, and the significance level was le: than .001 probability for each. The coefficien of multiple determination (R^2) are .61 (1967 .52 (1968), and .51 (1969).

A partial test for the relative importance c political versus socioeconomic variables wa obtained by separate runs using only one or th other set of data.[29] Political variables generall produced higher correlations, and for two pre reapportionment sessions they were significar (.05 in 1959 and .01 in 1963). The explana tory power of political variables in the 196 through the 1969 sessions was only slightly les than that found for all variables.

Table 3. Simple Correlation Coefficients of Partisan Index with Constituency Characteristics in the California Senate, 1957–1969

Variables	Session							
	1957	1959	1961	1963	1965	1967	1968	1969
Political Variables (percentage Democratic)								
Presidential vote	.18	.37*	.38*	.43**	.30	.75**	.77**	.77**
Gubernatorial vote	.29	.26	.29	.49**	.32*	.70**	.73**	.74**
State Senate vote	—	.53**	.41**	.52**	.36**	.83**	.76**	.73**
Voter registration	.32*	.40*	.38*	.54**	.36*	.80**	.79**	.77**
Mean	.26	.39	.37	.50	.34	.77	.76	.75
Socioeconomic Variables								
Race	−.13	−.28	−.10	−.16	−.25	−.46**	−.49**	−.51**
Unemployment	.11	.24	.26	.27	.17	.60**	.57**	.56**
Education	.02	−.13	−.07	−.21	−.22	−.46**	−.40*	−.39*
Income	.21	−.17	−.11	−.17	−.20	−.34*	−.29	−.26
Occupation	−.13	−.24	−.13	−.36*	−.31	−.30	−.31	−.22
Mean	.12	.21	.13	.23	.23	.43	.41	.39

* $p \leq .05$
** $p \leq .01$

---

[29] The intercorrelations and partial coefficients ar not reported. Political variables were highly inte correlated, especially in the 1967–1969 Sessions; socic economic variables were only moderately interco related in all sessions. When there are strong rel tionships between the independent variables, it is nc very useful to examine the partial coefficients. Se Dennis J. Palumbo, *Statistics in Political and B havioral Science* (New York: Appleton-Century-Croft 1969), pp. 214–216.

Table 4. Multiple Linear Correlation Coefficients of Partisan Index with Constituency *Characteristics in the California Senate, 1957–1969*

	Multiple correlation by Session							
	1957	1959	1961	1963	1965	1967	1968	1969
ll Variables	.23	.36	.23	.37	.24	.78†	.72†	.71†
olitical Variables	.11	.29*	.19	.34*	.16	.73†	.69†	.66†
ocioeconomic Variables	.15	.18	.09	.19	.17	.44*	.44*	.42*

* $p = < .05$
† $p = < .001$

Socioeconomic variables, when run sepaately, were not significant except in the three essions following reapportionment, and then xplained no more than 19 per cent of the variince in the partisan index. However, whether ll variables, only political variables, or only soioeconomic variables were used, the *multiple* orrelations were much greater in the three ost-reapportionment sessions.

As indicated earlier, reapportionment rought increased representation for urban reas and for Southern California, and it also reated more Republican districts. It would apear likely that increased party voting and reater correlations between party and constituency could have resulted from the voting by enators with districts in the areas which gained epresentatives. Because dividing the sample nto control groups within single sessions would roduce numbers too small for analysis, the hree post-reapportionment and the four pre-eapportionment sessions were combined for nalysis of six categoric groups: urban, rural, Democratic, Republican, northern members, nd southern members. Tables 5 through 7 alow comparison of the data for the pre- and ost-reapportionment categoric groups.[30]

Pre-reapportionment Democrats showed sigificant multiple correlations, although not very igh, on "all" variables, and on only political ariables, while the Republicans had a signifiant regression on only political variables. The relationship was partly reversed after reapportionment, when Republicans and Democrats each had significant correlations between partisanship scores and constituency variables (no matter how subdivided), but Republicans had correlations of much greater magnitude than did the Democrats. Constituency characteristics explain at *most* 22 per cent of the variance (R^2) in partisanship by Democratic senators, but at *least* 31 per cent of the variance in Republican partisanship.

The inverse pattern shown in Table 5 is not easily explained. Electorally, Republicans gained seats after reapportionment, but the rather weak correlations for Republicans serving in the earlier sessions indicate no necessary relationship between Republican constituencies and support for legislative partisanship.[31] Among the Republicans elected in reapportioned districts, 10 out of 19 were incumbents (Democrats: 7 of 21); therefore it is unlikely that the marked change was the result of new GOP senators. Perhaps the reconstituted districts, a closely divided house, and a newly elected Republican governor were sufficient incentives to produce the change.

Table 6, in which members are divided by the urbanization of their districts, also reveals an interesting result. As expected, before reapportionment, urban members showed substantially greater multiple correlations on all three combinations of variables than the rural members; any of the groups explained at least 29 per cent of the variance, but for rural members the variables explained no more than 6 per cent of the variance. Post-reapportionment urban senators produced a very high multiple correlation (explained variance = .74), but rural members also had a substantial correlation (explained variance = .56). When separate runs

---

[30] Combining sessions can be justified when any articular session is treated as a sample of all posible sessions, and if the behavior of members is ssumed to be a sample of all possible behavior of embers regardless of the session in which it ocurred. Only three members, out of a possible 120, id not participate fully in all three sessions.

The districts were classified into urban-rural cateories by several factors, the most important of hich was relationship to a central city of at least 90,000 population. For a more detailed explanation f the classification standards, see, Bruce W. Robeck, "Urban-Rural and Regional Voting Patterns in the alifornia Senate Before and After Reapportionent," *Western Political Quarterly*, 23 (December, 970), 785–794.

[31] This is consistent with the finding that Republicans in Congress have a higher proportion of delegate role types, and therefore may be more directly attentive to Constituent demands. See Roger H. Davidson, *The Role of the Congressman* (New York: Pegasus, 1969), pp. 130–131.

Table 5. MLR Coefficients of Partisan Index with Constituency Characteristics—California Senate 1959–1969

Variables	Combined Sessions Divided By Party			
	Pre-reapportionment (1959–1965)		Post-reapportionment (1967–1969)	
	Dem. (N=109)	Rep. (N=50)	Dem. (N=59)	Rep. (N=60)
All	.35†	.30	.47†	.75†
Political only	.32†	.21*	.44†	.58†
Socioeconomic only	.03	.10	.31†	.56†

* $p = < .05$
† $p = < .001$

were made using only political and only socioeconomic variables, urban members' partisanship seemed better explained by political than socioeconomic variables, but for rural senators the socioeconomic indicators produced higher correlations than the political. Both categoric groups showed a strong constituency influence in partisan voting, but they appeared to be responsive to different kinds of constituency variables.

Once again the results are not easily explained. Drawing constituency boundaries within large metropolitan complexes may reduce the saliency of socioeconomic variations in constituencies while enhancing political factors; the reverse relationship may occur in less densely populated areas. Several rural senators had districts in which party registration majorities strongly favored the opposite party, and yet these legislators had strong party loyalty scores. Perhaps the inclusion of these members was enough to throw off the results. Urban members, however, were more responsive to their districts (or the wider urban setting) than ones with rural constituencies, and these data help explain why a reapportionment which increases the proportion of urban constituencies at the expense of rural districts would tend to produce a more partisan roll-call voting pattern.

Southern California, in addition to Republicans and urban areas, gained representation from reapportionment. Table 7 shows the results of separate runs based on the regional location of the districts. It was expected that Southern California senators would have a stronger relationship between partisanship and constituency. Senators from the ten southernmost counties had higher correlations before and after reapportionment regardless of which set of variables was used. After reapportionment, members from both regions had higher correlations of partisanship with constituency than either of the groups in the earlier sessions. The very high multiple correlation of .90 for Southern California senators after reapportionment explains an impressive 81 per cent of the variance on the partisan index. Again these data reinforce the notion that reapportionment, within the particular setting of California, made drastic changes in the partisan voting in the Senate.

Summary and Conclusions

The relationship between legislative partisanship and constituency was studied in California so that comparisons could be made before and after reapportionment. It was found that the proportion of party votes in the Cali-

Table 6. MLR Coefficients (R) of Partisan Index with Constituency Characteristics—California Senate 1959–1969

Variables	Combined Sessions, Divided By Urbanness			
	Pre-reapportionment (1959–1965)		Post-reapportionment (1967–1969)	
	Urban (N=36)	Rural (N=123)	Urban (N=74)	Rural (N=45)
All	.65†	.24†	.86†	.75†
Political only	.54†	.22†	.78†	.44†
Socioeconomic only	.57†	.06	.45†	.71†

† $p = < .001$

Table 7. MLR Coefficients of Partisan Index with Constituency Characteristics—California Senate, 1959–1969

ariables	Combined Sessions Divided By Region Pre-reapportionment (1959–1965) North (N=116)	 Pre-reapportionment (1959–1965) South (N=43)	 Post-reapportionment (1967–1969) North (N=50)	 Post-reapportionment (1967–1969) South (N=69)
ll	.33†	.48†	.59†	.90†
olitical only	.23†	.35**	.54†	.78†
ocioeconomic only	.18†	.30**	.45†	.71†

** $p = < .01$
† $p = < .001$

ornia Senate increased significantly after reaportionment, while the Assembly (used as a ontrol) remained at a moderately high level of arty voting throughout the time period. Malpportionment may explain, in part, why Caliornia has been a deviant case in the level of egislative partisanship among the two-party tates.

Increased party voting indicates the strong ossibility that constituency support for legislaive partisanship was weakened under malaportionment. Simple and multiple linear correation analysis by session showed a substantially tronger tie between variations in constituencies nd legislative partisanship in all sessions after eapportionment. Whether political or socioconomic measures were used, the evidence learly shows that the link between constituncy and party voting was greatly strengthened fter reapportionment.

When senators were combined into pre- and ost-reapportionment groups for purposes of nalysis, it was found that urban, southern, and epublican groups may have contributed disroportionately to the changes which were oberved, but all categoric groups after reapporionment had higher correlations between the artisan index and constituency variables than he pre-reapportionment groups. Interestingly, he post-reapportionment rural senators' partianship seemed better explained by socioeconomic constituency indicators, and urban members seemed more responsive to political variables in their districts. Although the finding may be unique to this study, it raises some questions and may warrant more extensive investigation. Are there significant differences in member-constituent relations between urban and rural constituencies? Are urban constituencies more supportive of party conflict? Are urban legislators more dependent on political organizations, such as parties, for recruitment and continuance in office?

The findings of this study suggest the need for in-depth research on single state systems over extended time periods. If firm generalizations are to be established, particular care must be taken to study deviant cases which have been uncovered by more broadly based studies. Furthermore, the use of statewide averages, such as socioeconomic characteristics of the population, would have provided little understanding of the dynamic nature of legislative partisanship and constituency in California. It was not just the *sum* of the variables that counted, but their *distribution* within electoral districts which made the difference. Obviously, the results of this study apply only to California, but that is precisely the point. Given certain conditions, distortion of legislative constituencies can weaken party responsibility in legislative behavior.

Electoral Choice and Popular Control of Public Policy: The Case of the 1966 House Elections*

JOHN L. SULLIVAN
Indiana University

ROBERT E. O'CONNOR
Pennsylvania State University

Democratic Theory and Electoral Choice

Recent democratic theorists define democracy procedurally, providing lists of necessary and sufficient conditions for a democratic system. They require a free press, free and open elections, universal suffrage, one-person one-vote; they require that candidates or parties with the most votes must win, that minorities must be allowed equal opportunity to become majorities, and so on. Certainly this description fits such theorists as Dahl,[1] Downs,[2] and Mayo,[3] all of whom feel that the basic meaning of democracy is deciding who shall govern. Typical is the following definition of democracy: "One test of an electoral system is the extent to which it is democratic, that is, the extent to which everyone is permitted to participate in the choice (of rulers)."[4]

It is argued that since the size and complexity of modern nations have made direct popular control of policies impossible, the best test of democracy is popular selection of decision makers. According to this criterion, we have in the United States in the 1970s an approximation to democracy, since there is considerable popular choice of leaders in a large majority of congressional districts, senate races, and in all presidential elections.

Is this the highest level of democracy? Logically, we can imagine a higher level in which the people would control both the leaders *and* the policies. Popular control of leaders is not necessarily popular control of policies. If popular control of, for example, legislative policies exists, then the legislator's voting behavior is consistent with the attitudes of his constituents. If this relationship between congressmen's voting behavior and constituency opinion were to hold for every district, laws (legislative outputs) would closely reflect public opinion. This is what we mean by popular control of legislative outputs.

We have asserted that popular control of leaders exists. Does popular control of policy also exist? Miller and Stokes found correlations between constituency attitudes and the roll-call behavior of representatives of approximately −0.09 in the policy area of foreign affairs, 0.30 in social and economic welfare, and 0.60 in civil rights.[5] It appears that in at least one, and perhaps two, major policy areas, the relationship is weak enough to argue that constituency control does not exist.

Political scientists have made considerable effort to explain the absence of a strong linkage between constituency attitudes and public policy.[6] Generally this effort has focused upon two necessary conditions for a strong linkage: first, that voters perceive the issue positions of the candidates, and second, that voters cast their ballots on issue grounds. Popular control of policies is dependent upon these two conditions.

---

* This paper could not have been written without the assistance of several individuals. Milton C. Cummings and Donald R. Matthews helped us obtain the data. A special debt is owed to I. A. Lewis, Manager of NBC News, Election Unit. He allowed us access to the data and provided us with technical assistance. The data were originally collected by *Congressional Quarterly* for NBC News. Financial assistance was provided by the National Science Foundation and the National Institute of Mental Health. The first-named author would like to express his gratitude to the Psychology and Politics Program of Yale University and to NIMH for time and financial assistance in the form of a Postdoctoral Fellowship.

[1] Robert Dahl, *A Preface to Democratic Theory* (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1956), chapters 3 and 5.

[2] Anthony Downs, *An Economic Theory of Democracy* (New York: Harper, 1957), pp. 23–24.

[3] Henry B. Mayo, *An Introduction to Democratic Theory* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1960), chapter 4.

[4] Walter Berns, "A Critique of Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee's *Voting*," in *Public Opinion and Public Policy: Models of Political Linkage*, ed. Norman R. Luttbeg (Homewood, Illinois: Dorsey, 1968), p. 32.

[5] Warren E. Miller and Donald E. Stokes, "Constituency Influence in Congress," *American Political Science Review*, 57 (March, 1963), 49.

[6] See, for example, Philip E. Converse, "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics," *Ideology and Discontent*, ed. David Apter (New York: Free Press, 1964), pp. 206–261, and Luttbeg, *Public Opinion and Public Policy*.

Popular control of policies is also dependent upon two other conditions which have been neglected by political scientists.[7] These conditions are: third, that opposing candidates (for the same office) differ attitudinally on the issues, and fourth, that the winners vote in accordance with their pre-election attitudes.[8]

Although it has been demonstrated that there are real differences in the voting behavior of congressmen from the two major parties,[9]

> . . any ideological differences (or similarities) between Democratic and Republican challengers could be quite deceptive from the viewpoint of alternatives presented the electorate in specific districts. It is possible that nonincumbents are more like their incumbent opponents in most districts while pairs of congressional candidates differ from district to district.[10]

This third condition—that opposing candidates for the same elective office must differ in their attitudes toward the issues—is an essential component of any realistic linkage model of the political system of the United States.[11]

The fourth condition, that winners vote in accordance with their pre-election attitudes, also is essential for popular control of policies. If voters prefer the more conservative candidate but if, once elected, he behaves as his more liberal opponent would have, the electorate has been deceived in its efforts to exercise control of policies.

What we have referred to as the third and fourth conditions should be the first conditions examined by political scientists. If the third and fourth conditions are false, nonrealization of the two well-researched conditions of the linkage process is not surprising. If many candidates do not differ appreciably from one another, or if the winners fail to vote in Congress on the basis of their pre-election attitudes, there is little reason for voters to become familiarized with the issue positions of the candidates or to vote on the basis of these issue positions.[12] If the conditions of choice and of winners voting their expressed positions are not met, elections may still perform valuable functions,[13] but they cannot permit a strong linkage between public opinion and public policy.

This paper examines the two neglected conditions of the linkage process in an effort to evaluate an alternative explanation (other than voter apathy and ignorance) of why the linkage between public policy and constituency attitudes appears to be so weak.

Data

The data consist of attitudinal measures for all candidates for the House of Representatives in 1966. For all nonincumbents the data consist of answers to a questionnaire, while for all incumbents the data consist of both past roll-call behavior and responses to the questionnaire. The questions asked and the roll calls employed fall in three general areas: foreign affairs, civil rights, and domestic programs. The questions focus upon issues that were considered both substantively important and likely to be voted upon by the 90th Congress.[14]

Each of the eight items of the questionnaire received a score of one (liberal response), two (moderate response) or three (conservative response). The items scale across issues and can be combined into an overall liberalism-conservatism scale vis-à-vis public policy. The candidates' scores vary from eight (liberal on all eight items) to twenty-four (conservative on all eight items).

One condition for linkage involves candidates' attitudinal differences toward public policy for each congressional district. Candidate differences are obtained by subtracting the score of a given candidate from that of his opponent in each district. On this measure the minimum score possible is zero, meaning that the candidates do not differ on this liberalism-conservatism continuum; the maximum is sixteen, meaning that a conservative on every issue faces a liberal on every issue.

---

[7] An exception to this statement is found in Jeff Fishel, "Party, Ideology, and the Congressional Challenger," *American Political Science Review,* 63 (December, 1969), 1213–1232.

[8] John L. Sullivan, "Linkage Models of the Political System," *Public Opinion and Political Attitudes: A Reader,* ed. Alan R. Wilcox, forthcoming.

[9] See, among others, David B. Truman, *The Congressional Party* (New York: Wiley, 1959); Julius Turner, *Party and Constituency: Pressures on Congress* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1951); and Duncan MacRae, *Dimensions of Congressional Voting* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1958).

[10] Fishel, p. 1221.

[11] Sullivan, Part V.

[12] The individual voter cannot arrive at this conclusion unless he has first familiarized himself with the issue positions of the candidates and the later roll-call behavior of the winners. We know that the possession of this information is the exception rather than the rule. If, however, a district (or an entire political system) has in the recent past offered little choice, it may become part of the collective attitude of the citizenry that all attempts to gather this type of information are wasted.

[13] Richard Rose and Harve Mossawir, "Voting and Elections: A Functional Analysis," *Political Studies,* 15 (June, 1967), 173–201.

[14] See Appendix A for the questionnaire, roll calls, and scaling. *Congressional Quarterly* was able to obtain a 100 per cent response rate by making ample use of telephone followups. In several cases, aides answered the questions, but presumably they gave the same answers the candidate would have given. If the incumbent was absent for a roll call, he was asked how he would have voted had he been present.

The other condition of linkage examined in this study is that winners vote in a manner consistent with pre-election attitudes. For this we compare the roll-call behavior of the winners of the 1966 election with our pre-election measures.[15]

Choice

Table 1 evinces the magnitude of differences between candidates' attitude scores within districts. The modal category is represented by a score of zero. This finding reflects the fact that 57 Congressmen faced no opposition in the general election. If we focus momentarily only on contested seats, the median score rises to eight, the mean score to seven, and the modal category to nine.[16]

Table 1. Intradistrict Differences in House Candidates' Attitudes (Liberalism-Conservatism Scale)

Score	Freq.	%	Score	Freq.	%
0	69	16	8	40	9
1	19	4	9	46	11
2	28	6	10	35	8
3	31	7	11	21	5
4	21	5	12	14	3
5	24	6	13	9	2
6	28	6	14	5	1
7	41	9	15	3	1
			16	1	0
				435	99

Mean = 5.9
Median = 6

The distribution of Table 1 is based on differences on the overall liberalism-conservatism scale. The analysis presented in Appendix A makes it clear that it is possible for two candidates to have the same score on this scale, yet arrive at them by giving somewhat different responses. We think it important then to show (Table 2) the sum of the absolute differences, question by question. The average amount of choice, when choice is conceptualized as differences in response to eight individual questions, rather than as differences in overall liberalism-conservatism, rises from a mean of 5.9 to a mean of 6.5. Because the individual questions are highly scalable, the difference between these distributions is slight. That is to say, those who are more liberal on one set of issues also tend to be more liberal on other sets of issues.

One is faced with the problem of determining how much choice is sufficient to satisfy the third linkage condition. Does the election offer the electorate a chance to affect policy outputs in a significant manner? Our approach to the problem is to examine aggregate differences among the candidates. This determines whether or not the election of one aggregate set of candidates over another set would have made any differences in the balance of power in Congress. Would the most *liberal* Congress which could have been elected, in the aggregate, be quite different from the most *conservative* Congress which might have been chosen?

Table 3 presents the attitude distributions of five hypothetical Congresses and of the real 90th Congress on the foreign policy questions. The most liberal and most conservative hypothetical Congresses are composed of the candidates having the lower or higher score, respectively, for each district on the foreign policy attitude scale.[17]

Table 2. Intradistrict Differences in House Candidates' Attitudes (Absolute Differences)

Score	Freq.	%	Score	Freq.	%
0	61	14	8	42	10
1	5	1	9	56	13
2	20	5	10	43	10
3	18	4	11	24	6
4	19	4	12	14	3
5	31	7	13	9	2
6	36	8	14	5	1
7	48	11	15	3	1
			16	1	0
				435	100

Mean = 6.5
Median = 7

---

[15] The roll calls for the 90th Congress are presented in Appendix B. If the representative was absent but announced for or against, we accepted this announcement as indicating how he would have voted had he been present. If there was no information available, we coded his response as a moderate one, except where otherwise noted (Table 7).

[16] One complicating factor is the amount of choice offered in the primary elections. The available evidence, however, suggests that issues only weakly define primary elections. See V. O. Key, Jr., *Southern Politics* (New York: Knopf, 1949), pp. 105, 117, 142. The evidence further suggests that the amount of choice offered in primary elections in safe districts is not great. For example, Julius Turner, "Primary Elections as the Alternative to Party Competition in 'Safe' Districts," *Journal of Politics*, 15 (May, 1953), 197–210, found that, between the years 1944–1950, only half the primaries in safe districts were even contested. No doubt the candidates differed only marginally on the issues in at least some of the contested primaries.

[17] In each case, the most liberal and most conservative Congresses are based on the scores within the

Table 3. Hypothetical Congresses—Frequency of Scale Scores on Foreign Policy

ore**	Winners N	Unchallenged Winners & Losers N	Most Democratic* N	Most Republican* N	Most Liberal N	Most Conservative N
iberal	31	45	58	18	73	3
noderate-liberal	51	60	76	35	91	20
noderate	177	173	224	126	203	147
nod.-conservative	104	71	49	126	48	127
onservative	72	86	28	130	20	138
	435	435	435	435	435	435
ean	4.3	4.2	3.8	4.7	3.7	4.9
edian	4	4	4	5	4	5

* "Most Democratic" Congress includes Democrats plus unchallenged Republicans; "Most Republican" ongress includes Republicans plus unchallenged Democrats.
** See Appendix A for a clarification of scale scores by issue area.

The actual 90th Congress is very much like e hypothetical Congress of losers; the winners ve only fourteen fewer liberals and nine wer moderate liberals among their number an have the losers. The balance of power redes with the moderates in both the actual ongress and the Congress of losers, since no eral or conservative majority can be obtained ithout the support of a considerable number moderates. This finding suggests that the ection entailed much interdistrict canceling. many districts the more liberal candidate on, but in many other districts the more conrvative candidate won. The attitudinal comsition of the Congress would not have been uch different if all the losers had won. Perps even if we "threw all the rascals out," the w Congressmen would give us the same polies. We must throw them out selectively if we ish significant policy changes.

If only the more liberal losers had won, hower, the 90th Congress would have been very ifferent. In the most liberal Congress, only 68 embers would have favored a "tougher" poly toward Red China and in Vietnam. In the most conservative Congress, 265 members, a clear majority, would have favored a harder foreign-policy line. In the most liberal Congress, however, only 164 members would have preferred a softer foreign policy; the most liberal Congress would have provided a moderate balance of power, only slightly more liberal than the actual 90th Congress. The difference, or choice, presented in the election of 1966 on foreign policy was between a moderate, or status quo, policy (the moderate response on both questions was support for the present policy) or a more conservative policy. Even the most liberal Congress would not have resulted in a more liberal national policy without additional support from the moderates.

The civil rights data of Table 4 are comparable to those of Table 3. Again, the Congresses of winners and losers are similar (although the Congress of losers would allow a liberal majority without the support of any moderates), the Democrats are consistently more liberal than the Republicans, the most liberal and the most conservative hypothetical Congresses are very different, and the most Democratic and most liberal Congresses are quite similar, as are the most Republican and the most conservative Congresses. If the electorate had chosen the most conservative Congress, the balance of power on civil rights would have lain with the moderates. No conservative or liberal majority could emerge without the support of the moderate faction. On the other hand, if the most liberal Congress had been elected, there would have been enough civil rights liberals to enact civil rights legislation without any moderate support. In fact, there would have been a surplus of 54 confirmed liberals, without any support from moderate liberals. These data suggest

---

ue *domain considered, rather than on the overall* ale scores. Again, because of the scalability of the ms, the most liberal and most conservative Conesses do not differ appreciably even when the overall ale scores are used to determine which candidate is ore liberal. In no case is the mean or median differt from those presented in Tables 3–5 because there e very few cases where one candidate is more liberal the overall liberalism-conservatism scale but more nservative on one of the within-issue area scales, vice versa. It was done this way to ensure that ables 3–5 present the most conservative and most eral Congresses possible in each issue cluster. The me procedure is followed in the data presented in able 12.

Table 4. Hypothetical Congresses—Frequency of Scale Scores on Civil Rights

Score**	Winners N	Unchallenged Winners & Losers N	Most Democratic* N	Most Republican* N	Most Liberal N	Most Conservativ N
2 liberal	201	162	257	106	272	92
3 moderate-liberal	15	65	36	44	32	48
4 moderate	110	103	64	149	59	154
5 mod.-conservative	17	16	6	27	6	27
6 conservative	92	89	72	109	66	114
	435	435	435	435	435	435
Mean	3.5	3.5	3.1	4.0	3.0	4.0
Median	4	3	2	4	2	4

* "Most Democratic" Congress includes Democrats plus unchallenged Republicans; "Most Republican Congress includes Republicans plus unchallenged Democrats.

** See Appendix A for a clarification of scale scores by issue area.

that if Riker is right,[18] legislation even more liberal than the open-housing bill would have been seriously proposed, debated, and quite possibly passed.

The actual 90th Congress began with only 216 liberal or moderately liberal civil rights supporters, but more than 40 Congressmen shifted in the liberal direction to pass the Open Housing Act of 1968. These shifts, probably in response to civil disturbances and to the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., still would not have been sufficient to pass the legislation had the most conservative Congress been in office. In the area of civil rights, the electorate had a choice only between two positions—a liberal or a moderate balance of power in Con gress, rather than among three positions—a lib eral, a moderate, or a conservative balance.

Table 5 indicates that the electorate also ha an opportunity to affect policy outcomes on do mestic issues. Again the losers and winner look relatively similar, although the winners ar more conservative. Also, the fits between th most Democratic and most liberal Congresse on the one hand, and the most Republican an most conservative Congresses on the other, ar even closer than in the cases of foreign polic and civil rights. These correspondences on do mestic issues support the notion that the majo issues dividing the two parties are bread-and butter issues, i.e., domestic economic and wel fare policies.

Table 5. Hypothetical Congresses—Frequency of Scale Scores on Domestic Issues

Score**	Winners N	Unchallenged Winners & Losers N	Most Democratic* N	Most Republican* N	Most Liberal N	Most Conservative N
4 liberal	79	57	129	7	130	6
5–6 moderate-liberal	81	105	161	25	160	26
7–9 moderate	43	85	64	64	67	61
10–11 mod.-conservative	70	90	28	132	33	128
12 conservative	162	98	53	207	45	214
	435	435	435	435	435	435
Mean	8.7	8.3	6.6	10.5	6.5	10.5
Median	10	8	6	11	6	11

* "Most Democratic" Congress includes Democrats plus unchallenged Republicans; "Most Republican' Congress includes Republicans plus unchallenged Democrats.

** See Appendix A for a clarification of scale scores by issue area.

---

[18] William Riker, *The Theory of Political Coalitions* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962).

If the most liberal Congress had been elected, there would have been only 78 conservatives or moderate conservatives, while 290 members would have favored most of the liberal items of social legislation. If the liberals had been able to obtain the support of slightly more than half of the moderate liberals, a clear liberal majority would have resulted. On the other hand, if the most conservative Congress had been elected, there would have been only 32 liberals or moderate liberals, leading to a clear conservative majority with the support of only a small number of the 128 moderate conservatives. The median domestic scale score for the most liberal Congress is 6 (toward the moderate end of the moderate-liberal category); for the most conservative Congress it is 11 (toward the conservative end of the moderate-conservative category). This is a meaningful difference because different electoral outcomes imply majority support for different policies.

Attitudes and Behavior

We have been talking about attitudes toward public policy. It must be emphasized, however, that our measures for nonincumbents consist entirely of responses to a questionnaire and represent what are conventionally referred to as verbal attitudes, while our measures for incumbents consist partially of actual roll-call behavior. The questionnaire asked the nonincumbents if they supported certain programs which had been voted on in the previous Congress. As a result, the attitude-behavior distinction should be at a minimum, but it would be risky to assume, without a thorough empirical examination, that the questionnaire data and the roll-call data are comparable.[19]

The general question of the relationship between verbal attitudes and overt behavior has never been adequately resolved. In a review of more than 32 studies, Wicker concluded:

> Taken as a whole, these studies suggest that it is considerably more likely that attitudes will be unrelated or only slightly related to overt behaviors than that attitudes will be closely related to actions. Product-moment correlation coefficients relating the two kinds of responses are rarely above .30, and often are near zero.[20]

Taken at face value, this conclusion does seem to resolve the problem: there is no predictable relationship. Yet under the appropriate conditions, he implies, there ought to be a strong positive relationship. Wicker goes on to inventory the kinds of factors—personal and situational—that determine the strength of the relationship between verbal attitudes and overt behavior. Personal factors include other attitudes relevant to the observed behavior: competing motives; verbal, intellectual, and social abilities; and activity levels. Situational factors include the degree of privacy, normative prescriptions of behavior, alternative behaviors available, specificity of attitude objects, unforeseen events, and consequences of the act, expected or actual.[21] Without attempting a complete enumeration, we will suggest the effects of some of these variables in the present research.

The fact that we are comparing actual behavior with behavioral intentions of high specificity, rather than with general attitudes toward the attitude object in question, enhances the relationship between the two different types of measurements. For example, competing motives in this case could easily include the conflict between attitude toward civil rights and the desire to get re-elected. If questioned about his attitude toward civil rights, a representative may have indicated a positive response yet voted against a civil rights bill because he felt that his constituency opposed it and would not re-elect him if he voted for it. This conflict should be lessened because the questionnaire did not ask the challengers whether or not they favored civil rights, but rather whether they would have supported (voted for) a particular civil rights bill. Presumably, they considered these conflicting motives in the same manner they would have if actually faced with the behavioral decision. Undoubtedly there is slippage, since some candidates may not have been aware of all the conflicting motives they would encounter if they actually had to make a behavioral decision. The point is that the slippage should be minimal as compared to less behaviorally specific attitudes.

Or consider activity level. The attitude-behavior relationship is hypothesized to be considerably stronger for the active as opposed to the more apathetic individual. Certainly the candidates in the 1966 congressional elections were sufficiently active to produce a strong relationship between attitude and behavior vis-à-vis the major issues of the day.

It seems, therefore, that although the questionnaire and roll-call data are not isomorphic,

---

[19] Miller and Stokes, "Constituency Influence in Congress," p. 48, report correlations between the true opinion of Congressmen (as measured by a questionnaire) and their roll-call behavior of 0.75 among those who felt their attitudes were expressed in their roll calls, but only 0.04 among those who felt that they were not.

[20] Allan W. Wicker, "Attitudes versus Actions: The Relationship of Verbal and Overt Behavioral Responses to Attitude Objects," *Journal of Social Issues,* 25 (Autumn, 1969), 65.

[21] Wicker, pp. 67–74.

Table 6. Relationship Between Scale Positions on Pre-Election Attitudes and Postelection Roll-Call Behavior: Nonincumbents, Domestic Issues

		Pre-election Attitude Scale Position							Totals
		3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
Postelection Roll-Call Scale Position	3	1	2	1	0	1	2	0	7
	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
	5	0	0	0	1	0	1	1	3
	6	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	2
	7	0	0	0	1	3	3	3	10
	8	0	0	0	0	2	1	1	4
	9	2	0	0	4	3	12	31	52
Totals		3	2	1	6	10	19	38	79

gamma = .48
Somer's $d_{xy} = .37$

they ought to be directly comparable. We can examine this congruence empirically, at least indirectly, in the form of predictive validity. If both sets of pre-election data predict subsequent roll-call behavior with equal accuracy, we can feel secure about comparability. Thus the examination of the relationship between pre-election data and postelection roll-call behavior serves two functions. It allows us to examine and judge the comparability of the two types of pre-election data, and it allows us to determine the validity of the fourth linkage condition, i.e., that the pre-election differences between candidates are the basis of postelection roll-call differences.

In order to examine this relationship empirically, additional data were collected from the *Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1968*. Thes data are the roll-call votes of all winners of th 1966 Congressional elections on the same issues which constitute our pre-election data.[22]

Table 6 illustrates the relationship betwee the nonincumbents' pre-election attitudes an subsequent roll-call behavior on selected domes

---

[22] There were no roll calls comparable to the foreig affairs, labor, or voting rights items of the pre-electio scale. Therefore, in the tables that follow, these item have been dropped from the initial measures. The included roll calls are listed in Appendix B. It shoul also be noted that the foreign affairs data are questionnaire responses for both incumbents and nonincumbents (see Appendix A). Therefore, although w cannot examine the linkage condition in foreign affairs the methodological question of comparability does no arise.

Table 7. Relationship Between Scale Positions on Pre-Election and Postelection Roll-Call Behavior: Incumbents, Domestic Issues

		Pre-election Roll-Call Scale Position							Totals
		3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
Postelection Roll-Call Scale Position	3	63	16	46	1	5	0	0	131
	4	11	3	6	1	1	1	1	24
	5	3	0	8	0	5	0	5	21
	6	1	0	2	1	2	1	1	8
	7	1	0	3	0	2	3	20	29
	8	0	0	0	0	1	4	15	20
	9	0	0	1	1	6	9	102	119
Totals		79	19	66	4	22	18	144	352*

gamma = .86
Somer's $d_{xy} = .72$

* Among the 356 incumbent winners, there were no postelection data for four: both Younger (R-Calif.) and Fogarty (D-R.I.) had died, Powell (D-N.Y.) was excluded from the House, and McCormack (D-Mass.), as Speaker, did not vote.

ic issues. Table 7 illustrates the relationship beween the incumbents' roll-call behavior before he election and their postelection behavior on he same issues.[23] The relationship is very trong for the incumbents, while it is moderately strong for the nonincumbents. This difference requires a note of caution regarding the assumption of strict comparability of the quesionnaire and pre-election roll-call data, at least on domestic welfare issues. But clearly the relaionship, when compared with Wicker's dismal conclusion, is considerably stronger than his upper limit of .30.

Generally the winners voted as our pre-election scores indicated they would. Among the nonincumbents, there are 11 winners whose postelection score is two or more points more liberal than their pre-election scores. There are 9 whose postelection scores are two or more points more conservative than their pre-election scores. The figures for incumbents are 88 more liberal and 16 more conservative, illustrating a shift in the liberal direction. This shift was strong enough to cause slippage between the representation some voters might be expected to believe they would get and what they actually received on domestic legislation, but it was *not* sufficient to alter the moderate-conservative balance of power predicted on the basis of pre-election scores, as evidenced by Table 8. (Compare Table 8 to the winners column of Table 5.) Therefore, although individual voters may have been misled, the aggregate effect of such crossovers was not extensive enough to affect domestic policy. We may thus conclude that on domestic welfare issues the data support both the methodological contention that the pre-election data are comparable, and the substantive and theoretical contention that the pre-election candidate differences lead to postelection policy differences.

Table 8. Actual Congress, Frequency of Postelection Roll-Call Scores, Domestic Issues

Score	N
3 liberal	138
4–5 moderate-liberal	49
6 moderate	10
7–8 moderate-conservative	63
9 conservative	171
	431
Mean	6.3
Median	7

Table 9. Relationship Between Scale Scores on Pre-Election Attitudes and Postelection Roll-Call Behavior: Nonincumbents, Open Housing

		Pre-election Attitude Scale Scores 1	2	3	Totals
Postelection	1	15	7	7	29
Roll-Call	2	0	0	1	1
Scale Scores	3	4	6	39	49
Totals		19	13	47	79

gamma = .80
Somer's $d_{xy} = .58$

Table 10. Relationship Between Scale Scores on Pre-Election and Postelection Roll-Call Behavior: Incumbents, Open Housing

		Pre-election Roll-Call Scale Scores 1	2	3	Totals
Postelection	1	169	3	25	197
Roll-Call	2	3	1	5	9
Scale Scores	3	9	0	137	146
Totals		181	4	167	352

gamma = .97
Somer's $d_{xy} = .78$

---

[23] Gamma is stronger than Sommer's d_{xy} because it gnores all ties. It considers only the concordant and discordant pairs, while Somer's d_{xy} is penalized for very case in which the dependent variable varies but he independent variable does not vary. The actual heoretical relationships of Tables 7–10 are probably overestimated by the strength of gamma because if two ases are tied on one variable but not on the other, hey ought not to be ignored unless the theory predicts hat this should happen. This is not the case here. Conversely, Somer's d_{xy} probably underestimates the elationship because some of the cases which lower Somer's d_{xy}, cases which differ on the dependent variable but not on the independent variable, do so because of measurement error. Two nonincumbents whose pre-election scores are 8 on domestic issues might be expected to differ in postelection behavior because the ntermediate option is not so easily taken on roll calls as it is on questionnaires, and their reasons for hedging on one issue in the pre-election questionnaire may be quite different, leading to a different postelection roll-call decision. Somer's d_{xy} is included, however, to illusrate the range of values obtained, depending on the method of handling ties. Somer's d_{xy} was selected over d_{yx}, which is reduced by cases which vary on the independent but not the dependent variable, because of he nature of the two different kinds of measurement. The questionnaire allowed more options than a roll call, in that abstention on a roll call is more difficult han selecting the intermediate option on a questionnaire. Therefore, the situation of variation on the independent variable coupled with ties on the dependent variable is slightly more likely to occur than is variation on the dependent variable coupled with ties on the ndependent variable.

Table 11. Actual Congress, Frequency of Postelection Roll-Call Scores, Civil Rights

Score	N
1 liberal	226
2 moderate	10
3 conservative	195
	431
Mean	1.9
Median	1

Tables 9 and 10 present the relationships between pre-election and postelection measures on open housing for nonincumbents and incumbents, respectively. Again, the measures of association for the incumbents are higher, although they are also very high for the nonincumbents. This finding indicates a very strong link between attitudes and behavior, and comparability of the pre-election measures in the area of civil rights. The inferences about civil rights policy in the section on hypothetical Congresses seem to be supported. Generalizing the strength of the attitude-behavior relationship to those nonincumbents who lost, one can readily see that they would have voted as their attitudes indicated they would.

Unlike the shifts on domestic welfare, the shifts on civil rights *were* sufficient to affect policy. Fifteen nonincumbents shifted in the liberal direction, ten in the conservative direction; the figures for the incumbents are 33 vs. 12. As Table 11 illustrates, this shift resulted in a balance of power favoring the liberals (i.e., the bill passed). When compared to the balance of power predicted before the election (winners column and marginals, Table 4; pre-election attitudes, Tables 9 and 10) this change represents a shift from the moderate position. A shift on civil rights was to be expected, as this was a roll-call vote with only abstention representing a middle alternative. Therefore we have the paradoxical situation in which pre-election attitude is a better predictor of roll-call behavior on civil rights than on domestic welfare issues, yet the fewer civil rights crossovers result in a new balance of power. This result is entirely due to the precarious balance of power on civil rights issues, plus the events, such as the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, which influenced the passage of the Open Housing Act of 1968.

Summary and Discussion

This paper essentially presents three simple findings: (1) that the electorate in the aggregate was offered a substantively significar choice in the Congressional election of 196 (2) that winning candidates in that electio generally voted as their pre-election issue positions predicted, and (3) that the Democrati candidates were almost invariably more liber than their intradistrict Republican competitor

These simple empirical findings have broa implications for democratic theory. Concernin the linkage question, the data suggest that th relatively weak linkage between public opinio and policy outputs is neither a result of th party system's failure to provide choices on issue positions nor of the system's providing ora choices later ignored in roll-call behavior. Th voters could have established a strong overal linkage.

The findings also fuel the discussion abou voter rationality. In all three cases, the mos liberal Congress is very similar to the Congres composed of Democrats and unchallenged Republicans. Similarly, the most conservativ Congress resembles the most Republican Congress. Only 19 of the Republican candidate were more liberal than their Democratic opponents on the overall scale, even though the may have been more liberal than many Democratic candidates in other districts. This findin has interesting implications in light of studie which have bemoaned the electorate's supposedly limited awareness of public affairs and th limited extent of policy-oriented voting. If voter in 1966 wanted to vote conservatively, h only had to know that the Republican party i generally more conservative than the Democratic party in order to cast his ballot correctl in light of his values. If our findings may b generalized to other elections, party may b said to provide a valid cue for the policy-oriented voter who does not have a thoroug awareness of the issues or the policy position of the candidates.

If informational costs for policy-oriente voters are so low, why did Miller and Stoke fail to find strong linkages between public opinion and public policy? Perhaps one answer lie in the way rationality has been defined, namel in terms of a liberal-conservative scale on national issues. Although we have found tha Congressional candidates' attitudes do scale unidimensionally along a liberal-conservative dimension, there is little evidence that mass attitudes fall along the same continuum. This suggests not that mass attitudes are in some wa irrational but that candidates' attitudes are t some extent inconsistent with the attitudes o many voters. For example, a voter may b awkish, anti-civil rights, and a proponent of iberal domestic programs. He may have to hoose between a Democrat who is more liberal than his opponent in all three cases, and a Republican who is more conservative in all hree policy areas. By our scale, this citizen has wide choice. But the choice is not easy, for he nust choose on the one hand to support civil ights policies and foreign policies that he eally opposes, or on the other to help defeat lomestic programs he supports. Either way this voter's ability to help forge a linkage between ublic opinion and public policy is limited.

To reiterate: We have examined choice only n terms of a liberal-conservative dimension, ot in terms of whatever dimensions seem most elevant to individual voters. There is evidence which suggests that from the voters' own points of reference, their behavior is quite rational.[24] The crux of the matter is that even though the electorate is presented with a choice in elite attitudes, elite attitudes seem to be ordered along different dimension than are mass attitudes.[25] Therefore the linkage must of necessity be weak on some issues whether voters are issue-oriented or not.[26]

Another factor weakening the linkage between public opinion and public policy is the arge number of safe districts where the challenger has no realistic chance of winning.[27] Using the criterion that if more than 55 per cent of the vote goes to the winner, the district is noncompetitive, we found that only 73 of the 435 districts both were competitive and offered a policy choice. To quote Turner, "The alternative candidates must have nearly equal chances of success in the election, or else the voter is not presented with realistic alternatives."[28] As our data clearly show, the *opportunity* to affect policy outcomes via the electoral process certainly existed in 1966. To verify this linkage condition in no way vitiates the somewhat different but related point that the *probability* that the electoral process would affect policy in 1966 was somewhat lower.

To illustrate this point, the most liberal and most conservative Congresses were recomputed in all three issue clusters, assuming that a noncompetitive district offered a choice of zero regardless of how much the competing candidates may have differed. The results are presented in Table 12.

This makes it clear that although the "outer limits" of choice in the election were sufficient to verify the linkage condition in question, the realities of party competition narrowed these limits considerably. Realistically, the most the election meant was the difference between a liberal vs. moderate balance of power on civil rights and a moderate-conservative vs. moderate balance of power on domestic issues. Regardless of the outcome of the election, given the large number of relatively safe districts, the balance of power had to reside with the moderates on foreign policy.[29] This finding merely serves to clarify the nature of our analysis. We have not found that the 1966 election significantly affected public policy. Rather we have found that the opportunity for it to affect policy was present, and that this opportunity is all that is necessary to provide a means of policy control for the electorate.

Appendix A: Pre-Election Measurements

Accepting *Congressional Quarterly's* evaluations of which position was the liberal position on any given issue, we coded the candidates' policy positions as 1 = liberal, 2 = other or, in some cases, moderate, and 3 = conservative. Then three scales were constructed in the general areas of foreign affairs, civil rights and domestic welfare. For the foreign affairs and

---

[24] Michael J. Shapiro, "Rational Political Man: A Synthesis of Economic and Social-Psychological Perspectives," *American Political Science Review*, 63 (December, 1969), 1106–1119.

[25] Steven R. Brown and Richard W. Taylor, "Objectivity and Subjectivity in Concept Formation: Problems of Perspective, Partition, and Frames of Reference," paper delivered at the sixty-sixth annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Los Angeles, California, September, 1970.

[26] Miller and Stokes, p. 50, report correlations between constituency majority and congressional roll-call votes of 0.4, and between district majority and nonincumbent candidate attitudes of −0.4, in the social welfare policy domain. This suggests that within the confines of the amount and kind of choice presented, the masses are indeed selecting those elites whose attitudes are most congruent with their own. The fact that the congruency is not higher may be due primarily to the differing attitudinal structures of elites and nonelites.

[27] If the electorate votes primarily on the basis of party identification and if these identifications are unevenly distributed within a large percentage of districts, the result is a lack of intradistrict competition. If this uneven distribution of identifications reflects an equally uneven distribution of opinions and preferences on issues, then linkage could occur without a choice of candidates who differ in their issue positions. Therefore the optimal amount of choice in each district would depend on its internal distribution of opinion. Since data of this nature are not available, this analysis has focused on the systemic, rather than district, consequences of choice. From this framework, the more choice, the greater the opportunity for the electorate as a whole to exercise control over policy.

[28] Turner, "Primary Elections," p. 198.

[29] In all three issue clusters, the actual Congress resembles the most conservative Congress probable, given the existence of a large number of safe districts. To the extent that it makes sense to label an election a liberal or a conservative victory, the 1966 House election was a conservative victory.

Table 12. Hypothetical Congresses, Frequency of Scale Scores in Three Areas Controlling for Party Competition

Score	Foreign Policy		Civil Rights		Domestic Issues	
	N most liberal	N most conservative	N most liberal	N most conservative	N most liberal	N most conservative
liberal	36	26	220	181	88	73
moderate-liberal	62	42	11	20	104	66
moderate	187	169	106	116	42	41
mod.-conservative	90	114	12	24	52	84
conservative	60	84	86	94	149	171
	435	435	435	435	435	435
Mean	4.2	4.4	3.4	3.6	8.3	9.0
Median	4	4	2	4	8	10

civil rights measures the construction of scales was straightforward; each candidate's score on the two questions in each issue area was summed. The scores on each of these two scales range from 2 to 6; the higher the score, the more conservative the candidate's attitudes.

In the area of domestic welfare the data were in such a form as to preclude this simple solution. For the inflation and poverty items the data were in raw form; however, for the great society and labor items (three items under each category), each candidate received a 1 if his response to at least two of the three items was the liberal response, a 3 if his response to at least two of the three items was the conservative response, and a 2 for all other combinations. We then summed the scores on these four domestic welfare issues, resulting in scores ranging from 4 to 12. Again, for great society and labor (two of the four domestic items), three raw items were combined into one item.

Because the summated rating method is most confusing in the domestic policy area, with different response sets resulting in the same scores, we will elaborate in this area.

Table A-1 shows exactly what each score means in terms of the response sets of the candidates. That, for example, the response set "3—L, 1—C" is not equivalent to "2—L, 2—0" may well be argued. It is evident, however, that both of these response sets fall somewhere between the more liberal and more conservative alternatives. Hence, "3—L, 1—C" (6) is more conservative than "3—L, 1—0" (5), and it is more liberal than the two response sets receiving the score of seven. This same argument also holds for the "2—L, 2—0" response sets which logically fall between the sets receiving scores of five and seven. Both the response sets to which we have assigned a score of six do lie between the same combinations yet we are unable to compare these sets with each other in terms of liberalism-conservatism. The best alternative seems to be to equate their scores on our scale in spite of the fact that the sets are not intuitively equal. This weakness in measurement is a consequence of the crudity of the data.

Because we were interested in the concept of choice at a general level we desired an overall measure of choice, not just choice by issue areas. Therefore the scales of each issue area were combined into a generalized liberalism-conservatism scale. Since it consists of all eight items, it runs from 8 to 24. The reliability (split-half) coefficient, corrected by the Spearman-Brown formula, is 0.91. As for item validity, the average item-whole correlation is 0.74, well over twice the minimum possible item-whole correlation. The range is from 0.64 to 0.85. Since there were so few items, we retained all of them. If we had had more items from which to choose, we could have increased

Table A-1. Domestic Welfare Scores and Response Sets

4	4-L
5	3-L, 1-0
6	3-L, 1-C or 2-L, 2-0
7	2-L, 1-0, 1-C or 1-L, 3-0
8	2-L, 2-C or 4-0 or 1-L, 2-0, 1-C
9	2-C, 1-0, 1-L or 1-C, 3-0
10	2-C, 2-0 or 3-C, 1-L
11	3-C, 1-0
12	4-C

the average item-whole correlation by throwing out the less valid items. In view of this fact, plus the past failure of items to scale across issue areas, the magnitude of these validity and reliability coefficients is surprising.

Variation in the amount of choice per district could possibly be a function of the extremeness of the responses. If the incumbent in a district is either extremely liberal or extremely conservative, there is a chance for that district to have a very high degree of choice. On the other hand, if the incumbent is a moderate, there is no opportunity for an extremely high amount of choice. But since the correlation between extremity of scale position and choice is only 0.06, this explanation of variation in choice is vitiated.

Text of Questionnaire Items and Roll Calls

I. Foreign Affairs

A. VIET NAM: In regard to U.S. involvement in the war in Viet Nam, which position is *closest* to your own? (Asked of all candidates.)

1. More emphasis on peace talks, increased steps toward de-escalation of the conflict and eventual accommodation with the Viet Cong.
2. The basic course which the U.S. has followed.
3. More decisive military action by the U.S. to meet Communist aggression and achieve victory in the war.

B. RED CHINA: Below are three general courses of possible U.S. policy on Red China. Please check the one which *corresponds most closely* with your own position. (Asked of all candidates.)

1. Reduced isolation of Red China with such steps as U.S. recognition, admission to the United Nations, and increased trade.
2. A middle course close to existing U.S. policy.
3. Stricter military and economic confinement of Red China.

II. Civil Rights

A. VOTING RIGHTS: Would you have supported the 1965 Voting Rights Act? (Asked of challengers only.)

1. Yes 2. Other 3. No.

Incumbents: H.R. 6400, Voting Rights Act. Passed July 9, 1965, 333–85. Vote of member on final passage.

1. Yea (or paired yea or otherwise made intentions known)
2. Absent
3. Nay (or paired nay or otherwise made intentions known)

B. OPEN HOUSING: Would you have supported the modified version of President Johnson's proposal to prohibit discrimination in the sale or rental of real estate, as reported for House consideration in July, 1966? (Asked of challengers only.)

1. Yes 2. Other 3. No

Incumbents: H.R. 14765, Civil Rights Act. Defeated August 9, 1966, 190–222. Vote of member on motion to delete Title IV (open housing).

1. Nay 2. Absent 3. Yea

III. Domestic Welfare

A. INFLATION: If inflationary pressures from the Viet Nam war absolutely require corrective federal action, would you: (Asked of incumbents and challengers.)

1. Oppose cuts in domestic spending as an anti-inflationary measure.
2. Other
3. Support cuts in domestic spending as an anti-inflation measure.

B. POVERTY: Do you favor major cuts in expenditures for President Johnson's "war on poverty"? (Asked of challengers only.)

1. Oppose cuts 2. Other 3. Favor cuts

Incumbents: H.R. 15111, Equal Opportunity Amendments. Defeated September 29, 1966, 156–208. Vote of member on motion to strike the enacting clause (thereby killing the bill).

1. Nay 2. Absent 3. Yea

C. GREAT SOCIETY:

a. Rent Supplements: What is your position on the Johnson Administration's program of rent supplements for low income families? (Asked of challengers only.)

1. Favor 2. Other 3. Oppose

Incumbents: H.R. 14921, Supplemental Appropriations. Passed May 10, 1966, 192–188. Vote of member on amendment to provide $20 million in rent supplement contractual authority.

1. Yea 2. Absent. 3. Nay

b) Teacher Corps: Do you support the federally financed Teacher Corps to improve school education in slums and other impoverished areas, proposed by the Johnson Administration and first authorized in 1965? (Asked of challengers only.)

1. Support 2. Other 3. Oppose

Incumbents: H.R. 9567, Higher Education Act of 1965. Defeated October 20, 1965, 152–226. Vote of member on motion to send the bill back to conference with instructions to delete the Teacher Corps.

1. Nay 2. Absent 3. Oppose

c) Demonstration Cities: Do you favor the Johnson Administration proposal for $2.4 billion for a six-year program of federal aid to major cities to help them eliminate urban blight? (Asked of challengers only.)

1. Favor 2. Other 3. Oppose

Incumbents: S. 3708, Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan Development Act of 1966. Passed October 20, 1966, 178–141. Vote of member on passage of the bill authorizing "demonstration city" grants for community renewal.

1. Yea 2. Absent 3. Nay

D. LABOR

a) Taft-Hartley: Do you favor repeal of Section 14(b) of the Taft-Hartley Law, which permits state "right-to-work" laws? (Asked of challengers only.)

1. Favor 2. Other 3. Oppose

Incumbents: H.R. 77, Repeal of 14(b). Passed July 28, 1965, 221–203. Vote of member on final passage.

1. Yea 2. Absent 3. Nay

b) Minimum wage: Do you favor the Johnson Administration proposal to extend minimum wage laws to millions of additional workers and increase the minimum wage to $1.60 by the end of the decade?

1. Favor 2. Other 3. Oppose

Incumbents: H.R. 13712, Minimum Wage Amendments. Passed May 26, 1966, 205–194. Vote of member on amendment to delay for one additional year, until February 1, 1969, the second stage of the minimum wage increase from $1.40 to $1.60 an hour for workers covered under existing law.

1. Nay 2. Absent 3. Yea

c) Unemployment Compensation: Do you favor the proposals of the Johnson Administration, backed by organized labor, to establish federal standards for unemployment compensation benefits the states must pay, and to widen coverage of the program? (Asked of all candidates. The bill referred to, H.R. 8282, did not survive to the roll-call stage.)

1. Favor 2. Other 3. Oppose

Appendix B: Postelection Measurements

The roll calls listed below were utilized in our measurement of the postelection behavior of the 1966 Congressional winners. The three domestic welfare measures—the inflation item, the poverty item, and the great society items (scored the same way as the pre-election great society items)—were combined into a scale running from 3 to 9. The average item-whole correlation is .92, well above the minimum possible.

I. Civil Rights: H.R. 2516, Open Housing Act Passed April 10, 1968. Vote of member on motion to order the previous question on H.R 1100, thereby bringing the measure to a vote with no opportunity to alter the language and —in effect—expressing the House's desire to accept the Senate's open housing and other amendments without change.

1. Yea (or paired yea or otherwise made intentions known)
2. Absent
3. Nay (or paired nay or otherwise made intentions known)

II. Domestic Welfare

A. INFLATION: H.R. 888, Continuing Appropriations. Passed October 18, 1967, 238–164. Vote of member on amendment continuing expenditure authority for government agencies whose appropriations bill had not passed Congress; providing that no government agency could spend more in fiscal 1968 than it spent in fiscal 1967, with a few exceptions.

1. Nay 2. Absent 3. Yea

B. POVERTY: S. 2388, Antipoverty bill. Passed November 15, 1967, 221–190. Vote of member on motion to recommit the bill with instructions to reduce the fiscal 1968 authorization by $460 million.

1. Nay 2. Absent 3. Yea

C. GREAT SOCIETY:

a) Rent Supplements: H.R. 9960, Independent Offices and Department of Housing and Urban Development Appropriations Act. Passed May 17, 1967, 232–171. Vote of member on amendment to delete language permitting the government to sign 40-year contracts with private nonprofit housing sponsors to pay an additional $10 million a year in rent supplements for low income families.

1. Nay 2. Absent 3. Yea

b) Teacher Corps: H.R. 10943, Teacher Education. Defeated June 27, 1967, 146–257. Vote of member on motion to recommit the bill with instructions to strike the teacher corps provisions.

1. Nay 2. Absent 3. Yea

c) Demonstration Cities: H.R. 9960, Supplemental Appropriations. Defeated May 17, 1967, 193–213. Vote of member on motion to recommit the bill to the House Appropriations Committee with instructions to delete $75 million for urban renewal in model city project areas and $150 million for other model city grants.

1. Nay 2. Absent 3. Yea

Political Mobility and the Soviet Political Process: A Partial Test of Two Models*

PHILIP D. STEWART, ROBERT L. ARNETT, WILLIAM T. EBERT, RAYMOND E. MCPHAIL, TERRENCE L. RICH AND CRAIG E. SCHOPMEYER
The Ohio State University

Theories and Models

There are two major models of elite mobility in the literature on Soviet politics: the patron-client model and the rational-technical model.[1] While each recognizes a variety of variables as determinants of recruitment policies, they differ significantly in two respects: (1) the variables they identify as of primary explanatory significance and (2) their implications for theories of the national political process.

The patron-client model depicts the Soviet system as a "vast collection of personal followings."[2] It singles out the "patronage of dominant leaders" as the primary variable in determining the success of at least middle-level officials. Brzezinski and Huntington state the essential thesis of this model most clearly:

> . . . to get off to a fast start in the Soviet Union it is necessary to attract the attention of some upper-level political leader and become his protégé . . . Apart from the old Bolsheviks (who were leaders before they were bureaucrats) every major political leader in the Soviet Union has risen to power under the aegis of a patron and as a member of a clique.[3]

The rational-technical model, adopting as its basic premise that the overriding objective of the Soviet polity is rapid economic development,[4] emphasizes "ability to achieve the basic mission." The degree of plan fulfillment and level of labor discipline attained emerge as the crucial determinants of upward or downward mobility.[5] While this model does place importance on political loyalty as a variable, it is not the "toadying" type implied by most versions of the patronage model, nor is it conceived as personalized loyalty to a particular leader. Rather it is described as consisting of "a strong conception of duty," a "dedication to performance," of "understanding" and "sympathy" for the program being administered.[6] Loyalty becomes significant in the rational-technical model only to the extent that it affects the level of plan fulfillment.

---

* The Soviet Elite Mobility Project and Research Archive, *SEMPRA*, of which this study is a part, was initiated in 1967 with a small grant from the College of Social and Behavioral Sciences at the Ohio State University for the design and compilation of a coding scheme for reducing Soviet elite biographies to metric format. For her assistance on this codebook we are indebted to Fran Netting. Throughout, the Department of Political Science Polimetrics Laboratory (C. Richard Hofstetter, Director), and the Behavioral Science Laboratory (Philip M. Burgess, Director), of the College of Social and Behavioral Sciences have provided invaluable programming and statistical consultation. The University Instruction and Research Computer Center freely provided the large amount of computer time necessary to this study. Assistance from Philip M. Burgess, C. Richard Hofstetter, James Ludwig, Larry Mayer, Giacomo Sani, Nancy Schecter, Ann Rappoport, and Thomas Conrad as well as numerous other colleagues and students, is appreciatively acknowledged. The authors are grateful to John A. Armstrong and an anonymous referee for their support and valuable criticisms, but accept full responsibility for the content.

[1] For the fullest statement of the patron-client model see John A. Armstrong, *The Soviet Bureaucratic Elite: A Case Study of the Ukrainian Apparatus* (New York: Praeger, 1959). See also the effective development administration theory as developed by Jerry Hough in *The Soviet Prefects* (Cambridge: Harvard, 1969), esp. chaps. 13–15. Hough builds upon the rational-technical model elaborated by Barrington Moore in his *Terror and Progress USSR: Some Sources of Change and Stability in the Soviet Dictatorship* (Cambridge: Harvard, 1954).

[2] Armstrong, p. 146. For other discussions of patronage see: Frederick C. Barghoorn, *Politics in the USSR* (Boston: Little Brown, 1966), pp. 184–185, 186, 206–207, and 211; Frederick C. Barghoorn, "Trends in Top Political Leadership in the USSR," in *Political Leadership in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union*, ed. R. Barry Farrell (Chicago: Aldine, 1970), pp. 62–63, 75–77; Jerry Hough, *Soviet Prefects*, pp. 276–277, also chap. 7; Carl A. Linden, *Khrushchev and the Soviet Leadership: 1957–1964* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1966), p. 13; Philip D. Stewart, *Political Power in the Soviet Union: A Study of Decision-Making in Stalingrad* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1968), pp. 143–150. Sidney Ploss and Seweryn Bialer utilize the concept by categorizing individuals as protégés of particular leaders. See Sidney Ploss, *Conflict and Decision-Making in Soviet Russia: A Case Study of Agricultural Policy*, 1954–1963 (Princeton: Princeton, 1965); and also Seweryn Bialer, "How Russians Rule Russia," *Problems of Communism*, 13 (September-October, 1964), 45–52. Note also Yaroslav Bilinsky, *The Second Soviet Republic: The Ukraine After World War II* (New Brunswick: Rutgers, 1964), pp. 231–241 for documentation of the importance of personal affiliation among Khrushchev and his aids in the Ukraine.

[3] Zbigniew K. Brzezinski and Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Power: USA/USSR* (New York: Viking, 1964), p. 147.

[4] Moore, pp. 184–193, 222–226. For other discussions of the rational-technical model, see: Carl Beck, "Bureaucracy and Political Development in Eastern Europe," *Bureaucracy and Political Development*, ed. Joseph LaPalombara (Princeton: Princeton, 1963), pp. 268–300; Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, *Ideology and Power in Soviet Politics* (New York: Praeger, 1962), pp. 26–36 and 72–91. Brzezinski examines the limits of rational-technical evolution and refutes its political consequences. See also, Merle Fainsod, "Bureaucracy and Modernization: The Russian and Soviet Case," in LaPalombara, pp. 233–267, and W. W. Rostow, *The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto* (Cambridge: Cambridge, 1962).

[5] Hough, p. 296. The other elements of his theory include (1) incentive pay to compensate for the non-

The patron-client model is assigned a major explanatory role in two of the most widely accepted types of theories of the Soviet political process. Totalitarian theories stress the manipulation of patronage by the Party Secretariat through its institutionalized power over appointments as a central variable in Stalin and Khrushchev's rise to power.[7] By packing the Party and state bodies with members of their own factions and demoting those who were not entirely dependent upon them, first Stalin and then in his turn Khrushchev, were able to rise to a position of "unchallengeable" power. Kremlinological theories[8] interpret patronage not only as a principal factor in a leader's rise to power[9] but as having a continuous effect upon a leader's capacity to maintain his power and secure the fulfillment of his programatic commitments. Moreover, in these theories the very concept of patronage acquires a broader and yet subtler meaning.

Both the expanded role of the model and extended meaning of the concept are derived from the basic theorem of Kremlinology: namely, that ". . . the Soviet leadership from its inception has been peculiarly vulnerable to intense factionalism within its ranks."[10] While the "proof" of this theorem consists of countless instances of factionalism,[11] its explanation rests upon three factors: (1) an ideologically based insistence upon monolithism, (2) the pervasiveness and persistence of ill-defined institutional and personal relations within the leading group, and (3) the lack of any specific procedures for succession. Under these conditions patronage comes to mean, in addition to control of a political organization through manipulation of appointments, the building of a following on the basis of a program. The relationship of patron and client is seen not so much as that of master and servant, but rather the clients are conceived as "men of power who represent real political and organizational interests."[12] Their continued support of the patron depends, at least in part, upon the effect of policy successes and failures on the leader's prestige. Likewise, the career success of middle-level elites may come to depend upon their ability successfully to implement the leader's policies.

The theory of effective development administration, incorporating the rational-technical model of mobility, suggests that political recruitment is much less central to questions of leadership politics and power than has been posited by the Kremlinologists. Two basic propositions of this theory are relevant here: (1) As economic growth of the industrial sector advances, there arises a need for technical expertise in management to insure efficiency and progress; and (2) in a state where economic development is a major goal of the political regime, political leaders will tend to be selected for their technical, administrative, and "bargaining" skills.[13] Once the political system has established itself, routinized processes of socialization and recruitment are adequate to insure the loyalty of the elite to the govern-

---

routinized nature of the executive positions and the vagueness of the rules under which development executives must function; (2) provision for "dual supervision" because of the dysfunctional effects of the straight line of command in a development environment; (3) "provision for a governmental mechanism on the regional level to regulate the relationships of the specialized development institutions with each other and with the community."

[6] Hough, p. 297.

[7] Merle Fainsod, *How Russia is Ruled,* revised ed. (Cambridge: Harvard, 1963), p. 120. See also Myron Rush, *The Rise of Khrushchev* (Washington: Public Affairs, 1958), pp. 2, 59, 68, 83–84.

[8] Kremlinological theories are seen here as including "conflict theories" as a subset. See Linden, *Khrushchev and the Soviet Leadership,* p. 7.

[9] See Robert Conquest, *Power and Policy in the USSR: The Study of Soviet Dynastics* (New York: St. Martin's, 1961), especially chaps. 9, 12, and 13.

[10] Linden, p. 11.

[11] Most of the evidence supporting this position is found in Conquest, Linden, and Michel Tatu, *Power in the Kremlin: From Khrushchev to Kosygin* (New York: Viking, 1970). For a discussion of the assumptions and arguments of the "conflict school" note the following: Carl Linden, "Khrushchev and the Party Battle," *Problems of Communism,* 12 (September-October, 1963), 27–35; Thomas H. Rigby, "The Extents and Limits of Authority (a rejoinder to Mr. Linden)," *Problems of Communism,* 12 (September-October, 1963), 36–41; Carl Linden, "Facts in Search of a Theory," *Problems of Communism,* 12 (November-December, 1963), 56–58; and Robert C. Tucker, "The Conflict Model," *Problems of Communism,* 12 (September-October, 1963), 59–61.

[12] Carl Linden, *Khrushchev and the Soviet Leadership,* chap. 1, especially pp. 12–13.

[13] While the early work of Barrington Moore cited above laid out the essential features of the rational-technical model, its further adaptation into the model of effective development administration is due to the work of Jerry Hough, chaps. 8–12, but especially chap. 11. On the concept of bargaining, see especially chap. 15, pp. 281–282, 285–286, 312–314.

ment. Further, given the overriding commitment to economic and social development mong the leadership, political struggles at the enter are conceived as involving not so much ssues of personal power as matters of policy, uch as investment priorities.[14] Under these onditions support for particular leadership liques becomes a factor of minor significance n recruitment decisions.

Now, from the foregoing it should be clear hat the explanatory power of the totalitarian, Kremlinological, and effective development administration theories must depend in some significant measure on the validity of their component models of political recruitment. During he past fifteen to twenty years, considerable evidence has been gathered in support of both he patron-client and the rational-technical models. In his pioneering work, John Armstrong studies the background and career characteristics of Ukrainian officials, finding that political cliques tend to form as the result of association in earlier assignments as well as between career groups.[15] Evidence of patrons helping those who have worked with or under them has been accumulated in a number of other studies.[16]

Similarly, a wide array of research examines various aspects of the rational-technical model of recruitment. In an early study, T. H. Rigby describes the relationship of social background to recruitment into the Communist party.[17] Both George Fischer and Michael Ghelen analyze the significance of education and career pattern variables for recruitment into the elite. Hough attempts to identify types of elites on the basis of career backgrounds.[18] Fred Fleron makes an innovative effort at concept development, especially the concept of "co-optation" as a recruitment device.[19] Grey Hodnett, using a limited sample, makes a first effort at examining the relationship between types of regions or *oblasti* (provinces) to which secretaries are assigned and their career backgrounds.[20]

The most comprehensive description of the rational-technical model is Jerry Hough's *The Soviet Prefects*. Focusing on one segment of the Soviet elite, the *oblast* Party secretaries, Hough examines the relationship of economic performance to the political mobility of this group. Hough makes two major contributions. First, he provides a thorough and convincing compilation of Soviet pronouncements emphasizing economic performance as *the* major determinant of political mobility of regional Party secretaries. Second, he demonstrates persuasively the central role of the *oblast* Party first secretary in determining the level of economic performance in his *oblast*. But although Hough does present a number of case histories of the apparent effect of economic performance on political mobility, he does not provide a systematic test of this model. (This is not a criticism of his work in any sense: his descriptive effort is a major achievement in itself. Most of the studies cited above have been of this class, that is, limited to description of social and occupational characteristics of classes of elites.)

---

[14] Hough, especially chaps. 11–13.

[15] Armstrong, p. 146.

[16] See the works cited in footnote 2 above.

[17] T. H. Rigby, "Social Orientation of Recruitment and Distribution of Membership in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union," *The American Slavic and East European Review*, 16 (April, 1957), 275–290.

[18] Michael P. Gehlen, "The Educational Backgrounds and Career Orientations of the Members of the Central Committee of the CPSU," *The American Behavioral Scientist*, 9 (April, 1966), 11–14; Michael P. Gehlen and Michael McBride, "The Soviet Central Committee: An Elite Analysis," *The American Political Science Review*, 62 (December, 1968), 1232–1241; George Fischer, *The Soviet System and Modern Society* (New York: Atherton, 1968); Jerry Hough, "The Soviet Elite: I, Groups and Individuals," *Problems of Communism*, 16 (January-February, 1967), 28–35; and Jerry Hough, "The Soviet Elite: II, In Whose Hands the Future?" *Problems of Communism*, 16 (March-April, 1967), 18–25.

[19] Frederick J. Fleron, "Cooptation as a Mechanism of Adaptation to Change: The Soviet Political Leadership System," *Polity*, 2 (Winter, 1967), 176–201. See also, Frederick Fleron, "Representation of Career Types in the Soviet Political Leadership," in Farrell, *Political Leadership*, pp. 108–139.

[20] Grey Hodnett, "The Obkom First Secretaries," *Slavic Review*, 24 (December, 1965), 636–665. For other studies of the backgrounds of Soviet elites see: T. H. Rigby, *Communist Party Membership in the USSR: 1917–1967* (Princeton: Princeton, 1968) esp. Part 2, chaps. 11–16; Michael P. Gehlen, "The Soviet Apparatchiki," in Farrell, ed., pp. 140–156; Christian Duevel, "The Central Committee and the Central Auditing Commission elected by the 23rd CPSU Congress: A Study of the Political Survival of their Members and a Profile of their. Professional and Political Composition," *Radio Liberty Research Paper*, 6 (New York: Radio Liberty, 1966); Seweryn Bailer, "Notes on the Study of Soviet Elites," Paper presented at the 1964 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association; Yaroslav Bilinsky, "Changes in the Central Committee: Communist Party of the Soviet Union, 1961–1966," *Monograph Series in World Affairs*, 4 (Denver: University of Denver, 1967); Borys Lewtzkyj, "Generations in Conflict," *Problems of Communism*, 16 (January-February, March-April, 1967), 36–40; John Armstrong, "Party Bifurcation and Elite Interests," *Soviet Studies*, 17 (April, 1966), 417–430; Seweryn Bialer, "Twenty-four Men Who Rule Russia," *The New York Times Magazine*, November 1, 1964, p. 105; Peter Frank, "The CPSU Obkom First Secretary: A Profile," *The British Journal of Political Science*, 1 (April, 1971), 173–190; T. H. Rigby, "Changing Compositions of the Supreme Soviet," *The Political Quarterly*, 24 (July-September, 1963), 309–315; Abdurakham Avtorkhanov, *The Communist Party Apparatus* (Chicago: Regnery, 1966).

While the literature does provide considerable evidence in support of both the patron-client and rational-technical models of recruitment, a number of questions remain to be answered. Among the most important are the following:

1) How much of the total variance in elite political mobility is explained by patron-client relationships?

2) How much is explained by rational-technical criteria?

3) How does the explanatory power of each model vary over time?

4) What additional variables might explain the remaining unexplained variance in mobility?

This study is designed to provide initial answers to these questions and in so doing to provide a partial yet systematic test of the patron-client and rational-technical models of political recruitment. The accumulated evidence will then permit more rigorous appraisal of some important theories of Soviet political processes.

Research Design and Measures

As a partial test, this study examines the explanatory power of the two models with respect to the mobility of the 224 persons who left the position of regional Party first secretary in 58 Russian republic *oblasti* during the period 1955 through 1967.[21] This group is analytically defined as a population, and statistical analysis is confined to describing observed relationships within this population rather than attempting any statistical inferences to the larger universe of all Soviet elites or all regional first secretaries. This procedure is necessitated by two conditions: (1) Because of data problems, it is not possible to select a random or probability sample of elites; and (2) even if such a sample could be drawn, it is difficult to conceive of any operational measure of mobility that would be equally relevant to a variety of career types. As Alfred Meyer has observed with respect to the Soviet elite as a whole, ". . . it is often impossible for the outsider to determine whether a person's reassignment represents a move up, down, or laterally within the complex structure of the political system."[22] As described below, however, such measures of mobility can be conceived for the class of Party officials studied here.

The *oblast* first secretaries make an almost ideal group on which to test the two models (mobility. First, since in the post-Stalin perio this group has constituted one of the major r cruiting grounds for new Politburo members; *theoretical* inference may be drawn betwee variables explaining the mobility of this grou and recruitment policies and practices applie to other political elites.[23] Second, these secr taries' "prefectoral" role in the provinces su gests that the application of rational-technic criteria to mobility decisions should be mo evident within this group than within mo others.[24]

The unit of analysis is the individual in an *ol last* over the period of his tenure as a first se retary. In addition to the usual variables ident fied as individual characteristics, such as yea of Party entrance and extent of patron-clien ties, those features of the *oblast* that a give first secretary may influence, such as the size c the wheat harvest or the growth rate of indus try, are analytically assigned to each individua The theoretical basis for tying these contextua variables to individual first secretaries consist in the offical policy of the Party that identifie them as the persons most responsible for what ever happens in the *oblast,* from production t morals. That the careers of first secretarie *should* be affected by what occurs in the *oblas* is well supported in Hough's work.[25]

While no previous research has attempted t identify all of the concepts comprising eithe the patronage or the rational-technical mode of mobility, analysis of the existing literatur suggests as most relevant the concepts listed i Chart 1.

Chart 1 Core Concepts in the Analysis of Political Mobility

A. Political mobility
B. Basic concept of the patronage model
    Patronage
C. Basic concepts of the rational-technical model
    Economic performance
    Level of economic development
D. Concepts common to both models
    Political regime
    Policy conflict
    Party cohort
E. Additional relevant concepts
    Traditionalism
    Age
    Education
    Occupational patterns

---

[21] Work currently in progress will expand this study to all USSR *oblasti.*

[22] Alfred G. Meyer, *The Soviet Political System: An Interpretation* (New York: Random House, 1965), p. 147.

[23] Hough notes, for instance, that former *obkon* secretaries constituted nine of eleven voting member on the Politburo in 1967. Hough, *The Soviet Prefects* p. 285.

[24] On the "prefectoral" role of the *obkom* first sec retaries, see Hough, chaps. 2, 3, 5, and 12.

[25] Hough.

As generally used in the literature, recruitment is a process of initial selection and upward movement in some hierarchy. As such, it s a unidirectional concept. Mobility, on the other hand, for purposes of this study, is conceived as movement either up, down, or laterally within a hierarchy. The advantage of this conceptualization is that it alerts us to the need not only to examine the characteristics of those who are selected into a particular class of positions but also to account for the upward mobility of some, and the lateral or downward movement of others.[26]

The operational measure of mobility developed for this study was a nine-point ordinal measure of an underlying interval scale indicating relative movement of first secretaries out of the *oblast* Party committee. This judgmental index was used to measure, in a rough way, two dimensions of mobility: direction and distance. The position of *oblast* Party first secretary was arbitrarily and uniquely assigned the midpoint on the index (a code of 5). Direction was indicated by assigning a lower number to those whose new positions are believed a demotion and a higher one to those attaining positions considered as promotions. Distance was always measured relative to the position of *oblast* Party first secretary.

The following general rules were utilized in assigning specific mobility scores:

(1) The greater the *potential influence on national policy making*[27] relative to that of the *oblast* Party first secretaryship, the greater the distance involved in a promotion.

(2) Maintaining or losing Central Committee membership is a general indicator of promotion or demotion, respectively.

Following these general rules these specific coding rules were adopted:

(a) Only the position of First (or General) Secretary of the CPSU and member of the CPSU Presidium (or Politburo) are coded the highest score (9). No other positions are assumed to have equal influence on policy making.

(b) Party positions are the same formal level in the hierarchy as government or economic positions are considered to be one step higher with respect to influence on policy, following the general conclusion in the literature on the Party's dominance over the government in the post-Stalin era.

(c) Within the Party hierarchy, the position of first secretary is scored as equivalent to staff positions at the next higher level of responsibility. Thus, city Party first secretaries are scored like ordinary secretaries at the *oblast* level. An exception to this rule is made for republic and All-Union Central Committee department heads. The former are scored below the *oblast* first secretary, since for those in our study the former position implies a move out of the RSFSR to one of the smaller republics; the latter positions, however, are scored one step above the *oblast* first secretary, contrary to the general rules specified, because of the increased opportunities for access to central decision processes implied by working as a Central Committee department head in Moscow.[28] A fairly common move for a former first secretary is to USSR Ambassador, usually to an East European country. Appendix A indicates the reasons why this position is scored here as a promotion of one step. Table 1 summarizes the frequency with which individual scores on the mobility index were assigned. (Appendix B provides a complete listing of relevant positions and the scores assigned to each.)

The most careful attempt to define the concept of patronage is found in *The Soviet Bureaucratic Elite*. Following Armstrong, the concept is defined as "links between a secondary official and the figure who acts as his patron." The principal source of these links is "association in earlier assignments." Individual links formed in this manner may be strengthened by a "pattern of alignments between career groups."[29] Here the concept of association in earlier assignments is operationally defined as pairs of men who at some point in their careers

---

[26] For one effort at operationalizing the concept of mobility of Soviet elites, see Stewart, *Political Power*, chap. 7.

[27] For one attempt at conceptualizing potential influence in Soviet politics, see Stewart, pp. 3–13 and 194–212.

[28] One of the most obvious weaknesses in this mobility index is the large number of zero scores. Zeros were assigned under two conditions: (1) no biographical data were available on the individual after he left the *oblast* Party first secretaryship and (2) the secretary retired or is assumed to have retired because of age. In only four cases were secretaries known to have retired. In the rest, the assumption was made that the secretary was demoted to an insignificant position. While this was doubtless the case in most instances, several other possibilities must be considered: (1) the secretary may have been assigned to a sensitive position whose title could not be published; and (2) the individual may have been promoted without this fact's having been observed by the compilers of biographical data in the West. But despite these possibilities, the fact that most of those coded "unknown" were, at the time of their first secretaryship, either deputies to the USSR Supreme Soviet or members of the Central Committee who failed to reappear in either of these bodies after losing the first secretaryship, gives us confidence in the direction if not the distance components of the codes.

[29] Armstrong, *The Soviet Bureaucratic Elite*, p. 146.

Table 1. Summary of Mobility Index Scores

All Cases										
Mobility Score	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9[a]
Frequency N=224	55	0	1	3	34	77[b]	39	7	6	2

[a] Appendix B lists the positions included in each score. Descriptions of the archives from which individu biographical and aggregate economic data are drawn are available upon request from the authors.

[b] Includes the 58 first secretaries still in office in 1968.

work in the same *oblast* in the same year. The assumption is that temporal-geographic coincidence indicates an opportunity for forming patron-client links. Given the great variety of factors that may affect links within the political system, this indicator is taken as only a weak measure of patronage. That is, the variables derived from this indicator are expected to underestimate somewhat the effect of patronage on mobility.

Two patronage variables are derived from this indicator. The first, career group links, measures only those instances in which at any time during their careers, two or more first secretaries in this study worked in the same *oblast* at the same time. The second measures such temporal-geographic proximity between first secretaries and Politburo-Secretariat officials (except for those instances specified in Appendix A). These variables are seen as tapping two different dimensions of patronage: namely, patterns of career group alignments, and links between a secondary official and his patron, respectively.[30]

The concept of political regime embodies two ideas: the common tendency to associate particular periods with the dominant leader,[31] and the assumption that at least some of the variance in mobility may be attributed to variation in the programmatic commitments of one regime or leadership as compared to another. In the belief that the impact of regime on mobility can be most readily observed as variation over *time* in the relative explanatory power of patronage and performance variables, time is here adopted as the operational measure of regime.[32]

The concept of policy conflict, meaning political dispute among the leadership over th adoption, manner of execution, or relative success of policy, reflects the linkage suggested b Carl Linden between policy successes or failures and the leader's power.[33] The working hypothesis derived from this concept is that whil the leader may have considerable latitude i mobility decisions in areas where his policy i currently successful (e.g., agricultural areas i good harvest years), considerable pressure ma be applied to him when his policies fail. On th basis of this position two measures of polic conflict over domestic issues are employed: (1) the growth rate of the RSFSR cereal crop harvest, and (2) the growth rate of RSFSR industrial output.[34] A marked decrease in growt rates is taken as an indicator of increased pressure on the leader resulting from conflict engendered by policy failure, and vice versa.

The concepts of economic performance and level of economic development constitute the core of the rational-technical model. The most direct meaning of economic performance in the Soviet case is the degree of plan fulfullment. Unfortunately, data on plan fulfillment by *oblast* are not available outside the Soviet Union.[35] On the assumption, however, that every plan anticipates some growth in each region for each major product, measures approximating the degree of plan fulfillment can be devised. Two such indicators have been developed for this study: a weighted measure of the growth of industrial production by oblast, and a weighted measure of the growth of food and clothing production. Each measure consists of two parts: a growth rate and a weight. The industrial index (elaborated in Appendix A) includes the growth of all industrial production in each *oblast,* both directly in industrial enterprises and in the industrial components of nonindustrial enterprises. The growth rates are calculated for each year, but the score assigned to each secretary is the *average* growth rate for the entire period of his tenure.[36] The weights are the percentages of total USSR manufacturing contributed by each *oblast* as of 1956. These weights were calculated from the work of Lonsdale and Thompson who, on the basis of an examination of several hundred Soviet economic and geographic sources, calculated the percentage of total USSR manufacturing contributed by each of 571 leading industrial centers in 1956.[37] The effect of the weights on the industrial index is to control for the impact of level of economic development on the industrial growth rate of each *oblast.*

---

[30] This conception tends to be supported by the correlation between these two variables of .40, suggesting that they share only 16 per cent of their variance. It should be clear, however, that the Politburo-Secretariat links variable does not measure ties with each member of these bodies, but rather the measure consists of an aggregation of such individual links as identified by temporal-geographic coincidence.

[31] See for example Conquest, *Power and Policy*, especially chaps. 9–14.

[32] The time periods adopted here are 1955–1957; 1958–1960; 1961–1963; 1964; 1965–1967. The first three periods cover roughly "Khrushchev's rise," "Khrushchev's ascendancy," and "Khrushchev's time of troubles.' " The year 1964 is singled out for two reasons: it is a transitional year, but most importantly it is the year of the undoing of Khrushchev's bifurcation of the CPSU that led to 33 RSFSR first secretaries losing their jobs almost entirely as the result of this institutional change. The 1965–1967 period constituted the first part of the "Brezhnev-Kosygin era."

[33] Linden, *Khrushchev and the Soviet Leadership*, especially chaps. 1, 2.

[34] On the relationship of agricultural policy to leadership conflict see Sidney Ploss, *Conflict and Decision Making;* Linden, chap. 4; and Jerry Hough, "Enter N. S. Khrushchev," *Problems of Communism*, 13 (July-August, 1964), 28–33.

[35] Such data are generally published in the *oblast* press, however. A fuller test of these two models could be made by a future student willing to spend some time in the Lenin Library at Moscow collecting such data. Existing deficiencies in the biographic data could also be overcome in this manner. See Stewart, *Political Power*, pp. x–xi, on the use of the *oblast* press.

The weighted measure of food and clothing production is more complex. It combines the tenure-averaged growth rates of nine principal measures of agricultural and consumer oriented production. Included are cereal harvest, sown area of potatoes and vegetables, and total meat slaughtered; cotton, linen and wool cloth produced; and leather shoes manufactured and raw wood harvested. These measures are detailed in Appendix A. Each of these variables is weighted separately for each case by the average percentage of the RSFSR total produced by each *oblast* during each secretary's tenure. These weights make the growth rates accurately reflect the mean importance of each *oblast*'s output for the Russian republic as a whole. To the extent that performance criteria are relevant, a secretary will presumably be judged by meaningful growth rates in major products for which he is responsible more than by impressive growth rates for minor products under his supervision.[38] The final food and clothing index is created by adding the weighted growth rates and dividing by the number of indexed products produced in the region. This yields a single, weighted, tenure-averaged index of the growth rate of food and clothing production.

Barrington Moore, in his formulation of the rational-technical model, suggests indirectly that the degree of application of this model may vary with the level of economic development of the particular political system.[39] By implication, the application of patronage and rational-technical criteria within the Soviet Union may vary with the level of development of a region. In order to examine the possible interaction effects of differential development on the major variables in the two models, the RSFSR was divided into four regions by level of development. These divisions were made by combining the Lonsdale and Thompson weights and the agricultural weights (recalculated as rank orders) to yield four categories of *oblast*: important agricultural and industrial, primarily industrial, primarily agricultural, and undeveloped. Appendix C lists the *oblasti* included in each region and explains the criteria used to assign *oblasti* to a category.[40]

Some of the variance in mobility not explained by either of the two models may be attributed to what Moore calls traditionalism.[41] This concept stresses custom and precedent as standards. In a system emphasizing either political ties or rapid development it should occupy a quite minor position. Traditionalism is measured by the tenure attained by *oblast* Party first secretaries before they are removed. The *effect* of traditionalism is conceived as indicated by the strength of the relationship between tenure and mobility.

---

[36] Much of the analysis presented in the text was also done using only the growth rates for the last full calendar year completed by each secretary prior to leaving the position. Average figures are used in the present study on the assumption that at decision time, a man's overall record most probably forms the basis for both the direction and distance of his move, while the last year's performance probably is the source of the occasion for the decision about his future. See Stewart and Rich, *The Relationship of Economic Performance to Political Mobility of Soviet Middle-Level Elites* (Working Paper #4, *SEMPRA*, The Ohio State University, 1970), mimeo, for an analysis using "last-year" growth rates.

[37] Richard E. Lonsdale and John H. Thompson, "A Map of the USSR's Manufacturing," *Economic Geographic* 36 (January, 1960), pp. 36–52. The weights range from 8.20 for Moscow city to 0.05. The median *oblast* produced 0.65 per cent of the total USSR manufacturing. For a complete elaboration of the industrial and agricultural weights, see Stewart and Arnett, *Oblast Economic Profiles and the Political Mobility of Soviet Elites* (Working Paper #5, *SEMPRA,* The Ohio State University, 1970), mimeo. All of the "working papers" cited here are available upon request. For an earlier use of the Lonsdale data to study *obkom* elites, see Hodnett, "Obkom Secretaries."

[38] This assumption finds some indirect support in Hough, *The Soviet Prefects,* especially p. 296, but also see chaps. 14 and 11 and 3. Hough's phrase is fulfillment of the "basic missions." It is clear from his chapter 3 that the main component of this mission is economic growth.

[39] Barrington Moore, 188–190, 193.

[40] For a fuller elaboration of this measure, see Stewart and Arnett. For other efforts at examining the effects of region type upon politics, see Hough, *The Soviet Prefects,* chaps. 11–13, and Hodnett, "Obkom Secretaries."

[41] Moore, pp. 184–193, 222–226.

The concept of Party cohort reflects the theoretical significance of broad-gauged career group loyalties.[42] One can create a dichotomous variable on the basis of year of Party entrance, including in one group those who joined prior to the end of the great purges in 1938 and in a second those who entered after 1938. It then becomes possible to analyze the interaction effects on the two models of having served as a Party member throughout the worst period of Stalinist arbitrariness or having been invited into the Party only at the end or following the great purges.

Since the literature on career backgrounds of elites increasingly indicates that such variables as age, education, and occupational patterns have quite indirect effects, being modified significantly by events occuring near the time of those actions being studied (e.g., mobility decisions), the analysis of the impact of background on mobility is left to a separate study.[43]

Findings

This section reports the results of confronting the models described in the first section with the measures outlined in the second. After examining the explanatory power of the major components of each model for the period 1955–1967 as a whole, we consider in turn the effects on the model of variables measuring "regime," "policy conflict," "region," and "Party cohort." Attention is given to analyzing the interaction effects of each variable on the models and suggesting tentative interpretations rather than to constructing a new model to account for the joint effects of all these variables on mobility.[44]

Table 2. Regression Coefficients Between Political Mobility and Patronage, Rational-technical and Traditionalism Variables for the Years 1955–1963, 1965–1967[a]

	Political Mobility	
	No Control	Control[b]
Patronage Variables		
Politburo-Secretariat links	.27[c]	.19
Career group links	.33	.04
Rational-technical variables[d]		
Industrial performance	.19	.14
Food-clothing performance	−.08	.25
Traditionalism variable		
Tenure	.07	.05
Multiple R	.40	.33
Per cent of variance explained	16	11
Number of cases (N)	(124)	(83)

[a] Data for 1964 are deleted here to eliminate the effects of the unusually large number of demotions in that year attributable to the undoing of the bifurcation of the Party. The data on 1964 are analyzed separately below.

[b] The control used here consists of deleting those cases in which the position attained after leaving the *oblast* Party first secretaryship is unknown.

[c] The cell entries in the table are beta's calculated on transformed, standardized variables. See Appendix D for the transformations used on each variable.

[d] The terms "rational-technical variables" and "performance variables" are used interchangeably in the tables and text.

The beta coefficients reported in Table 2 reveal that no single major component of the models explains more than ten per cent of the variance in the mobility of *oblast* Party first secretaries over the period as a whole. When those individuals whose mobility is unknown but who are presumed to have been demoted (the "unknowns") are included, the patronage variables appear as the best overall predictors of mobility, accounting jointly for some 13 per cent of its total variance.[45] This relationship disappears almost entirely, however, when we consider only the individuals whose mobility is known. Using this control for known mobility,

---

[42] See Armstrong, *The Soviet Bureaucratic Elite*, p. 146, but especially his concept of the "men of '38."

[43] L. J. Edinger and D. D. Searing, "Social Background in Elite Analysis: A Methodological Inquiry," *The American Political Science Review*, 61 (June, 1967), 428–445. Two important analyses of the backgrounds of Soviet officials are George Fischer, *The Soviet System and Modern Society;* and Robert E. Blackwell, Jr., *Social Backgrounds of Political Leaders in the Soviet Union: An Analysis of the Obkom Leadership in the CPSU, 1950–1968* (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan, 1971). A systematic study of the relationship of background variables to such dependent variables as political mobility, level of development of *oblast* assignment, level of economic performance, and tenure while an *obkom* first secretary is currently being completed as a part of the Soviet Elite Mobility Project.

[44] Preliminary work on a causal model of Soviet political mobility, incorporating the variables in this study as well as background variables and such political behavior variables as participation and political communication, is now in progress as a part of this project.

[45] As indicated by stepwise regression analysis. For a discussion of the stepwise regression procedure, see N. R. Draper and H. Smith, *Applied Regression Analysis* (New York: Wiley, 1966), pp. 171–172.

Table 3. Regression Coefficients Between Political Mobility and Patronage, Rational-technical and Traditionalism Variables Controlling for Regime

	Political Mobility					
	1955–1957	1958–1960	1961–1963	1964		1965–1967
Patronage variables						
Politburo-Secretariat links	.35[c]	−.14	.45	−.45[a]	.44[b]	.10
Career group links	.45	−.33	−.16	−.24	.36	.17
Rational-technical variables						
Industrial performance	.24	.07	.20	−.26	.04	.16
Food-clothing performance	.45	.23	.33	−.61	.21	.22
Traditionalism variable						
Tenure	.17	−.43	.44	.07	.46	−.14
Multiple R	.60	.55	.85	.80	.54	.36
Per cent of variance explained	36	31	72	64	29	13
Number of cases (N)	(23)	(27)	(13)	(11)[d]	(24)[e]	(19)

[a] The entries in this column are for the secretaries who served in the agricultural sector during the bifurcation.

[b] The entries in this column are for the secretaries who served in the industrial sector during the bifurcation.

[c] The cell entries in the table are beta's calculated on transformed, standardized variables. Only those cases whose new positions are known are included, except as indicated.

[d] Includes 2 "unknowns" presumed demoted.

[e] Includes 8 "unknowns" presumed demoted.

we find that performance in food and clothing explains six per cent and the number of patron-client links explains an additional three per cent of the variance in mobility. While the most important conclusion may be the very large amount of variance *not* explained, it is worth noting that *both* the rational-technical and the patron-client models have some explanatory power across most of the post-Stalin era, irrespective of changes in regime or the effects of policy conflict and regional differences.

Table 3 displays the interaction effect of regime upon the explanatory power of the two models of mobility. The cutting points established for regimes correspond closely to those identified in the Kremlinological literature and, for our purposes, may be labeled as follows: 1955–1957, "Khrushchev's rise"; 1958–1960, "Khrushchev's ascendancy"; 1961–1963, "Khrushchev's 'time of troubles'"; 1964, "Year of transition and institutional change"; and 1965–1967, "Enter Brezhnev-Kosygin."[46]

Two conclusions emerge immediately from the table: (1) controlling for regime strikingly increases the total variance in mobility explained by each model; and (2) regime has a marked effect on the variance explained by each of the major variables comprising the models. Total variance explained ranges from only 13 per cent in the early Brezhnev-Kosygin era to a high of 72 per cent during "Khrushchev's 'time of troubles.' " These data suggest that while both models are of general relevance during the entire Khrushchev regime, some additional factors are affecting recruitment policies in the most recent period. The wide shifts in the explanatory power of individual variables in the models from regime to regime are the primary reason for the small amount of variance explained when the 1955–1967 period is taken as a whole.

During "Khrushchev's rise" more than one-quarter of the variance in mobility is accounted for by the joint effect of career group links and level of performance in food and clothing.[47] This finding is consistent both with the emphasis in the literature upon Khrushchev's skill in utilizing patronage to pack the Party bodies, especially the Central Committee, and with the stress in the Central Committee's resolutions at that time on the particular significance of raising the level of agricultural and consumer production.[48]

---

[46] While the period of Khrushchev's rise may appropriately be thought to extend from 1953–1957, because of data limitations for this study, discussion of this regime is restricted to the years 1955–1957. On "Khrushchev's rise," see Rush, *The Rise of Khrushchev*; on "Khrushchev's ascendancy," see Linden, *Khrushchev and the Soviet Leadership*, chaps. 2, 3, and also see Conquest, *Power and Policy*, chap. 14; on "Khrushchev's 'time of troubles' " see Linden, chaps. 6–9, and also Tatu, *Power in the Kremlin*, parts 1–3; on the "Transition" see Tatu, part 4, and Linden, chap. 10; and on the "Brezhnev-Kosygin era" see Tatu, part 5.

[47] As determined by stepwise regression. The partial beta's are .301 for career group links and .296 for food and clothing performance.

Two conclusions emerge clearly from the data on "Khrushchev's ascendancy" but the existing literature provides no good explanation for them. First, rational-technical variables explain almost none of the variance in mobility in precisely the period when the responsibility of the *oblast* Party committees for industry was supposed to have been greatly augmented by the abolition of the ministries and the establishment of the regional economic councils within the same borders as the *oblasti*.[49] Second, Politburo-Secretariat links and career-group links, far from being positively related to promotion, were in fact, negatively associated with career success. One speculative explanation is that during the period of his ascendancy, Khrushchev, in making decisions on mobility, sought to bring into the top leadership those secretaries from the Russian republic who had established few career contacts with either their fellow secretaries or with Politburo or Secretariat officials, while at the same time demoting those who had many ties with the "anti-party group" of Malenkov, Molotov, et al., or who had been in office for a considerable period and thus might be considered more difficult to win over to Khrushchev's own coalition.

The role of both patronage and performance variables already noted during "Khrushchev's rise" is quite similar to that observed during "Khrushchev's 'time of troubles' " During this latter period, too, both patronage and performance variables are important, with the patronage model accounting for nearly 42 per cent of the variance in mobility and the rational-technical model adding an additional 28 per cent (as determined by stepwise regression).

The mobility occurring during 1964 is explained almost entirely by the eliminating of Khrushchev's bifurcation of the Communist party.[50] Within the Russian republic, as the result of reuniting the agricultural and industrial regional Party organs into single Party committees, some 39 first secretaries had to be placed in other jobs.[51] The contrasting signs of the beta's for both of the models in the agricultura and industrial sectors suggest strongly that mobility decisions affecting the former followed quite different rules from those affecting the latter.

The most obvious difference is in the relative number of secretaries removed in each sector. Although during the bifurcation there were an equal number of industrial and agricultural *oblast* Party committees, more than twice as many industrial secretaries were removed from the first secretaryship. Armstrong sees this fact as evidence of the tendency of the agriculturally oriented secretaries to dominate the Party apparatus.[52] However, the very strong *negative* relationship of *both* agricultural performance (which alone accounts for more than 37 per cent of the variance in mobility of this group) and Politburo-Secretariat links (accounting for an additional 20 per cent of variance) suggests that both the well-connected and the high performers in the agricultural sector suffered as a result of this institutional change.[53] On the other hand, while a larger number of industrial secretaries was affected, the direction and distance of their mobility is most fully predicted by the measure of traditionalism and precedent—tenure.[54] Fourteen of the sixteen industrial secretaries whose new positions are known simply moved to the position of second secretary.

In the Brezhnev-Kosygin era the patterns evident during "Krushchev's rise" and "Khrushchev's 'time of troubles' " tend to re-emerge, but the strength of the relationships is considerably weaker. Patronage variables account for only 3.5 per cent while performance variables explain some 7.5 per cent of the variance in mobility during this regime. Since the two models of mobility explain less variance in this regime than in any of the others examined, it may be useful to consider several additional tentative explanations of mobility in this period.

---

[48] On patronage during the period, see Conquest, chaps. 11 and 12. On the significance of agricultural policy, see Ploss, *Conflict and Decision-Making*. The Central Committee plenum resolutions of the period are reported in *Spravochnik Partiinogo Rabotnika* (*Handbook of a Party Worker*) (Moskva: Gospolitizdat, 1957) hereafter cited as *Spravochnik*, pp. 101–130, also pp. 131–248.

[49] *Spravochnik*, pp. 112–119. On relations between the *oblast* Party first secretaries and the regional economic councils, see Stewart, *Political Power*, pp. 114–117; and Hough, *The Soviet Prefects*, especially p. 104.

[50] For a detailed analysis, see Armstrong, "Party Bifurcation."

[51] The Central Committee plenum resolution ending the bifurcation is reported in *Spravochnik* (1966), pp. 100–101.

[52] Armstrong, "Party Bifurcation."

[53] That the high performers and the well-connected were probably different people is suggested by the correlation of .19 between food-clothing performance and Politburo-Secretariat links.

[54] Because of the high correlation between tenure and Politburo-Secretariat links (.75), in a stepwise regression the latter variable adds only about 3 per cent to the 21 per cent of the variance explained by the former variable. On the problem of multicollinearity, see Hubert M. Blalock, Jr., "Correlated Independent Variables: The Problem of Multicollinearity," in Edward Tufte, ed., *The Quantitative Analysis of Social Problems* (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1970); see also R. A. Gordon, "Issues in Multiple Regression," *American Journal of Sociology*, 73 (March, 1968), 592–616.

The Brezhnev-Kosygin regime is generally conceived as maintained by a delicate balance of contending groups formed into several relatively large coalitions. One result of the effort to maintain this coalitional structure may be de facto limitations on the number of officials demoted, irrespective of performance. Now, although the twenty-one first secretaries moved in this period is exactly the average for all regimes in the post-Stalin era, the distribution of mobility scores is skewed toward the high side of the scale. Fifteen were promoted, three transferred to other first-secretaryships, one was demoted to the post of ordinary *obkom* (regional Party committee) secretary, and the new positions of two others are unknown but presumed to be demotions. This finding is particularly striking when it is also observed that in only six cases did those promoted achieve an industrial performance index score above the mean of all incumbents as of 1968. The corresponding number of above-average performers on the food-clothing index is four.

A second consequence of a delicate balance of power may be the need to distribute rewards, such as promotions, in some relationship to the strength of groups within the ruling coalitions. While an adequate measure of patronage doubtless would provide more systematic evidence of the significance of this variable, existing data on promotions in the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime tentatively suggest that this may indeed constitute an important aspect of an explanation of mobility in the post-Khrushchev era. Armstrong has persuasively demonstrated that one of the more formidable groupings in the Party is composed of those who served as agricultural first secretaries during the bifurcation of the Party. It was against this group, according to Armstrong, that the Party bifurcation was directed in 1962, and it was doubtless this threat to their careers that inclined them to support the Brezhnev-Kosygin coup.[55] While it is true that some of the well-connected and high performers among the agricultural secretaries were demoted in 1964, eight agricultural secretaries, more than half of all those promoted in the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime, were rewarded with more responsible positions by the new regime reflecting payments of political debts.

A further possible explanation of mobility, and one not so dependent upon assumptions about the structure of power under Brezhnev-Kosygin, may involve the effects of a conscious effort by the Brezhnev-Kosygin leadership to develop economically competent generalists—men with both specialist and managerial experience. In this case, the desire to provide officials with experience in varied types of work may become a more important consideration in promotions than either patronage or recent economic performance. While it is difficult to find actual promotions among Party secretaries that could *not* be considered as potentially expanding the breadth of their experience and their managerial competence, several features of the promotions in the post-Khrushchev period suggest that this variable should not be ruled out. First, the new positions of those promoted correspond roughly, in terms of policy area, to the Party secretaries' backgrounds. Six of eight agricultural secretaries gained new positions either directly or indirectly connected with agriculture, and all of those promoted who had had previous experience either as secretaries in major industrial regions or as enterprise managers acquired posts in industrial ministries or departments. Second, most of the new positions gained may be considered as "training grounds" for high level executives. Nine of the new positions are either at the RSFSR level as minister or at the USSR level as deputy minister or deputy chairman.

Additional evidence of how much the desire to provide increased training may constitute an explanatory variable in mobility decisions in the post-Stalin era as a whole is provided by an analysis of transfers, the lateral reassignment of a first secretary from one region to another. Such transfers may be inferred to have been motivated by a desire to broaden Party officials' competence when: (1) the transfer is from an economically less developed to a more developed region, (2) the "trainee" is less experienced than the average secretary, or (3) the economic performance of the "trainee" prior to his transfer is near or above the average. Moving into an economically more developed region with its wider variety and potentially more significant economic and political problems may provide both broadening experiences for the secretary and better opportunities for the leadership to test the capabilities of potentially upwardly mobile officials. The training motivation for mobility would appear to be more appropriate with respect to younger, less experienced officials who nevertheless have already demonstrated some capacity for performance.

Of 224 instances of mobility in this study, 22 may be classified as transfers. Of these, 17 involved transfers to *oblasti* more economically developed than the previous assignment. The mean level of development of the *oblasti* from which "trainees' were transferred is about 88 per cent below the average for the Russian republic, while the "new" *oblasti* are just about at the republic average. Although the average length of Party membership prior to transfer for these trainees is just at the mean for all cases in the study (21.6 years), it is about one-half year less than the mean for all transfers and nearly two years less than those secretaries transferred to less developed regions. The average economic performance of trainees is considerably below the mean for all secretaries in the study. The mean scores for all cases are 10.3 and 42.3 on the industrial and food-clothing indices, respectively, whereas the corresponding scores for trainees are 5.5 and 8.3. This suggests that "good" performance is probably not a significant factor in the selection of secretaries for assignment to more developed regions. The differences in the means for the two patronage variables, however, are sufficient to suggest that both Politburo-Secretariat ties and career group links are associated positively with the selection of trainees. The average number of Politburo-Secretariat ties and career group links respectively are 1.82 and 7.82 as compared to the mean scores for all cases of 1.3 and 5.4. This evidence, then, suggests that trainees tend to be selected from among those secretaries who, while slightly less experienced and considerably less productive economically than the average, have substantially more political connections.

---

[55] Armstrong, "Party Bifurcation."

Transfers are made not only for training but for troubleshooting. The "troubleshooter" would probably be a more experienced secretary who is sent from a more developed region to strengthen the leadership of a less developed region that may be in serious trouble economically. Kaganovich is frequently cited as an example of a successful trouble-shooter under the Stalin regime. Of the twenty-two transfers in this study, five moved from more to less developed regions. The mean length of Party membership prior to transfer is 23.4 years for trouble-shooters as compared with 21.1 years for all cases, tending to support the conception of this type as possessing greater than average experience. The economic performance of the regions to which trouble-shooters were assigned was, on the average, considerably below the average for all transfers. The mean industrial performance score for all regions is 10.31 as compared with a score of 4.67 for those regions to which trouble-shooters were dispatched. Th corresponding scores on the food-clothing index are 42.3 and 14.2. During their tenure while the trouble-shooters on the average managed to double the growth rate of product measured on the food and clothing index, average industrial performance fell slightly. Thi finding suggests the appropriateness of furthe analysis of the several motivations for transfe decisions, particularly with respect to the stud of the backgrounds of those transferred.

It is not possible to estimate the amount o additional variance in mobility in the Brezhnev-Kosygin era that these tentatively suggested variables may explain, and it is highly probable that these variables have had some significance in each regime. Nevertheless, the greatly reduced explanatory power of the patronage and performance models in the post-Khrushchev period suggests that variables such as these may become increasingly important in more adequate models of Soviet political mobility. In summary, the interaction of regime with patronage and performance variables is an important source of variation in the explanatory power of the two models of political mobility. One of the characteristics of regimes that may lead to this interaction effect is political conflict over domestic policy among the leadership.

The impact of political conflict within the leadership on the explanatory power of the patron-client and rational-technical models of mobility is displayed in Table 4. The role of political conflict is measured in terms of this question: How much of the year-to-year *variation* in the *relationship* of patronage and performance variables to mobility is attributable to changes in the *degree* or *intensity* of policy conflict over domestic issues? Operationally this question may be phrased as follows: How much of the year-to-year variance in the size and sign of the beta coefficients between political mobility and each major variable in the two models can be explained by each of the two principal indicators of the state of the domestic economy: the annual growth rate of industrial output and the annual growth rate of the harvest of all cereal crops (both measured as percentage change over the previous year for the RSFSR as a whole)? While an adequate validity study has yet to be undertaken, an underlying working hypothesis that the state of the economy at any given time inversely affects both the probability of leadership conflict and its intensity appears in several major studies of leadership politics.[56]

---

[56] A validity study of this construct of political conflict is currently in progress as a part of this project. For several major studies of leadership politics where

Table 4. Pearsonian Correlation Coefficients Showing the Amount of Variance in the Relationship of the Major Variables to Mobility Explained by Political Conflict Variables[a]

	Political Mobility				
	1955–1967	1955–1957	1958–1960	1961–1963	1964–1967
Politburo-Secretariat links					
Growth rate industry[b]	−.35	−.23	−.53	−.28	−.94
Growth rate cereal harvest[b]	.22	—[c]	.17	−.22	.54
Career group links					
Growth rate industry	−.07	.99	−.83	.55	−.76
Growth rate cereal harvest	.23	—[c]	.80	.60	−.27
Industrial performance					
Growth rate industry	.09	−.85	−.73	.60	.73
Growth rate cereal harvest	.19	—[c]	.85	.55	−.55
Food-clothing performance					
Growth rate industry	.44	.58	.25[d]	.13[e]	.11
Growth rate cereal harvest	.24	—[c]	−.92[d]	.58[e]	.45

[a] The cell entries are Pearson product-moment correlation coefficients between the following dependent and independent variables: the dependent variable is the beta coefficient of mobility and each of the four major variables calculated separately, and for each year; the independent variables are the yearly growth rates of the cereal harvest and industry respectively.

[b] The growth rate figures used in both policy conflict variables are measured as percentage change from the previous year. The figures are calculated from *Narodnoe Khoziastvo RSFSR* (Moskva: Tsentral'noe Statisticheskoe Upravlenie), vols. 1958–1968.

[c] The correlation for 1955–1957 with the cereal harvest could not be calculated because the cereal harvest figures for the 1954–1957 period as reported in the source are averaged.

[d] The cell entries are calculated for the period 1958–1962 to show the persistence of this relationship for the five year period.

[e] These cell entries are calculated for the period 1963–1967 to point up the effect of the 1963 data in reversing the explanatory power of the two conflict variables.

What the correlation coefficients in Table 4 display, then, is *not* the strength in the relationship of patronage and performance to mobility but the degree to which two measures of policy conflict explain variations in those relationships.[57]

For the 1955 to 1967 period as a whole, two relationships stand out: There is a slight tendency for increases in the growth rate of industry to be associated with decreases in the relationship of Politburo-Secretariat links to political mobility. A moderately strong tendency is indicated for increases in the growth rate of industry to be positively related to increases in the degree to which performance in food and clothing explains variance in mobility. The *consistency* in the *direction* of the relationship of political conflict (measured by changes in the growth rate of industry) to the role of Politburo-Secretariat links in mobility decisions, in spite of variations in *strength,* suggests an interpretation consistent with Barrington Moore's formulation of the rational-technical model. Namely, the higher the growth rate of industry the less important patronage becomes to mobility decisions.[58] Indeed, for the Brezhnev-Kosygin era more than 88 per cent of the variance in high-level patronage and nearly 58 per cent of the effect of career group linkages on mobility is explained by variance in the level of political conflict, as measured by the growth rate of industry.

Both the direction and to a lesser degree the strength of the relationship of political conflict to the explanatory power of the rational-technical model vary sharply with regime, although the precise regime boundaries do not always match the previously specified cutting points.

During "Khrushchev's rise" and his "ascendancy" there is a very strong relationship between decreases in the growth rate of industry and increases in the variance in mobility accounted for by industrial performance. (The relationship, of course, is transitive but the for-

---

this concept appears as an underlying working hypothesis, see Tatu, *Power in the Kremlin,* pp. 114–122; Linden, *Khrushchev and the Soviet Leadership,* especially pp. 58–70; also note Ploss, *Conflict and Decision-Making.*

[57] The annual figures on which these calculations are based are reported in Appendix E.

[58] Moore, *Terror and Progress,* pp. 188–193, but especially pp. 224.

mulation given is consistent with the predominant trend during his period.) This finding suggests that during these two regimes one response to decreasing industrial growth rates was to increase the significance of level of industrial performance in mobility decisions, while reducing its significance whenever industrial growth showed an upward trend. In "Khrushchev's 'time of troubles'" and especially during the "Brezhnev-Kosygin era" this relationship becomes exactly reversed. A similar shift is likewise apparent in the relationship of conflicts engendered by variation in the cereals harvest to the explanatory power of performance in the food and clothing sector. From the defeat of the anti-Party group in mid-1957 right up to the bifurcation of the Party in late 1962, more than 80 per cent of the variance in the relationship of food and clothing production to mobility is explained by the growth rate of the cereal harvest. Again, the worse the harvest, the greater the importance of agricultural and light-industrial production to mobility. From 1963 to 1967, however, the direction of the relationship is reversed, although it is less than half as strong. While no fully convincing explanation of this change is readily apparent it does suggest the utility of further analysis of the concepts of regime and policy conflict as explanatory factors in political recruitment.

When a control for level of economic development is introduced into the analysis of patron-client and rational-technical models of development, as displayed in Table 5, Barrington Moore's general thesis that as the level of development increases, political decision making based upon considerations of power gradually gives way to decision processes based upon rational-technical criteria is shown to have some validity *within* the Soviet Union. When the post-Stalin era is analyzed as a whole, the most important variable in each region is essentially that predicted by applying Moore's proposition to different levels of development within the Russian republic. In the least developed *oblasti* evidence of links with Politburo-Secretariat members explains more than 14 per cent of the variance in mobility.[59] In those *oblasti* with a

Table 5. Regression Coefficients Between Political Mobility and Patronage, Rational-technical and Traditionalism Variables, Controlling for Level of Development

	Political Mobility			
	Unimportant oblasti	Agricultural oblasti	Industrial oblasti	Mixed oblasti[a]
Patronage variables				
Politburo-Secretariat links	.37[b]	.10[c]	.07	.19
Career group links	.04	.59	.02	−.15
Rational-technical variables				
Industrial performance	.13	.60	.32	.06
Food-clothing performance	.08	.73	.20	.26
Traditionalism variable				
Tenure	.18	.60	−.12	−.24
Multiple R	.44	.87	.37	.54
Per cent of variance explained	19	76	13	30
Number of cases (N)	(23)	(7)	(23)	(30)

[a] Mixed *oblasti* include those important in *both* agriculture and industry. The *oblasti* are grouped on the basis of the relative contribution of each to total USSR industrial output as of 1956, and to total Russian republic agricultural output by major product in 1961. See Appendix C for a complete listing of *oblasti* and the indicators used to place each in a group.

[b] The cell entries in the table are beta's calculated on transformed, standardized variables. Only those cases whose new positions are known are included. All cases from 1964 are excluded to eliminate the effects of institutional change.

[c] In a separate analysis, including the data for 1964 and raising the number of cases in the agricultural *oblasti* to 16, the only significant changes were to raise the beta for Politburo-Secretariat links from .10 to .40 and to reduce the beta's for agriculture. Thus the beta's for agricultural *oblasti* fairly accurately reflect underlying relationships irrespective of the small number of cases.

---

[59] A potentially significant intervening variable in the analysis of the unimportant *oblasti* is the geographic location of seven of these regions on the Soviet Union's frontiers with other countries—significant because of the great emphasis the Soviet Union places on the security of its borders and the correspondingly large role likely to be played by both regular and border forces within these regions. Under these conditions it is probable that our measures of performance are unrelated to mobility decisions in the border areas. To the extent that this assumption is valid, it may be anticipated that the actual significance of performance variables in the nonborder unimportant *oblasti* may be somewhat higher than indicated by

ghly developed agriculture but no significant
dustry, while both career group links and in-
strial performance are significant, perfor-
ance in food and clothing explains more than
lf of the variance in mobility.[60] Although the
ta for industrial performance in those regions
ith a highly developed industry but little ex-
nsive agriculture is modest (.32), its relative
portance tends to support the basic argu-
ent. While the data on the most highly devel-
ped *oblasti* tend to follow the predicted pat-
rn for the variables of food-clothing perfor-
ance and career group links, the slight in-
ease in the explanatory role of Politburo-Sec-
tariat links and the negative relationship of
nure to mobility are suggestive of the com-
lexity of decisions about the careers of those
charge of the regions most capable of power-
lly affecting the capacity of any leadership to
chieve its basic economic objectives.

The time during which those who served as
blast Party first secretaries in the post-Stalin
ra received their early training as Party mem-
ers (i.e., whether they experienced as Party
ctivists the collectivization and early industri-
lization drives in addition to the two great
urges of 1934–1936 and 1937–1938, or
hether they entered the Party only after this
omplex time) influences both the *magnitude*
nd *direction* of the relationship of career
roup links to mobility. For the post-1938 co-
ort, career group links are negatively related
o mobility, while Politburo-Secretariat links
re positively (and somewhat more strongly)
elated to mobility than for the pre-1938 co-
ort. But for the pre-1938 cohort, in contrast, career group links are positively related to upward mobility and explain 16 per cent of the variance in career distance and direction after leaving the *oblast* first secretaryship. One explanation for these differences may be the possible development of a relatively greater sense of cohesiveness and identity as a group among those who not only grew up in the Party when it was a relatively small and elite institution but who also served and survived through the Party's most difficult years.[61]

Table 6. Regression Coefficients Between Political Mobility and Patronage, Rational-technical and Traditionalism Variables, Controlling for Party Cohort

	Political Mobility	
	Pre-1938	Post-1938
Patronage variables		
Politburo-Secretariat links	.24[a]	.26
Career group links	.40	−.21
Rational-technical variables		
Industrial performance	.14	.16
Food-clothing performance	.14	.17
Traditionalism variable		
Tenure	−.01	−.15
Multiple R	.53	.71
Per cent of variance explained	28	50
Number of cases (N)	(29)[b]	(18)

[a] The cell entries in the table are beta's calculated on transformed, standardized variables.

[b] Two kinds of cases are excluded from this analysis: those from 1964, to eliminate the effects of institutional change, and those whose new positions are unknown. A number of additional cases were deleted because of missing data on date of Party entrance.

Conclusions and Implications

The results of this partial test of the patron-client and rational-technical models of Soviet elite mobility may now be summarized and the implications of the findings for theories of Soviet politics assessed.

General Conclusions. (1) For the post-Stalin era as a whole, the variables central to each model fail to explain most of the variance in Party elite mobility. When the most reliable data on political mobility are used, the major components of the rational-technical model explain 6 per cent of the variance, while an addi-

---

he data in Table 5. To test this assumption the vari-
bles in the models were regressed against mobility for
he unimportant regions, excluding those that share
orders with other countries. (The excluded *oblasti*
re indicated by an asterisk in Appendix C.) To the
xtent that one would expect the explanatory power of
erformance variables to increase when the border
egions are excluded, the assumption is not supported
y the data. The beta's for the industrial and food-
lothing indices drop from .13 to —.09 and from .08
o —.16 respectively. A marked change does occur,
owever, in the variance explained by the patronage
ariables. The beta for Politiburo-Secretariat links
rop from .04 to —.59. These findings suggest that
lthough the general interpretation of the intervening
ffects of level of development on mobility is not al-
ered by controlling for the impact of the military in
order regions, for the nonborder unimportant *oblasti*
xtensive career group ties tend to be strongly associ-
ted with downward mobility, whereas Politburo-
ecretariat links are only weakly associated with up-
ward mobility.

[60] The problem of multicollinearity is again evident
ere. The two patronage variables are correlated .76,
nd the food-clothing index is correlated .85 with ca-
reer group links.

[61] For a systematic analysis of "groupism" in the Soviet Union, see Milton Lodge, *Soviet Elite Attitudes Since Stalin* (Columbus: Merrill, 1969), especially chap. 3. Also see Philip D. Stewart, "Soviet Interest Groups and the Policy Process: The Repeal of Production Education," *World Politics*, 22 (October, 1969), 29–50; and Armstrong, "Party Bifurcation."

tional 3 per cent is accounted for by the principal variables of the patron-client model.

(2) A significant amount of the variance in elite mobility *is* explained by each model when the interaction effects of "regime," "policy conflict," "level of economic development," and "party cohort" on the relationship of the major variables in each model to mobility are controlled.

The Effects of Regime. (a) During "Khrushchev's 'time of troubles,'" both models explain a fair proportion of the variance in mobility, but they differ in both absolute and relative explanatory power. In the first regime more than 25 per cent of the variance is accounted for by the joint effect of both models, with the beta's being roughly equal for each model. In the second regime the patron-client model accounts for nearly 42 per cent and the rational-technical model for an additional 28 per cent of the variance in elite mobility.

(b) The fact that the patronage and performance variables account for only 3.5 and 7.5 per cent of the variance respectively during the "Brezhnev-Kosygin era" is tentatively explained as due to the intervening effects of (1) the delicate balance of power among the contending groups forming the ruling coalition, and (2) a conscious policy of the Party to facilitate the development of more competent generalists within the secondary ranks of the leadership.

(c) In "Khrushchev's ascendancy," when the literature suggests that Party responsibility for industry should have been at its height, rational-technical variables explain almost none of the variance in mobility. This is partially explained by the inverse relationship of political conflict related to the growth of industry and the explanatory power of rational-technical variables. Unexpectedly, patronage was negatively related to career success in this regime.

(d) During the undoing of the Party bifurcation both agricultural performance and high-level patronage were strongly *negatively* related to the mobility of former agricultural secretaries, while tenure most fully accounts for mobility in the former industrial sector.

The Effects of Political Conflict. (a) For the 1955–1967 period as a whole, *increases* in the growth rate of industry are weakly related to *decreases* in the explanatory power of the patronage model; but the growth rate of industry is moderately and positively associated with increases in the amount of variance accounted for by the rational-technical model.

(b) Both the direction and strength of the relationship of political conflict to the explan tory power of the rational-technical model va sharply with regime.

The Effects of Level of Development. (a) Wit in the Russian republic, as level of econom development increases, the patronage mod tends to explain less and the performan model tends to account for more of the var ance in mobility.

(b) The complexity of politics in the mo highly industrialized and agriculturally d veloped regions is suggested by the finding th both models account for some variance b neither explains very much in these *oblasti*.

The Effects of Party Cohort. (a) "Career grou links" is the only variable significantly affecte by this control.

(b) Career group links are moderately an positively associated with mobility for the pr 1938 cohort, but negatively and weakly relate to mobility for the post-1938 cohort.

Further Implications. Some implications fo theories of the Soviet political process may no be suggested. It is a basic thesis of theories o totalitarianism that by the use of his patronag powers, the First Secretary may dominate th Party apparatus and then move to a positio of unchallengeable power.[62] Two proposition are easily derived from this thesis: (1) a significant amount of the variance in elite mo bility in periods of struggle for successio should be explained by measures of politica patronage; and (2) once a leader is "unchallengeable" political conflict among the leadership should have little relationship to varianc in the explanatory power of either patronag or performance models. The findings of thi study suggest, although not conclusively, tha while patronage is relevant to succession struggles, its significance is probably overestimated This is indicated by the modest amount o variance explained by either patronage o rational-technical variables in the 1955–196 period and the even smaller amount accounte for by these variables in the first three year under Brezhnev-Kosygin; the amount is especially small in comparison to the large amoun of variance explained by patronage betwee 1961 and 1963, when the leader was widel regarded as "unchallengeable." With respect t the second proposition, the very strong relationship between the measures of political conflict used here and variation in the explanator ower of the two models tends to disconfirm ie hypothesis. At the same time, this evidence rovides some confirmation of the alternative, erived from Kremlinological theories that the itensity of political conflict may affect the cri-ria applied in recruitment decisions.

---

[62] Fainsod, *How Russia is Ruled*, especially pp. 120–121.

A further proposition that may be derived rom Kremlinological theories, stressing the oughly equal significance of patronage and olicy success as instruments in maintaining as vell as acquiring power,[63] is the following: with ome variations, the overall significance of pa-ronage and rational-technical variables should e roughly equal in elite mobility decisions. he data, however, suggest that sharp varia-ions in the relative importance of these vari-bles occur when one controls either for regime r level of development.

The findings of this study tend to confirm artially the basic proposition of the theory of ffective development administration—i.e., as olitical development increases, so does the ten-lency to replace political by performance crite-ia in mobility decisions. The evidence for the igriculturally important regions and the indus-rially important regions provides the strongest upport, but the modest amount of total vari-ince explained by the rational-technical model uggests the need for further development of his theory to account more fully for other vari-ibles.

This brief confrontation of theory and data ias not been aimed at fundamentally question-ng current theories of Soviet politics. Rather ts underlying intent is to suggest that the inter-olay of theory and rigorous, systematic testing of models may contribute significantly to ad-vancing our understanding of the complex pat-terns that constitute the Soviet political process.

Appendix A. On the Measures

On Mobility Scores for Ambassadors. Stewart concluded in an earlier work (*Political Power*, pp. 172–174), that the move from *oblast* Party first secretary to USSR Ambassador represented only a transfer. But analytic clarity is gained by conceptualizing only a move to another *oblast* first secretaryship as a transfer, and on the basis of evidence considered below regarding a first secretary's move to ambassador, this position is more appropriately thought of as a promotion. The procedure adopted to clarify this question was to examine the lists of USSR ambassadors published in the biographical yearbooks for 1961–62, 1965–66, and 1968 and comparing those who had previously served as first secretaries with all other ambassadors in terms of two factors: Central Committee membership, and the type of countries to which they were assigned. The evidence is as follows:

(1) While very few ambassadors are accorded full membership in the Central Committee, about half of the full members in this group are former *oblast* first secretaries. As of 1960, out of 63 ambassadors only 9 were full members and of these, five were former first secretaries. In both 1965 and 1968 there were 89 ambassadors; in 1965 these included 10 full members of whom 4 were former first secretaries; in 1968 there were 10 full members of whom 6 were first secretaries.

(2) With few exceptions, ambassadors who are former first secretaries are assigned to Communist countries, but especially to Eastern Europe. The significance obviously attached to these assignments by the Soviet leadership is evidenced by the fact that from 60 to 80 per cent of the ambassadors accorded full membership in the Central Committee are assigned to Communist countries. This doubtless is reflective of the important role the Soviet ambassador plays in the politics of other Communist countries.

These two considerations tend to justify considering the move to ambassador as a promotion relative to the position of *obkom* first secretary. That is, this move appears to provide him with greater opportunities for access to significant national decision-making processes.

On Patronage

Those persons in the study who were "paired" in geographic-temporal proximity with either an *obkom* first secretary or a Politburo-Secretariat member in Leningrad city, Moscow city and Moscow *oblast* are not included as cases in the patronage variables as compiled for this study. Two factors recommended this decision: (1) the total number of pairings in these cities is greater than those for the rest of the Russian republic: inclusion of all these cases would considerably weaken the assumptions and plausibility of the measure; and, (2) the biases introduced by geographical pairing in these regions can probably be overcome in a later study in which patronage ties are measured on the basis of affiliation in the same or interacting institutions. For a full elaboration of the measures of patronage used here, see Stewart and Schopmeyer, *Personal Affiliations and Political Mobility In Soviet Politics* (Working Paper #3, *SEMPRA*, The Ohio State University, 1970), mimeo. Information on the Research Archive is available upon request from the senior author.

---

[63] Linden, chap. 1, especially pp. 12–13.

On the Index of Industrial Performance

This index is calculated from indices of industrial output by *oblast* reported in the official Soviet statistical handbook, *Narodnoe Khoziastvo RSFSR* (*The National Economy of the RSFSR*) (Moskva: Tsentral'noe Statisticheskoe Upravlenie), vols. 1958–1968. The definition of industrial output reported in the text is that provided in the above handbook. Since the source altered the base year of its index (from 1950 for the years 1953–1961, to 1960 for 1961–1968) it was necessary to convert the index into a single base year index. This was done for the base year 1960 by simple linear interpolation based upon the ratio of the 1950 base-year index to the 1960 base-year index for the only year in which figures were reported on both bases—1961. This ratio was then used to complete the conversion. This 1960 base year index was then transformed into a percentage change annual index according to the formula "quantity for year N+1, minus quantity for year N, divided by the quantity for year N." For a full elaboration of this procedure and of alternative measures of performance, see Stewart and Rich, *The Relationship of Economic Performance to Political Mobility of Soviet Middle-Level Elites* (Working Paper #4, *SEMPRA*, The Ohio State University, 1970), mimeo.

On the Index of Agricultural Performance

The cereals harvest and meat measures tap the growth of two major "commercial" crops. Potatoes and vegetables are two basic "sustenance" crops. Raw wood harvested measures the principal economic activity of several *oblasti*. Cloth and leather shoe production are used as indicators of level of concern for consumer welfare. Each of these variables was calculated from data reported in *Narodnoe Khoziastvo RSFSR*. The raw data sources and the calculated variables are as follows: (1) cereal crops harvest in tons (including all grains plus corn): percentage change per year in cereal crops harvest; (2) total meat (all categories) in tons: percentage change per year in total meat produced; (3) sown area of potatoes: percentage change per year in sown area of potatoes; (4) sown area of vegetables (including legumes): percentage change per year in sown area of vegetables; (5) running meters of cloth produced (by type—cotton, wool, and linen): percentage change per year in running meters of cloth produced; (6) leather shoes produced (pairs): percentage change per year in leather shoes produced; (7) wood carted out (cubic meters): percentage change per year in wood carted out. Growth rates for potatoes and vegetables are measured by growth in the sown area since only these figures are available by *oblast*. It is assumed, however, that productivity of the two crops is fairly constant and that changes i sown area are roughly proportional to changes i actual harvests. For a full elaboration of the variables and of other alternative variables use in earlier analyses. see Stewart and Rich.

Appendix B. Positions and Codes as Scored on Mobility Index.

Code = 9

All-Union Party Positions:

- First Secretary
- Full Member of Politburo (Presidium)
- Chairman Central Committee Bureau for th RSFSR

All-Union Government Positions:

- President, Chairman of the Presidium of USS Supreme Soviet
- Chairman of All-Union Council of Ministers

Code = 8

All-Union Party Positions

- Second Secretary and Secretaries of the CPS
- Candidate Member of Politburo
- Chairman, Party Control Commission

All-Union Government Positions:

- 1st Deputy Chairman All-Union Council o Ministers

Code = 7

All-Union Party Positions:

- Deputy Chairman Party Control Commissio

Union-Republic Party Positions:

- First Secretary
- First Deputy Chairman Central Committe Bureau for RSFSR
- Deputy Chairman of Central Committe Bureau for RSFSR

All-Union Government Positions

- Deputy Chairman All-Union Council of Ministers
- Minister of the USSR
- Chairman USSR State Committee or Commission

Code = 6

All-Union Party Positions:

- Central Committee Department Head
- Editor, Central Party Press Organ

Union-Republic Party Positions:

- Second Secretary of Republic Central Com mittee

Full Member Central Committee Bureau for the RSFSR
Chairman Republic Party-State Control Committee

All-Union Government Positions

USSR Ambassador
Deputy USSR Minister
Deputy Chairman USSR State Committee or Commission

Union-Republic Government Positions:

Chairman Presidium Republic Supreme Soviet
Chairman, First Deputy Chairman RSFSR Council of Ministers
Chairman, First Deputy Chairman Ukraine Council of Ministers
Member, RSFSR or Ukraine Council of Ministers Presidium
"Significant" RSFSR Minister

Code = 5

Oblast Party Committee First Secretary

Code = 4

All-Union Party Positions:

Chairman Central Auditing Commission
Central Committee "official" (title not known), CC Party Organizer, CC instructor, "Executive Party Worker"

Union-Republic Party Positions:

Candidate Member Presidium
Department Head, Official, Party Organizer, Instructor, Executive Party Worker
Deputy Chairman Party-State Control Commission

Lower Party Organs Positions:

Secretary *Oblast* Party Committee
Gorkom, Autonomous *Oblast*, or *Okrug* first secretary
Executive Party Worker (level not known)

All-Union Government Positions:

All not listed above

Union-Republic Government Positions:

All not listed above
Oblast Soviet Executive Committee Chairman
Chairman Council of the National Economy (1957–64) (*oblast* level)

Code = 3

First Secretary City or Rural District Party Committee
Second Secretary City Party Committee, Autonomous *Oblast*, or National *Okrug* Party Committee

Local Government Positions:

Other *Oblast* Executive Committee Post
Chairman City, etc. Soviet Executive Committee Administrative Post in Education
Higher Party School Student
Director, Head, Chief of Enterprise, *Kombinat*, etc.
Other *Sovnarkhoz* position not listed above

Code = 2

Other Party Post not listed above except in Primary Party Organization
First Secretary Primary Party Organization

Local Government Positions:

Chairman City or Rural District Soviet Executive Committee
Teacher: Elementary through Higher Education

Code = 1

Other Primary Party Organization Post
Other Urban or Rural District Executive Committee Post
Student

Code = 0

Position Following *Oblast* Party Committee First Secretaryship is Unknown, or *Obkom* First Secretary removed by retirement, illness or death.

Appendix C. Oblasti by Level of Economic Development

A fourfold classification scheme was devised to classify *oblasti* by level of economic development. Its general form is as follows:

	Low Industrial	High Industrial
High Agricultural	Agriculturally Important	Agriculturally and Industrially Important
Low Agricultural	Undeveloped	Industrially Important

The following criteria were used to establish the cutoff points on the agricultural dimension. The rank order of each *oblast* in 1961 within the RSFSR was calculated for the following variables: (1) cereal harvest, (2) wheat harvest, (3) sown area of potatoes, (4) sown area of vegetables, and (5) total meat produced in tons, dead weight. 1961 was chosen as the year for the rankings used since upon examination of the ranks calculated for each year, from 1953 to 1967, there were few significant changes from year to year and 1961 constitutes about the mid-point of the study. The *oblasts* were then divided into two groups by including in the "important" group those that ranked in or near the top 10 on two or more variables. All others were included in the unimportant category. Together, these *oblasti*, comprising 31 percent of the RSFSR *oblasti* produced:

60 per cent of RSFSR cereal harvest
71 per cent of RSFSR wheat harvest
26.6 per cent of RSFSR potatoes (sown area)
38.8 per cent of RSFSR vegetables (sown area)
33 per cent of RSFSR meat

The low percentages of potatoes and vegetables was expected because production of these two commodities is widely dispersed throughout al the *oblasti*. See Robert C. Kingsbury and Rober N. Taaffe, *An Atlas of Soviet Affairs* (New York Praeger, 1968), p. 104. *Oblasti* were divided along the industrial dimension on the basis of the measures of magnitude of industrial production estimated by Lonsdale and Thompson. The weights ranged from 8.20 for Moscow city to 0.05. The median *oblast* produced 0.65 per cent of tota USSR manufacturing in 1956. The *oblasti* were divided by assigning all those above the median to the industrially important category and those at and below the median to the industrially unimportant group. This put 27 *oblasti* in the important group and 30 in the unimportant group

List of Oblasti by Level of Development

Oblast	% Total USSR Industry	RSFSR Rank Order by Product					
		Wood	Cereal Harvest	Wheat Harvest	Potato Sown Area	Veg. Sown Area	Meat
		"Agriculture/Industrial Important"					
Sverdlovsk	3.90	2	21	24	9	10	16
Chelyabinsk	3.05	21	13	13	27	19	14
Moscow obl.	2.40	31	37	33	4	3	11
Gor'ky	2.30	9	29	32	1	4	12
Kuybyshev	1.70	39	10	17	34	20	17
Rostov	1.30	54	2	2	41	2	2
Novosibirsk	1.25	32	12	10	17	27	9
Krasnoyarsk	1.20	6	10	9	10	11	8
Krasnodar'	1.05	20	3	4	32	1	1
Saratov	1.05	45	5	11	33	7	6
Orenburg	1.00	47	7	3	36	31	7
Volgograd	.95	49	4	7	47	14	10
Voronezh	.70	47	8	12	15	6	5
		"Industrially Important"					
Moscow city	8.20	—	—	—	—	—	—
Leningrad city	4.90	—	—	—	—	—	—
Kemorovo	2.20	15	23	18	20	15	20
Perm'	2.10	1	27	31	14	16	13
Irkutsk	1.25	4	19	15	31	32	28
Khabarovsk	1.15	11	51	46	48	29	51
Yaroslavl'	1.10	24	42	41	26	25	59
Ivanovo	1.05	25	45	42	25	35	46
Arkhangel'sk	.95	3	49	51	44	51	50
Tula	.90	46	20	29	13	17	36
Primor'skii	.95	16	39	35	37	8	44
Kalinin	.70	14	35	44	7	28	19
Vologda	.70	7	43	43	40	48	40
Vladimir	.80	28	44	38	22	33	43
		"Agriculturally Important"					
Stavropol'	.45	43	6	8	43	5	4
Ryazan	.35	30	26	27	3	9	31
Altai	.60	19	1	1	11	22	3
Omsk	.65	27	9	5	21	30	18
Kurgan	.20	26	11	6	42	42	23
Bryansk	.45	36	30	37	2	13	25

List of Oblasti by Level of Development—(*Continued*)

blast	% Total USSR Industry	RSFSR Rank Order by Product					
		Wood	Cereal Harvest	Wheat Harvest	Potato Sown Area	Veg. Sown Area	Meat
			"Undeveloped *oblasti*"				
irov	.55	5	32	39	12	36	24
skov	.05	35	41	49	23	43	29
amchatka*	.05	40	—	—	52	53	54
elgorod	.05	50	15	14	29	21	21
agadan	.10	41	—	—	54	54	52
ovgorod	.20	18	47	48	35	44	41
strakhan	.25	55	48	45	53	34	45
yumen'sk	.25	13	22	16	39	50	32
rel'	.25	53	25	28	6	40	30
om'sk	.30	10	36	20	49	52	47
urmansk*	.30	29	—	—	55	—	55
eningrad obl.*	.30	12	50	50	30	24	35
aliningrad*	.30	44	40	36	50	47	42
aluga	.30	33	38	34	16	38	38
mur'*	.30	22	33	25	45	37	49
lyanovsk	.30	30	24	22	28	39	33
ipetsk	.35	51	20	23	18	26	37
molensk	.35	34	34	38	5	41	15
akhalin*	.55	34	—	—	51	49	53
ostroma	.40	8	46	47	38	45	48
ambov	.45	42	14	19	19	18	27
Kursk	.30	52	16	21	8	23	22
Penza	.50	37	17	20	24	12	26
Chita*	.60	17	31	26	46	36	34

* Indicates *oblasti* in frontier regions, sharing part of their border with foreign Countries. See footnote 59.

Appendix D. The Transformations Performed on the Variables[a]

Transformation	Mean	Variance	SD	Skewness[b]	Kurtosis[b]	Minimum	Maximum
Mobility index							
Y=X** 1.5	9.391[c]	37.81	6.149	−.075	2.773	.0000	27.000
Politburo-Secretariat links							
Y=ALOG(X)	−4.144	24.98	4.998	−.009	1.036	−9.210	2.565
Career group links							
Y=SQRT(X)+SQRT(X+1)	4.498	3.317	1.821	.0911	2.648	1.010	9.273
Industrial performance index							
Y=ALOG(X)	1.910	1.514	1.230	−2.984	31.95	−9.211	6.908
Food-clothing index							
Y=X** 0.333333	4.440	1.808	1.345	5.287	37.25	.045	15.13
Tenure							
Y=X** 1.5	9.319	2.634	1.623	−1.083	2.508	1.010	6.162

[a] Transformations were selected on the basis of minimum skewness.

[b] For the equations used in calculating skewness and kurtosis, see George W. Snedcor and W. G. Cochran, *Statistical Methods* (Ames: Iowa State, 1967), pp. 86–89.

[c] All 224 cases were included in each transformation.

Appendix E. Year-by-Year Product-Moment Correlation Coefficients of Independent Variables and Mobility

Year	Politburo-Secretariat Links	Career Group Links	Industrial Performance Index	Food-Clothing Performance Index	G.R.[a] of Ind. %	G.R.[b] of Agr. %
1955	.6	.45	−.01	.6	11.2	8.[c]
1956	−.33	.375	.275	.85	10.1	8.
1957	.77	.19	.295	.34	8.6	8.
1958	.11	.02	.301	.05	9.6	19.
1959	−.03	−.72	−.175	.44	11.1	−11.
1960	−.06	−.26	.05	.27	8.8	11.
1961	.95	−.02	−.65	.40	8.6	3.
1962	0.00	−.5	.625	.08	9.25	17.5
1963	.37	−.9	−.275	−.13	7.65	−24.
1964	.67	.46	.12	−.04	6.25	32.
1965	.22	.30	.12	.27	7.5	−20.
1966	.21	−.5	.05	.76	8.3	43.
1967	−.8	−.2	.62	−.05	9.5	−11.

[a] Figures in this column are annual growth rate of RSFSR industrial output as calculated from *Narodnoe Khoziastvo RSFSR* (Moskva: Tsentral'noe Statisticheskoe Upravlenie), vols. 1958–1968.

[b] Figures in this column are annual growth rate of cereal crop harvest, calculated from same sources as "a".

[c] Growth rate figures for 1955–1957 are average figures as published in the source.

Intergenerational Social Mobility and Partisan Choice*

PAUL R. ABRAMSON
Michigan State University

"Class is the basis of British party politics; all else is embellishment and detail."[1] Peter G. J. Pulzer is correct in this assertion. Yet more han one British voter in four does not vote for he party most popular among others in his social class. Many students of British politics have attempted to explain the behavior of the "working class Tory,"[2] and some have discussed the middle-class Labourite.[3]

In this paper I will demonstrate that many voters who do not support the party of their social class are supporting the party of their fahers' social class. My data base will be 2,009 Britons randomly sampled in 1963 by David E. Butler and Donald E. Stokes.[4] Their survey provides the best available data about the political effects of intergenerational social mobility n Britain. After analyzing the effects of mobility, Butler and Stokes concluded, "social mobility can make only a small contribution to the fact that more than a quarter of British electors fail to vote in accord with their class."[5] I disagree.

Butler and Stokes defined social mobility too narrowly and, as a consequence, overlooked the sizable impact that intergenerational social mobility makes upon the social composition of each party's electoral support. Most students of social mobility have classified as mobile those persons whose occupational position differed substantially from that of their fathers. But Butler and Stokes employed a "combined test" of mobility: To be classified as socially mobile in their study a respondent not only had to occupy a social class position different from his father's, but also had to *consider himself* to be socially mobile. Butler and Stokes write: "In view of the dependence of these indicators on human memory, we have sought to identify purer groups of the socially mobile by separating out those whose upward or downward movement is confirmed both by their perceptions of their own and their father's class and by a comparison of their own and father's occupational grade."[6]

Such a combined test does isolate purer groups. My reanalysis of the Butler and Stokes data shows that people who are mobile, and who pass the "combined test" of mobility, are more likely to support the party of their class than are those who fail to recognize that they are mobile. But the combined test sharply reduces the number of persons who can be classified as mobile. Whereas Butler and Stokes found 26 per cent of their sample to be socially mobile on objective grounds, only nine per cent of their sample survived the combined test of mobility.[7]

My analysis of the Butler and Stokes data differed in several important respects from theirs. In the first place, my analysis was restricted to the first wave of their three-wave panel. Second, I classified all nonmanually employed respondents[8] as middle class, whereas

---

* I would like to thank the Department of Political Science and the Computer Institute for Social Science Research, Michigan State University, for support. The data utilized in this paper were made available by the Inter-University Consortium for Political Research. The Consortium bears no responsibility for the analyses and interpretations presented here.

[1] Peter G. J. Pulzer, *Political Representation and Elections: Parties and Voting in Great Britain* (New York: Praeger, 1967), p. 98.

[2] For example, see Eric A. Nordlinger, *The Working Class Tories: Authority, Deference and Democratic Stability* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1967) and Robert T. McKenzie and Allan Silver, *Angels in Marble: Working Class Conservatives in Urban England* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968).

[3] For example, see Mark Abrams, "Party Politics After the End of Ideology," in Erik Allardt and Yrjö Littunen, eds. *Cleavages, Ideologies and Party Systems: Contributions to Comparative Political Sociology* (Helsinki: Westermarck Society, 1964), pp. 53–63. My analysis demonstrates that Abrams is wrong in his assertion that "Middle class deviants [i.e., those who vote Labour] . . . are likely to be at least second generation middle class" (pp. 57–58).

[4] The sampling procedures are described by David E. Butler and Donald E. Stokes, *Political Change in Britain: Forces Shaping Electoral Choice* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1969), pp. 449–462. Although the first wave included 2,009 respondents, the total N in Table 1 is 1832. I have excluded from the analysis those for whom the social class of the "person to be graded" was not available, or for whom no data about the "social class of father when respondent was a child" were available. I have also excluded respondents for whom direction of party identification was coded as "not applicable."

[5] Butler and Stokes, p. 104.

[6] Butler and Stokes, pp. 97–98.

[7] See Butler and Stokes, p. 97. If Butler and Stokes had classified lower nonmanual employees as middle class, they would have classified 30 per cent of their sample as objectively mobile.

[8] To be more precise I assigned persons to a class on the basis of the "social class of the person to be graded." In most cases that person was either the respondent or the respondent's husband. Butler and

Butler and Stokes classified lower grade nonmanual workers as working class.[9] Most important, using objective measures of social mobility, I classified 28 per cent of the respondents as intergenerationally mobile. Had I used a combined test, only five per cent of the sample would have been classified as mobile.

The proportion classified as mobile matters little when one attempts to explain the effects of social mobility upon individual behavior. My basic findings about the partisan preferences of objectively mobile and nonmobile respondents are presented in Tables 1 and 2; these data are very similar to the results reported by Butler and Stokes. For example, I found, as Butler and Stokes did, that middle-class persons with working-class Labourite backgrounds were much more likely to support Labour than were other members of the middle class. We both found that upwardly mobile persons were disproportionately recruited from the children of working-class Conservatives.[10] We both found that upwardly mobile respondents were mo likely to support the Conservative party tha downwardly mobile respondents were to suppo Labour, although in my analysis this relationsh did not hold when I controlled for the partisa preferences of the respondents' fathers.[11]

The data in Tables 1 and 2 can be summ rized as follows: Upwardly mobile perso were more likely to vote Conservative tha were persons of working-class origins who we not upwardly mobile; they were less likely t vote Conservative than were middle-class r spondents who had middle-class origins. Dow wardly mobile respondents were more likely t vote Labour than were persons of middle-cla origins who remained in the middle class; the were less likely to vote Labour than were stabl members of the working class.[12] These diffe

Table 1. Intergenerational Social Mobility and Party Preference

Social Mobility*	Nonmobile Working Class (%)	Upwardly Mobile (%)	Downwardly Mobile (%)	Nonmobile Middle Class (%)
Partisan Preference:				
Conservative	21	52	38	68
Liberal	8	16	13	16
Labour	65	27	44	10
Other response†	6	5	5	5
Total per cent	100	100	100	99
(Number)	(1008)	(380)	(136)	(308)

* In all the tables presented in this paper, the four categories of mobility have the following meanings: non mobile working class = manual origins, manual occupation (based upon occupation of head of household) upwardly mobile = manual origins, nonmanual occupation; downwardly mobile = nonmanual origins, manua occupation; nonmobile middle class = nonmanual origins, nonmanual occupation.

† Includes other, none, and don't know.

Stokes also assigned persons to a class on the basis of the occupation of the head of household.

[9] The rationale for Butler and Stokes' decision is discussed in Butler and Stokes, pp. 68–73. I have employed the more generally used manual, nonmanual distinction. When studying the relationship of social mobility to partisan choice, mobility appears to be a threshhold phenomenon. (See Arthur S. Goldberg, "Social Determinism and Rationality as Bases of Party Identification," *American Political Science Review*, 63 (March 1969), 22–25.) My analysis of Butler and Stokes' data shows that mobility *within* either the manual or nonmanual occupational categories contributes little to partisan change. Persons mobile *across* the manual, nonmanual threshhold differ markedly in their partisan preferences from members of their class of origin.

[10] This may be seen if one recalculates the data in Table 2. Among the 274 respondents with working-class Conservative fathers, 36 per cent were upwardly mobile; among the 520 respondents with working-class Labour fathers, only 21 per cent were upwardly m bile.

[11] Butler and Stokes introduced controls for t partisan preferences of the respondents' parents, wher as I controlled for the partisanship of the respondent fathers.

Butler and Stokes found that upwardly mobile r spondents with Labour parents were more likely t support the Conservatives than were downwardly m bile respondents with Conservative parents to suppo Labour. As the data in Table 2 show, I found the r verse to be true. This is only a minor discrepanc however. In the first place, both my finding and th Butler and Stokes finding are based upon small N' Is my analysis, there were only 50 downwardly mobil respondents with Conservative fathers. Butler an Stokes did not report the N's upon which their pe centages were based, but the N of downwardly mobil respondents must be small since they classified only tw per cent of their entire sample as downwardly mobil In the second place, by restricting my analysis to th 1963 panel I have slightly overrepresented Labour normal strength, since 1963 was a period of peak La bour popularity in the public opinion polls.

[12] Kenneth H. Thompson found a similar pattern i his analysis of British survey data collected in 196

Table 2. Intergenerational Social Mobility and Party Preference, by Father's Party Preference*

Father's Party Preference:		Conservative		
Social Mobility:	Nonmobile Working Class (%)	Upwardly Mobile (%)	Downwardly Mobile (%)	Nonmobile Middle Class (%)
Respondent's Partisan Preference:				
Conservative	50	85	50	83
Liberal	8	9	14	7
Labour	36	5	32	7
Other response	6	1	4	3
Total per cent	100	100	100	100
(Number)	(175)	(99)	(50)	(161)
Father's Party Preference:		Labour		
Respondent's Partisan Preference:				
Conservative	9	29	22	36
Liberal	4	15	6	32
Labour	83	52	72	28
Other response	4	5	0	4
Total per cent	100	101	100	100
(Number)	(412)	(108)	(32)	(25)
Father's Party Preference:		Liberal		
Respondent's Partisan Preference:				
Conservative	29	53	22	65
Liberal	20	28	44	31
Labour	49	19	28	2
Other response	3	0	6	2
Total per cent	101	100	100	100
(Number)	(111)	(64)	(18)	(51)
Father's Party Preference:		Other†		
Respondent's Partisan Preference:				
Conservative	19	44	42	48
Liberal	9	17	3	20
Labour	63	28	44	19
Other response	9	12	11	13
Total per cent	100	101	100	100
(Number)	(303)	(103)	(36)	(69)

* The total N in Table 2 is 1817. Fifteen respondents included in Table 1 were not included in Table 2 because their fathers' party preference was coded as "not applicable."

† Includes: other party, no preference, moved around, respondent does not know.

ences persisted even when I controlled for the partisan preferences of the respondents' fathers,[13] and they are consistent with findings reported by Butler and Stokes.[14] Both my analy-

---

See "A Cross-National Analysis of Inter-generational Social Mobility and Political Orientations," *Comparative Political Studies,* 4 (April, 1971), 8. However, Thompson was not able to add controls for the respondents' parents' party. Paul R. Abramson and John W. Books found a similar pattern in their analysis of a survey of British youth conducted in 1963. See "Social Mobility and Political Attitudes: A Study of Intergenerational Mobility among Young British Men," *Comparative Politics,* 3 (April, 1971), 420–426. These patterns held even after they controlled for the respondents' fathers' party.

[13] There is only one exception to this pattern. Upwardly mobile respondents with Conservative fathers are more likely to support the Conservatives than are nonmobile middle-class respondents with Conservative fathers.

[14] Butler and Stokes do not present data on the partisan preferences of nonmobile respondents. Nonetheless, a careful comparison of their data on the partisan preferences of mobile respondents with their data on the partisan preferences of all working and middle-class respondents reveals a pattern substantially similar to the one I report.

sis and theirs suggest that a substantial proportion of socially mobile persons are resocialized to support the predominant party of their class of entry; both analyses also show that many socially mobile persons continue to favor the party of their class of origin, especially if it is the party preference of their fathers.

The proportion of persons considered to be mobile is very important if one is attempting to explain why "more than a quarter of British electors fail to vote in accord with their class." When Butler and Stokes classified less than one person in ten as mobile, mobility could not account for much of the behavior of more than one-fourth of the electorate. By classifying more than one person in four as mobile, I reached different conclusions: more than one-third of the respondents who did not support the party of their social class were socially mobile.[15]

Even more striking results appear when one looks at the effects of social mobility upon the social composition of the Conservative and Labour electorate (see Table 3). Downwardly mobile respondents make up eight per cent of the Conservative electorate, and constitute 20 per cent of the working-class Tories. Upwardly mobile respondents make up 12 per cent of the Labour party electorate, and 75 per cent of the middle-class Labourites. Upwardly mobile respondents who are not resocialized away from the Labour party[16] have a substantial effect upon its social composition. If large numbers of persons were not upwardly mobile the Labour party would consist almost totally of working-class supporters.

Table 3. Social Composition of Conservative and Labour Party Electorate

Party Preference:	Conservative (%)	Labour (%)
Social Composition:		
Nonmobile working class	32	77
Downwardly mobile	8	7
Nonmobile middle class	31	4
Upwardly mobile	29	12
Total per cent	100	100
(Number)	(673)	(850)

---

[15] This may be seen if one recalculates the data in Table 1. Thirty-nine per cent of the respondents did not support the party of their class; of these respondents, 36 per cent were socially mobile.

[16] There is a possible alternative explanation for upwardly mobile respondents being more likely to support the Labour party than nonmobile middle-class respondents are. Upwardly mobile persons tend to occupy lower occupational positions within the middle class than nonmobile middle-class persons hold. Differences between mobile and nonmobile middle-class respondents might be the result of residual variation *within* the middle class. But these differences are only in small part the result of residual variation. Even within occupational grades, upwardly mobile respondents were less likely to support the Conservatives than were nonmobile middle-class respondents.

House Careerists: Changing Patterns of Longevity and Attrition*

CHARLES S. BULLOCK, III

University of Georgia

In commenting on the attractions of the life of a congressman, Clem Miller wrote his constituents, "No wonder that 'few die and none resign.'"[1] Scholars also have noted the increasing tendency of congressmen to view service in the House as a career rather than merely as a stepping stone to other offices. Nelson Polsby shows that the proportion of new members per Congress has been declining, while the mean tenure of congressmen has been rising.[2] Witmer demonstrates that the survival rates of classes of congressmen are generally increasing.[3]

In this note one aspect of what Witmer terms "the aging of the House" will be investigated. Congressmen who have made a career of House service will be studied, with data presented to show both how their numbers have grown and their susceptibility to various perils which can terminate congressional service. For purposes of this research, congressmen victorious in ten or more elections will be designated as careerists.[4]

Frequency of Long Tenure

The confluence of several factors has created conditions which make extended service in the House of Representatives rewarding. Development of the seniority system as a technique for choosing committee chairmen and frequently subcommittee chairmen and as the basis of awarding offices and other perquisites enables representatives to exercise influence over various programs and also serves to guarantee that those who remain in the House will enjoy power and prestige. Moreover, the expanding scope of the federal government's functions offers to those occupying influential positions broader arenas in which to exercise their power.[5] The foregoing suggests that senior congressmen can derive personal rewards by affecting policy as well as by controlling the committee environment in which they function. Also, as Polsby aptly shows, the institutionalization of the House has made it a more predictable and professional place, which may be an additional reason for members not to retire.[6]

Not only are there a number of motives prompting members to make a career of House service, but electoral conditions also seem to be increasingly favorable to the success of incumbents seeking re-election. Between the periods of 1914–1926 and 1952–1960, the number of House seats undergoing changes in party control declined from 165 to fewer than 100.[7] Evidence on the defeat rate of incumbents offering for re-election during the 1950s and 1960s shows that rarely do as many as ten per cent of the incumbents stumble.[8]

The combination of (1) reasons for remain-

---

* Professor Harrell Rodgers and two referees for the *Review* read an earlier draft, offering helpful comments. Les Bradley helped with the data collection.

[1] John W. Baker, ed., *Member of the House* (New York: Charles Scribners, 1962), p. 93.

[2] Nelson W. Polsby, "The Institutionalization of the U.S. House of Representatives," *American Political Science Review*, 62 (March, 1968), 144–168.

[3] T. Richard Witmer, "The Aging of the House," *Political Science Quarterly*, 79 (December. 1964), 526–527.

[4] "Careerists" is chosen to characterize senior members, since the typical man or woman who spends ten terms or more in the House of Representatives is there from his mid-forties until he reaches the median retirement age in this country. For material on the median age of freshman congressmen across time see Roger H. Davidson, *The Role of the Congressman* (New York: Pegasus, 1969), p. 62.

[5] One of the major congressional "reforms" of this century has contributed to reasons for members to make careers of House service. As a result of the Cannon revolt the positions of committee chairman and ranking minority member have become power bases rather than rewards given the Speaker's allies.

[6] Polsby, "Institutionalization of the U.S. House," pp. 144–168. For a detailed treatment of the seniority system see Nelson W. Polsby, Miriam Gallaher, and Barry Spencer Rundquist, "The Growth of the Seniority System in the U.S. House of Representatives," *American Political Science Review*, 63 (September, 1969), 787–807.

[7] Charles O. Jones, "Inter-Party Competition for Congressional Seats," *Western Political Quarterly*, 17 (September, 1964), 461–476.

[8] Charles O. Jones, *Every Second Year* (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1967), p. 68; Charles O. Jones, "The Role of the Campaign in Congressional Politics," in *The Electoral Process*, ed. by M. Kent Jennings and L. Harmon Zeigler (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1966), p. 24; Barbara Hinckley, "Seniority in the Committee Leadership Selection of Congress," *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, 13 (November, 1969), 620.

Table 1. Congressmen Who Have Won Ten or More House Elections, by Congress

	No.	%		No.	%
1911	11	2.8	1943	48	11.0
1913	10	2.3	1945	49	11.3
1915	24	5.5	1947	43	9.9
1917	26	6.0	1949	36	8.3
1919	22	5.1	1951	40	9.2
1921	25	5.7	1953	43	9.9
1923	18	4.1	1955	54	12.4
1925	22	5.1	1957	71	16.3
1927	23	5.3	1959	65	15.0
1929	23	5.3	1961	76	17.4
1931	34	7.8	1963	74	17.1
1933	34	7.8	1965	72	16.5
1935	31	7.1	1967	76	17.5
1937	34	7.8	1969	76	17.5
1939	37	8.5	1971	87	20.0
1941	39	9.0			

ing in the House of Representatives and (2) general electoral security have created conditions in which a growing number of congressmen are careerists. As shown in Table 1, the percentage of senior congressmen has risen from 2.8 per cent of the chamber in 1911, the first post-Cannon-revolt Congress, to 20 per cent sixty years later. After hovering between five and ten per cent of the House during most of the period before 1953, the proportion of senior men rose to 12.4 per cent in 1955 and to 16.3 per cent two years later. Thus the most pronounced growth in the number of senior solons came as the New Deal Congresses matured. The post-1957 plateau has been maintained even for the classes elected in the turbulent years of 1946 and 1948. There is evidence that careerists are generally free of the vagaries of national partisan fortunes, with their ranks reduced only when a party suffers massive losses. When the number of Democrats elected to each congress was taken as a measure of "partisan stability," the correlation with the number of patriarchs was found to be relatively low and positive (r = .29). The number of careerists declined, however, following the 1946, 1948, 1958, and 1964 elections when 46, 75, 49, and 36 seats, respectively, changed parties. Witmer's suggestion that after the 87th Congress the proportion of senior men in the House might begin to decline seems, at the least, premature.[9]

---

[9] Witmer, "Aging of The House," pp. 536–537.

Table 2. Comparisons of the Distributions of Careerists & All House Members Among Southern Democrats, Northern Democrats & Republicans (in per cent)

	1941–50			1951–60			1961–70		
	House Members	Careerists	Careerists as a % of the Group	House Members	Careerists	Careerists as a % of the Group	House Members	Careerists	Careerists as a % of the Group
Democrats	54.8	60.5	11.0	55.1	59.0	13.5	60.1	77.3	22.1
N. Dems.	31.1	23.3	7.5	32.1	25.3	9.9	39.5	38.5	16.8
S. Dems.	23.7	37.2	15.6	23.0	33.7	18.4	20.6	38.8	32.4
Republicans	45.3	39.5	8.7	44.9	41.0	11.5	40.0	22.7	9.8
	100.1* N=2164**	100.0 N=215		100.0 N=2174	100.0 N=273		100.1* N=2177	100.0 N=374	

* Errors due to rounding.

** N = the number of terms served by members of a group. Fluctuations in the size of the N in the three "House Members" column results from the exclusion of third party candidates and increases in the size of House membership caused by the admission of Alaska and Hawaii.

During the last three decades, Southern Democrats[10] have contributed a disproportionte share of the senior congressmen. As shown n Table 2, during the 1960s the incidence of atriarchs among Southern Democrats was almost twice as great as the proportion of Southrners in Congress. While the proportion of seior members who came from the South remained fairly constant, Northern Democrats ave comprised a growing share of the careersts as population movements and reapportionment have produced additional safe Demoratic seats in Northern cities.[11] Simultaneusly, the minority GOP has had an almost 50 er cent decline in the proportion of patriarchs whose allegiance it held (although the actual number is the same—85 out of 215 in 1941–950, and 85 out of 374 in 1961–1970).

A comparison of columns 3 and 9 in Table 2 hows that the proportion of careerists among oth sets of Democrats has more than doubled ince the 1940s, while increasing only slightly or the Republicans. The data showing that almost a third of the terms served by Southern Democrats during the 1960s were served by areerists indicate that many Southern congresional districts have suffered neither from Republican challengers nor from reapportionment. While the number of congressional seats held by Southern Democrats has certainly declined, careerists comprised a larger proportion of this group during the last decade than earier. That they held a smaller proportion of the nfluential positions in Congress in 1969 than in 1964[12] may be because a growing number of Northern Democrats had equal seniority.

The increase in the number of Northern Democratic careerists during the last decade perhaps signals full recovery from the 1946 debacle.[13] The declining percentage of Republicans among congressmen who reach the ten term milestone may be a product of the decline in the number of safe Republican seats and the general youth of the House Republican party.[14] The continued high proportion of careerists during the 1960s is accounted for by increases in the incidence of careerists among both groups of Democrats.

Why Careerists Leave the House

In analyzing the causes for senior members' departures, only congressmen who had ended their careers during the last three decades were considered. The 77th Congress was selected as the cutting point because of (1) the small number of senior members in many of the earlier congresses, and (2) with regard to current careerists, the contemporary period began in 1941 when Emmanuel Celler, dean of the House since 1965, began his tenth term.[15]

The Miller statement with which this research note began implies that death is the most common factor in the termination of careerists' House service. It is somewhat surprising, therefore, to see in Table 3 that in each decade voluntary departure (retirements[16] and those seeking other offices) was the most frequent reason for career termination, accounting for a majority of all departures in the 1940s and 1950s. For each ten-year period death ranked second among causes of attrition. The greater frequency of retirements among Republicans may be a product of their extended term as the minority party with fewer rewards and satisfactions to offer members.

Defeat caused few of the senior members to leave the House during the 1940s (15.2 per cent) and 1950s (12.3 per cent). The pattern was greatly altered in the 1960s, when 19.8 per cent of the patriarchs leaving the House lost

---

[10] Southern Democrats are those from Ala., Ark., Fla., Ga., La., Miss., N.C., S.C., Tenn., Tex., and Va.

[11] Raymond E. Wolfinger and Joan Heifitz Hollinger, "Safe Seats, Seniority, and Power in Congress," in *The Congressional System: Notes and Readings,* ed. by Leroy N. Rieselbach (Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth, 1970), pp. 85–86.

[12] Wolfinger and Hollinger, pp. 87–88.

[13] "The Northern wing of the congressional party is just now [1965] recovering the ground lost in the Republican sweep of 1946," Wolfinger and Hollinger, p. 87.

[14] Between the periods 1942–1950 and 1952–1960 the number of safe Republican seats declined from 147 to 136. Jones, "Inter-Party Competition," pp. 461–466. There is little reason to doubt that this trend continued in the 1960s. In regard to the lack of seniority among Republicans in the House, in 1967, "two-thirds of the House Republicans had been elected since 1959." Charles O. Jones, *The Minority Party in Congress* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1970), p. 173.

[15] Some of the material in Polsby, "Institutionalization of the U.S. House," pp. 146 and 159, suggests that the 77th Congress may be a watershed. It is only since 1941 that mean House tenure has consistently exceeded four terms. Also a measure which Polsby uses to show growth in internal complexity in the House, the budget for the House, has been moving steadily upward only since around 1939–1941 when gains lost to the depression were recovered.

[16] Of careerists who voluntarily left Congress, those not seeking another public office were categorized as having retired. Even though some of those in the retirement category said, in announcing their decisions not to seek another term, that they were returning to vocations, such as law, it would seem that these activities might often have been only part time. The mean age of retirees when leaving Congress was 69.7, only slightly less than the average age (71.0) of those who died in office. In contrast, those seeking other public offices were, on average, 59.6 when they left the chamber. The mean age of those defeated in primary and general elections were 68.4 and 63.8, respectively.

Table 3. Causes of Attrition of Senior Congressmen, Across Time (in per cent)

Causes	1941–50	1951–60	1961–70	1941–70
Died in Office	34.8	28.6	23.5	27.8
N. Dems.	13.0	10.2	8.7	10.2
S. Dems.	10.9	4.1	7.4	7.4
Reps.	10.9	14.3	7.4	10.2
Lost General Election	8.7	4.1	19.8	12.5
N. Dems.	2.2	0.0	3.8	2.3
S. Dems.	0.0	0.0	4.9	2.3
Reps.	6.5	4.1	11.1	7.9
Lost Primary Election	6.5	8.2	19.8	13.1
N. Dems.	2.2	2.05	8.65	5.1
S. Dems.	4.3	4.1	8.65	6.3
Reps.	0.0	2.05	2.5	1.7
Retired	39.1	55.1	29.6	39.2
N. Dems.	8.65	6.1	9.9	8.5
S. Dems.	13.05	10.2	8.6	10.2
Reps.	17.4	38.8	11.1	20.5
Sought Other Offices	10.9	4.1	7.4	7.4
N. Dems.	4.35	0.0	1.1	1.7
S. Dems.	4.35	0.0	3.8	2.85
Reps.	2.2	4.1	2.5	2.85
	100.0	100.1*	100.1*	100.0
	N=46	N=49	N=81	N=176

* Errors due to rounding.

general elections, with an equal proportion losing primary contests. When primary and general election defeats are combined, they account for more departures during the last decade than are attributable to either retirement or death.

The sharp increase in the frequency of both types of electoral defeat comes in a decade during which (1) all multimember states have been redistricted, (2) some newly mobilized, vocal segments of society have demanded a reorientation of politics with new issues, new decision makers, and new styles of representation, and (3) two-party competition has become increasingly a national phenomenon. One or more of these factors may help explain the rise in the number of defeats among long-term representatives.

Although causality cannot be demonstrate the frequency of electoral defeats in recent redrawn districts has risen markedly in the la decade. Of the six general-election defeats senior congressmen during the 1940s ar 1950s, only one occurred following a redra ing of the loser's district, and only one of t seven primary defeats during these decad came after a redistricting. Since 1962, five ge eral election defeats and three primary loss were indisputably occasioned by reapportio ment, which forced two incumbents to conte a single seat.[17] In all, 11 of 16 general electi defeats during the 1960s occurred in distric which had been redrawn since the precedi election. The coincidence of primary defea and reapportionment is less striking, althoug its frequency is much greater in the 1960s tha before. Eight of 16 patriarchs rejected by the party in primaries since 1962 ran in new drawn districts. Four of the eight senior incu bents who succumbed to primary opposition i districts not redrawn since the last electio were toppled in 1970.

Although evidence is skimpy, it is interestin to speculate that the 1970 primary defeats ma be in response to the activation of new sets voters and the introduction of new issues in th late 1960s. In support of this speculation, B ron Rogers (D-Colo.) and Philip Philbin (Mass.) were defeated by antiwar challenger Rogers and George Fallon (D-Md.) were o posed by the League of Conservation Voters; group active against congressmen judged u sympathetic with environmental needs.[18] It also suggestive that more senior Norther Democrats lost primaries in 1970 than in th preceding 28 years combined.[19]

---

[17] Careerists losing general elections to fellow incumbents were Thomas Lane (D-Mass.), Ivor Fento (R-Pa.), Robert Secrest (D-Ohio), Frances Bolto (R-Ohio), and Ross Adair (R-Ind.). Frank Boyki (D-Ala.) ran ninth in a primary contest for eight a large seats when the Alabama legislature failed t draw new districts following the state's loss of on representative in the wake of the 1960 census. Othe victims of primary contests between incumbents wer Lindley Beckworth (D-Tex.), and Edna Kelly (N.Y.).

All of the above except Adair were defeated in th first election subsequent to reapportionment. The Indiana Republican's defeat is classified with other touched by redistricting because he lost to Edwar Roush (D-Ind.), the former incumbent whom Adair ha narrowly defeated in 1968, immediately after redistricting.

[18] *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report* (Octobe 30, 1970), pp. 2728–2729, 2735.

[19] Between 1942 and 1960 four of seven primary defeats were absorbed by Southern Democrats, one by Republican, and two by border state Democrats. Between 1962 and 1968, eight of 12 primary defeats fe

The third possible explanation for the greater number of general election losses—bipartisan ompetition in previously one-party areas—reeives weak support. It is true that the bulk (11 of 16) of the general election defeats during he 1960s involved midwestern Republicans and Southern Democrats, two sets of represenatives previously often immune to opposition rom the other party. These figures, however, must be tempered by noting that excluding osses sustained in redrawn districts, careerists ost only 1.3 per cent of the general elections hey contested during the last decade. This figure is midway between the ratio of losses in the wo earlier decades, 1.8 per cent during 1942–1950 and 0.7 per cent during 1952–1960. (When the same procedure is used with data on primary defeats, the rate of osses sustained by senior members is found to be 2.2 per cent, still somewhat higher than the 1.3 per cent obtaining during the 1940s and 1950s). Measuring the independent effects of reapportionment and new two-party competition was not attempted; it does seem, however, that defeats can be most clearly attributed to new two-party competition in only three cases.[20]

During the 1960s, as in the two previous decades, general election defeats were more frequent among Republicans than either set of Democrats. The greater susceptibility of Republican careerists to general election defeat may be caused by a continuation of the pattern —noted in the 1950s by Jones—of declining numbers of safe Republican districts in all sections of the nation except the South.[21] The higher proportion of primary defeats among Southern Democrats seems attributable to the fact that in many Southern districts a primary victory is the key to a congressional career since Republican opposition is weak. The same reason may help account for some of the defeats of Northern Democrats in primaries in non-reapportioned districts during the last decade.

Of those voluntarily leaving the House, some were lured away to other political offices. Five each became judges or contested Senate seats, and one each became governor, Republican National Chairman, or accepted appointment to the International Atomic Energy Agency. Evidence on the growing number of House careerists and on the institutionalization of the chamber suggests that retirements in favor of other offices should be declining.[22] A linear relationship does not obtain throughout the 1941–1970 time period, however, since the proportion of senior men seeking other offices was 10.9 per cent in the 1940s, 4.1 per cent in the 1950s, and 7.4 per cent in the 1960s. Thus, progressive ambitions were only slightly less in evidence in the 1960s than two decades earlier.[23]

Although the effect is difficult to identify with precision, reapportionment may have induced some candidates not to seek re-election For example, Frank Karsten (D-Mo.) retired, although a relatively young 55, after his district was altered to include a black majority.[24] (His successor, William Clay, a black, defeated the white candidate backed by Democratic leaders in the primary.) There are other instances, no doubt, in which a congressman voluntarily terminated his career after reapportionment left him a district which he judged unwinnable, or clearly marginal.

Implications

Data in this note demonstrate the growth in the number of senior congressmen. The proportion of representatives having won ten or more elections to the House has doubled in the past two decades, until currently one-fifth of the members have been returned to the chamber for a score of years or more. A disproportionate number of the careerists have continued to come from the South. A more recent trend is the decline in the relative proportion of senior Republicans and a rise in the number of Northern Democratic careerists. The growing numbers of senior members suggest possible institutional and policy implications.

For example several recent reforms may be a product of the increased number of senior congressmen. The action of the Democratic caucus

---

on Southern Democrats, two each on Republicans and Northern Democrats. In contrast all five incumbents turned out in 1970 primaries were Northern Democrats.

[20] Careerists whose defeats seem most clearly attributable to two-party competition in previously one-party districts are Ben Jensen (R-Iowa), Arthur Winstead (D-Miss.) and William Ayers (R-Ohio). Reapportionment seems to have figured in the defeats of three of the other four Southern Democrats and four of the other Republicans. Another Republican, Earl Wilson (R-Ind.), represented a clearly marginal district

[21] Jones, "Inter-Party Competition," p. 461–476.

[22] Polsby, "Institutionalization of the U.S. House," pp. 149–153; Davidson, *Role of The Congressman*, pp. 63–66.

[23] Schlesinger distinguishes between progressive ambition (desire to hold public office[s] other than the one currently occupied), static ambition (desire to retain one's current position), and discrete ambition (intention to relinquish one's present position and withdraw from politics at the end of the current term). Joseph Schlesinger, *Ambition and Politics: Political Careers in the United States* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966), p. 10.

[24] *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report* (March 8, 1968), p. 491.

at the beginning of the 92nd Congress limiting members to one legislative subcommittee chairmanship may have been an effort to distribute rewards more broadly among the growing number of careerists. A second recent reform, and one adopted by both parties, has been the establishment of procedures permitting deviation from the seniority norm in choosing committee chairmen and ranking minority members.[25] These changes may reflect not so much a revolt among "young Turks" as restiveness on the part of senior members who desire to exercise greater control over their environments. The reforms of 1971 with their potential for circumscribing the powers of committee leaders may contribute to the further decentralization of influence in the House.

The bargaining influence of the Speaker and other party leaders may also have declined as differences in seniority—which may at times be a surrogate for experience—between these men and a number of other congressmen have declined.[26] Thus during this century all but one of the Speakers has had at least ten terms of experience when elected to preside over the House. However while Speaker Champ Clark was one of only 11 careerists in 1911, Carl Albert was one of 87 careerists in 1971 and was outranked in seniority by 26 colleagues, of whom 13 were committee chairmen. The increased number of careerists may be one reason for the collegial leadership patterns which have existed durin the 1960s.[27]

Finally, Davidson reports data showing tha the proportion of congressmen who perceiv themselves to be trustees is higher among senior than junior or freshmen members. He concludes that "Seniority probably works independently to stimulate the Trustee style of representation."[28] As the numbers of very senio men swell, the likelihood is greater that congressional decisions will be based on legislato preference rather than perceived constituen desires. Moreover, it can be argued that senio members will be less receptive to innovation— to new ideas, to new issues, and to new participants in the political process. There are thos who argue that before the House can effectivel cope with contemporary problems, its patriarchs must be replaced by younger members better attuned to current issues and propose remedies. For them, these data through 197 offer little hope for rapid change.

---

[25] *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report* (January 22, 1971), pp. 177–179.

[26] See Polsby, "Institutionalization of the U.S. House," pp. 148–149.

[27] For a discussion of patterns of majority and minority party leadership with an attempt to categoriz the leadership of the House during the period 1861–1967, see Randall B. Ripley, *Party Leaders in the House of Representatives* (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1967), pp. 82–113. Ripley concludes that the Democrats have had collegial leadership since the death of Sam Rayburn, with a similar pattern obtaining in the GOP since the displacement of Minority Leader Martin by Charles Halleck. Prior to these events there had been two instances of collegial leadership of the majority party (1899–1903 and 1919–1925), but none previously in the minority party.

[28] Davidson, *Role of The Congressman*, p. 136.

A Note on Redistributive Politics*

JOHN L. SULLIVAN
Indiana University

In a recent article, Fry and Winters develop a redistributive ratio for the states and correlate it with a series of socioeconomic and political variables. Their most important finding, in their view, is that

> previous studies of policy outcomes in the states have been hard pressed to find an independent impact for the political variables considered, and where the relative impact of political and socioeconomic variables has been examined the socioeconomic variables have predominated. In the present analysis, these findings are reversed.[1]

The evidence for this statement is an analysis utilizing multiple-partial correlation coefficients. The multiple-partial correlation between the redistributive ratio and twelve political variables, controlling for six socioeconomic variables is .46, but when the socioeconomic variables are correlated with the ratio controlling for the political variables, the correlation is only .27. (See Table 1.)

The obvious defect in this analysis is that the authors used twice as many political as socioeconomic variables. Fry and Winters are aware of this problem and claim to solve it by selecting only the five most powerful variables from each class; they state that virtually similar results are obtained with equal numbers of political and socioeconomic variables.

Yet this procedure really does not solve the problem: It involves comparing the best five of twelve variables with the best five of six variables. The crucial question then becomes whether the results would have been different if twelve socioeconomic variables had been compared with twelve political variables, or if the best five of twelve had been compared with the best five of twelve.

Selection of Indicators

The concepts and indicators used by Fry and Winters are presented, along with their correlations with the redistributive ratio, in Table 1. (See the original article for their theoretical exposition.) The inequality in numbers of socioeconomic and political variables results from their failure to provide four indicators of need or a third category of socioeconomic variable.

Table 1. Fry and Winters' Indicators and Results

	Correlation with Redistributive Ratio	
I. Variables		
Socioeconomic Variables		
Ability to Pay		
Median Income	.18	
Industrialization	.29*	
Urbanization	.34*	
Education	−.01	
Need (Demand)		
Geni Index	.00	
% under $3,000	−.14	
Political Variables		
Mass Political Behavior		
Political Participation	.14	
Democratic Vote	−.06	
Interparty Comp.	−.21	
Leg. Inducements	.03	
Government Insts.		
Apportionment	.04	
Leg. Party Cohesion	.24	
Governor Power	.26	
Governor Tenure	.17	
Elite Behavior		
I.G. Strength	−.04	
Civ. Ser. Coverage	.33*	
Leg. Professionalism	.51*	
Innovation Index	.46*	
II. Multiple Coefficients of Correlation and Determination		
	R	R^2
All Variables	.75	.55
Socioeconomic Variables	.42	.17
Political Variables	.62	.38
III. Multiple-Partial Coefficients		
Political Variables Controlled for Socioeconomic Variables	.46	
Socioeconomic Variables Controlled for Political Variables	.27	

* Zero-order correlations significant at the .05 level.

The indicators noted in Table 2 were added to the six socioeconomic indicators used in the

---

* I would like to thank Yale University and NIMH for aid in the form of a postdoctoral fellowship.

[1] Brian R. Fry and Richard F. Winters, "The Politics of Redistribution," *American Political Science Review*, 64 (June, 1970), 521.

[2] Taken from *Congressional District Data Book, 1963.*

Table 2. Additional Socioeconomic Indicators and Results

	Redistributive Ratio	
I. Additional Socioeconomic Variables		
Ability to Pay		
Industrialization Factor Ranks	.43*	
Need		
% Renter-Occupied Dwellings[1]	.33*	
Willingness to Pay		
Socioeconomic Diversity	.29*	
Exposure to Public Affairs	.54*	
Non-White vs. White Unemployment	.22	
Non-White vs. White Education	.30*	
II. Multiple Coefficients of Correlation and Determination		
	R	R†
All Variables	.75	.56
Socioeconomic Variables	.68	.47
Political Variables	.62	.38
III. All 24 Variables: Multiple-Partials		
Political Variables Controlled for Socioeconomic Variables	.41	.17
Socioeconomic Variables Controlled for Political Variables	.54	.29
IV. 10 Variables (5 "Best" of Each Set): Multiple-Partials		
Political Variables Controlled for Socioeconomic Variables	.38	.12
Socioeconomic Variables Controlled for Political Variables	.41	.17

* Zero-order correlations significant at the 0.5 level.
† See text footnote 2.

original Fry and Winters analysis. Only one additional indicator of need could be provided, so an additional indicator of "ability to pay" was added. The industrialization indicator used by Fry and Winters is based on the percentage of the population engaged in farming, fishing, and forestry. An additional industrialization indicator, Hofferbert's industrialization factor ranks for the states, was included in this analysis.[3] It is more highly correlated with the redistributive ratio than is the first indicator of industrialization.

The diversity indicator is an index that reflects the degree of economic, social, and religious heterogeneity of the electorate in each state. It is based on a measure developed by Stanley Lieberson and has the following interpretation: The value for each state represents the percentage of social, economic, and religious characteristics upon which any two randomly selected individuals will differ.[4] The higher the value, the more diverse, or heterog neous, the state's population. The values rang from .556 in New York, which means that tw average (randomly selected) New Yorke differ on 55.6 per cent of these characteristic to .330 in Mississippi, which means that tw average Mississippians differ on only 33 pe cent of their social, economic, and religio characteristics.[5]

. The prediction that pluralism, or diversit leads to a higher level of redistribution can b derived from Rae and Taylor's analysis c James Madison. Their restatement hypothesize that diversity of interests in the electorate lead to diversity of organized factions; the more d verse the organized factions, the more difficu it is for a majority faction to exist and remai cohesive; the less cohesive the majority factior the less probable are tyrannical policies.[6] Assuming that the lack of redistribution represents tyranny, and that social, economic, an religious diversity represents a diversity of *interests*, it is predicted that diversity is correlate with redistribution. Diversity should increas the power of minorities, including the have-nots.

The "exposure to public affairs" variable i the number of newspapers divided by the tota number of families in the state.[7] This is an extremely indirect indicator, but presumably th larger the per-family ratio of newspaper reader ship, the higher the exposure to public affairs which in turn leads to a greater "public-mindedness" and greater support for redistributiv policies.

The white-nonwhite differences in educational levels and unemployment rates[8] indicat the extent to which the redistributive policie help the nonwhite minority. The greater th gap between the whites and nonwhites in education and employment, the greater the likelihood that a disproportionate share of the benefits of redistributive policies helps members o the nonwhite minority. This tendency in turn i kely to reduce popular support for such poli-ies.

---

[3] Richard Hofferbert, "Socioeconomic Dimensions of the American States: 1890–1960," *Midwest Journal of Political Science;* 12 (1968), 410–413.

[4] It is A_w, as developed by Lieberson. See Stanley Lieberson, "Measuring Population Diversity," *American Sociological Review*, 34 (December, 1969) 850–862.

[5] John L. Sullivan, "Political Correlates of Social Economic, and Religious Diversity in the American States," *Journal of Politics*, forthcoming.

[6] Douglas W. Rae and Michael Taylor, *The Analysis of Political Cleavages* (New Haven, Conn.: Yal University Press, 1970), pp. 6–8.

[7] U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, *Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1961* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1961), p. 518 and p. 40.

[8] Thomas Dye, "Inequality and Civil-Rights Policy in the States," *Journal of Politics*, 31 (November, 1969), 1082–1083.

Results

As indicated in Table 2, Fry and Winters' ndings are reversed. In fact the "independent" mpact of political variables is now less than he "independent" impact of the socioeconomic ariables of Table 1. The five best socioeconomic variables yield a multiple-partial correlaion of .41, the five best political variables yield a multiple-partial correlation of .38. The multiple-partial coefficients of determination are .17 and .12, respectively. Using this evidence, one would not reach the conclusion stated by Fry and Winters: ". . . our data not only support he assertion that politics makes a difference, hey suggest that politics plays a dominant role n the allocation of the burdens and benefits of public policies."[9] Rather one could conclude that although politics may make a difference n the amount of redistribution, it by no means overshadows the role of socioeconomic factors.

It is tempting to conclude, as have other analysts, that socioeconomic factors completely determine policy, while political factors are related only spuriously to public policy. This would be misleading for several reasons. First, a spurious model, such as that illustrated in Figure 1, predicts that there will be no relationship between political variables and policy variables once socioeconomic variables are controlled. Yet in the present analysis this is not the case. Although the residual relationship is weak, it nonetheless exists. A more plausible general model is illustrated in Figure 2. This model makes no specific predictions since it is a three-variable recursive model with three hypothesized causal relationships. Nevertheless, it is consistent with these data. If there were no direct relationship between social variables and policy variables, the multiple-partial correlation should drop to zero. It does not. If there were no relationship between political variables and policy variables, the multiple-partial correlation should drop to zero. Again, it does not.



Figure 1. Spurious model

A second and perhaps more important reason to eschew such statements is that any such generalizations are probably misleading at this stage. Certainly it has not been shown that all (or almost all) sets of socioeconomic, political, and policy variables fit any particular model—neither the spurious model of Figure 1 nor the direct model of Figure 2. The results obtained in any particular regression analysis can be altered substantially by the addition or subtraction of a few variables. Therefore, even though these data seem to fit the direct model, the addition of several as yet unquantified political variables could conceivably alter the findings. This consideration leads to a third problem, the need for criteria to select variables to be entered in the regression equation. We cannot simply keep adding variables to be entered in the regression equation and trying different combinations until we are satisfied with the results. Most probably, we would never be satisfied because many sets of results would differ. Further, even the 24 independent variables utilized in this analysis represent an unwieldy number. Attempts to add additional independent variables could only complicate the problem. What are needed are some criteria to narrow the analysis, and the procedure of selecting the five "best" variables from each set, in a stepwise regression, is certainly not the best alternative.

One criterion is simply to compute tests of significance on the zero-order correlations, not for purposes of generalizing from a sample to a population, but merely to provide a standard to determine which independent variables ought to be examined more closely. This criterion eliminates all except the ten variables noted in Tables 1 and 2. Seven socioeconomic variables but only three political variables remain. It should be noted that neither mass behavior nor governmental institutions are significantly related to redistribution. The only reason the political variables do as well as they do is the size of the correlations between *elite* behavior and redistribution. Among the socioeconomic variables, ability and willingness to pay are much more important, as *classes* of variables, than is need. This might be expected since need does not, nor should an astute observer of politics



Figure 2. Direct model

---

[9] Fry and Winters, p. 522.

expect it to, lead to automatic allocation of resources in the appropriate areas. It is much more dependent on the ability to pay, as well as the willingness of those involved to make the appropriate decisions.

Having reduced the number of independent variables from 24 to 10, one could compare the two sets of variables once again. But as noted in an exchange following the publication of the original article, because of the possibility of multicolinearity, such attempts are likely to be misleading.[10] Multicolinearity is a problem because small errors of sampling or measurement (among the independent variables) can result in highly unreliable partial correlations, hence unreliable estimates of the "independent effects" of various independent variables.[11] Therefore multicolinearity is most relevant whenever one is attempting to make such comparative statements.

The lower the correlations among the variables to be compared, the less serious the multicolinearity problem. Therefore a second criterion to narrow and improve the analysis is the size of the correlations among the variables to be compared.[12] Table 3 presents the between-set correlations among those independent variables with significant zero-order relationships with redistribution. This shows that ability t pay is most highly correlated with elite behavior, suggesting that such things as legislativ professionalism, civil service coverage, and innovativeness are heavily dependent on th wealth of the state. Therefore the effects o ability to pay and elite behavior on redistribution are overlapping and cannot be determine by means of partial coefficients.

If, however, we compare the three socioeconomic variables which have the smallest between-set correlations with the three politica variables, the multicolinearity problem, although not completely solved, is reduced.[13] Th results are virtually unchanged: the multiple-partial correlation between these three politica variables and redistribution (controlling for th three socioeconomic variables) is .31; for th socioeconomic (controlling for the political), i

Table 3. Between-Set Correlations, Significant Zero-Order Independent Variables

	Civ. Service	Leg. Prof.	Innovation	Average[1]
Ability				
Industrialization	.59	.51	.50	.53
Urbanization	.45	.61	.63	.56
Indust. Factor Ranks	.45	.72	.71	.63
Need				
% Renter-Occupied Dwellings	.35	.30	.10	.25[2]
Willingness				
Socioeconomic Diversity	.46	.41	.69	.52
Exposure to Public Affairs	.17	.55	.57	.43[2]
Nonwhite vs. White Education	.17	.04	.45	.22[2]
Average[1]	.38	.45	.52	

[1] Average correlations do not have any specific interpretation, but are presented as indicators of the degree of between-set overlap for each variable.

[2] These are the three socioeconomic variables with the smallest between-set correlations. When the remaining four socioeconomic variables are eliminated, the average between-set correlations for the political variables are altered: civil service .23, legislative professionalism .30, and innovation .37. These three socioeconomic variables are compared with the three political variables in the text.

---

[10] See Communications, *American Political Science Review*, 64 (December, 1970), 1249–1251.

[11] See, among others, Hubert M. Blalock, Jr., "Correlated Independent Variables: The Problem of Multicolinearity," *Social Forces*, 42 (December, 1963), 233–237.

[12] The size of the within-set correlations is not relevant unless we attempt to compare the effects of within-set variables. Within-set multicolinearity will, however, affect the redundancy of the effects of that set on the dependent variable.

[13] Traditionally, econometricians have established the criterion that correlations of .80 and above indicate "harmful multicolinearity." This criterion can be misleading, for it has been suggested that it is not simply the size of the correlations among the independent variables that matters, but their size relative to the multiple correlation of independent variables with the dependent variable. Therefore multicolinearity is considered "harmful" if $r_{ij} \geq R_y$, where r_{ij} represents the correlation between two independent variables, and R_y stands for the multiple correlation between the independent variables and the dependent variable. See Lawrence R. Klein, *An Introduction to Econometrics* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1962). In the present case, the multiple correlation between these six independent variables (the three political variables and the three socioeconomic variables with the lowest between-set correlations, Table 3) and the dependent variable is .66. It can be seen in Table 3 that none of the nine correlations between these three political and three socioeconomic variables exceeds this limit.

s .44. Of course, since we have increased the rthogonality of the two sets, it was expected hat both would have an independent impact. It s significant, however, that even after the elimnation of four socioeconomic variables, the renaining three have a stronger residual effect han the three political variables.

Conclusion

In light of these findings, we can conclude hat these socioeconomic variables (particularly villingness to pay) have an impact on redistribuion that is independent of these political varibles. Further, it can be concluded that these olitical variables have an impact independent f need and willingness to pay, but it is unclear vhether this effect is independent of ability to ay (wealth). That question cannot be resolved ere, since the two sets of variables are correated at a level that approaches "harmful multiolinearity."

Although the emphasis in this paper has been on the independent variables, the dependent variable is by no means completely satisfactory. Among other things, it assumes that all taxes and all services are equally regressive or redistributive across the 50 states. Certainly this is not the case, as Fry and Winters acknowledge. Data limitations prevented handling this problem. This needs to be emphasized, lest these results be taken as more than suggestive.[14]

---

[14] It can be noted, however, that random measurement error in the dependent variable does not attenuate the slope coefficients in a regression equation, whereas random measurement error in the independent variables does attenuate them. Therefore, measurement of the independent variables is, in fact, more important in regression than is measurement of the dependent variable, although careful measurement of both kinds of variables is a desirable goal. If we can assume accurate measurement of the independent variables discussed in this paper and can further assume that the measurement error in the redistributive ratio is random, the regressions are accurate. See John Johnston, *Econometric Methods* (New York: McGraw Hill, 1963).

Scaling Models for Legislative Roll-Call Analysis*

HERBERT F. WEISBERG
University of Michigan

Guttman scaling has become the usual scaling approach in political science, but a different scaling model—the "proximity model"—is sometimes more appropriate. The inadvertent use of an inappropriate scaling model can lead to faulty inferences from the data, as the main example of this paper will demonstrate.

The proximity model and the general model specification problem have wide application, but the present discussion of them will be set within the framework of legislative roll-call analysis. As the richness of legislative roll-call data is now being tapped more fully, it becomes essential to recognize the utility of the proximity model. The alternative scaling approaches will be compared in the following pages, with the suggestion that the two models may differ in their relative applicability in different historical periods. After considering why the Guttman model has been very successful in analyzing congressional roll calls of the 1950s and 1960s, voting on the Compromise of 1850 will be examined as an historical instance of the proximity model. The concluding section will discuss some general problems of model specification and will speculate about the differential utility of these models for understanding American politics in the 1970s.

Scaling Models

Roll calls are scaled in order to obtain classifications of the roll-call items or classifications of the legislators or both. The number of dimensions obtained from analyzing a set of roll calls may indicate the complexity of the voting. The types of issues on each dimension may suggest the mechanisms of the underlying process. The legislators can be scored on the dimensions, and these scores can then be correlated with potential explanatory variables such as party and type of constituency. Legislative voting is sometimes found to be dominated by the dimension of partisanship, but in other case voting is multidimensional with partisanship being only a minor dimension. Changes in the dimensional structure over time may reflect o even anticipate changes in the underlying part structure.

There are two basic scaling models—the cumulative model of Guttman scaling and th proximity scale model. The essential differenc between these models can be stated in terms o which proposals a legislator would favor. Consider, for example, voting on an appropriatio bill. According to the cumulative model, th legislator would be willing to support an amount up to a certain limit such as three billion dollars, but he would oppose any greate value. The proximity model instead assume that some legislators will favor the appropriation of any sum within a given range, such a between two billion and four billion dollars while opposing proposals which are more extreme in either direction.

The cumulative model of Guttman scaling is the more commonly used model. Table 1 shows an example of a unidimensional Guttman scale which will be interpreted as a left-right dimension. The first legislator opposes all the motions, the second accepts only the most conservative proposal, the third accepts the most conservative motion and a more moderate one, and so on. Each legislator votes for all the motions accepted by the preceding legislator. Guttman scaling seeks the ordering of roll calls and legislators which best approximates such a cumulative pattern.[1] One measure of the scale's quality is the proportion of legislators whose voting patterns perfectly fit the dimension. Another traditional goodness-of-fit measure is Guttman's coefficient of reproducibility—the proportion of individual votes which conform to the scaling model.[2]

The proximity scaling model does not re-

---

* The research reported here is based on a section of the author's doctoral dissertation, revised and extended under a postdoctoral fellowship from The University of Michigan's Rackham School of Graduate Studies. This work has benefited from the generous advice and comments of Professors Donald E. Stokes, Hayward R. Alker, Herbert B. Asher, Paul A. Beck, Jerome M. Clubb, Clyde H. Coombs, Warren E. Miller, Richard G. Niemi, and Jerrold G. Rusk.

[1] In some instances it may be necessary to reverse items since, for example, a vote to recommit a motion is generally equivalent to a vote against its passage.

[2] The Guttman scaling approach is detailed in Lee F. Anderson, Meredith W. Watts, Jr., and Allen Wilcox, *Legislative Roll-Call Analysis* (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1966), pp. 89–121.

Table 1. A Hypothetical Guttman Scale (Ordering Both Items and Legislators)

Legislator	Item A	Item B	Item C	Item D
1	No	No	No	No
2	No	No	No	Yes
3	No	No	Yes	Yes
4	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
5	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

quire cumulation of individual response patterns as a condition for unidimensionality. Instead unidimensionality is said to exist when each legislator votes for a set of roll calls which are contiguous on the scale.[3] Table 2 shows an example of such a proximity scale. Some legislators might accept only moderate bills while others might support only proposals at one of the extremes. Voting for proposals of both the extreme left and extreme right while opposing those of the center would violate this model. Proximity scaling seeks the ordering of the roll calls which best approximates the case in which each legislator votes for a set of roll calls adjacent on the scale. The degree of conformity to the model can be measured by the proportion of legislators having voting patterns in perfect accord with the dimension. Guttman's coefficient of reproducibility can also be adapted to this model, as the proportion of individual responses fitting the model.[4]

Table 2. A Hypothetical Proximity Scale (Ordering Only Items, not Legislators)

Legislator	Item A	Item B	Item C	Item D
1	No	No	No	No
2	Yes	No	No	No
3	Yes	Yes	No	No
4	No	Yes	No	No
5	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
6	No	Yes	Yes	No
7	No	No	Yes	Yes
8	No	No	No	Yes

The classic theoretical notion of unidimensional attitudes involves the "single-peaked preference function."[5] Attitudes on an issue area are unidimensional if the alternatives can be ordered in such a way that each individual has a single-peaked preference function—he prefers some proposal the most, and his degree of preference for other alternatives decreases monotonically on each side of that preference peak. The further an item is from that which he most favors, the less he will desire it. For example, a legislator favoring an appropriation of three billion dollars for a given project would desire an appropriation as close as possible to that amount if that exact value cannot be obtained. On either side of his preference peak of three billion dollars, his preference function decreases monotonically as the proposed amount is further from three billion.

A critical question is how single-peaked preference functions would be translated into votes on legislative motions.[6] Single-peaked preference functions may lead to either the Guttman or the proximity model. It can be shown that the Guttman model will hold in two legislative situations. Guttman scales occur when there is consensus on the goal of obtaining a maximum (or minimum) of the dimension in question, but the legislators differ in how much departure from that goal they would tolerate. An example might be unanimity on the desirability of total governmental honesty with differences between legislators about how serious corruption would have to be before they would support the censure of a colleague. Guttman scales also occur in issue areas in which there is no consensus on goals but instead the legislators vote according to whether they prefer the passage of a motion (Aye) to the status quo (Nay). This situation is a fairly typical one, which probably explains the considerable success obtained in Guttman scaling roll calls. By contrast, the proximity model holds when legislators have single-peaked preference functions with disagreement on goals and when their votes are determined by their absolute desire for passage of the motion—i.e., the passage of the motion is positively desired and not simply preferred to its defeat.

---

[3] This model is based on Clyde H. Coombs, *A Theory of Data* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1964), pp. 295–302. Its applicability in political science was first suggested by Hayward R. Alker, Jr. in the context of studying attitudes toward political candidates. See the discussion of a "point scale" in Alker, "Statistics and Politics," in Seymour Martin Lipset, ed., *Politics and the Social Sciences* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969), pp. 276, 77.

[4] Additional procedures for scaling under this model are presented in Herbert F. Weisberg, "Dimensional Analysis of Legislative Roll Calls" (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan, 1968), pp. 94–103. It is also shown there that conventional correlation coefficients (and consequently factor analysis) are inappropriate under the proximity model.

[5] Duncan Black, *The Theory of Committees and Elections* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1958), pp. 1–11.

[6] This discussion summarizes the results presented in Weisberg, "Dimensional Analysis of Legislative Roll Calls," pp. 69–94.

We can further specify legislative cases in which the formal conditions for the proximity model are likely to be satisfied. Proximity voting occurs when victory on the particular motion is not considered critical. For example, a nation may be more concerned with the implications of its United Nations voting record for its foreign policy than with the passage of various nonenforceable resolutions. Also, in multiparty systems, a party might be so concerned with maintaining its separate identity that it would oppose marginally desired changes which do not correspond precisely to its party doctrine, as when a Communist party opposes progressive reform legislation which it does not consider sufficiently radical.

Proximity voting occurs when a motion is supported by the moderates but is opposed by both extremes. The proximity model should be useful in studying multiparty legislatures, in which the parties of the left and right often unite in opposition to the center parties. Proximity voting also occurs when legislators vote against bills which they feel do not go far enough in changing the status quo in the desired direction, as when Senator Morse (D., Ore.) voted against the Civil Rights Bill of 1957 on the ground that it was too weak. Proximity voting is particularly likely to occur during volatile periods marked by disagreement on the desired direction of social change, with different groups trying to change the status quo in opposite directions.

One special procedure for attaining legislative compromise fosters proximity voting. Usually compromise involves adding a series of amendments to a single bill, in which case a majority vote must be mustered in favor of the final version of the bill. When, however, the legislature passes a package of separate bills, no single majority need favor the complete legislative package, although each constituent bill would have to attain the requisite majority. In this case, a legislator does not have to fear that his opposition to an individual bill would imperil the other bills he favors. This second form of compromise facilitates proximity voting in the sense that the legislator is relatively free to vote his exact position on each item without having to take into account his preference between passage and defeat of the full compromise package.

The considerations discussed in the previous paragraphs suggest that the Guttman model will apply to some legislative situations, while the proximity model will hold in others. Many analysts have demonstrated that the Guttma model is successful in scaling roll calls in th Congresses of the 1950s and 1960s, since small number of dimensions can explain a substantial majority of the roll calls.[7] The abov discussion suggests the nature of the circumstances which might explain these results. Presumably there have not been serious legislativ attempts in these Congresses to cut back th federal role in such areas as social welfare an civil rights; indeed, what has been at issue i the *degree of expansion* rather than the *direction of change* from the status quo. It als seems reasonable to speculate, in the absence o empirical evidence, that in this period mavericks rarely voted against bills which they regarded as token gestures. Few legislators woul care to explain to their constituents that the voted against a bill whose objectives they favored because it was too moderate. Thus, in all the Guttman scale model provides a very goo first approximation for the issue areas of the mid-twentieth century.

Yet this argument implies that the proximity model should prove useful in studying roll-call voting during other historical periods. There have been volatile eras in American history when controversy centered on the direction of social change. We shall now turn to one such period, the pre–Civil War years, for an historical example of proximity voting.

Voting on the Compromise of 1850

The Compromise of 1850. Several related issues disturbed the relations between the North and the South at the midpoint of the nineteenth century. The South was upset by the North's reluctance to return runaway slaves. The North was embarrassed by the open slave trading and auctions in the nation's capital city. Texas had been annexed in 1845 as a slave state, but there was a dispute over its border with the area now known as New Mexico. The South favored large boundaries for Texas, while the North desired smaller ones. Also many Texans (and Texas bond holders) wanted the federal government to assume the public debt that Texas had contracted before annexation. The Missouri Compromise had settled the question of the extension of slavery in the territories and new states of a previous era, but this problem re-emerged for the territory ceded by Mexico in 1848. In particular, California was ready for statehood, and territorial governments had be established in the Utah and New Mexico eas. These regions had been free soil under exican rule, but the South felt that it should rewarded for shouldering most of the bur- en of the Mexican War. In 1850 the numbers f slave and free states were equal, and the outh realized that this last vestige of a sec- onal balance of power would be destroyed if e territory gained from Mexico were brought nto the Union as free states. The Compromise f 1850 was devised to resolve these problems.

---

[7] See, for example, Duncan MacRae, Jr., "A Method for Identifying Issues and Factions from Legislative Votes," *American Political Science Review*, 59 (1965), pp. 909–926.

The passage of the Compromise required onsiderable legislative maneuvering. An "om- ibus bill" was prepared, combining proposals or admission of California as a free state, crea- on of the Utah territory, establishment of the ew Mexico territory, resolution of the Texas oundary with New Mexico, and federal pay- ent of the Texas debt. The Senate disassem- led the omnibus bill, but later passed each of he components in separate bills along with a ugitive slave bill and a bill prohibiting slave rade in the District of Columbia. The House ombined the three measures related to Texas nd New Mexico into a "little omnibus." After assing that bill, the House proceeded to pass he California statehood, Utah territory, fugi- ive slave, and District slave trade bills in that hronological order. The Senate accepted this 'little omnibus" approach, and President Fill- nore signed the five bills constituting the Com- romise of 1850.

The Compromise bills differed considerably n the extent to which they benefited sectional nterests. Three bills clearly benefited a single ection—the fugitive slave bill favored the South, while the California statehood and Dis- rict of Columbia slave trade bills favored the North. The remaining Compromise bills—the Utah territory bill and the Texas-New Mexico little omnibus—permitted the territorial legislatures then being created for Utah and New Mexico to determine whether slavery would be allowed in their confines. As a result these two "territorial" bills did not satisfy either the southerners promoting the extension of slavery or the northerners demanding its prohibition.

A proximity scale of voting on the Compromise. There are several reasons to apply a proximity scale model to the voting on the Compromise. Not only did the actors disagree on the desired direction of legislative changes, but they actually passed bills which modified the status quo in opposite directions simultaneously. Neither the northern abolitionists nor the southern slave holders were satisfied with all parts of the Compromise. The fugitive slave bill was particularly repugnant to many northerners, while the admission of California as a free state and the prohibition on slave trade in the District of Columbia were vigorously opposed by many southerners. The Utah territory bill and the Texas-New Mexico little omnibus appealed most to moderates rather than to those firmly committed to the extreme demands of either section—a situation suggestive of proximity voting. Because passage of the Compromise involved passing five bills rather than a single omnibus measure, the Compromise could be passed by shifting coalitions with different elements contributing to the passage of each separate bill. Thus the Compromise of 1850 did not require the legislators to compromise in order to obtain a majority vote for the final passage of a single legislative act; instead it permitted each side to have its winning moments with a minimum of concessions. There is no evidence that members opposed parts of the Compromise because they felt it did not go far enough, but we shall soon see that some legislators who favored parts of the Compromise did vote against more extreme proposals which were favored by their section.

Table 3 shows a proximity scale of the final House passage votes on the five Compromise bills.[8] The top eight rows of the table represent perfect response patterns. Since only four of the 223 Representatives who voted on any of the bills have response patterns inconsistent with this dimension, there is very little error in this scale.[9]

The ordering on the proximity scale of Table 3 differentiates the northerners from the southerners. At one end of the scale are the northerners who favored only the portions of the Compromise restricting slavery in the District

---

[8] The main source of the data is Holman Hamilton, *Prologue to Conflict* (Lexington, Kentucky: Kentucky University Press, 1964), pp. 195–200. Supplementary data have been made available to the author by the Inter-university Consortium for Political Research.

[9] A large number of Representatives did not participate in all five votes. There is reason to believe that many of the absences were intentional maneuvers, particularly the absences of several northerners on the fugitive slave bill. See Hamilton, p. 162. The winning margins on some of the bills were quite narrow, but they could have been defeated only if the absent Representatives from the North and South had united to vote against them. The closest votes were on the Utah territory bill and the Texas-New Mexico bill, the two bills which were opposed by some Representatives from both sections. Only two of the Representatives not voting on all bills had voting patterns inconsistent with the proximity scale. Treating all the absences as covert yes votes, as covert no votes, or as an intermediate category would detract from the fit of the proximity model, though not so much as to upset the basic interpretation of this model.

Table 3. Proximity Scale of House Voting on the Compromise of 1850*

Fugitive slaves	Utah territory	Texas/ N. Mex.	Calif. statehood	D. C. slavery	Total	Northern			Southern	
						Free Soil	Whig	Dem.	Whig	Der
No	No	No	Yes	Yes	48	7	32	9	—	—
No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	6	—	5	1	—	—
No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	5	—	3	2	—	—
Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	28	—	1	24	2	1
Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	9	—	—	—	6	3
Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	15	—	—	—	4	11
Yes	Yes	No	No	No	5	—	—	—	—	5
Yes	No	No	No	No	13	—	—	—	1	12
Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	1**	—	1	—	—	—
Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	1**	—	—	—	—	1
Total					131	7	42	36	13	33

Coefficient of reproducibility =0.996
Percentage of perfect scale patterns = 98% (N = 131, based on those legislators without any missing data)

* Only those legislators who voted on all five items are shown.
** These are error patterns under the proximity model.

of Columbia and granting California statehood as a free state. At the opposite end are the southerners who voted for only the fugitive slave legislation. The legislators who supported all five Compromise bills are in the middle of the scale. The proximity scale also is consistent with the opposition to the two territorial bills by both northern extremists and southern extremists.

Strong partisan differences are evident in the Compromise voting. Among northerners, the Free Soilers adhered to the abolitionist positio with no inclination toward compromise, an the Whigs tended to follow that position whil the Democrats provided considerable suppo for the passage of the full Compromise. Mo southern Whigs supported at least four of th five Compromise bills; the southern Democra were less favorable, one bloc supporting con promise to the extent of voting for the Uta and Texas-New Mexico bills and another blo rejecting all attempts for compromise.

Table 4. Guttman Scale of Support for Abolitionist Positions in House Voting on the Compromise of 1850*

Texas/ N. Mex.	Utah territory	Fugitive slaves	D. C. slavery	Calif. statehood	Frequency	Northerners	Southerners
Pro**	Pro**	Pro**	Pro**	Pro**	48	48	0
Anti	Pro	Pro	Pro	Pro	6	6	0
Anti	Anti	Pro	Pro	Pro	5	5	0
Anti	Anti	Anti	Pro	Pro	28	25	3
Anti	Anti	Anti	Anti	Pro	9	0	9
Anti	Anti	Anti	Anti	Anti	15	0	15
Anti	Anti	Pro	Anti	Anti	5†	0	5
Anti	Pro	Pro	Anti	Anti	13†	0	13
Anti	Pro	Anti	Pro	Pro	1†	1	0
Anti	Anti	Anti	Pro	Anti	1†	0	1
Total					131	85	46

Coefficient of reproducibility =0.960
Percentage of perfect scale patterns = 85% (N = 113, based on those legislators without any missing data)

---

* Only those legislators who voted on all five items are shown.
** Pro-abolition: Votes *against* the Texas-New Mexico bill, the Utah territory bill, and the fugitive slave bil are treated as Pro-abolition as are votes *for* the District of Columbia slave trade bill and the California statehood bill.
† These are error patterns under the Guttman scale.

The proximity scale fits these roll calls better an a Guttman scale based on the same data. he Guttman scale which has the least error is own in Table 4. The Guttman scale does ot place the fugitive slave bill at the pro-outhern extreme of the scale. Also it regards pposition to the territorial legislation as an abo-tionist vote rather than admitting these bills ere opposed by extremists from both sections. he handling of these points by the proximity cale corresponds better with the usual inter-retation of the Compromise. The statistical oodness-of-fit measures indicate that the Gutt-an scale's quality is good, but the proximity cale contains noticeably less error.

Another possible explanation of the data in able 3 should be mentioned. The legislators ot voting for the full Compromise could be re-arded as two sectional groups with northerners nd southerners having cumulative patterns in pposite directions: This interpretation would ccount for voting in terms of the Guttman odel rather than the proximity model. The ata in Table 3 do not contradict such a cumu-ative interpretation, but other votes taken dur-ng the 31st Congress clearly support the prox-mity interpretation. For example, one week af-er passing the final part of the Compromise hich prohibited slave trade in the District of olumbia, the House refused to consider a bill bolishing slavery in the District. The vote gainst consideration of the abolition bill would it perfectly the proximity scale of Table 3, be-ng more extreme than the slave-trade vote. A trictly cumulative interpretation is violated, ince some northern legislators opposed both the pro-southern parts of the Compromise and the extreme abolitionist proposals: such voting is in perfect accord, however, with a proximity process. The complete voting on the Compromise of 1850 merits a more extended analysis than that given here, but such an analysis must make allowance for the proximity response model.

These results can be compared to the Guttman scales which historians Thomas Alexander and Joel Silbey have obtained for the 31st Congress.[10] Both constructed scales of issues which divided the sections, including in them votes on the three Compromise bills that benefited one of the two sections.[11] These sectional issues scales differentiate northerners from southerners with the northern Whigs tending to be at one end of the scales and the southern Democrats at the opposite end. Thus the sectional scales and the proximity scale suggest the same sectional party orderings, but the proximity scale shows that voting on all five Compromise bills was unidimensional.

An index of Compromise support. In analyzing the voting on the Compromise of 1850, one might also determine the nature of the coalition responsible for its passage by finding which sectional parties provided the crucial support for the Compromise effort. A measure of support for the Compromise is necessary—ranging from complete support for the Compromise to support only for the parts beneficial to one's own section (which is equivalent to refusing to compromise). The conformity of the passage votes to a unidimensional proximity scale justifies the construction of an index of Compromise support based on all five Compromise bills.

In the construction of a Compromise index, legislators have been classified according to their willingness to support legislation not advantageous to their sections. The "pro-Compromise" group includes those who favored at least one bill against their sectional interests. The "moderate" group consists of those who voted against the bills opposed by their sections but favored at least one of the territorial bills which did not totally satisfy either section. The "anti-Compromise" group includes those legislators who voted only for the bills directly advantageous to their sections. Table 5 shows the distribution of the legislators on the resultant Compromise index.[12]

The data in Table 5 indicate that House support for the passage of the Compromise was greater among southerners than northerners and greater among Democrats than Whigs.[13]

---

[10] Thomas B. Alexander, *Sectional Stress and Party Strength* (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 1967), pp. 70–73; Joel H. Silbey, "Congressional Voting Behavior and the Southern-Western Alliance, 1841–1852" (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, State University of Iowa, 1963); Joel H. Silbey, *The Shrine of Party* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1967), pp. 108–114.

[11] The Alexander and Silbey scales also contain votes prior to final passage and votes taken on other bills during the 31st Congress.

[12] Legislators not voting on a bill opposed by the extremists of their sections have been treated as if they voted against it, the legislators not having supported the bill. This procedure for dealing with absences permits the categorization of nearly all the legislators, so Table 5 includes 89 more legislators than did Table 3.

[13] Southerners were classified as pro-Compromise if they voted for either of two pro-North bills while northerners were classified as pro-Compromise only if they voted for the one pro-South bill. The southerners therefore had a greater chance to be categorized as pro-Compromise than did the northerners. However the southerners would still be found to be

Table 5. Compromise Index

Position on Compromise	Total	Northern			Southern	
		Free Soil	Whig	Democrat	Whig	Democrat
Pro-Compromise	60	0	4	28	17	11
Moderate	63*	0	20	7	10	25
Anti-Compromise	97	10	49	15	3	20
Total	220	10	73	50	30	56

* Includes one northern legislator from the Native American Party.

The greatest support was among southern Whigs and northern Democrats in that order, but substantial proportions of both groups did not favor the bills opposed by their sections. The northern Whigs constituted the core of the opposition to the Compromise. The southern Democrats also supported the Compromise only to a limited degree.

The contributions of the sectional parties to the shifting coalitions which passed the Compromise are evident in Table 5. First, the two pro-northern bills could have passed simply with the solid backing of the North. The contribution of the southern supporters of the Compromise to the passage of these two bills was truly supplementary. By contrast, the pro-southern bill—the fugitive slave bill—would have failed had it obtained only southern backing. Its northern Democratic support was crucial. The two territorial bills also required a coalition between the two sections. The pro-Compromise groups were not large enough by themselves to pass these bills. Nor would the addition of the moderates of a single section or a single party have been sufficient. From this point of view, each sectional party was important to the passage of the territorial bills. These results can be contrasted to Holman Hamilton's discussion of the Compromise voting. He suggests that "the Compromise was primarily Democratic- and North-supported" with the Whig contribution being "supplemental" though it "should not be minimized."[14] Our results instead indicate that credit for the passage of the Compromise cannot be so readily apportioned.

The Compromise index can also be compared to a special Guttman scale which Silbey constructed on the Compromise issue. This scale includes roll calls taken on the Utah and Texas-New Mexico bills—the two bills whic did not completely satisfy either region.[15] A shown in Table 6, both parties and both sections were "badly fragmented" on this Compromise scale.[16] All southern Whigs were on th pro-Compromise end of the scale. Most northern Democrats also favored the Compromis The southern Democrats and northern Whig were found equally divided on the Compromise. While the amount of scale error on thi Compromise scale is acceptable, the proportio of legislators with perfect Guttman scale patterns is small. In fact 12 of the 14 scale patterns include fewer legislators with perfect scal patterns than legislators with error patterns. I summary, Silbey's Compromise scale is wea and does not prove that voting on the Compromise followed the Guttman scale model.

The Compromise index given in Table shows a much less favorable distribution o opinion on the Compromise, especially amon Whigs, than Silbey's scale does. These differences can be largely explained by Silbey's choic of cutting points for the division of his 14-poin scale into three categories. The data underlyin Tables 5 and 6 are much more consistent wit one another than they may appear. The division into three categories, however, seems mor rational in the case of the Compromise index the cutting points being based on a specific degree of willingness to vote against sectional interests. There is a substantial correlation between scores on the two measures (gamma = .89), but the scores on the Compromise index seem more trustworthy in the instances in which there are differences.

Silbey's splitting of the Compromise of 1850 bills into separate sectional and Compromise scales has further implications. His sectional scale orders the congressmen from northern abolitionists at one end to southern advocates of

---

more pro-Compromise than the northerners if the District of Columbia bill were omitted so as to equalize the chances for each section.

[14] Hamilton, *Prologue to Conflict*, pp. 164–165.

[15] The details of the scale are given in the Appendix.

[16] Silbey, "Congressional Voting Behavior . . . ," p. 291.

Table 6. Silbey's Compromise Scale*

Position on Compromise	Scale Patterns	Total	Northern			Southern	
			Free Soil	Whig	Democrat	Whig	Democrat
Pro-Compromise	0–4	106**	0	22	32	27	24
Moderate	5–8	40	1	24	8	0	7
Anti-Compromise	9–13	63	9	24	7	0	23
Total		209	10	70	47	27	54

Coefficient of reproducibility = 0.947
ercentage of perfect scale patterns = 54% (N = 118, based on those legislators without any missing data)

* Adapted from Silbey, *The Shrine of Party*, p. 114, Table 8.10. The percentages have been dropped from Silbey's table and the totals have been added. The figures for the Free Soil Party, the scale patterns, and the summary statistics have been determined through inspection of the data given in Silbey, "Congressional Voting Behavior and the Southern-Western Alliance", pp. 522–528.
** Includes one northern legislator from the Native American Party.

lavery at the other. One would assume that the xtreme groups at the ends of this scale would oppose compromise while those legislators in he middle of the sectional scale would favor it. ndeed the northern votes for the pro-South fugitive slave bill and the southern votes for the pro-North California statehood and District of Columbia slave trade bills indicate a desire to compromise, even more than do the ambiguous votes on the territorial bills. Thus the sectional ssues scale itself describes a compromise process. Silbey's finding separate sectional issues and Compromise scales suggests two distinct compromise mechanisms—one extending to voting for bills against sectional interests and one involving territorial legislation. I have argued that there was but a single compromise mechanism encompassing both classes of votes, with voting on all five Compromise bills being unidimensional according to the proximity model. The finding that a unidimensional scale underlay the voting on all the Compromise bills and the use of a Compromise index based on that unidimensional scale have clarified the nature of the compromise mechanism, and emphasized its unity.

In summary, past studies of voting during the 31st Congress have included the votes on the Compromise of 1850 in sectional and Compromise scales of the cumulative variety. While the cumulative Guttman scale model is the most familiar scaling model, the noncumulative proximity model more faithfully reflects the process underlying the voting on the Compromise of 1850. House final passage votes on the Compromise bills form a nearly perfect proximity scale. Thus only a single dimension is needed to explain House voting on the Compromise, and only a single compromise mechanism need be inferred. The unidimensionality of the votes justifies combining them into an index of the degree to which the legislators departed from narrow sectional interests. Close inspection of such an index reveals that no single party or region can be credited with the passage of the Compromise of 1850; it was passed through a series of shifting coalitions to which each major party and section made a vital contribution.

Conclusions

Roll-call analysis has already suggested a considerable degree of structure in legislative voting. Our estimates of the degree of ideological structure are further increased by the realization that the legislative voting procedure can map ideological voting into a pattern which does not conform to the conventional Guttman scale.

The Compromise of 1850 illustrates that the choice of scaling model can directly affect substantive conclusions, with the wrong model leading to wrong substantive conclusions. The selection of a scaling model, however, is not always an easy chore, particularly because the proximity-cumulative distinction is neither mutually exclusive nor exhaustive. Any voting pattern consistent with a cumulative scale is equally consistent with a proximity scale employing the same item ordering. This complicates the determination of the model underlying a set of data, though some tests to discriminate between these two models have been suggested.[17]

Additionally, it is possible in some cases that neither model will adequately explain the data. Multidimensional and probabilistic versions of these models are sometimes useful when the unidimensional deterministic versions outlined here are not sufficient, but even those generalizations cannot handle data which violate the most basic scaling criteria. We have assumed throughout that individual attitudes take the form of single-peaked preference functions, but that assumption is not always valid. For example, reformers favoring major changes will often prefer the status quo to a token change, a case in which there would be a major peak corresponding to a sizable change, a minor peak corresponding to the status quo, and lower preference values for intermediate minor changes as well as for changes in the opposite direction. It is sometimes possible to handle such cases through reinterpreting the problem (as by switching to a multidimensional framework), but conventional scaling techniques generally cannot cope with multipeaked preference functions. Thus, failure of the Guttman model does not automatically imply that a proximity model would be more appropriate; in some cases, neither model will do.

---

[17] See Weisberg, "Dimensional Analysis of Legislative Roll Calls," pp. 94–103, and Robert K. Leik and Merlyn Matthews, "A Scale for Developmental Processes," *American Sociological Review*, 33 (1968), pp. 62–75.

Different scaling models may be useful in different issue areas, in different periods of history, and in different legislative settings. A strong argument can be made, for example, that the proximity model is particularly appropriate in multiparty legislatures.[18] As regards the American Congress, we have argued that the Guttman model works well in the 1950s and 1960s, whereas the proximity model would fit better in some earlier periods. The proximity model would be most useful for transitional periods in which the direction of social change was at issue, as in the case of the Compromise of 1850. Multipeaked preference functions might even exist for public questions at some periods.

American politics at the beginning of the 1970s provide a fascinating illustration of this theme. The very direction of social change has been debated on such prominent topics as the Vietnam policy and President Nixon's Family Assistance Plan. Popular attitudes toward the extent of American involvement in Vietnam suggest multipeaked preferences, with many individuals favoring total victory the most and complete withdrawal second, and preferrin both to the intermediate possibility of contin ued fighting under a no-win strategy. The Fam ily Assistance Plan controversy comes closer t the proximity model. President Nixon propose replacing the welfare system with a guarantee $1600 annual income for a family of fou Work incentives were provided by permittin families receiving assistance to keep some o their outside earnings and by cutting some o the aid when an able-bodied parent refused t accept employment. The amount of the mini mum stipend, the level of outside earnings to b kept, and the penalty for refusing work were al controversial. The Nixon plan drew fire bot from conservatives, who were opposed to wel fare (or who would settle only for a much les costly program), and liberals, who wer pledged to a more generous program. Thus th Senate Finance Committee defeated the Famil Assistance Plan on November 20, 1970 by 10–6 vote with the opposition coming fro such liberals as Gore (D., Tenn.) and Harri (D., Okla.) and such conservatives as Curti (R., Neb.) and Williams (R., Del.). Congress may not subject the Vietnam and welfare reform issues to roll-call votes which would provide adequate tests of the cumulative model, but the debate on both issues has already shown that the underlying attitudes do not conform to the cumulative theory. The system-level implications of the controversy about the direction of social change on such issues cannot be foreseen at this writing, but it is tempting to speculate that the early 1970s may prove to be a transitional period in the American political and party systems.

Finally, the limitation of the discussion in this paper to the legislative situation should not conceal the wider applicability of this treatment of scaling models. Other articles have pointed to the utility of the proximity model in the study of developmental phenomena[19] and in the study of coalition behavior.[20] The proximity model may also be useful in the survey area, though investigators too frequently interpret a proximity situation in that context as a case of faulty question construction. In the end, the choice of scaling model is tied to the nature of ideological and attitudinal theories, making this topic of fundamental concern.

---

[18] See Herbert F. Weisberg, "L'étude comparative des scrutins législatifs," *Revue Française de Sociologie*, 12 (1971), pp. 151–176.

[19] Leik and Matthews.

[20] Weisberg, "L'étude comparative . . . ," pp. 158–159.

Appendix

Silbey's Compromise scale contains votes taken prior to the final passage votes and also the Speakership vote. he chart below shows the voting patterns which have a frequency of at least two. The voting patterns shown ccount for only slightly more than half of the Representatives, 93 others having unique voting patterns. The otes are identified below the chart.

	*Votes**													
Score	*1*	*2*	*3*	*4*	*5*	*6*	*7*	*8*	*9*	*10*	*11*	*12*	*13*	*Frequency*
0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	41
0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	6
0	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	3
0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	–	x	x	x	2
0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	2
0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	0	0	x	2
0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	–	x	x	x	x	x	2
1	–	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	8
1	–	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	2
2	x	–	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	2
7	–	x	–	x	x	–	–	x	x	x	x	x	x	2
8	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	x	x	x	x	x	7
8	x	–	–	–	–	–	x	–	x	x	x	x	x	5
8	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	x	0	x	x	x	4
8	–	–	–	–	–	–	x	–	x	x	x	x	x	3
11	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	0	–	x	x	4
11	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	x	–	x	–	x	x	2
11	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	x	–	–	–	x	x	2
13	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	6
13	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	0	–	–	–	3
13	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	x	–	–	2
13	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	0	0	–	–	2
13	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	x	–	–	–	–	–	2
														114

* "x" represents a pro-Compromise vote, "0" an abstention, and "–" an anti-Compromise vote.

Vote 1—Aye on reading the Texas boundary bill a third time.
2—Aye on passage of Utah territorial bill.
3—Aye on third reading of Texas bill with New Mexico and Colorado territories included in it.
4—Aye on reconsidering vote sending Texas bill to committee.
5—Aye on adding Utah and Colorado bills to Texas bill.
6—Aye on reading Texas bill with amendments a third time.
7—Aye to reconsider vote against reading Texas bill a third time.
8—Aye on upholding Speaker's decision to include New Mexico and Colorado in Texas bill.
9—Nay on tabling Texas bill.
10—Aye on resolving that Howell Cobb is elected Speaker.
11—Aye on tabling appeal against Speaker's ruling to bring up Texas bill.
12—Nay on rejecting Texas boundary bill.
13—Nay on tabling same bill including New Mexico and Colorado territories.

Derived from Silbey, "Congressional Voting Behavior . . . ," Table 40, pp. 522–528.

COMMUNICATIONS

TO THE EDITOR:

Isaac Kramnick's interesting analysis of the political thought of William Godwin ("On Anarchism and the Real World: William Godwin and Radical England," *American Political Science Review*, 66 [March, 1972]) contained two conjectures about anarchism to each of which, in my opinion, there are significant counterexamples. The two conjectures (page 114) were the following:

> (1) Freedom, the anarchist holds, cannot be realized through political methods and certainly not through popular or mass action.
>
> (2) . . . both forms of anarchist thought share a most important belief, a common conviction of superiority. Above the mediocre, the petty, the base, the dull, and the deceived, stands the anarchist . . . convinced of his superiority of intellect or feeling. No surprise, then, that as political thought anarchism has traditionally been the expression of an intellectual or artistic elite.

The first statement might serve as an adequate description of the ideal for anarchists such as Thoreau or Tolstoy, but it ignores the very strenuous efforts made by many anarchists to employ political or mass action to achieve the ultimate goal of ending overt political (and necessarily coercive) activity. Sorel, Bakunin, and Proudhon advocated or accepted mass organization and agitation, and at least three anarchist movements organized for mass action: the followers of Proudhon who helped initiate the First International, the syndicalist labor movements of France and Spain, and the Industrial Workers of the World. Although syndicalist movements (like the I.W.W.) did indeed organize by industry and not according to political boundaries, they were clearly recognized as potentially dangerous political movements by the established political authorities with whom they clashed.

The second statement relies too heavily, I believe, upon Kramnick's thesis that Godwin serves as an accurate illustration of anarchist thinkers in general. According to Kramnick, "The masses, more often than not, have seen the anarchist for what he is, an arrogant, albeit sensitive, snob; and they have rewarded him accordingly" (page 114). But this description simply cannot apply to Kropotkin or Tolst and I would hesitate to label even Proudh "an arrogant, albeit sensitive, snob." Proudh did display a certain arrogance and pride, b that could not have been the product of "elite" background or of any attempt to isola himself from local organizations of worke and artisans; he was not so spiritually or s cially isolated as, say, Max Stirner or Alexa der Herzen, and, as George Woodcock noted *Anarchism* (pages 111–112), Proudhon d not see himself as the member of "an intelle tual or artistic elite."

If communitarian anarchist thinkers (li Proudhon, Bakunin, or Kropotkin) or activis like William Haywood of the I.W.W. ha shared any conviction of superiority, it h been the superiority of social class (like t proletariat) or cultural group (like the pea ants); their works are noticeably lacking condescending references to "the mediocre, t petty, the base, the dull, and the deceived." believe Kramnick is mistaken in his assertio that, since many anarchists who followed Go win borrowed freely from his ideas, they ther fore were also unable to avoid assuming h elitist attitudes.

Finally, I want to object to what I believe an implication of Professor Kramnick's pape that anarchists, because of their snobbery an their rejection of politics, are not worthy of th serious respect of political philosophers or "the masses." As far as the support of th "masses" is concerned, I believe the historic evidence is mixed or in favor of the anarchist The claim that anarchism is not a sensible respectable political philosophy is one which cannot accept without further argument; it not obvious.

THOMAS HONE

Institute of Governmental Affairs
University of Wisconsin, Madison

TO THE EDITOR:

Professor Isaac Kramnick's recent attack o the anarchism of William Godwin ("On Anar chism and the Real World: William Godwi and Radical England" is a combination of serious and sophisticated historical study and presentist polemic. For the former—especiall for the fascinating study of Godwin's confronta tion with the English radical Thelwall—we mus thank the author. With the latter—especiall rofessor Kramnick's ahistorical linking of Godin to the entire anarchist tradition—we must ke exception.

Since it is not my purpose here to make aise, let me reserve my comments to a discuson of Kramnick's manifest errors. Anarchism, ys Kramnick, has "been the expression of an tellectual or artistic elite," citing George oodcock and James Joll, two eminent experts the subject. Even a cursory reading of Joll or oodcock allows the reader to note that the verwhelming number of anarchist theorists d practitioners—though they may well ineed have been artists or intellectuals—were t elitists. Proudhon and Bakunin, Kropotkin d Tolstoy were devoted to a democratic ideal. ax Stirner, who is usually lumped into the anchist pantheon, was certainly an elitist and lealist, but his influence upon the main trends anarchist theory was of minimal significance. deed, had he not been rescued from the arives by the latter-day Young Hegelians or by e American individualist Benjamin Tucker, he ight yet be reaping the obscurity he deserves.

Mikhail Bakunin—it might well be argued—ith his contribution to the *revolutionary vanuard* theory of revolution was at least implicly an elitist. On this issue of interpretation I ould at least like to join Professor Kramnick debate. But his blanket style of indictment—g., "the masses, more often than not, have en the anarchist for what he is, an arrogant, lbeit, sensitive snob . . ."—makes discussion early impossible.

Godwin, as far as we are able to tell, had *no* fluence on the development of anarchist ought in the 19th century. Certainly Prouhon had not read him. The Russians had no nowledge of his work. In fact, even in Enland, as early as 1811, Shelley, Godwin's own n-in-law, was astonished to find that the auor of *Political Justice* was alive. As George oodcock has shown, only since World War II ave anarchist writers returned to Godwin George Woodcock, *Anarchism* [Cleveland: eridian Books, 1961], pp. 91–92).

Now Professor Kramnick may demur; he ay say that he meant that what Godwin had say—which admittedly sounds elitist, utoian, at times conservative—can be found in ome of the work of some anarchists at some imes. One could not deny this. But this is hardly onsonant with the sentiment that

> He [Godwin] gives to anarchism qualities that ndure despite the philosophical, methodological nd cultural gap that may separate him from that octrine's later proponents." Or, again, "Finally, odwin in these years may well have marked anarchism with another indelible stamp, its ultimate service to the status quo. . . ."

Here the author's presentism, his anxiety about Abbie Hoffman, Jerry Rubin, and the chaotic street-fighters who do not share Kramnick's notions about social change, leads him to grief.

For in smearing the anarchist tradition—which, I would remind you, has been more unyielding to attacks on libertarianism in the last 150 years than either socialism or liberalism—Professor Kramnick has lost his historical "cool" and descended to a level of name-calling that is hardly rescued by his otherwise careful and analytically interesting work on 18th century British politics.

TERRY M. PERLIN

WILLIAMS COLLEGE

TO THE EDITOR:

Professor Merelman's "Policy Thinking in Adolescence" (*American Political Science Review*, 65 [Dec., 1971], 1033–1047) has done much to advance our understanding of the adolescent's modes of political thoughts. His statement of the problem and his presentation of components of policy thinking are most helpful. However, his actual study causes one to raise some serious questions concerning his methodology and discussion. Merelman's discussion seems to be based, in part, on a logical omission and a "straw man" dichotomy.

The size of his sample and the coding of openended questions constitute serious methodological limitations of his study. However, an even more questionable procedure is his comparison of the responses of subjects using a moral dimension based on totally different questions. On page 1038 Merelman, as the investigator, begins the questioning of student "P" with the neutral declarative statement, "Some people feel that we should try to do away with poverty." His second sentence in the questioning of "P" ("Other people feel that a certain amount of poverty is a good thing") clearly infers a social value connotation. However, when Merelman questions student "J," he does not begin with an introductory statement. At this point he asks, "Do you think we ought to try and get rid of poverty?" At no time in the questioning of "J" is the socially value laden view that poverty may have a positive aspect inferred or explicitly stated as it was with "P."

It is evident that Professor Merelman faced a problem in developing nonobtrusive questions while desiring a degree of control or comparability concurrently. He has not resolved this problem, nor has he taken it into account in his presentation. One may justifiably sacrifice strict parallelism and repetition of questions in interview procedures to ascertain unobtrusive responses but only within the context of extensive and heterogenous samples.

The series of questions given to students "P" and "J" were not the same. They lack basic parallelisms (e.g., "get rid" implies total obliteration of something and "reduce" implies merely limiting or constricting something). A comparison of respondents by their answers to questions different in structure and content seems to violate all concepts of scientific testing procedures.

Professor Merelman has also made a logical omission in his discussion of political thinking based solely upon intense, visible and unequivocal politically related stimuli (pp. 1046–1047). This is especially noticeable since, in his introduction on page 1037, he warns the reader against making the same error of supposed developmental progress. Merelman's conclusion that political thinking is primarily a function of politically related stimuli is unjustified in the instance he cites (pp. 1046–1047), since his hypothetical situation neglects the time or era of the collection of the data that serves as the basis for the benevolent leader literature. This literature predates the "generalizing events" of college demonstrations, city riots, etc. which his sampled eighth and twelfth graders both used as the basis for their conclusions. Obviously both the eighth and twelfth graders of 1970 are very different politically from their counterparts of the late 1950s and early and mid-1960s. During this period the benevolent leader literature may have been a more appropriate frame of reference given the samples of those studies and the general lack of widespread active disobedient behavior.

Merelman's discussion is generally founded on the dualist traditional problem of either/or so that he can advance an eclectic position that allows for development and environment simultaneously. His dichotomization of the developmental and environmental approaches is clearly a "straw man" argument, given his view that it is difficult to distinguish analytically between the aspects of developmental maturity and environment input across a time dimension which is subject to continuous uncontrollable influences.

The criticism of Piaget's implicit approach of an ideal pattern of development seems inappropriate. That Hunt observes Piaget's traditional lack of emphasis on the effects of long term experiences on the stages of development is vali but only within the context of Piaget's contin ously evolving, ever refining approach to inte lectual development (see p. 1046, footno 34; Hunt, pp. 48–55). Merelman appears t have forgotten that "Piaget rejects the twin a ternatives of nativism and empiricism" (Ha G. Furth, *Piaget and Knowledge*, p. 19). Give the structure of poverty as a variable, it see that Merelman's developmental model, whic allows for environmental effects and uneven d velopment of skills, is analogous to Piaget's p sition concerning the thought patterns of ad lescents as presented in "Intellectual Evolutio From Adolescence To Adulthood," trans. Joa Bliss, revised by Hans Furth (*Foneme,* 3rd I ternational Convention, Milan, 1970), pp. 157 164.

Viewed in its totality, Professor Merelman "Policy Thinking in Adolescence" is a mo persuasive beginning in our attempt to recon cile the complex interaction of developmenta theory and environmental influences. Howeve the deficiencies within his study should lea one to conclude that further testing of his h potheses is necessary before one can give cr dence to his conclusions that there are onl small ascertainable differences in the orienta tion of adolescents in their conceptualization o the elements of policy thinking which are peculiarly socially related (e.g., poverty).

W. LEE JOHNSTON, JR.
University of Maryland

TO THE EDITOR:

Professor Johnston's letter should be welcomed by readers of the *Review* for, unlik several of the communications which hav graced these pages in recent issues, it raise questions of research strategy, investigator prudence, and analytic judgment that transcen my own particular article and may be of mor general interest. Professor Johnston and I diffe mainly about the boundaries of the researcher' initiative. His conception of these boundaries i narrower than mine, but, I think, each is fundamentally legitimate.

First, consider the matter of absolute parallelism in question wording. It is true that tota parallelism is not observed in the instances h cites (though I do tell "J," "Other people fee we shouldn't . . . [do something abou poverty]," which certainly should imply tha poverty might have value, since people rarel attack things they believe valuable). Still, th lack of parallelism *is* there on occasion.

How can this procedure be justified? Ther were three things that suggested its plausibilit o me. First, I was interviewing the respondents nyself, and was eager to see how the general ntellectual problems I posed were received. What seemed important was the general problem posed by each dimension, not specific question wording. Only by suiting the wording of the question to the individual respondent could I be certain he understood the problem at hand. Is this likely to produce less comparability than f I had bound myself to a research format that occasionally deterred discussion with some respondents while advancing it with others?

Second, consider the sample, which was deliberately chosen from relatively homogeneous backgrounds. All respondents were middle or ower middle class, all came from the same community and school district, and all were high scholastic achievers. Given this homogeneity, I thought I could expect reasonably uniform reactions to the problems I posed and could therefore afford to vary question format occasionally when the interview seemed to require it, as I could not have done if social class and academic differences had dictated probable structural variability in subject response.

Finally, I believe that research into cognitive styles and political reasoning demands maximum involvement with the subject and, particularly, the establishment of rapport. The interviewing technique I use aims toward this goal; sometimes question parallelism suffers in the process. (Incidentally, if he wants to see some *real* examples of interviewing legerdemain, all Professor Johnston has to do is examine the work of Piaget and Freud, both of whom, dispite their flaws, somehow managed to advance science further than either he or I probably will.)

I'm not sure I understand Professor Johnston's criticism of my use of the benevolent leader literature, nor the inference I offer from responses to my hypothetical question about authority. I did not mean to attack the benevolent leader findings. I agree that this literature was "appropriate" for its time. The question turns on whether I should interpret the benevolent leader findings as *politically* determined, just as I do with my respondents' negative reactions to authority. Does the absence of negative political stimuli cause a benign response to authority, or is this positive response evidence of a "natural" developmental process? I believe that the absence of political stimuli should not predispose the child either way. Therefore, it is possible for me both to treat the benevolent leader findings as evidence of a normal developmental process and to treat the reactions of my own respondents as evidence that this process has been aborted. Again, this is a matter of judgment.

Finally, whether I construct a "straw man" argument in my use of Piaget also is a matter of judgment. Any writer as prolific for as long as Piaget cannot help but have assumed different positions on particular subjects. Therefore, much depends on how and what we read. My impression is that, though Piaget does stress the interaction of environment and genetically based development as individuals move from stage to stage, he lays greatest emphasis on universal aspects of human development. He apparently assumes, for example, that human growth inevitably presents the same basic environmental problems and opportunities across cultures. Otherwise, how can we account for the uniformity of individual development across cultures or the invariant sequence of cognitive stages? I shamelessly admit that I emphasized this aspect of Piaget's work in order to provide the reader with a range of approaches to my subject, and I do not think it amiss to do so if, as I hope, my own approach represents a useful refinement in thinking about these matters. Again, however, I play a little looser with these things than Professor Johnston would have me do.

I do think Professor Johnston does me a little disservice by suggesting near the end of his communication that I somehow believe thirty-seven midwestern high schoolers have somehow said the last word on policy thinking. I constantly use the qualification, "in this small sample," in reporting my findings, and I specially call attention to the limits within which my findings may be useful (p. 1037). Indeed, if I hadn't myself been surprised by the relative lack of development along policy-thinking dimensions I would not currently be undertaking a larger study of policy thinking.

Ultimately, however, Professor Johnston opts for a "harder" science than I do. I think there is ample precedent in the history of science for both his view and mine.

RICHARD M. MERELMAN
University of Wisconsin, Madison

TO THE EDITOR:

I am pleased that Professor Edgar Litt found my book, *The Italians in Chicago* (reviewed in *American Political Science Review*, 65 [Dec. 1971], pp. 1191–1192) to have value. He misunderstood, however, what he terms "the main point of the book," which is *not*, in his words, the "solidarity of the Italo-American community," but is rather that community's lack of cohesion. The book's theme, the mobility of urban newcomers, is indicated in the subtitle, described in the preface, and examined throughout the text. During the decades of large-scale immigration, Chicago's Italian colony was in constant flux, with immigrants moving into and out of neighborhood tenements, shifting into other ethnic areas, and often moving into American neighborhoods. (In the years since the passage of federal legislation restricting immigration, static or solid communities of the type described by Gans have developed.)

The review misinterpreted my presentation of the roles of crime and politics. The book does not say that "crime retarded mobility or assimilation," for it concludes that crime played a significant part in encouraging both social and economic mobility. Contrary to the reviewer's assertion, the book found no evidence of "solidarity" in "Italo-American criminal organizations." In Chicago's crime (and politics), Italians cooperated with members of other ethnic groups. Some belonged to organizations headed by non-Italians, while Italian-led groups (like Capone's) contained members of all ethnic backgrounds, with many non-Italians in positions of authority. No completely Italian "syndicate" existed in the city. Far from demonstrating ethnic solidarity, Italians, like others, killed and maimed compatriots in the struggle for supremacy over Chicago's organized crime.

The reviewer observed that Italians served as "a swing group between the Irish and Eastern European blocs," although the book emphasizes that politics in Chicago varied according to ward conditions and that no one role could be assigned to Italians. I contrasted the Nineteenth Ward, where Italians battled with and lost to the Irish-controlled machine, the Seventeenth Ward, where Graham Taylor successfully organized a multiethnic coalition against the machine, and the First Ward, where a succession of Republican Italian bosses delivered the vote for Democratic Irish bosses. Italians obtained their greatest political successes in th ward, where the machine retained office and i Italian-led allies got a free hand in operatin and controlling gambling, prostitution, and (i the 1920s) bootlegging.

The review singled out "John Lanseco" as a example of an "Italian politician." I assume th reviewer meant John Landesco, identified i the book as a member of the Illinois Crim Commission and the author of its *Report*. Lar desco was neither an Italian nor a politician.

Professor Litt is perhaps premature in dismissing the role of "white, European derive groups" as an area of study for political scier tists. The successes of Blacks during the 196 has encouraged white, European-derived ethni elements (as well as Chicanos and Puerto Ricans) to emphasize group identity and to see political, economic, and cultural benefit through group pressures. This resurgence o white ethnic awareness is making an impac that merits examination and analysis by scholars.

HUMBERT S. NELLI

University of Kentucky

TO THE EDITOR:

I am not clear about Professor Nelli's mai objection to my review. Interested reader should check the text for differences on interpretation and conclusions of the study. M main point is uncontested—ethno-political history deserves renewed interest by urban historians, that endeavor requires concepts and theories broader than the "case study," and only i this manner are we to revitalize scholarshi about ethnic groups perceived by many as marginal to contemporary political conflicts. again welcome Professor Nelli and his associates in revisionist urban history to the undertaking of this task.

EDGAR LITT

University of Connecticut

he Political Science of E. E. Schattschneider: Review Essay*

DAVID ADAMANY

University of Wisconsin at Madison

Introduction

Of his own work, E. E. Schattschneider 892–1971) once said, "I suppose the most portant thing I have done in my field is that I ve talked longer and harder and more persis- ntly and enthusiastically about political par- es than anyone else alive."[1] It was an assess- ent very wide of the mark. Yet, he remains day almost exclusively identified with the idea party reform, of a responsible two-party sys- m.

It is true, also, that Schattschneider's literary yle sometimes diverted attention from the ope and power of his work. Often lyrical, epi- ammatic, and metaphorical, Schattschneid- 's writing is in a literary league quite apart om modern scholarship.[2] What contemporary olitical scientist would say:

> he boss is as American as a jazz band.[3]

> he party in Congress is like a Mexican army; eryone in it takes care of himself. When the emy appears he may fight, run or parley as he inks best. This is the kind of army that can be erwhelmed by one man assisted by a boy beat- g a dishpan.[4]

> he parties] let themselves be harried by pres- re groups as a timid whale might be pursued by school of minnows.[5]

> olitical science, like Genesis, begins with chaos ut it does not end there.[6]

> *merican Business and Public Policy* slays a choice ollection of political dragons: economic deter- inism is manhandled; myths about lobbyists and usinessmen, and a lot of folklore about congress- en are destroyed. It kills off or wounds a small rmy of pressure boys and groupists, and torpedoes at least a boatload of public opinionists. All friends of democracy will applaud the slaughter.[7]

> The schoolboy who wrote that Congress is the antonym of Progress probably expressed about as well as anyone can the sense of frustration most Americans have when they think about the national legislature.[8]

> The compulsion to know everything is the road to insanity.[9]

> Philosophers have beguiled us with tales about the origin of government about as convincing as the fables we tell children about where babies come from.[10]

> . . . when Congress takes time to pass a bill "increasing the penalty for making false oaths for the purpose of bathing at the government bath house at Hot Springs, Arkansas," one has a feeling that we may be using a cyclotron to warm up a cup of coffee.[11]

> A political party which . . . does not capitalize on its successes by mobilizing the whole power of the government is a monstrosity reflecting the stupidity of professional politicians who are more interested in the petty spoils of office than they are in the control of the richest and most powerful government in the world—like an army of barbarians who, having overrun the city of Baltimore, content themselves with plundering a dime store.[12]

> To manage pressures is to govern; to let pressures run wild is to abdicate.[13]

These are phrases of advocacy. But as an empirical political scientist, democratic philosopher, academic innovator, political commentator, and theorist of change, Schattschneider ranged far beyond his notable pleas for more responsible parties.

---

* I am indebted to my Wesleyan colleagues, Rich- d W. Boyd, Fred I. Greenstein, and Clement E. ose, for their helpful comments on earlier drafts this paper.

[1] *The Wesleyan Argus,* March 5, 1971, p. 2.

[2] Schattschneider's standard for his own writing as its forcefulness and persuasiveness when read oud. His method was to read his work to his wife lorence and then to revise passages to improve eir rhetorical quality.

[3] E. E. Schattschneider, *Party Government* (New ork: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1942), p. 106.

[4] *Party Government,* p. 196.

[5] *Party Government,* p. 197.

[6] E. E. Schattschneider, "Intensity, Visibility, Di- ection and Scope," *American Political Science Re- iew,* 51 (December, 1957), 935.

[7] E. E. Schattschneider, rev. of *American Business and Public Policy* by Raymond Bauer, Ithiel de Sola Pool, and Lewis Dexter, *Public Opinion Quarterly,* 29 (Summer, 1965), 343.

[8] E. E. Schattschneider, "Congress in Conflict," *The Yale Review,* 41 (December, 1951), 181.

[9] E. E. Schattschneider, *The Semi-Sovereign People* (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1960), p. 137.

[10] E. E. Schattschneider, *Two Hundred Million Americans in Search of a Government* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1967), p. 5.

[11] "Congress in Conflict," p. 187.

[12] E. E. Schattschneider, *The Struggle for Party Government* (College Park: University of Maryland, 1948), p. 31.

[13] E. E. Schattschneider, *Politics, Pressures and the Tariff* (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1935), p. 293.

The explication of Schattschneider's wide-ranging commentary holds special dangers. His work reached across three and a half turbulent decades: his first book was published in 1935 and his last in 1969. In different times and contexts, men change their minds without giving notice to the world, and the commentator may mistakenly treat as a static body of thought that which is in fact dynamic.

It appears, for instance, that Schattschneider's views about pressure groups evolved gradually from the harshest condemnation to a recognition that in the "creative process" of policy making, pressure groups, "the most easily organized groups," may be vehicles for thrusting into the public arena problems that have failed of solution in the private sector.

There is, in addition, the special possibility of going astray in discussing the work of one who combines the role of theorist with that of activist. The Committee on Political Parties, for instance, in "Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System," apparently preferred a definition of party membership that encompassed all registered party voters. Schattschneider, who was chairman of the Committee and a member of its drafting committee, had previously been outspoken in his belief that party membership should include only party activists. Austin Ranney poses the dilemma for interpretation: Schattschneider might have "simply changed his mind," or perhaps he "was outvoted on this point in the Committee's deliberations, and being, as he is, a good majoritarian-democrat, went along with the Committee majority."[14]

One steers carefully, then, among expressions of advocacy in searching for the core theory from which Schattschneider derived his stances; and this is nowhere more difficult than in considering "Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System," in which Schattschneider took a leading hand, but which was finally a collegial effort.

The Advocate as Political Scientist

At least since 1950, the majority sentiment in political science has been that advocacy and political studies are incompatible. Schattschneider, however, espoused the opposite principle. Advocacy is inherent in political science because subjects of study, methods of investigation, and standards of evaluation are all val laden. Schattschneider, whose argument th anticipated by almost two decades the contei porary "radical" critique of empirical politic science, forcefully denied that social scienti: could escape their underlying value assum tions.

> . . . it is usually much more difficult to discov the right question than it is to find the answ *It is precisely at this point that the unexamined a unstated assumptions we make are most likely defeat us, for the questions we ask grow out the assumptions we make.* . . . The assumptio we make tend to determine what we investiga what kind of techniques we use, and how evaluate the evidence.[15]

For Schattschneider the "right question" w clear enough, and from it flowed the opport nity to generate and test hypotheses about po tics and then to evaluate political institutio and processes.

> The most legitimate question to be asked in democracy is:—how can people get control of t government? In any other kind of system, tl question cannot be asked at all.[16]

From this broad question of the relationsh of people and government, Schattschneid then made certain assumptions about the ro of political parties in a democracy. This was ε untitled version of contemporary functiona ism.[17] Although party reformers have bee sometimes criticized for their failure to speci whether the "functions" they ascribe to parti are activities which parties actually perform (those which parties should perform in a dem cratic system,[18] Schattschneider's position is u ambiguous.

> I assume that *parties are designed to take ov the general control of the government,* that it

---

[14] Austin Ranney, *The Doctrine of Responsible Party Government* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1953), p. 18, note 29. Ranney prefers the second view of Schattschneider's position.

[15] *Struggle for Party Government,* p. 21. All itali in quoted material are Schattschneider's emphases

[16] *Struggle for Party Government,* p. 22.

[17] Schattschneider's work was identified as a "fun tional" approach by one of his earliest reviewe F. A. Hermans, rev. of *Party Government,* by E. Schattschneider, *Review of Politics,* 4 (April, 1942 241. On the other hand, a commentary on the d velopment of functionalism in political science do not include Schattschneider among the early use of that theory. See Martin Landau, "On the Use Functional Analysis in American Political Science *Social Research,* 35 (Spring, 1958), 48–75. The co fusion about the meaning of functionalism in th study of parties is discussed by Ranney, *Doctrine Responsible Party Government,* pp. 8–9, 157. S also, Frank Sorauf, "Political Parties and Politic Analysis," *The American Party Systems,* ed. Willia Nisbet Chambers and Walter Dean Burnham (Ne York: Oxford University Press, 1967), pp. 48–55.

[18] Ranney, *Doctrine of Responsible Party Gover ment,* pp. 8–10, 157.

> *function of parties to govern.* It seems to me .t the investigation of parties ought to begin with :onception of the purposes of the whole political erprise to be *used as a standard of measure-nt.* The standard of measurement to be applied political parties is therefore:—are the parties e to govern in fact?[19]

us, striving for control of government is th what parties do, although often imper-:tly, and what they are supposed to do. The plication of the general standard of measure-:nt which Schattschneider advances, then, is ıether parties govern in fact—by struggling win office, do parties in fact provide the peo-: a means to control the government?

Schattschneider's concern about the hidden ıumptions of political research and his belief ıt political studies should be guided by the neral question of "how can people get con-ıl of the government" are perhaps best illus-ıted by his critique of early public opinion ıdies. He warned in biting language that these ıdies had condemned the public as ignorant out political affairs without even specifying ıat the people must know to make democracy ›rk.

> ıe implication of public opinion studies ought be resisted by all friends of freedom and de-›cracy; the implication that democracy is a failure cause the people are too ignorant to answer in-ligently all the questions asked by the pollsters. ıis is a professorial invention for imposing pro-ıssorial standards on the political system and de-:ves to be treated with extreme suspicion. Only a dagogue would suppose that the people must pass me kind of examination to qualify for participa-ın in a democracy. Who, after all, are these self-pointed censors who assume that they are in a sition to flunk the whole human race? Their atti-de would be less presumptuous if they could me up with a list of things that people must know. ho can say what the man on the street must know out public affairs? The whole theory of knowledge ıderlying these assumptions is pedantic. Democ-:y was made for the people, not the people for mocracy. Democracy is something for ordinary ople regardless of whether or not the pedants ıprove of them.[20]

The problem is not one of research, but one assumptions, definitions and theory. It arises ›m "a confusion of ideas about what people :ed to know, what the role of the public in a :mocracy is, how the public functions in a de-ocracy."[21]

Schattschneider's critique was not, it should : emphasized, a hostility toward voting studies, but a demonstration of the hidden assumptions and values which lurk in all political research, especially in the evaluation of data. Schattschneider's analysis of the "business and upper-class bias of the pressure system," for instance, was based partly on surveys of the occupations and the socioeconomic ranks of interest group members.[22] This research had a clear application to the central question of political science: the pressure group system, with its business and upper-class bias, does not provide a way for the people to get control of government.

Similarly, Schattschneider's use of voting studies to demonstrate "the law of the imperfect political mobilization of social groups" was more than a clever manipulation of data to determine the electoral influence of organized interest groups. The impulse for his investigation was a belief that neither government nor political parties needed to be as responsive to interest groups as they traditionally had been, for the electoral claims of such groups were vastly exaggerated.[23]

The way in which Schattschneider's basic assumptions informed his research is perhaps most apparent in his best known empirical proposition, his explanation of the two-party system in America.[24] The combination of single member districts and plurality elections, he argued, exaggerates the victory of the majority party by awarding it more seats than its percentage of the vote, and it "discriminates *moderately* against the second party but against the third, fourth, and fifth parties the force of this tendency is multiplied to the point of extinguishing their chance of winning seats altogether."[25] Only a minor party with strongly concentrated sectional strength can hope to win seats. And the presidential election system, because it rewards national majorities, undermines sectional third parties because, even if they are strong enough to win congressional seats in their electoral bastions, they are "doomed to permanent futility . . . in the pursuit of the most important single objective of party strategy,"[26] the presidency.

The structural causes of two-partyism were not, however, merely an interesting observation on the operation of American politics. They were, for Schattschneider, worthy of investigation to show the elements of permanence in the American two-party system and thus to argue the likelihood that more centralized, responsible, and issue-oriented parties would not destroy two-partyism, fueling the rise of many small ideological parties in a multiparty competitive pattern.

---

[19] *Struggle for Party Government,* p. 23.

[20] *Semi-Sovereign People,* p. 135.

[21] *Semi-Sovereign People,* p. 136.

[22] *Semi-Sovereign People,* pp. 30–36.

[23] *Semi-Sovereign People,* pp. 49–52.

[24] *Party Government,* pp. 67–90.

[25] *Party Government,* p. 75.

[26] *Party Government,* p. 83.

The Political Scientist as Democrat

As already shown, Schattschneider, both as advocate and political scientist, was guided primarily by his preference for democracy. But what kind of democracy? Schattschneider's greatest contribution to democratic thought in contemporary political science was not in formulating a definition or advancing a new perspective, but rather in reopening an issue that had mainly laid dormant in American political studies since the second decade of the century. The issue is a commonplace today: how can popular sovereignty be exercised in a modern nation-state?

The problem arose, Schattschneider asserted, because ". . . the controversy about democracy . . . antedates the rise of modern democracy," with the result that "[t]he main lines of the argument were laid down long before anyone had ever seen a real [modern] democratic government at work."[27] Consequently, as the nation-state emerged, democrats continued to think in classical terms. Democracy was defined as "government by the people." But classical democracy was ill-suited to modern nations, for the process of government "by the people" in Athens—whose total population was 30,000, of whom three-fourths were slaves—has little relevance to modern nation-states. The classical concept of government by the people, of popular sovereignty exercised by direct participation in affairs, was kept alive during the rise of democracy in America by the influential writings of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, by the practice of town meetings in New England, and by the rhetoric of politicians like Lincoln, who continually renewed the image of "government by the people."[28] The pervasiveness of the classical ideal of democracy has led to continual confusion about the proper role of the people in American democracy.

The contrary model of democracy was captured, according to Schattschneider, by Jefferson's phrase, "government by consent of the governed."[29] This is a conceptualization that is possible in a modern state where numbers make the classical notion of democracy absurd. But even when it was recognized by democrats that some system of representation would necessarily replace direct participation by citize few obstacles were seen to the full and prec translation of public preferences into puk policy. The way in which this translation woı occur evoked little interest among political p losophers. The result, Schattschneider argu was a disaster for modern political theory.

> So certain were the philosophers that the peo would in fact use their new powers that the wh controversy has been concentrated on the com tence of the masses to direct public affairs. At t point oceans of ink have been wasted. . . . T classical definition of democracy left a great, ı explored, undiscovered breach in the theory modern democracy, the zone between the sovere people and the government which is the habitat the parties.[30]

Leaving aside for the moment Schattschne er's assumption that the "zone between the sc ereign people and the government" necessar is or should be filled by political parties, t general point of his argument was in 1942 revival of a central issue of democracy th continues today to be the most perplexing qu tion of political theory explored by empiri studies. What are the linkages between the sc ereign people and government in a democrac How should they and how do they work?

Schattschneider's answer explicitly discard the argument that what is needed to strength democracy in America is to educate and int est everyone to an extent that "voters can thi about politics the way a United States senat might think about it."[31] The whole theory knowledge underlying such expectations fal fies the reality of modern life. People survive the contemporary world by distinguishing t tween what they must know and what they not need to know or cannot know. In their p vate lives they are required to "place con dence daily in a thousand ways in pharmacis surgeons, pilots, bank clerks, engineers, plu bers, technicians, lawyers, . . . [T]hey reali that it is not necessary to know how to *make* television set in order to buy one intelligently.'

Similarly, the people cannot know enou actually to govern. Indeed, "there is no esca from the problem of ignorance because *nobo knows enough to run the government.*"[33] Pub officials know only slightly more than the or nary citizen, and one who becomes an exp fails the classical test of citizenship because "ɩ expert is a person who chooses to be ignora about many things so that he may know ɩ bout one."[34] The role of the citizen in public ffairs is, therefore, the same as in private maters. In both, "[o]ur survival depends on our bility to judge things by their results and our bility to establish relations of confidence and esponsibility so that we can take advantage of what other people know."[35]

---

[27] *Party Government*, p. 13.

[28] *Two Hundred Million Americans*, pp. 58–61.

[29] *Two Hundred Million Americans*, p. 58.

[30] *Party Government*, pp. 14–15.

[31] *Semi-Sovereign People*, p. 133.

[32] *Semi-Sovereign People*, p. 137.

[33] *Semi-Sovereign People*, p. 136.

Schattschneider's analysis points up a strikng parallel between the modern radical expoents of participatory democracy and the early tudents of public opinion: both found the pubc ignorant and declared a crisis of democracy. The pollsters, of course, blamed the public and rescribed education; the radicals blamed Establishment institutions and preached mass parcipation in open meetings empowered to deide all public questions.

Neither seems to understand Schattschneidr's point that the people cannot know enough o decide everything. "The crisis here," Schattschneider argues, "is not a crisis in democracy but a crisis in theory."[36] And the path or serious political thinkers is to "re-examine he chasm between theory and practice because t is at least as likely that the ideal is wrong as t is that the reality is bad."[37]

Hence the need for a redefinition of popular overeignty in a context of what the people are able and willing to do and to know in a complex modern world. In the nation-state, then,

> *Democracy is a competitive political system in which competing leaders and organizations define he alternatives of public policy in such a way hat the public can participate in the decision-making process.* . . . Conflict, competition, organization and leadership are the ingredients of a working definition of democracy.[38]

It is this need—the need for leadership and organization to define and submit alternative public policies so that the people may choose among them as best they can—that led Schattschneider to resurrect the doctrine of responsible parties and to advocate it so vigorously that the debate virtually dominated political science for a decade. His critique of interest groups, too, flowed from his preference for majority policy decisions made through electoral processes organized by the parties rather than for decisions arrived at in the more restricted arena of pressure politics.

Schattschneider's preference for responsible parties and his critique of interest groups raise two further questions about the nature of his democratic theory: whether the rule of majorities is unlimited, and what protection should be accorded civil liberties. Austin Ranney has argued that the responsible party school assumed that the American people preferred unlimited rule by popular majorities but that in "Toward A More Responsible Two-Party System" such underlying issues of democratic theory were avoided.[39] He reminds us also that responsible parties are an old idea whose time seems never to have come, partly because the American people have not been fully willing to accept majority rule democracy. Such students of parties as A. Lawrence Lowell have believed that the nonmajoritarian nature of parties serves well the antimajoritarian biases of the American people.

It is not clear, of course, that the public actually favors Lowell's version of minority rights, an institutionalized and absolutely effective minority veto over public policy. Americans might alternatively hold some vision of democracy encompassing both majority rule and minority rights, even though the internal contradictions of this vision have been shown both by Ranney and Kendall, and by Dahl.[40] Nonetheless, as long as Americans cling to ideals of democracy, regardless of how logically weak, that are incompatible with unlimited majority rule, the responsible party model remains chimerical. Popular acceptance of majority rule democracy is, in short, the precondition of party reform.

Schattschneider was unambiguous about his preference for unlimited majority rule; he did not, like the *Report,* lay the issue aside as unnecessary for resolution in the advocacy of responsible parties. "There is no democratic reason for slighting the *rule* in majority rule," he said.[41] Political science has been marked by a fear of power *per se.* And this has caused academicians to recoil from responsible parties and other reforms of government which explicitly vest full power in government leaders and political organizations.

Schattschneider believed that this fear of power, and thus of majority rule democracy, had been transmitted by teaching and perhaps by tradition to a large body of the American public. Parties were tainted in the public mind precisely because they did offer the possibility of mobilizing the full *power* of government. This was the main obstacle to the reconstruction of parties in the responsible party mold. "Let us concede that the American people will never create a powerful party system unless they want one."[42] They must first discover that the problems of the nation require a political solution, "that the parties are fit instruments for this use," and that it is not "immoral to organize the democratic forces of the nation."[43]

---

[34] *Semi-Sovereign People,* pp. 136–137.

[35] *Semi-Sovereign People,* p. 137.

[36] *Semi-Sovereign People,* p. 134.

[37] *Semi-Sovereign People,* p. 131.

[38] *Semi-Sovereign People,* p. 141.

[39] Austin Ranney, "Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System: A Commentary," *American Political Science Review,* 45 (March, 1951), 498–499.

[40] Austin Ranney and Willmoore Kendall, *Democracy and the American Party System* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1956), pp. 29–37; and Robert A. Dahl, *A Preface to Democratic Theory* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956), chap. 1. See also a criticism of the Ranney-Kendall position by Thomas Landon Thorson, "Epilogue on Absolute Majority Rule," *Journal of Politics,* 23 (August, 1961), 557–565; and Ranney's response in the same volume, "Postlude to an Epilogue," pp. 566–569.

[41] *Struggle for Party Government,* p. 9.

Schattschneider's advocacy of majority rule democracy was accompanied by occasional evidences of a strong belief in civil liberties. But nowhere did he consider the potential implicit in unlimited majority rule for the infringement of these liberties. Indeed, he discussed liberty only in relationship to promoting majority rule, to assuring the free political action necessary to organize and present alternatives for public approval. Thus, in *Party Government*, he pointed out that the Founding Fathers had constructed a Constitution with a dual attitude toward parties:

> [They] refused to suppress the parties by destroying the fundamental liberties in which parties originate. They or their immediate successors accepted amendments that guaranteed civil liberties and thus established a system of party tolerance, i.e., the right to agitate and to organize. This is the pro-party aspect of the system.[44]

The separation of powers, on the other hand, was the antiparty aspect, because it was designed to exhaust and frustrate the efforts of parties to win full control of the government and to use that control actually to govern.[45]

Freedom of speech, press, and association are also essential for the process of education that must continually occur in successful democracies both to permit minorities to seek majority status and to allow majorities to convince minorities to consent to their decisions.[46] Even pressure groups, so severely criticized in most of his works, are recognized as within the ambit of civil liberties. Schattschneider denounces pressure politics but defends the right of pressure groups to be heard because that right "is intimately associated with a battery of highly valued restrictions on arbitary government and is closely related to the idea of government b consent."[47]

Schattschneider's apparent unconcern wit the potential clash between civil liberties an majority rule can be fully understood only i the light of his attitude on the question c whether democracy is a form of government o a moral system. This issue has occasioned enc less confusion in discussions of democracy, fo popular sovereignty and majority rule cannc be first principles if democracy is conceived a requiring decisions that conform to certain sc cial, economic, or moral philosophies. Ye Schattschneider, the unrelenting advocate o majority rule, professed that democracy was in deed a moral system. His argument was frame in such a way, however, that it did not requir any denigration of the majority rule principle.[4

Simply put, *"democracy is first a state o mind."*[49] It "begins as *an act of imaginatio about people."*[50] This act of imagination is em bodied in the Judeo-Christian tradition, the cul ture of ancient Greece, the common law, th history of western Europe, the Gettsyburg Ad dress, and a host of other sources that hav shaped American thought. The essence of de mocracy as a moral system is the recognitio that men are equal—*"equal in the one dimen sion that counts: each is a human being, infi nitely precious because he is human."*[51]

From this act of imagination flows a mora consensus upon which Schattschneider, too of ten viewed simply as a conflict theorist, rest the democratic state. "As a moral system de mocracy is an experiment in the creation of community. . . ."[52] And the conflict over pol icy, which allows the people by majority vot to control the government, is possible onl within the context of such a community, whos consensus is found in the attitudes of demo cratic citizens toward one another.

"To put it very bluntly, democracy is abou the *love* of people."[53] The essential prerequisit r a democratic society is an attitude toward, a ve of, people by their fellows. If this is susptible to empirical testing, no political scienst has bothered with it. Yet it stands in a huane tradition of western political thought that ught not to be readily discarded in deliberaons about politics. And it seems somehow a ore startling assumption about the nature of emocracy when it comes from a leading emirical political scientist of the modern day ather than from a scholar associated with the ore traditional approach to political philosohy.

---

[42] *Struggle for Party Government*, p. 12.

[43] *Struggle for Party Government*, p. 12.

[44] *Party Government*, p. 7.

[45] *Party Government*, p. 7.

[46] *Two Hundred Million Americans*, p. 88.

[47] *Party Government*, p. 203.

[48] Schattschneider's views about democrary as moral system were first elaborated in a discussio with Dr. Julian Hart of Yale in "Democracy as Moral System," one in a series of television broad casts entitled "The American Government and the Pursuit of Happiness" conducted by Schattschneide on The National Broadcasting Company in 1957 an 1958. Schattschneider won a Freedoms Foundatio Award for the series. Some of these ideas also ap pear in *Semi-Sovereign People*, pp. 104–109. But th main discussion is found in *Two Hundred Millio Americans*, chap. 3.

[49] *Two Hundred Million Americans*, p. 42.

[50] *Two Hundred Million Americans*, p. 46.

[51] *Two Hundred Million Americans*, p. 45.

[52] *Two Hundred Million Americans*, p. 47.

[53] *Two Hundred Million Americans*, p. 43.

Schattschneider's belief in democracy as a oral system illuminates the majoritarian atti-ıde toward civil liberties:

> emocracy is based on a profound insight into uman nature, the realization that all men are nful, all are imperfect, all are prejudiced, and one knows the whole truth. That is why we need berty and why we have an obligation to hear all en. Liberty gives us a chance to learn from ther people, to become aware of our own limitaons, and to correct our bias. Even when we disgree with other people we like to think that they peak from good motives, and while we realize hat all men are limited, we do not let ourselves nagine that any man is bad. Democracy is a potical system for people who are not too sure hat they are right.[54]

iberty, in short, rests finally on democratic atitudes toward others and toward oneself. Love or others combined with a recognition of one's wn limitations make freedom necessary. Instiutional vetoes are thus unnecessary to protect he essential liberties of minorities because the eystone in majority rule democracy is a domiant attitude which upholds minority rights.

Parties, Pressure Groups, and Democracy

Schattschneider's preference for majorityule democracy pervades his commentary on olitical parties and pressure groups. He harply distinguishes the two.

> olitical parties characteristically undertake to get ontrol of the government by nominating canlidates and electing them to office; the object is o get power by winning elections.[55]

> n the other hand, pressure groups are not organized to take over a government in its entirety; hey seek to accomplish specific, relatively narow tasks, to influence policy at selected points, and do not aim at winning the general power to govern.[56]

Parties win the power to govern only when they mobilize majorities. Their legitimacy cannot therefore be questioned, and the policies they make either are sanctioned by majorities or are at least reviewable by them at the next election. Special interest groups, on the other hand, cannot make any claim to represent a body of citizens entitled to set public policy, for they are inherently minority organizations. If they were not, they would displace parties by contesting elections and winning control of government.

Some theorists have objected that electoral majorities, even in a responsible party system, might be merely coalitions of minorities. Schattschneider apparently anticipated this argument, as later paragraphs show, by emphasizing the role of leaders in defining election-day alternatives and conducting the government, and by arguing that electoral cleavages involve an ordering of priorities in which members of coalitions subordinate other goals to the objective(s) around which they are united. This second argument must await further explication in the next section of this paper.

But the earlier discussion of the people's role in a democracy illuminates Schattschneider's first point. By carefully stating the principles on which they seek public support and by appealing directly to the electorate, the party leadership group that wins office has a majority sanction for its entire policy—at least as compared to the mandate that can be asserted for any other policy by any alternative leadership group. Furthermore, because elections involve "relations of confidence and responsibility," elected officials can lay claim to popular trust, subject of course to review in the next election, for decisions on policy matters which were not salient during the campaign.

The interest-group system is the arena not only of minorities, but of particular minorities. Small in scope, encompassing few Americans, it has a probusiness and upper-class bias. The business community is far more completely and

---

[54] *Two Hundred Million Americans,* p. 53.

[55] E. E. Schattschneider, "Pressure Groups Versus Political Parties," *The Annals,* 259 (September, 1948), 17. See also, *Party Government,* pp. 35–39 for a discussion of the nature of parties.

[56] *Party Government,* pp. 187–188. Note Schattschneider's assertion in the same book, pp. 189–190, that pressure politics is not an attempt by a group to become a majority, but rather an attempt by a minority to control policy. He also distinguishes public interest groups, i.e., those whose members will accrue no direct gain from the causes they espouse and which are not limited in membership to those who have such direct interests, from special interest groups which are limited to members who will gain directly from the policies advanced by the group. *Semi-Sovereign People,* pp. 25–29. Also, "Pressure Groups Versus Political Parties," p. 20.

far better organized than other segments of the population.[57] Furthermore, "[t]here is overwhelming evidence that participation in voluntary organizations is related to upper social and economic status . . ."[58] and *"even non-business organizations reflect an upper-class tendency."*[59]

The methods of special interest groups distort democracy and majority rule. In his study of the tariff, Schattschnider reported that the method of giving notice about congressional committee hearings and of conducting these hearings favored groups with experienced lobbyists in Washington. Privileged groups obtained semiconfidential information from congressmen, often because they supported them in previous election campaigns or had other inside connections.[60] Pressure groups exaggerate the size of their membership and the unanimity of their interests.[61] In some cases, association leaders represented positions to congressional committees that had not been approved by their membership or their duly constituted governing bodies. In one case, at least, Schattschneider discovered the "representation of the one by the many" in which "the whole group acts in behalf of one of its members" in lobbying Congress.[62] Congressional committees seemed uninterested in the real size or internal cohesion of groups appearing before them, and the process of representation was thus badly distorted.

But more than the bias and methods of the pressure system condemn it. The popularity of the group theory of politics, Schattschneider argued, has obscured the difference between the public interest and the private interests. The group theorists "describe a majority as a mere aggregate of special interest groups." This is empirically fallacious, according to Schattschneider, because the sum of the organized special interests is not a majority of the people; and it is probably impossible, in any case, to find common grounds to bring together enough groups to make a majority.[63]

Private and special interests must be subordinated to the public interest—"to the great common interests of the nation" at times when there is concern throughout the nation for its continued survival. In the contemporary world,

> [t]he *dominant anxieties* in the community a neither local or special . . . we share these anxieti with most of our fellow citizens because the ult mate question involved in them is the future the community and all it implies.[64]

Concepts of "the public interest" are treache ous in a democracy, for they suggest that ther is a "right answer" or "correct policy" apa from the decisions of majorities. Indeed, th public interest as a fixed, substantive policy i incompatible with Schattschneider's adherenc to majority-rule democracy.

Schattschneider seems, however, to make different point. Among the public interests c the nation are, first, both "the common intere in seeing that there is fair play among privat interests"[65] and the "body of common agreement . . . known as the 'consensus' withou which . . . no democratic system can survive."[6 But beyond procedural rules and agreed firs principles, there are also broad substantive policies, about which people might differ, that address themselves to the commonly recognize problems which threaten the nation's survival.

> The nature of modern public policy (economi stabilization, control of inflation, war mobilizatio of the economy, the integration of defense an foreign policy) creates a new kind of politics. . ., The distinguishing characteristic of modern politic is that it is based on conflicts about the public interest rather than on conflicts among special ir terests. It is the principal function of politics t defend the public interest. The fact that both side are concerned with the public interest condition the conflicts tremendously, but it does not produc unanimity. Conflicts about public policy are rea because there are real differences of opinion abou what the best public interest is in any given situation. . . .[67]

The "public interest" in Schattschneider' second sense, then, is a displacement of th striving for narrow goals of special interes groups that has characterized much of American politics by controversy about issues o much broader public concern that relate to th ultimate survival of the nation. In this formulation, the public interest is a majoritarian concept, because it involves the whole public in political conflict over the appropriate policies t meet national crises, and because it requires th resolution of such conflicts by majorities wh prevail in asserting their view of the public interest.

It is only a short step from this reading o contemporary politics as dominated by th uggle over the public interest to Schattsch- ider's advocacy of party reform. "[P]arty vernment is good democratic doctrine be- use the parties are the special form of politi- l organization adapted to the mobilization of ajorities."[68] The existing parties show the ne- ssity of mobilizing a majority, for that is the y to victory in a two-party system. But the rties as presently constituted are defective, r they ". . . *function effectively in electing ndidates to office but govern badly because ey do not mobilize effectively the men they ect to office*."[69]

---

[57] *Semi-Sovereign People,* pp. 30–32.

[58] *Semi-Sovereign People,* p. 32.

[59] *Semi-Sovereign People,* p. 33.

[60] *Politics, Pressures and the Tariff,* pp. 164–184.

[61] *Politics, Pressures and the Tariff,* pp. 226–249. Also, *Party Government,* pp. 199–203.

[62] *Politics, Pressures and the Tariff,* pp. 271–278. Quoted material at p. 271.

[63] E. E. Schattschneider, "Political Parties and the Public Interest," *The Annals,* 280 (March, 1952), 22–25

[64] "Political Parties and the Public Interest," p. 23

[65] "Political Parties and the Public Interest," p. 22

[66] *Semi-Sovereign People,* p. 23.

[67] "Political Parties and the Public Interest," p. 23

Parties must formulate positions on the great ues of the day, submit them to the voters, d then implement those policies if rewarded th victory at the polls. Leadership and orga- zation by parties in mobilizing majorities at e polls and in government are essential, for odern democracy cannot be—as already inted out—"government by the people" but ly "government by consent of the governed."

> e immobility and inertia of large masses are to litics what the law of gravity is to physics. This aracteristic compels people to submit to a great annelization of the expression of their will, and due to *numbers*, not to want of intelligence. An ectorate of sixty million Aristotles would be ually restricted. . . . The people are a soverign ose vocabulary is limited to two words, "Yes" d "No." This sovereign, moreover, can speak ly when spoken to.[70]

The failure of parties to govern in this way emed to Schattschneider, when he wrote *rty Government* in 1942, a reflection of their lit personality. Their private personality is minated by the desire to wring patronage d plunder from electoral victory, and the rties organize government effectively for this rpose. The public personality of parties, on e other hand, involves formulating issues, bmitting them to the electorate, and convert- g party victory into governmental policy. ere the parties fail because "*a national leader- ip strong enough to control party majorities Congress would also be strong enough to cut f the flow of patronage to the local bosses*."[71]

Other factors contribute to the "failure of e system to convert party politics into party vernment."[72] Sectionalism and localism focus tention on special interests, consolidate re- onal voting around those issues, and draw at- ntion away from larger, national issues involving the public interest. This tendency toward parochialism thwarts attempts to organize the party nationwide and to instill discipline in government around issues on which the party has made national appeals.[73] Constitutional arrangements, such as the separation of powers[74] and the regular scheduling of elections (rather than their being called by the government as a test of policy),[75] further hinder party government.

The nominating process, Schattschneider asserted, also weakens party government. Before the rise of Jacksonian democracy, the congressional caucus permitted national party leaders to make presidential nominations, thus uniting the president and his party in Congress. But the national party convention, on the other hand, is the arena of the state and local bosses who choose delegates; it decentralizes national politics by weakening the role of national party leaders.[76] Nor are nominations by primary an improvement, for primaries are dominated by local bosses and they suggest a theory of intraparty democracy by registered party members that has all the defects of the theory of "government by the people." It might be necessary, therefore, to develop parties within the parties to define and simplify the alternatives for registered party "members."[77] The lesson is that nominations should be made by the active party members who wish to advance policies for electoral approval and who will then feel compelled to carry them out. "Democracy is not to be found *in* the parties but *between* the parties."[78]

In the 1950s, Schattschneider reported changes in American politics that were eroding these old alignments and structures which had been a barrier to a policy-oriented, responsible party system. He welcomed the demise of sectionalism,[79] the decline of the old-style machine,[80] the rise of class politics to replace sectional alignments,[81] the development of national interest groups—especially organized labor—which attached themselves more or less permanently to one of the party coalitions,[82] and the emergence of issues such as employment policy and foreign affairs that had nationwide impact on electoral behavior.[83] Here, he believed, were the raw materials with which to build an issue-oriented, responsible party system.

---

[68] *Party Government*, p. 208.

[69] *Struggle for Party Government*, p. 29.

[70] *Party Government*, p. 52.

[71] *Party Government*, p. 137.

[72] *Struggle for Party Government*, p. 29.

[73] *Party Government*, pp. 111–123.

[74] *Party Government*, pp. 7–9.

[75] *Party Government*, pp. 127–128.

[76] *Party Government*, pp. 99–106.

[77] *Party Government*, pp. 53–61.

[78] *Party Government*, p. 60.

[79] E. E. Schattschneider, "1954: The Ike Party Fights to Live," *The New Republic*, February 23, 1953, pp. 15–17. See also, E. E. Schattschneider, "United States: The Functional Approach to Party Government," *Modern Political Parties*, ed. Sigmund Neuman (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956), pp. 209–214.

[80] "Functional Approach to Party Government," p. 214.

[81] "1954: The Ike Party Fights to Live," pp. 16–17.

Schattschneider, as a leading figure in the Committee on Political Parties, must be regarded as a cosponsor of its extensive proposals for institutional reform as a step toward party government. But in his own writings, Schattschneider's approach was more modest in the particulars and far broader in its assumptions. He urged the development of a party cabinet in which the party's congressional leaders would become the president's principal advisers. The chasm created by the separation of powers would be bridged by each side's giving up some of its prerogatives in order to win others: the president would share his policy-making power with his party in Congress, and they would, in turn, be bound to pass the program agreed on.[84] He hoped also that the system of presidential nominations might be changed to create greater stability in the national party leadership and to give the congressional party a greater voice, although he prescribed no mechanism for achieving either of these goals.[85] The congressional agenda and committee structure, he held, should be changed to displace the power of seniority leaders with the authority of party leaders.[86] Schattschneider's preference for nominations by the party activists has already been mentioned.

Essentially, however, Schattschneider believed that party reform would be achieved, if at all, by persuading large numbers of people that it was necessary for successful self-governance under modern conditions. Thus, although the parties "have been forced to operate in an incompatible constitutional system,"[87] it is nonetheless true that

> [t]he greatest difficulties in the way of the development of party government in the United States have been intellectual, not legal. It is not unreasonable to suppose that once a respectable s tion of the public understands the issue, ways promoting party government through the Consti tion will be found.[88]

"What Does Change Look Like?"[89]

Coupled with Schattschneider's belief th men can change their political arrangements they have the will and intelligence is a theo of the dynamic quality of politics. "The dyna ics of politics has its origin in strife,"[90] he gued, for without strife politics would be an u moving equilibrium. The first dimension conflict is scope: how widespread conflict b comes, and who takes part. Since it is unlike that the addition of new participants to a fig will benefit all viewpoints equally, expandi the scope of conflict changes the balance forces.[91]

The scope of conflict is marked by a lon standing struggle between opposing tendenci toward the "privatization" and "socializatio of conflict.[92] Private conflict is settled witho the intervention of public authority; it may resolved in terms of economic competition, r ciprocal denial of goods and services, priva negotiations, and so forth. "Since contestants private conflicts are apt to be unequal strength, it follows that *the most powerful sp cial interests want private settlements* becau they are able to dictate the outcome as long the conflict remains private. . . . It is the we who want to socialize conflict, i.e., to invol more and more people in the conflict until tl balance of forces is changed."[93] The socializ tion of conflict occurs when the losers in p vate conflict involve public authority in tl struggle. And in a democracy, this "flight government is perpetual."[94]

In American life, a congeries of sentimen supports both the privatization and the socia ization of conflict. Private power settlemen are sanctioned by a long list of deeply root American ideals: individualism, free enterpris and privacy are examples. Other ideas, how ever, support the socialization of conflict— "ideas concerning equality, consistency, equ protection of the laws, justice, liberty, freedo of movement, freedom of speech and associ tion and civil rights. . . ."[95] Democracy is th reatest force for the socialization of conflict, ecause it invites the whole public into every onflict that it wishes to enter.

---

[82] "Functional Approach to Party Government," pp. 213–214. A similar relationship between the business community and the Republican Party is considered in *Semi-Sovereign People*, pp. 42–43.

[83] E. E. Schattschneider, "Party Government and Employment Policy," *American Political Science Review*, 39 (December, 1945), 1147–1157. "Functional Approach to Party Government," pp. 208, 213. *Semi-Sovereign People*, pp. 88–89.

[84] *Struggle for Party Government*, p. 41.

[85] *Struggle for Party Government*, pp. 41–43.

[86] "Congress in Conflict," pp. 188–193.

[87] *Party Government*, p. 207.

[88] *Party Government*, pp. 209–210.

[89] *Semi-Sovereign People*, p. 114.

[90] "Intensity, Visibility, Direction and Scope," 935.

[91] "Intensity, Visibility, Direction and Scope," p 941–942. Also, *Semi-Sovereign People*, pp. 2–3.

[92] *Semi-Sovereign People*, p. 7.

[93] *Semi-Sovereign People*, p. 40.

[94] *Semi-Sovereign People*, p. 40.

[95] *Semi-Sovereign People*, p. 7.

A second dimension of conflict is visibility. The historical tendency of government, chattschneider argues, has been to maintain a ow profile. Painless taxes are designed to divert he spotlight from how much government is dong. The use of private "focal points at which emote controls may be applied,"[96] is a way to bscure government regulatory policies adminstered by others (e.g., druggists in narcotics egulation or financiers in monetary policy). But conflict is becoming more visible: public ervices and foreign affairs overshadow the regulatory role of government, and new adminisrative procedures and different modes of political combat emphasize all that government does. This enlarges the dynamic aspect in contempoary politics.

Intensity is a third dimension of conflict. Political organization in the United States has hisorically assumed widespread public indifference. But there has been a change in the genda of government. Not only is government nore expensive and larger, but it grapples with ssues of the stability and survival of the social ystem. In such a context, especially when conlict becomes more visible, the intensity of pubic feeling may change, and "a very slight change in the temperature of the mass may ave important consequences" for political organization and governmental action.[97]

Finally, there is the direction of conflict—hat is, the way in which people are divided nto factions, parties, classes, and so forth.[98] Many conflicts arise, of course, each dividing people in different ways. But Schattschneider is keptical about too easy acceptance of the concept of cross-cutting cleavages, for it assumes an "equality of conflicts" which "weakens all ntagonisms in the community, producing a ystem of low-grade tensions."[99] Some conflicts displace others, he argues; and the more visible and intense conflicts tend to override the less visible and less intense. As among conflicts, people must set priorities.

Once lines of division are drawn, each side ends to become unified. To keep the coalition together, people must submerge conflicts to which they accord lesser priorities. Consolidaion among those on the same side of a major conflict is as natural a result of strife as division between those who disagree.[100] This creates an element of stability in politics, characterized by majority and minority coalitions which have some permanence.

The dimensions of politics are, of course, related. Direction is determined by the visibility and intensity of conflicts. It is also determined by scope, since the line of conflict will be drawn by those who participate. New participants, with different priorities about the most important directions of conflict, can change the direction. Conversely, the direction of conflict has a bearing on its scope, because a division about issues which are irrelevant to numbers of people may well cause them simply to ignore the fight altogether.

The dimensions of conflict set the strategy of politics. Once a line of conflict is drawn, the leaders of the majority seek continuously to exploit the cleavage so that they can hold their coalition together. If the opposition merely fights along the same line, the system becomes relatively stable. But the strategy of opposition is to seek "a substitution of conflicts" by raising new issues which will exploit the inferior conflicts in the majority coalition by raising their intensity and visibility. Of course, a substitution of conflict which alters the scope of conflict by changing the number of participants could have the same effect.

Schattschneider demonstrated that the Republican coalition of 1896 was based on just such a displacement of conflicts. Those who wanted to exploit class issues were outflanked when, after 1876, racial cleavages became dominant in the South, creating a one-party system dominated by conservative Bourbon Democrats. The campaign of 1896 drove Northern conservatives of both parties into the Republican ranks, thus insuring conservative hegemony in the Northeast. Western radicals were consequently unable to find allies in their attempt to organize a national majority coalition on class lines. They had lost the "conflict of conflicts."[101]

Such displacement of conflicts is, for example, the heart of the strategy urged by Kevin Philips upon the contemporary Republican party.[102] He prescribes the substitution of the issues of race, welfare, crime, and protest, on which the dominant Democratic party is divided, for the economic issues which are the foundation of the majority Democratic coalition. And the counterstrategy developed by Richard Scammon and Ben J. Wattenberg advises the Democrats to take hold of the Social Issue in such a way as to damp down the intensity of feeling about it, thus permitting economic issues to remain the major cleavage in electoral politics.[103]

---

[96] "Intensity, Visibility, Direction and Scope," p. 938.

[97] "Intensity, Visibility, Direction and Scope," p. 938.

[98] "Intensity, Visibility, Direction and Scope," pp. 939–941. Also, *Semi-Sovereign People*, p. 147.

[99] *Semi-Sovereign People*, p. 67.

[100] *Semi-Sovereign People*, p. 64.

[101] *Semi-Sovereign People*, pp. 78–96. Also, "Functional Approach to Party Government," pp. 201–206. For a study of California alignment following Schattschneider's thesis, see Michael Rogin, "California Populism and the 'System of 1896.'" *Western Political Quarterly*, 22 (March, 1969), 170–196.

[102] Kevin P. Phillips, *The Emerging Republican Majority* (New Rochelle, New York: Arlington House, 1969).

The relationship between the direction and the scope of conflict bears on popular participation in politics. Sectional politics depresses both party organization and electoral participation because the direction of issues makes voting futile for minorities and uninteresting for many in the majority party.[104] But even the nationalization of politics and the enlargement of two-party competition does not bring full participation: 40 million Americans continue to abstain in a system where only 60 million participate.

Schattschneider takes no comfort in this nonparticipation. He rejects the theory that it mirrors the satisfaction of the nonvoters. But even if that were true, he warns, mere satisfaction is not enough, for in the modern day, politics is shifting from the distribution of benefits to the apportionment of burdens, and a democracy must therefore find ways of *"changing consent into support, because consent is no longer enough."*[105] The abstention of the 40 million is a crisis of support which imperils American democracy:

> The problem is serious because the forty million are the soft underbelly of the system. The segment of the population that is least involved or most convinced that the system is loaded against it is the most likely point of subversion. This is the *sickness* of democracy.[106]

Schattschneider's 40 million are drawn disproportionately from among the young, the poor, and the racial minorities; and his warning in 1960 that "the present boycott . . . has brought the political system *very near to . . . the limit of tolerance of passive abstention* . . . "[107] was soon realized when some, who reflected the frustration if not the philosophy of the nonvoters, turned from acquiescence to taking their case into the streets. Here indeed was "the revolutionary potential" in America!

Schattschneider also identified with remarkable prescience the causes of abstention amon the potentially revolutionary 40 million. First the boundaries of voting, he said, correspon roughly to the boundaries of the social community—that segment of the population who shar values as well as goods. The others are excluded by a process portrayed by Schattschneider in terms that might later have been advanced as a definition of "institutional racism.'

> If politics is thought of as part of the total socia experience of people, there must be a great dea about that experience that contradicts the democratic professions of the community.
>
> . . . The system operates largely through processes of which people are unaware. Stratificatio and isolation and segregation are to a great exten the unconscious by-products of the way the social system operates to organize the community It is not necessary to speak one unkind or ungracious word to keep a poor man out of a ric man's church or college or club or hotel. Anyon familiar with the compulsive standards of dres and play in American schools can understand wh the children of the poor drop out of school eve when schooling is free. It is not enough to sa that the poor are not hungry and cold. People ca suffer from humiliation and degradation as muc as from hunger. . . .[108]

Second, although the 40 million are numerous enough to change the direction of conflic by enlarging its scope, the organization of politics inhibits them, for

> . . . the problem of nonvoting is to be found in the way in which the alternatives are defined, the way in which issues get referred to the public, the scale of competition and organization and abov all what issues are developed.[109]

But neither the pressure system nor the nonprogrammatic parties organize the 40 million or present them with meaningful alternatives that will draw them into the electoral process where their numbers would be decisive.

This is only an example of a larger principle about conflict: all *"organization is itself a mobilization of bias in preparation for action."*[110] The existing organization of politics reflects the bias of the 60 million. And the strategy of politics is precisely to maintain such bias, for *"the definition of the alternatives is the supreme instrument of power."*[111]

Conflicts are kept out of the public arena by invoking well-established community ideals. They are also checked by providing no orum for them or by creating no public agency with power to do anything about them. Reducng visibility is another strategy: thus the serecy of internal processes in the Supreme Court and the Cabinet, the confidentiality of iplomatic exchanges, and many of the proceures of the legislature have this effect. Every organization and structure reflects bias, for it avors visibility for some groups exploiting ome issues but not for others.

---

[103] Richard Scammon and Ben J. Wattenberg, *The Real Majority* (New York: Coward-McCann, 1970).

[104] "Functional Approach to Party Government," pp. 203–205.

[105] *Semi-Sovereign People,* pp. 111–112. Quoted passage at p. 112.

[106] *Semi-Sovereign People,* p. 104.

[107] *Semi-Sovereign People,* p. 109.

[108] *Semi-Sovereign People,* p. 108.

[109] *Semi-Sovereign People,* p. 110.

[110] *Semi-Sovereign People,* p. 30.

[111] *Semi-Sovereign People,* p. 68.

The direction of conflict hinges, finally, on the morale, self-confidence and security of the ndividuals and groups who must challenge the dominant groups in the community in order to raise an opposition. People are not likely to tart a fight if they are certain they are going to be severely penalized for their efforts. In this ituation repression may assume the guise of a false unanimity."[112] This shutting off of conflict before it starts has been recently rediscovered n political science in the concept of "nondecisions" in which "demands for change in the exsting allocation of benefits and privileges in the community can be suffocated before they are even voiced. . . ."[113]

Although Schattschneider thus illuminates the dimensions and processes of conflict, he does not give as satisfactory an explanation of how change occurs. On the one hand, his work emphasizes that change occurs when men have the will and intelligence; thus parties can be reorganized to govern effectively and to alter the direction and scope of conflict. On the other hand, he argues that the party system is "a function of politics," by which he means that it reflects the dominant issues of the day rather than the purposeful leadership and organization of politics. Thus the policy revolution of 1932 and the second revolution of World War II were not initiated by Democratic party leaders but were rather thrust on them from outside the political system.[114]

This latter approach is elaborated in *Two Hundred Million Americans in Search of a Government,* in which Schattschneider had apparently begun a new analysis of the nature of politics and of change. "To a large extent," he wrote, "politics deals with the *results* of changes that originate outside the political system."[115]

> The life of the nation is the source of politics. . . . The cycle is apt to begin in the private sector because that is where almost anyone can make a beginning by himself. The private life of the community is the breeding ground of millions of initiatives; later when the chain reaction gets out of hand the government is involved.[116]

Delay is inherent in such a process, for it takes a long time for private agitation to be tested. If it catches on, there is finally a socialization of the conflict. Problems in the private sector involve more and more people; but private attempts to deal with some of these problems are unsatisfactory. Pressure groups, because they are easily organized, inject issues into the governmental process, where they are first dealt with by speeches in the legislature, the introduction of bills, hearings, inquiries, commissions, and the rest. Only then, if an issue stoked by individuals and interest groups becomes a contagion among the public, do parties and candidates pick it up. Even then, consideration of the problem is just beginning.[117]

The nature and length of this process of change temper some of Schattschneider's earlier conclusions about the need for swift action by majoritarian political structures. "Why is a Generation the Proper Period of Time for the Study of Politics?" he asks.[118] Because "ideas govern the world."[119] Schattschneider shows how dramatically the vocabulary of politics changes from generation to generation. Changes in language reflect changes in ideas which in a democracy gradually impose themselves upon public institutions and policy.[120] Not only must an idea be expounded and introduced into the public arena, it must be shaped and reshaped in the search for a majority. Acceptance of new ideas and changes in policy are linked to the changing population.

> Every year death extinguishes the memories of nearly two million Americans while about four million Americans are born with no memories. How much obstinate, hardshell opinion is lost by this process of population replacement? . . . Time refutes a million illusions. Much of the resistance to change is caused by baseless fears about new people, new liberties, changes in the status of people and changes in the distribution of wealth. Time proves that many of these fears have been groundless; old conflicts are resolved and new policies gain acceptance because people cannot help learning and changing their minds.[121]

Nor does the process stop when a majority is assembled and a policy enacted. In a noncoercive democracy, the minority must continue to be persuaded even after they have lost the vote. And policy must continually be reshaped to meet their most persuasive objections. As in building a majority, the consent of minorities is related to generational changes and the obsolescence of old fears.

---

[112] *Semi-Sovereign People,* p. 8.

[113] Peter Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz, *Power and Poverty* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970), p. 44.

[114] "Functional Approach to Party Government," pp. 206–208.

[115] *Two Hundred Million Americans,* p. 92.

[116] *Two Hundred Million Americans,* p. 93.

[117] *Two Hundred Million Americans,* pp. 94–95.

[118] *Two Hundred Million Americans,* chap. 5.

[119] *Two Hundred Million Americans,* p. 99.

[120] *Two Hundred Million Americans,* chap. 6.

[121] *Two Hundred Million Americans,* pp. 83–84.

The timetable for change in a consensual democratic nation is a long one. The whole process of government with its structural complexities, becomes a vehicle, first, for socializing conflict[122] and then for gradually hammering out and winning acceptance for majoritarian policies. "Much of the sense of frustration that people feel about the American political system is due to the fact that they take a very short-range view of the political process."[123]

This analysis puts change in a long-term perspective, expands the horizon of political analysis far beyond the decision-making process, and focuses anew on the importance of the private sector in a democracy. But it is also at odds with Schattschneider's earlier views. The people are expected to know a great deal about public affairs; change flows from widely based, long-term public discussion rather than from party leaders who submit simplified and manageable alternatives to the voters.

The generational theory of change ignores, furthermore, the scope and bias of the political system. The upper-class bias of the pressure system and the alienation of the 40 million from the electoral process mean that the disadvantaged will not be so capable of sustaining the extensive activity that is necessary to promote change. Michael Lipsky's study of protest as a political resource emphasizes that groups representing the disadvantaged are impoverished in the resources needed for ordinary political action and that they are most susceptible to the ravages of delay because their constituency lacks political efficacy and is only marginally within the sociopolitical system.[124] Schattschneider's most recent analysis seems, therefore, both to alter his earlier view about the role of the public in affairs and to downplay the differential effects on groups of the scope and bias of the system.

Perhaps Schattschneider's commentary was addressed to those emerging authoritarian demands for immediate change on nonnegotiable terms just as his earlier writings warned of the dangers to democracy of excluding the 40 million. Time and circumstance may have invited him to turn his mind toward a different prol lem, but he left nonetheless a contradiction i his philosophy about the exercise of popul sovereignty and about change in a democrat polity.

In Retrospect

E. E. Schattschneider was one of those wh in the 1930s and 1940s, set political science o its present course. He disputed the worth of a older scholarship devoted entirely to the de scription of statutory and constitutional prov sions and of formal institutional arrangement He propounded a study of politics that ac vanced hypotheses and gathered data to te them.

But he was not a proponent of value-free p litical science. He believed, first, that prefer ences were inherent in the subjects studied, th assumptions behind the hypotheses advance and the evaluation of data. More important however, he argued that political science *ough* to address questions of philosophy and publi affairs that had bearing on how democrati government should in fact be organized.

His impatience with political science tha was not applied to these purposes was apparen at both ends of his professional career. Early h warned that volume after volume on politica philosophy discussed democratic thought wit no notice of the political parties that were s crucial to organizing popular expression in th nation-state. In his last book, at a time whe the pendulum had swung almost entirely to a behavioral approach to politics, he causticall defined political science as "a mountain of dat surrounding a vacuum" and he wryly reporte in his study of political words that in 1815 empiricism was defined as "a form of quackery."[125]

Because Schattschneider deliberately se himself the role of advocate, many of his judgments were rhetorically overdrawn. But his characteristic stances on the nature of political science set in high relief the essential tenet that informed his life and work: He was first a democratic philosopher and partisan, and he was a political scientist only as far as that was useful in discovering and advocating means by which the people could indeed get control of the government. His empirical investigations were all directed to this overriding purpose. And while time has defeated the idea of party reform, his study of pressure groups, the two-party system, the changing nature of party alignments, and—perhaps most important—the dynamics of change and the socialization of conflict con-ue as major contributions to understanding olitics.

---

[122] "Intensity, Visibility, Direction and Scope," p. 94.

[123] *Two Hundred Million Americans,* p. 81.

[124] Michael Lipsky, "Protest as a Political Resource," *American Political Science Review,* 62 (December, 1968), 1144–1158.

[125] *Two Hundred Million Americans,* pp. 8, 103.

Schattschneider's main monument in schol- ship is not, however, an investigation of poli- cs, but rather a question. By reviving and in- sting upon the question of how popular sover- gnty can be expressed in a modern demo- atic society, he has influenced the direction of e best writing about politics until the present me.

What is less well acknowledged is the moral ias from which Schattschneider asked that uestion. He stood squarely in the Western hilosophic and religious tradition that trea- red the inherent worth of each man; and he ombined this moral assumption with an En- ghtenment belief in the capacity of men to ake intelligent collective decisions by a process of rational discourse. All of Schattschneider's political science was built on these ethical assumptions. This temper of his work was best captured in his epitaph for another.

> He paid us the great compliment of thinking that we were *interested in public affairs and could* understand what politics was about. . . . He did *not think the way to a man's heart was through* his stomach; he thought the way to a man's heart was *through his head! To him, democracy made* sense because public discussion might be used to *enlightened the people. . . . The formula is extremely* simple. All of us can understand it and all of us can practice *it. . . . Reasonableness was essential* because he addressed himself to the minds of the people. He wanted us to *think. The purpose was* essential, though he never gave up on anybody no *matter how much they might have opposed his* views.

The Grassroots of a Discipline: A Review of Some Introductory Texts in Political Science*

ALAN C. ISAAK
Western Michigan University

Several kinds of payoff might result from a comparative review of books which introduce, summarize, or characterize a field of study. Most obvious is assistance in selecting texts for introductory courses. Another less directly utilitarian but perhaps more interesting consequence is the impression such a review gives of the field. The books under consideration are not long descriptive introductory texts but instead relatively brief attempts to capture some of the essential features of contemporary political science. If successful such a book should give us a good idea of what a discipline is all about. This review will evaluate seven books in light of several issues which concern their appropriateness for use in introductory courses; but its main objective is to consider them in a broader perspective to see if they give us a better overall grasp of the discipline. Indeed, some of these books are themselves contributions to political knowledge.

The seven books under consideration can be placed roughly into one of three categories, each category representing a strategy for conceptualizing and introducing political science. Two (Strum and Shmidman; and Murphy) take a "Brief Overview" approach; three (Dahl; Strickland, Wade, and Johnston; and Tinder) a "Central Questions or Concepts" approach; two somewhat different books (Beam and Thorson) take what can be described as "The Way to Look at Politics" approach.

Books in the first category make the most conscious effort to tell the student what political science is all about and how political scientists occupy their time. They examine such topics as the historical development of politic science, including the movement from tra tionalism to behavioralism; its basic orient tions and subdivisions; some leading a proaches and methodologies; and the relatio ship between political science and the other s cial sciences. Given the brevity of these book such topics are at best only skimmed. The tv books also include chapters on how to stu political science; how to write term papers ar book reports; and where to look for politic data. In addition, they both provide useful bi liographies for those wishing to do furth reading. This is a worthwhile supplement f beginning students of political science, esp cially those who plan to major in the subje Since the books in this category are designe specifically for introductory courses, or should expect to find in them only the simple kinds of analysis. But they might also be use at more advanced levels as indicators of ho political scientists see their discipline.

The books in the second category use a di ferent strategy. They do not discuss the fiel of political science but instead explicate som of the basic concepts and issues that concer political scientists. Despite a common emph sis, the three books in this category approac their task differently. The Strickland, Wad and Johnston volume and the Dahl book ar behaviorally oriented, emphasizing empiric concepts and theory. The Tinder volume, o the other hand takes a more traditional, philo sophical approach, combining empirical an normative concerns and in emphasizing th "perennial question" of politics, e.g., "Are me unequal in essence?" "Is it justifiable for gov ernments to do evil in order to accomplis good?" "Should governments appropriate th major facilities for production and distribu tion?"

There is considerable overlap among th books in regard to topics covered, but given th dissimilarity of orientations, these topics ar handled somewhat differently in each. Take for instance, the concept of power. Dahl an Strickland et al. are concerned with the mean ing of power and its scope and distribution i the political system, all conceptual and empiri cal issues; Tinder, in his analysis of power, ask such primarily normative questions as, "Is i ood to possess and use power?" and "Who ould be entrusted with power?"

---

* George Beam, *Usual Politics* (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1970. Pp. 196. $3.95.)
Robert Dahl, *Modern Political Analysis* (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1970. Pp. 118. $4.50.)
Robert E. Murphy, *The Style and Study of Political Science* (Glenview, Illinois: Scott, Foresman, 1970. Pp. 136. $2.25.)
D. A. Strickland, L. L. Wade, and R. E. Johnson, *A Primer of Political Analysis* (Chicago: Markham, 1968. Pp. 106. $1.95.)
Phillippa Strum and Michael Shmidman. *On Studying Political Sciences* (Pacific Palisades, California: Goodyear, 1969. Pp. 90. $1.95.)
Thomas Landon Thorson, *Biopolitics* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1970. Pp. 216. $3.95.)
Glenn Tinder, *Political Thinking* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1970. Pp. 147. $2.95.)

Although both the Dahl and the Strickland al. volumes are behaviorally oriented, they iffer in several important respects. Dahl's aproach is both more sophisticated and more aditional in its structure. Thus, it is organized round some of the typical issues raised by potical scientists ("What is Politics?" "Similaries and Differences in Political Systems," "Potical Conflict, Coercion and Popular Governent"); but it analyzes these issues by rigorusly applying a conceptual scheme based on ower and conflict and by synthesizing much ontemporary research and theorizing. The trickland, Wade, and Johnston work is less amitious in scope and depth. It attempts to expliate and relate a number of empirical concepts uch as "decision," "conflict," and "opinion" hich are central to political science. The obective seems to be to provide a basic concepual foundation for students of politics and to uggest a number of hypotheses for use in exlaining political phenomena.

The third category includes two books which ive a more impressionistic and selective renlering of political science than one finds in the ther books. Beam and Thorson concentrate on vhat they think are a few of the significant feaures of political science without attempting to utline the discipline comprehensively. Thus, to greater extent than the other books, they are learly more than introductory texts, although hey might be used with profit in introductory ourses. Their characterizations have a negative ast, for each book begins with a critique of the liscipline that claims in essence that political cientists have been misdirected and misleading n the way they have gone about their work. Beam and Thorson suggest ways for reorienting olitical scientists so that their work can beome more fruitful. Significantly, both see as a asic shortcoming of modern political science ts apparent inability to deal adequately with olitical change and their somewhat polemical uggestions point in the direction of more dynamic models. Beam makes much of the political scientist's proclivity to employ equilibrium models and suggests that given the instability of most political systems, disequilibrium would be a more useful central concept. Thorson's methodologically more sophisticated analysis includes a defense of models which view politics as an evolutionary process.

Let us now compare the advantages and disadvantages of each of the three strategies exemplified in the texts under review. The "Brief Overview" is the most useful if the objective is a rapid survey of political science. But, the very brevity and simplicity put added burdens on the instructor to cover in sufficient depth the topics mentioned. For a primary concern is the payoff one can expect from a strategy which mentions issues, concepts, and historical developments with a minimal amount of supporting analysis —a kind of conceptual namedropping. As long as they are employed for setting the stage at the beginning of a course their contribution can be significant. But as the only source of knowledge these books are inadequate.

The "Central Questions and Concepts" approach has great potential usefulness but at the same time more potential for misdirection. Because it attempts more, it runs a greater risk of misrepresenting political science to beginning students, although all the books reviewed manage to avoid this error. The dangers of parochialism and idiosyncracy are ubiquitous: It is one thing to devise a ground-breaking paradigm for consideration by one's colleagues; it is something else to summarize the main concerns of your discipline through a set of concepts. So it is obviously more difficult to write an adequate "Central Questions and Concepts" book than one of the "Brief Overview" variety because so much depends upon the questions and concepts selected. But if the selecting is done with care, the book can provide the soundest kind of introduction, for the student is not simply told what concepts are important in political science. He actually sees how basic political analysis is carried out and perhaps even begins to do some himself. And beyond its pedagogical functions the book may contribute to the synthesis of knowledge in its field.

The third kind of book; "How to Look at Politics," runs an even greater risk of idiosyncratic analysis. But because such books are not designed to be used as the central texts in introductory courses, this tendency is not necessarily dangerous. In fact, the most significant function of both *Usual Politics* and *Biopolitics* is to stimulate discussion which will lead to a critical examination of accepted political thinking. Surely, there is a place for such an examination, but in the introductory setting something of a more straightforward nature must be read first to ground the critical analysis. This suggests that the books in the third category should be of greatest use to: (1) introductory students who have already been exposed to some of the basic concepts and assumptions of political science; (2) more advanced political science students; and (3) professional political scientists.

It might now be appropriate to examine

some of the books (primarily those in categories two and three) individually and in greater detail to learn what each can tell us about the nature of contemporary political science, its concerns and methods. Tinder's book indicates that some political scientists are still interested in value questions. Most of the propositions he considers are either normative or instrumental. The latter, which are more numerous, are ultimately empirical (how do we achieve goal X?) and hence are to be answered presumably by going to the appropriate data. Instead, however, Tinder consults political philosophers. This approach can be criticized on the grounds that these are the wrong sources, and that contemporary political scientists have sought the answers to factual questions more systematically than have their more normatively oriented ancestors.

But such a criticism does not really take into account what Tinder is up to. He does not try to answer any question definitively but instead presents a series of alternative answers from the writings of traditional political philosophers. Using the "old masters" as a source of hypotheses is one of the most effective ways to incorporate their work into contemporary political analysis. For in addition to normative analysis, they engaged in empirical speculation, often producing the kind of instrumental propositions Tinder is interested in. Take, for instance, his treatment of the question, "Can any real unity be achieved without abolishing classes?" Tinder begins by briefly describing the Marxian response. Then he contrasts it with Burkean conservatism—"class divisions are assumed to be just and necessary" (p. 34), and with modern liberalism—"a measure of unity can be achieved without abolishing classes—at least there is hope of abolishing classes peacefully" (p. 35). That these ideas cannot be thoroughly developed in several pages is obvious. But to bring them together as alternative answers to a crucial political question is surely useful. It is nevertheless probably true that Tinder's book is more appropriate for use in topically oriented political philosophy courses. Still, it does get across to contemporary students of politics that the systematic study of politics, especially the process of hypothesis formulation, did not begin twenty-five years ago.

The most significant feature of *A Primer of Political Analysis* is its format, which has clearly been influenced by Harold Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan (Lasswell wrote the Foreword). *Power and Society* was of course a ground-breaking work, noteworthy for its attempt to formulate a set of interrelated hypotheses constructed from rigorously defin concepts. Strickland, Wade, and Johnston car on this tradition. They introduce politics by d scribing the first steps of political analysis they see it; defining concepts, making assumptions and deriving theorems from them. T book begins with eight basic assumptions abo political man which the authors believe warra the label "self-evident" within the context contemporary political science. For instance, is assumed that human and therefore politic behavior is goal-oriented, that political acto have both similar and dissimilar wants and th humans and therefore political systems ha limited amounts of energy to expend. Usi these along with concepts which are define and explicated throughout the book, Stricklan et al. present "proofs" of a number of the rems or hypotheses. Several of these h potheses ("Without coercion, there can be n political system," for instance) are formul tions of the great issues of politics, the kinds questions with which Tinder is concerned. Ot ers are more specific and contemporary, bein derived from systems theory, game theory, conflict theory, and other modern models of pol tics.

It is important to note that the authors ar not trying to establish political truth but rathe to demonstrate the process of political analysi Thus, with some theorems, alternative proo are presented, and with others, a theorem an its contradiction are given. The value of thi approach lies in its rigor and in the fact tha the student comes to see political science a an ongoing activity at an early stage of his development. That is, he watches as meaningfu propositions are constructed from the basi building blocks of science—concepts and assumptions. That beginning students are bein exposed to this kind of systematic presentatio is a hopeful sign. The main problem is to successfully carry out the strategy in a very shor book. One could, for instance, argue that th concepts discussed in one chapter are not sufficiently related to those in other chapters. Thu while the book has structural unity, it could us more substantive cohesiveness. But, if the book is better conceived than executed, the reaso lies to a great extent in the significance of th approach. What it tells us is that political science has progressed enough so that fairly sophisticated strategies can be used to introduc its substance and methodology. It is also encouraging to observe attempts to return to th sources of contemporary political science, leading one to appreciate the considerable continuity in the production of political knowledge.

Dahl's volume is the most fully developed and comprehensive of those under consideration, drawing extensively upon the results of recent research to support its analysis. And, unlike many other books of its genre, it actually incorporates research findings into the analysis, instead of artificially putting them in as an afterthought or selling point. For this reason, *Modern Political Analysis* is as useful at the more advanced level as it is at the introductory level. This impression is reinforced by the "To Explore Further" section which contains a set of rather high-level readings. Despite the book's relatively sophisticated nature, however, if the instructor of the introductory course takes the time, more can be extracted from this book than from any other in the group. It covers the basic concepts of political science—power, conflict, political behavior—and includes a very worthwhile chapter on political evaluation, an area too often ignored or superficially treated in introductory courses.

Dahl's discussion of political evaluation is worth a closer look because one rarely finds so sound an examination of this important type of political analysis. In recent years an increasing number of political scientists have come to recognize that value judgments are inevitable in political analysis. Dahl's chapter on political evaluation is important because of its emphasis, unusual in an introductory text, on second-order questions. Thus, instead of trying to decide which type of political system is best, or what values a political system should attempt to achieve, he classifies and analyzes the justifications given by those who defend normative political propositions. The discussion relies heavily on the work of Felix Oppenheim; justice is done to both cognitive and noncognitive positions. The inclusion of a chapter devoted to metaquestions in an introductory text suggests that political science has matured.

Although the analysis of value judgments is a valuable part of *Modern Political Analysis*, perhaps its most worthwhile contribution is the foundation it lays for comparative analysis, especially in the two chapters devoted to "Similarities in Political Systems" and "Differences in Political Systems." The analysis is structured around such topics as the distribution of political resources and influence, methods of conflict resolution and the development of legitimacy.

As I have already implied, the books written by Beam and Thorson are the most distinctive of the lot because each is more a characterization and critique than a survey of political science. Instead of analyzing a political hypothesis from several alternative frames of reference, they argue for a particular orientation. While the two books are very different, they share a basic dissatisfaction with contemporary political science. Beam's criticism is directed primarily at the substance of political science, Thorson's at its methodology. Each critique seems to be based on a reaction to the static equilibrium models which have typically characterized political science (in Beam's language, "Usual Politics"). The main objective in both cases is to formulate models and theories which emphasize political change, the characteristic they see as basic to politics.

Beam's critique is more impressive than his final recommendations. He attempts to take apart Madisonian political theory and interest group pluralism, identified as dominating political science. As he sees it, they are based on three principles: (1) equilibrium, "the state of balance between nation-states or powers of any kind" (p. 95), which according to Beam is both descriptive and prescriptive; (2) determinism, "the postulation that one event or group of events calls forth its consequence—a consequence that cannot be mitigated" (p. 127); and (3) an emphasis on political procedure rather than substance. He then attempts to link each principle to a tendency in American politics. For instance, Beam posits a relationship between a society's acceptance of determinism and widespread psychological resignation of citizens; that is, when a society comes to believe that no event just happens, lower levels of efficacy become commonplace, and alienation begins to set in. This is an interesting but at best tenuous relationship, for not only does it link a philosophical principle to behavioral tendencies, but its interpretation of the philosophical principle is questionable. For as it is used by contemporary thinkers, determinism does not imply inevitability. We can look for the causes of political events without becoming fatalists. Determinism is after all a methodological assumption. The loss of efficacy is a societal condition of great import, but perhaps there are more effective ways to explain it.

Beam carries out the same kind of analysis with his other two principles, relating the principle of equilibrium to the tendency of Americans to believe in neutral, self-correcting government, and relating the principle of equilibrium to the tendency of the American system to de-emphasize substantive values. Perhaps, to do justice to Beam's argument the three relationships should be viewed together, as indicators of a trend he finds alarming both in American society and in American political science.

Beam's alternative to "usual politics" emphasizes substantive values and increased political activity on the part of the people, aiming at the take-over of the centers of political power, all within the view that political equilibrium is unrealistic and political change is basic.

Along with Dahl's contribution, the work of Thorson is the most significant, but for very different reasons. His task is not to summarize but to stimulate and activate. This he does admirably. Thorson clearly articulates the uneasiness many political scientists feel when confronted with the typical model of politics. He sees the main shortcoming of these models as the failure to consider change, flowing from a frequent tendency to copy the natural sciences without a full understanding of what the real limits and possibilities of these more sophisticated disciplines are. This point is valid, but many social scientists are aware that while all sciences share certain basic assumptions, there are significant differences between the natural and social sciences, calling for a variety of methodologies.

Thorson's critique of political science is misleading also because his concentration on the work of David Easton suggests an apparent identity between behavioralism and systems theory. After all, systems theory is only one behavioralist strategy and it has been criticized on a number of grounds by behavioralists themselves. In short, while Thorson points out many questionable methodological assumptions of contemporary political science, he too often overstates his case.

Perhaps his most significant contribution is the suggestion, really the basic theme of *Biopolitics,* that political scientists should seriously consider biological-evolutionary models of politics. These models, he feels, adequately account for change and development and recognize what to him is the basic fact that politics is part of the evolutionary process. To Thorson this means analyzing politics by concentrating on the specific stages through which a given political system has developed rather than trying to formulate a general theory which can explain the development of all political systems. The latter approach usually forces one to glos over many of the essential features of system and so is often no explanation at all. The basi distinction, then, according to Thorson, is between universalist and evolutionary models.

As we said at the outset, one of the primar reasons for examining introductory texts is t see what they tell us about the state and natur of their discipline. In summarizing these varie texts, one notes the following: (1) We hav reached the point in the development of contemporary political science where we can summarize its main concerns and concepts to beginning students. This requires a certai amount of disciplinary confidence—confidenc that we have something to introduce. Eve more important, there is considerable agreement on what the central concerns are. (2) I is possible to formulate fairly straightforwar and rigorous conceptual schemes to present basic hypotheses about politics. (3) More substantively, it seems clear that there is dissatisfaction in the discipline, and one of its primary targets is the static model of politics so widely employed. Many political scientists are searching for models which will enable them to dea more effectively with political change. (4) There is continued interest in value analysis both at the first-order normative level and second-order meta-level. Tinder's book represents the first, Dahl's the second type of analysis. (5) If the preceding four propositions have any validity, then introductory books are of crucial importance. The method of exposure will shape a student's interest in and orientation toward political science. Furthermore, such books often function as significant syntheses of existing knowledge or starting points for new approaches. One of the best ways to clear away the undergrowth of a discipline is to attempt to identify its basic structure, as these introductory books attempt to do. It is clear, then, that introductory texts do more than introduce beginning students to political science.

OOK REVIEWS

s **Partis Politiques.** Edited by Jean Charlot. (Paris: Librairie Armand Colin, 1971. Pp. 255. Fr. 9.80.)

Another *Les Partis Politiques* has been pub- hed by the same house that produced Mau- ce Duverger's work of that title in 1951. The rlier volume was the controversial work of a ngle hand; *Les Partis Politiques* of 1971 is an thology of 48 selections drawn from the holarship of seven nations. However, the ex- nsive introductory comments to the five sec- ons into which this book is divided, and the ture and unusual organization of the mate- al, combine to make of this newer work an iginal and intriguing contribution to the litera- re on parties.

Each section is organized to give point to a ifferent aspect of the party phenomenon. The rst, subtitled "Un phénomène récent," stresses at parties as presently defined (Charlot cities aPalombara's four indices: lasting organiza- on, complex organization, will to power, and uest for popular support) have not been ound very long. Representative speculation n the origins of parties is included, for ex- mple, Duverger's in-Parliament/out-of-Parlia- ent dichotomy and Janda's reminder that ome parties are formed out of other parties. art Two, "Un phénomène complexe," con- ders the three dominant approaches to party: ructural, ideological, and functional, and harlot's introductory comments usefully sort ut the central concerns of each. He is best, s befits a colleague of Duverger, in his analy- is of the work on party organizations. His riticism of Michels and Eldersveld as equally rring in the direction of overgeneralization is ell-taken, and his elucidation of the analytical ools this approach has produced is clear and elpful. Selections from the appropriate experts re included here, and it is worthwhile to re- iew Merton's classic defense of functional- sm against the charge of conservative bias and avau's catalogue of the supportive functions hat even the most virulently antisystem party annot help performing. Perhaps of more im- nediate interest, however, are the two papers rom the Center of Political Lexicology at the Ecole normale supérieure de Saint-Cloud, in which the shifting development of French po- itical ideology is traced by content analysis of racts and *proclamations de foi*. The authors de- clare their "conclusions can only be linguistic"; hus whether greater repetition of the same key words makes a party's propaganda monotonous and dogmatic or coherent and persuasive remains, as always, "libre au lecteur" to decide.

The emphasis of Part Three, "Un phénomène partiel," is on parties in relationship to other parties and groups or to the system at large. Excerpts from Lenin, Ionescu, Apter, and others illustrate these perspectives, but suprisingly Charlot argues that Raymond Aron is "on solid ground when he reduces . . . the opposition between totalitarianism and democracy to that of the *unicité* or multiplicity of parties" (p. 119). The integrative function of single parties is discussed, but not a centimeter of space is alloted to those who argue for the representativeness of third world single parties. (In general, coverage of work on non-Western parties is poor throughout; only African studies are mentioned and these are consistently misinterpreted and misrepresented.)

If Part Three reveals an unusual bias, however, Part Four presents a point of view often ignored. Entitled "Un phénomène contesté," it sets forth the principal antiparty arguments, both individualistic (Ostrogorski, Weil, Michels) and nationalistic (Napoleon, De Gaulle, Debré). As Charlot reminds us, American acceptance of parties as fully legitimate is unusual; Simone Weil's prescription of penal punishment for anyone caught giving "a defined character" to membership in a group is less startling in the European context.

Through careful selection and organization of materials in the final section, "Typologies," —including his own paraphrase of Duverger's typology, Wildavsky's critique, and strategically chosen excerpts from Neumann, McKenzie, Kirchheimer, Blondel, Sartori, and his own work—Charlot makes clear the distance traveled since the first *Les Partis Politiques*. Here we trace the rise of the pragmatic and impersonal vote-oriented party of the postwar years. Kirchheimer's Catch-All party, Sartori's Electoral Mass Party, and Charlot's Parti d'Electeurs are all nonideological, popular (but in a plebiscitarian sense only) and, above all, aggregative. But at the same time that this new (or newly recognized) party type must be accommodated in new taxonomies, the questions of *party system* type, and of the relationship, if any, between party type and party system type, continue to perplex. These problems are explored but not resolved in this final section. The yet unwritten theory of parties may one day be the substance of a third *Les Partis Politiques;* meanwhile Charlot capably brings us up to date on numerous less ambitious but related efforts.

KAY LAWSON
San Francisco State College

Fact and Relevance, Essays on Historical Method. By M. M. Postan. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971. Pp. 186. $8.95.)

Political History, Principles and Practice. By G. R. Elton. (New York: Basic Books, 1970. Pp. 183. $5.95.)

Serious concern with their own tasks and methods has been a characteristic of Cambridge historians during the past two decades: witness the succession of books from Sir Herbert Butterfield, Mr. Carr, Professor Elton, Professor Plumb and others. Now Professor Elton gives us a second volume of his reflections on historical research, and Professor Postan has republished those of his occasional essays and addresses which deal with the methodology of history and the social sciences.

Postan's equipment for work in this field is remarkable. He is one of the leading economic historians of his age, and he has a grasp of the historical, sociological and philosophical literatures of the main countries of Europe—"from the Atlantic to the Urals"—which shows up most of us as the narrow provincials that we are. He is also a competent critic of current economic doctrines; he understands the function of mathematics in the social sciences; and he constantly displays a subtle, penetrating, and warmly human intelligence. Now, an economic historian, especially one with Postan's cultural range, ought to be singularly well placed to deal with what is perhaps the central problem in the methodology of history: How can the individuality of historical treatment be fused with the generality of scientific understanding? And in the best of these essays Postan certainly does much to clarify this question, chiefly via his very perceptive criticisms of traditional answers supplied to it by writers of both the idealist and the materialist persuasion. But his own answers to it—viz, that historians must proceed *as if* their subjects were individual and unique, "dressing them up" in individual and concrete guise, or that historians rightly prefer generalizations which are "not formulated but merely implied"—are to my mind unsatisfactory. They suggest a judicious reconnaisance of the problem, but not a determination to find the best possible answer to it. No doubt this is very much a philosopher's criticism; certainly it suggests what I feel to be another weakness in P
tan's otherwise admirable essays—his evide
unhappiness in sorting out terminological
sues. Thus in "Function and Dialectic in Ec
nomic History" and "Fact and Relevance
Historical Study"—possibly the two best essa
in the book—his jugglings with the word "fac
and its derivatives and his excessive simplific
tion of the idea of dialectic are likely to put
all but his most sympathetic readers. But the
criticisms hardly affect the great educati
value of Postan's essays. By their range
knowledge and unfailing perceptiveness th
help us to think more sanely and more deep
about problems which traditional philosophic
dichotomies do little to illuminate.

Professor Elton describes this new book
primarily a development of some poin
sketched in his earlier *Practice of History*. Th
book set out, with brisk authority, the main r
alist presuppositions which every historical r
searcher brings to his job, no matter what idea
ist or relativist siren songs he may succumb
in his leisure hours. The present book is, to m
mind, less well constructed and less well writte
than its precursor. Is it primarily a deepenin
of Elton's treatments of the place of narrativ
the nature of evidence, and the function of e
planation, in history? Or is it, as its title su
gests, a book about politics as treated by histo
rians? Elton seems to be undecided betwee
these two alternatives, even though some of h
arguments move toward a most interesting an
swer that unites the above questions in a quit
unexpected way. Again, Elton makes no pre
tense of being more than a homespun philoso
pher of history: he is simply trying to see an
to state clearly some of the general implication
of his own historical problems and method
There are pages in this book, however, i
which his lack of a more general philosophica
equipment works to his disadvantage an
where the force and clarity of the writing dete
riorates. But the merit of the book is that in i
its author has chanced his arm, has gone into
number of questions more deeply than in th
earlier book, and has deservedly come out wit
two or three really striking prizes. Moreover
even the book's worst failures are provocative
When Elton fails to write clearly he makes on
wonder why.

First, as to the book's main weaknesses. Al
though its opening section is entitled "A Defini
tion," this—a demarcation of the distinctive
field of politics—is exactly what the book fail
to provide. For the most part Elton identifie
politics with government: but sometimes he
tries to identify it with whatever is "dynamic" in

e life of any society. The first of these claims clearly too narrow; the second almost bsurdly too wide. Yet Elton is not alone in his oubles here. Obviously the two concepts rgely overlap, yet to date, no political philosoher has (to my knowledge) provided even a lausible account of their exact relation. Nor oes the central failing in Elton's treatment villy damage the three most original lines of adance which he makes in this book. First, he ives a most persuasive account of the releance of military, diplomatic, constitutional, nd administrative history to the study and riting of political history proper. On the last f these he is particularly forceful; as when he vrites of parliament in Britain before the presnt century that "we know just about everyhing about it except what it did and how it vorked" (p. 35). Second, he provides an intelectually illuminating and pedagogically useful lassification of the main types and functions of vidence that guide and restrict the political istorian. Third, his arguments move steadily oward—even if they do not fully articulate—he impressive claim that, of all forms of hisory, political history is that to which narrative reatment is most essential. Why is this? Elton loes not develop his insight as fully as one ould wish. In particular he fails to connect it dequately with his sensible discussion of the ategory of cause and its use in historical thinkng. But he sees clearly that politics is the field n which coincidences of intentions with oberved results can be most convincingly evidenced, and also in which failures of plan can be most certainly identified and assessed. Here, I suspect and hope, he has made the first dent at a spot which will later see a breakthrough, as younger philosophers of history follow the lead he has given them. If so, Elton will owe his deserved if imperfect success to the one truly philosophical gift that he possesses, and that is a gift as much of character as of intellect: the determination to understand what, as a professional historian, he is about, and to establish, as clearly and simply as possible, the main aims, standards and methods of his work.

W. B. Gallie

Peterhouse, Cambridge

Constitutional Bricolage. By Gerald Garvey. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971. Pp. 156. $7.50.)

Alfred North Whitehead once pointed out that objections to novel terminology often represent a concealed dogmatism. Perhaps that is my difficulty with this book. Though I can detect in it many admirable qualities—range of information, brilliant style, seriousness of purpose, willingness to generalize—the point of the work largely eludes me even after several readings.

There is, to be sure a not unusual difference in the magnitude of claims made by author and publisher for the book. The jacket blurb suggests that "uniquely blending anthropological and exchange theory, Professor Garvey offers a new interpretation of American Constitutional development." Professor Garvey has a more limited claim: "Except for the word *bricolage* . . . there is little new in this thesis." Peculiarly he suggests that "what may be surprising, however, is the extent to which analysis of America's constitutional tradition from the perspective of 'social sciences' that were not even separate disciplines when Beard and Corwin began publishing has led to conclusions consistent with those of traditionalist writers" (preface, n.p.).

Garvey adapts the term bricolage from Levi-Strauss, defining it as "a process of fabricating 'make-do' solutions to problems as they arise, using a limited and often severely limiting store of doctrines, materials, and tools—the way a household handyman must respond to a novel 'fix it' task, relying only on his ingenuity and a small kit-bag of mending tools" (p. 5). The term is, of course, aptly applied to the Supreme Court's function, but the insight is hardly novel. It is—to paraphrase Dr. Johnson—a pleasant enough borrowing, but hardly sufficient to base a whole book on.

The first third of the book translates court function and the rule of law into various modes of anthropological and exchange theory. This is not uninteresting, but is curiously *ad hoc* and meandering; "*bricoleur*, heal thyself!" one is tempted to say. The bulk of the book (90 of 156 pages) is a sweeping retelling of constitutional history characterized by generalizing that is neither wholly convincing nor at all unconventional.

The final chapter is a clear disappointment. The effort is to intellectualize the trendy theme that the Court should be even more activist, should go "from the bricoleur's art . . . beyond the Constitution." Obviously, there is room for a good intellectual statement of this position. But 15 pages would have been meager enough without such excursus as a six-page discussion of the buyer-seller model said to dominate Stone and Frankfurter and others on free speech. The final chapter seems to me also to contradict both Garvey's functionalist model for the Court and litigated processes generally—as well as his history, which closely follows the Corwin-Mason model. Despite Garvey's argument in Chapter VIII, the rest of the volume and his own *précis* seem to accept the propositions: (1) that the Court has no great difficulty playing a vital shaping role while remaining limited by its sense of craftsmanship, and (2) that there are rather real limits to apodicticism. There is a rather elementary confusion of all legal and law-like processes with those of the Supreme Court. If demonstrations and other protests can be reconciled as a "new franchise," as Garvey suggests, then that franchise represents reconciliation with the broad political regime—not merely with the sensibilities of our nine middle-aged men. There is an absence of awareness of the broad interrelations of law and the polity throughout this chapter, and no indication of how a democratic regime could accept an oligarachy that would avowedly live "beyond the Constitution."

SAMUEL KRISLOV

University of Minnesota

Population, Migration and Urbanization in Africa. By William A. Hance. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970. Pp. 450. $15.00.)

Attention of aid agencies and development theorists has swung in recent years to a new emphasis on population control as a crucial aspect of development programs. Professor Hance has here compiled useful information on population problems in Africa. Population statistics are often grossly inadequate, because of the heavy costs of gathering essential data and fears that such data might be used for tax or political purposes. Although the continent is not characterized by such overall high man-land ratios as India or China, Hance shows that it confronts high population densities in some areas; and, everywhere, rapidly growing young populations which must be fed, clothed, housed, and educated before becoming productive.

Hance lists a series of indicators suggesting the nature of population pressures affecting some areas in Africa today: soil deterioration, use of marginal lands, reduced fallow periods, declining crop yields, a changed emphasis on soil-tolerant crops, and a breakdown of the indigenous farming system. These may be accompanied by food shortages, hunger and malnutrition, land fragmentation, disputes over land, landlessness and rural indebtedness, unemployment and underemployment in rural or urban areas or both, and certain types of emigration.

Hance details three periods of widespread migratory patterns in Africa: (1) unplanned precolonial migrations in search of more fallow land as well as for defense; (2) colonial migr tions, mainly for economic reasons, spurred in tially by taxes and forced labor to provide lab for plantations and mines; and (3) postind pendence migration, reflecting nationalist pol cies attempting to deal with the growing unemployment which plagues major urban area One chapter depicts the fascinating characteri tics of the larger modern cities, some influence by traditional factors, but all having mushroomed in recent decades.

Population control in Africa, we are tol has had limited success. Rural parents conside large numbers of children necessary to provid a future family labor force and old-age security. Solution or amelioration of populatio problems, Hance concludes, involves every aspect of development planning, including improved agricultural policies and greater attention to nonagricultural sectors. One regrets tha he did not explore this conclusion in muc greater depth, particularly in view of the current almost naive inference that, since effort to augment Gross Domestic Product have produced disappointing results, reduction of th population growth rate is all that is needed t achieve desired increases in per capita incomes This one-sided prescription tends to gloss ove the necessity of deepseated institutional change required if planning is to contribute to development.

Professor Hance has unfortunately given u a primarily descriptive book rather than an in depth examination of the causes of migration urban overcrowding, and unemployment. H hints at, but fails to elaborate, the way in whic the colonial institutional structure shaped a relatively modern, externally dependent enclave linked to the export of raw materials and the import of manufactured goods for a narrow high income group, while shipping out of the continent a significant share of the resulting investable surpluses.

The vast majority of the populations of most African countries have been deprived of any opportunity to participate in so-called "modern development" except as members of a cheap labor force: low-paid wage earners in mines or on plantations, or cash-crop farmers dependent on uncertain, world markets for a limited range of export crops. Today, as Africa's major trading partners are enmeshed in an international monetary crisis, African countries tend to earn still less for their exports, and unemployment mounts; the recession thus spreads throughout the export enclave and into the hinterland, as the urban unemployed trickle reluctantly back to their homelands. There, large numbers of children continue to be perceived as the family's main productive resource—and in the context of subsistence farming, that perception has some objective reality.

Simply to describe the resulting problems reflected in the population and migration patterns does little to focus on the institutional changes and resource allocation policies required to solve them. Professor Hance may have felt constrained by the view that economic geography should exclude examination of institutions. But development problems in Africa—like real-life problems anywhere—do not come neatly labeled "economic geography," any more than they come wrapped prettily as "sociology" or "political science." They result from the complex interaction of phenomena that defy pedantic efforts to squeeze them into academic pigeonholes.

There is at least a danger that the very valuable material contained in Professor Hance's latest book may simply be used to bolster oversimplified prescriptions for development like the current rash of family planning proposals. Far from getting at the root causes of the serious problems suggested by Hance's own list of indicators, such proposals gloss over their underlying source in the inherited political-economic-social institutional structure which perpetuates the lopsided, externally dependent dual economies of Africa. Only when development policies alter this institutional structure will it be possible to create a more balanced, nationally integrated economy, capable of achieving increased productivity and higher incomes for the broad masses of the population; yet these constitute the objective conditions needed to render family planning programs effective in Africa.

ANN SEIDMAN

University of Zambia

The Political Structure. By Grace Jones. (New York: Humanities Press, Inc., 1969. Pp. 110. $3.00.)

The Political Structure is a volume in the series The Social Structure of Modern Britain, a series which, the blurb claims, is intended to meet the needs of students in courses of professional training for social work and teaching for introductory texts that take into account "the rapid advances now being made in teaching and research in the social sciences." Dr. Jones, a historian, has her task made more difficult by having to span two other disciplines—political science and sociology—in presenting her subject. The result is a somewhat awkward compound of orthodox sociological analysis and traditional institutional description.

The plan of the book is promising: After an introduction to the study of political sociology, the central chapters are concerned with society and its impact on British politics, the involvement in politics of electors, politicians, pressure-groups, bureaucrats and the communications media, and the book concludes with a survey of British government in operation. But the laudable aims of the author are impeded by the brevity with which these themes are treated. And—since this book is intended primarily for the instruction of a fairly specific type of reader—two fundamental questions are raised about the possible benefits of such a terse overview of a broad and complex field.

The first question is whether so general a treatment can satisfy the needs of readers either for a straightforward presentation of information, or for the stimulation of controversy which, presumably, is one of the purposes even of vocationally oriented courses in political and other social sciences. The jacket promises much. Some answers to questions such as "How important is class and religious affiliation in determining political opinion?" are to be provided, for example. Yet the text, after an introductory couple of paragraphs on social class in general, offers no more than a page of text and a table on the links between social class and politics in Britain; religious influence on political behavior is similarly briefly dealt with. Such compression affords only a superficial and much oversimplified discussion of topics which are indeed extremely significant, but also extremely complicated and controversial. The subtleties and qualifications, as much as the generalizations, concerning these topics are what one would commend to the attention of students. True, there is a bibliography inviting the reader to pursue chapter material in books and journal articles, but if space had to be so limited it would have been more valuable to have interwoven these references into the text: to have produced a bibliographical commentary, in other words.

The second question raised is whether the students expected to be satisfied with so simple an introduction to the British political structure are also provided with the analytic concepts and frameworks necessary first for comprehending and then for being able to work on the material provided here. To the author's credit, the book is written in a very clear, jargon-free style. But the introduction of topics such as the relations among class, education and politics, the phenomenon of working-class Conservatives, elites and ruling classes, political socialization and political recruitment assumes a specialized vocabulary and a repertoire of conceptual frameworks not generally provided in secondary education courses—and certainly not in the traditional "British Constitution" syllabus!

This book offers a straightforward treatment of its subject, but it is too brief to serve as a full introduction to the British political structure, and too superficial to stimulate discussion of the topics it presents.

GEOFFREY K. ROBERTS
University of Technology, Loughborough, England

Marxism and Philosophy. By Karl Korsch. Translated and with an Introduction by Fred Halliday. (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1970. Pp. 175. $7.50.)

It is not easy to define Karl Korsch's place in the development of Marxist thought. With Lenin and the German communists he denounced the reform interpretation of the Second International and particularly Kautsky's separation of Marxist theory and class struggle. Yet few publications were more bitterly attacked by Soviet theoreticians than his *Marxism and Philosophy* (1923), and in 1926 Korsch was expelled from the German Communist Party for "idealist deviationism." His name was usually associated with that of Lukacs. Yet in his *Anti-Critique* of 1930 (included in the present volume) Korsch went out of his way to state the basic disagreement between himself and Lukacs. To Korsch, only Marx's mature works contained his basic message. After the Reichstag fire in 1933 he was forced to go into exile. He died in the U.S. in 1961.

Perhaps the difficulty in assigning Korsch a place results from his own rejection of any definitive, nonhistorical characterization of what constitutes "pure" Marxism. Korsch himself described his work as "the application of the materialist conception of history to the materialist conception of history itself" (p. 102). Each theoretical development, including Marxist theory, must be seen from the historical perspective of the practice within which it originates. Thus Korsch distinguishes three major stages of development in Marxist doctrine. Marx's early writings until the revolution of 1848 presented a total theory of social change. The second period, which lasted until the end of the century, saw a strong return of capitalist strength. In response to the new situation Marxist theory diversified into economic, political and ideological elements. In Marx those elements remained interdependent but in his followers they became fragmented. Thus scientific socialism more and more developed into a set of purely scientific observations disconnected from the actual class struggle. The materialist conception of history changed into a mere heuristic principle of investigation, while the dialectic froze into a set of sociological principles. In this perspective Marxist criticisms of the bourgeois order "no longer necessarily develop by their very nature into revolutionary practice; they can equally well develop into all kinds of attempts at *reform* which fundamentally remain within the limits of bourgeois society and the bourgeois State and in actual practice they usually did so" (p. 64).

The third period of Marxism started with an upsurge of new social conflicts at the beginning of the twentieth century. Here the issue which had been avoided during the preceding phase returned with full force: the relation of the proletarian revolution to ideology and ultimately to philosophy. All too often Marxists simply assume that by "superseding" idealist philosophy their theory has terminated its contact with philosophy. Such a view runs contrary to Marx's own persistent conviction that philosophy had to provide an essential link to the understanding of his theory, a link without which Marxism would become totally nondialectical.

Korsch does not deny that Marxism overcomes philosophy—indeed, he explicitly rejects the thesis so popular in Europe after the second war that the early, philosophical works contain the essence of Marx's thought. Yet, he claims, the dialectic of theory and practice can be understood only through Hegel's philosophy. The Hegelian principle—philosophy is its own epoch comprehended in thought—remains correct for the pre-Marxist stages of history. If Marxism means the overthrow of the *entire* bourgeois society, then it must stand in as close a dialectical connection with the theoretical expression of this society, which is synthesized in Hegel's philosophy, as it stands to its social-political realities. Marxism is not a new philosophy, but it presents a new theory which implies a dialectical relation to the preceding ideologies. Of those none is more powerful than Hegel's philosophy.

This brings us to the heart of Korsch's argument: the status of ideologies. All too often Marxists tend to dismiss them as mere illusions without a genuine object and, as such, essentially different from social and political structures. To Marx, ideologies are false only in that they mistakenly attribute an autonomous character to the purely theoretical aspects of social life. A real critique, then, should not be restricted to economic structures or political forms, but must include the theoretical forms of consciousness. Any dismissal of those forms as pseudorealities is based upon a naive-realistic concept of the relation between consciousness and reality according to which the former is merely a passive reflection of the latter. For Marx the active relation of consciousness and reality is essential to the dialectical development itself: without it the critique of capitalist economy could never have developed into a theory of social revolution. Even Engels, who in his later writings tended to regard consciousness as a product of nature, nevertheless at the end of his life protested against a naturalistic outlook that accepts consciousness as "a given." All forms of social consciousness are *realities,* because consciousness and being are interdependent in genuine Marxist theory. This holds true even for the higher ideologies of art, religion and philosophy. "They must be criticized in theory and overthrown in practice, together with the economic, legal and political structures of society and at the same time as them" (pp. 96–97).

Korsch's theories agree with much of what Lukacs was saying at the same time and partly anticipate what Althusser would say three decades later on the status of ideologies. They obviously conflict with the revisionist doctrine of the Social Democrats, but almost as much with the nondialectical scientist materialism of the Soviets. Indeed, in his *Anti-Critique* Korsch takes Lenin to task for a theoretical pragmatism which pays little attention to theory as such, whether it be ideological or Marxist. Marx himself had nothing but contempt for those who imagine that they can "supersede" philosophy (in practice) without realizing it (in theory). Lenin's view of theory is characterized by a heavy emphasis on the materialist and a de-emphasis of the dialectical elements of Marxism. To be sure, Lenin, unlike his Russian followers, paid considerable tribute to Hegel's philosophy, but he never attempted to "overcome" it. Instead he simply reversed it: Hegel's absolute Spirit is replaced by an absolute matter. Thus "he drags the whole debate between materialism and idealism back to a historical stage which German idealism from Kant to Hegel had already suppressed" (p. 131). In the final analysis, such a materialist interpretation of the relation between consciousness and reality must destroy the dialectical interdependence of theory and practice and, with it, the basis of Marx's revolutionary theory.

Korsch's small book remains a milestone in the interpretation of Marxist doctrine. After almost half a century his words sound refreshingly modern. This scholarly revolutionary who was a doctrinal outcast for most of his life may still come into his own a decade after his death.

LOUIS DUPRÉ

Georgetown University

The Logic of Social Hierarchies. Edited by Edward O. Laumann, Paul M. Siegel, and Robert W. Hodge. (Chicago: Markham Pub. 1970. Pp. 790. $10.00.)

In recent decades, social scientists have produced a spate of theories and research about social hierarchies—about their origins, their nature and bases, their dynamics, and their consequences. Hence several dilemmas confront the compiler of a set of readings. Which selections from the literature on social inequalities, social class, or social stratification can at once inform the student and challenge the initiate? What balance should be struck by each new anthology—and there are already several—between well-known and fresh materials? How can the many divergent empirical findings and theoretical formulations be reconciled in order to tease out, as the title of this book promises, the underlying "logic"?

The editors of the volume, well aware of such dilemmas, are guided by three major considerations in selecting and arranging their material. First, although they illustrate the pervasiveness of social hierarchies in national states as well as in formal organizations and informal groups, they nevertheless impose definite *sociotemporal constraints* upon the content of the volume. Of the 49 selections, most are of recent date (in large part issued between 1960 and 1970), and most refer exclusively to the United States. At the same time, the editors draw attention to these constraints and make laudable attempts to offset them. Not all classical thinkers are excluded: there are excerpts from Weber and Mosca, if not from Marx or Sorokin. Moreover, certain of the selections transcend the boundaries of the United States: thus Pineo and Porter compare Canada with the United States in distribution of occupational prestige; Petras and Zeitlin analyze the diffusion of political radicalism from mining to agrarian areas in Chile; Stinchcombe, in relating stratification to the degree of organizational dependency of inferiors upon superiors, uses illustrations from diverse cultures. One ingenious device for offsetting limitations on content is the inclusion of several pieces that synthesize major portions of the field. Thus from just two of the papers the reader can glean considerable insight into the voluminous literature on "status inconsistency," which postulates that individuals who are high on one dimension of status (like income) but low on another (like education) will evidence such characteristic responses as symptoms of stress, or political discontent and alienation. One of these papers, by Geschwender, reformulates the theory of status inconsistency (conversely, status crystallization) within the framework of cognitive dissonance; the second, especially prepared for this volume by two of the editors, subjects to critical scrutiny some of the empirical evidence.

Also affecting the content of the book are the divergent *backgrounds* of the editors, described by them respectively as the "Parsonian versus the Chicago School" (p. x). On the one hand, for example, they utilize distinctions among the political, economic, and social bases of inequality; and, in dealing with the dynamics of change, they point to the linkage—through the concept of "strain" (p. 678)—between the Marxist emphasis on conflict and Parsons's normative emphasis. On the other hand, they deal with the ecological basis for stratification of communities, and they also exemplify the methodological sophistication of Duncan and his students in measuring inter-generational occupational status and defining its causal matrix.

A third consideration guiding the editors is their *multidisciplinary approach,* which exposes readers in one social science to ongoing work in other fields. Social scientists may be generally unfamiliar with the piece by Nathan Keyfitz on international stratification published initially in the *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists;* or with the assessment by the geneticist, Theodosius Dobzhansky, of the potential impact of differential fertility rates upon the societal level of intelligence. Also included are speculations by the anthropologist, Morton Fried, about stratification and the evolution of the modern state; an interpretation of American class politics through a modified Weberian theory of class and class politics, originally published by Norbert Wiley in a sociological journal; and miscellaneous excerpts by political scientists and sociologists on the political influence of corporations, aspects of community power, or the national power elite.

All these varied selections are arranged under eleven headings, starting with "Social Differentiation," ending with "The Problem of Equality," and including "The Social Psychology of Status," "The Consequences of Stratification," and "Dynamics of Change in Stratification Systems." Each section is prefaced by an introduction intended as "a provocative essay that *articulates* rather than merely summarizes" (p. ix).

Both in the sectional arrangement and in the introductions the promised "logic" of social hierarchies is unfortunately, perhaps predictably, not always apparent. The sections are not entirely distinguishable from one another. For example, the section "On the Sources of Inequality" comprises three articles on the now-hackneyed debate over the "functional" theory of stratification and one article on Marx's concept of class. Not one of these selections does justice to theories stressing power arrangements as a major source of inequality. Yet an essay that does point to the ultimate importance of power, Ralf Dahrendorf's "On the Origin of Inequality," appears in an entirely different section and is not even cross-referenced here.

Throughout the book, the sections might have been knit together by such cross-referencing and, more importantly, by the introductions. But these introductions, informative and indeed provocative as they are, fall short of explaining the main themes of the sections and the relevance of the component selections. They vary in clarity and in coverage of relevant issues. The introduction to the section on "Access to Status, Wealth, and Power," for example, where the reader might expect a full treatment of social mobility, focuses largely instead on ascription versus achievement, paying little attention to such important aspects of mobility as its consequences for political behavior and attitudes.

Aids in using the volume are its bibliographies and the topical index. However, there is no name index, the sources of several selections are not listed, and points of excision from original pieces are not indicated. Since the pieces were not reset in standard type, they give an uneven appearance in keeping with the ephemeral nature of such a compilation.

In short, the book provides a potpourri of standard, new, and sophisticated material on social hierarchies, if not the desired "systematic introduction to the field" (p. ix). And, although its very recency prevents full representation of this farflung literature (even highlighting the omission of work published *since* 1970), it should serve well as a supplementary source book on the relationship of stratification and inequality to political life.

ANNE FONER AND
MATILDA WHITE RILEY

Rutgers University

Five Lectures. By Herbert Marcuse. (Boston: Beacon Press, 1970. Pp. 109. $7.50.)

Contra Marcuse. By Eliseo Vivas. (New Rochelle, N.Y.: Arlington House, 1971. Pp. 236. $8.95.)

In a discussion following a lecture which is included in the first of the two books under review, Herbert Marcuse is asked by a student to connect his ideas on a new theory of man with declarations by Frantz Fanon and Che Guevara. Marcuse replies that a new theory of man is indeed emerging in the struggles and methods of development of the third world:

> I would not have mentioned Fanon and Guevara as much as a small item that I read in a report about North Vietnam and that had a tremendous effect on me, since I am an absolutely incurable and sentimental romantic. It was a very detailed report, which showed, among other things, that in the parks in Hanoi the benches are made only big enough for two and *only two* people to sit on, so that another person would not even have the technical possibility of disturbing. (p. 82)

I cite this passage at the beginning of my review to suggest the curious mixture of romanticism and conservatism that lies at the heart of the doctrines of the famous revolutionary ideologist. Despite Marcuse's regular emphasis upon erotic liberation, his goal is to safeguard the privacy of the traditional couple (*"only two"*: no orgies to terrify the bougeoisie in romantic old North Vietnam!). There is, of course, a somewhat more ambiguous reference to Eros in Marcuse's discussion of an antiwar demonstration at Berkeley. Instead of a threatened confrontation with the police,

> After two or three scary minutes the thousands of marchers sat down in the street, guitars and harmonicas appeared, people began "necking" and "petting," and so the demonstration ended. You may find this ridiculous, but I believe that a unity spontaneously and anarchically emerged here that perhaps in the end cannot fail to make an impression even on the enemy. (Pp. 92 ff.)

This reviewer, an incurable and sentimental romantic, would like to believe that the necking and petting was in each instance carried out by two and *only two* anarchists.

These passages may cast light on the murky prose of Marcuse's theoretical formulations, as well as provide some balance against Eliseo Vivas's denunciation of Marcuse as an embittered nihilist, "a splenetic old man, sputtering hatred" (p. 112), and so on. Marcuse's doctrines are by now so well-known that one hesitates to provide an elaborate summary of his lectures under review, in which no new ground is broken (apart, perhaps, from the confession of romanticism). Not so widely discussed, in this country at least, is the theoretical background of the Marcusean teaching. This teaching, as I understand it, emerges from two sources, the Idealism of Fichte and the *Lebensphilosophie* of Dilthey. These sources are in turn blended together with various doctrines of Martin Heidegger, who was Marcuse's teacher in the early 'thirties, and from whom Marcuse no doubt inherits numerous echoes of Nietzsche. It is with respect to this line of descent that Marcuse's better-known interpretations of Hegel, Marx, and Freud must be understood. In Fichte's revision of Kant, Being, or the reality which is constructed by the discursive intelligence, is a derivative concept, in opposition to spiritual activity, and thus the negation of freedom, which alone is positive. Man is fundamentally an agent of the Absolute Ego. Human work (the phenomenal world as defined by the subject-object opposition) is both stimulated by a desire to achieve the Absolute, and is itself an insuperable obstacle between the empirical or discursively rational agent and his divine essence. Stated with maximum concision, discursive thought produces a reified world (in which even the subject is "objectified"), which is man-made, or historical, but also a mark of human alienation. The domain of freedom and "satisfaction" (a Hegelian term) lies "beyond" the Being of determinate reality (the world of *res*), and is accessible via intellectual intuition, or a nondiscursive perception of man's infinite task as obedience to the categorical imperative: thou shalt strive toward the infinitely inaccessible (namely, the Absolute as reached by discursive thinking).

For Hegel, man overcomes alienation in the completion of discursive thinking, or acquires freedom in the knowledge of determinate reality as a whole. The free man's knowledge is produced by the transformation of "reality" as a world of things (*res*) into an "actuality" or the revelation of Absolute Activity. This process is too complex to be more than mentioned here. The result is that the Absolute manifests itself in the historical world, but precisely as the essence or significance of that world. The Hegelian science of wisdom is therefore the completion of history in the sense that man's life in this world is vindicated by reason. Freedom is no longer separate from, or prior to, but identical with, Being. Post-Hegelians like Nietzsche and Dilthey retain the notion of Being as radically historical, but reject the notion of the Absolute, or the complete manifestation, in terms accessible to human intelligence, of the essence or significance of history. The empirical or phenomenal world becomes a human artifact, a historical relic of man's unending expression of his unfinished nature, or in the extreme case, a perspectival interpretation of chaos, by which man temporarily deludes himself into taking his own contingent creations for the marks of stability and order, even for "eternity." If freedom is the true perception of man as creator (i.e., as the new god or master and possessor of "nature" now understood as history, whether in an ontological or ontic sense), whereas man's individual creations, especially as they lose their initial vitality or integrity, conceal that perception, then the pursuit of freedom would seem to entail a permanent state of revolution. Man creates reality in order to express his freedom, but the creation of reality is an occlusion of freedom. Hence the instinct to create has as its necessary complement the instinct to destroy. Stated all too briefly, this is the precondition of the Freudian doctrine of the eternal conflict between Eros and Thanatos. It is also the theoretical essence of Marcuse's crucial tenets.

The conservative nature of Marcuse's thought is evident from his belief in the possibility of overcoming alienation, or in acquiring freedom, within the framework of the historical, and more specifically, the political world. The genuine radical denies the possibility of heaven on earth, or the presence of the future within the historical present. Furthermore, the glimpses we receive of Marcuse's utopia have nothing to do with violence, intolerance, and sexual experimentation. Instead, Marcuse envisions a Schillerian world of cultured play, albeit this "aristocratic" ideal is compromised by a post-Marxist and post-Freudian inclination toward individual gratification. Even this inclination, however, is due to Marcuse's desire to go beyond the Freudian version of the permanence of alienation, or to find stability within creation by a redistribution of erotic energies. This is not the mark of a genuinely permanent revolutionary. In fact, Marcuse's insistence upon freedom for all individuals is, ironically enough, not so far removed from contemporary conservative doctrine, with its emphasis upon individual liberty against the restrictions of the state. In this context, it should be noted that Marcuse believes in natural law (p. 105), although he defines it in terms of rights rather than obligations. Since Marcuse is also a historicist, i.e., one who regards human needs as historically determined and mutable (p. 65; cf. p. 72: human nature is historical), and for whom the objective world is essentially a human creation, his "rights" can have no stable content, any more than his analysis of human desire. It is at this point that cultural traditionalism is diluted by a longing for individual freedom, so that conservatism deteriorates into romanticism. Marcuse is thus transformed from a German Idealist, or a historicist ontologist, into a hero of alienated middle-class juveniles (of all chronological ages). The priority of freedom to Being becomes an invitation to destroy the capitalist world because it currently dominates the globe: I risk the speculation that Marcuse prefers the "third world" simply because it is the "force of the negative" at the current epoch of world history, and not because he is an egalitarian. His egalitarianism is an uncomfortable political tactic, brought about by an incoherent theoretical aristocratism.

Eliseo Vivas has seen very clearly the destructive political consequences of Marcuse's teaching. He emphasizes the vagueness of Marcuse's conception of the future Utopia (a defect shared by all prophets, we must add), the unbalanced character of Marcuse's condemnation of noncommunist society, the lack of careful supportive argumentation, the dangers involved in Marcuse's jettisoning of the past, and perhaps most important, the degree to which modern liberalism is itself responsible for producing Marcuse's audience and for supporting their prophet with full academic honors, even though he be the engine of destruction of a truly liberal society. On the other hand, Vivas's book suffers from serious weaknesses. Although I understand and sympathize with his righteous indignation, and would agree that it serves a valid political purpose in the contemporary situation, the fact remains that Vivas's anger has led him to distort the lineaments of his portrait of Marcuse. The advice of Nietzsche, that experienced revolutionary,—*Keine Rache* (No Vengeance)—is still valid for theoretical activity, and hence for prudent political action as well. Vivas's anger distorts his portrait of Marcuse as a man, and I suspect it blinds him to the theoretical deficiencies of his own grasp of Marcuse's work. Vivas states candidly that he is not a specialist on Hegel; this admission may be taken to represent a lack of adequate preparation in the German sources of Marcuse's thought. Such a preparation is by no means "merely academic." It prepares the way for a deeper analysis of Marcuse's doctrines, as well as their relation to "the enemy" (in Marcuse's phrase) than Vivas is able to give.

I shall have to limit myself to one illustration of this criticism. Just as it makes sense to refer to Marcuse as in a way a conservative, so too might one call Vivas a somewhat old-fashioned, even romantic radical. Thus it is Vivas, not Marcuse, who rejects the doctrine of natural law, which he associates with the reification of reason (p. 187). It is Vivas, not Marcuse, who denies any connection between reason and the good, and for whom reason is an *instrument,* which can be pressed into service on behalf of any "value premise," even that of the Nazis. Perhaps the weakest part of Vivas's book is thus what should be the strongest: his discussion of goodness, justice, or virtue. Vivas seems himself to accept the historicist presuppositions of Marcuse's thought, even though he gives them a pragmatist and scientific rhetoric. His confusion of artistic creation and "genuine thinking" (pp. 168 ff.), his respect for the past as a source of traditional wisdom (pp. 195 ff.), his own cultural and ethical pluralism (pp. 103 ff.), his extremely pluralistic conception of philosophy as the "open-minded" search for truth (p. 95), all leave him in a peculiarly weak position to repel Marcuse, or to offer viable political (and theoretical) alternatives. It is not enough to be told that we must respect everyone else "regardless" of who he is or what he is" (p. 188). Clearly Vivas does not respect Marcuse. Vivas understands the link between Marcuse and the defective side of modern liberalism. But he does not seem to have noticed the deep theoretical relationship between Marcuse and himself. The missing link is an adequate analysis of German thought from Kant to Heidegger, as well as its relation to British philosophy, and the derivation of both branches from the Cartesian revolution. Despite all of Marcuse's Freudian jargon and lengthy disquisitions on technological man (better done by Heidegger), the roots are both deeper and more beautiful than their contemporary flowers. Vivas's book has many valuable pages, but in the last analysis, it obscures rather than uncovers these roots.

Stanley Rosen

Pennsylvania State University

Constitutional Theory. By Geoffrey Marshall. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971. Pp. ix, 238. $7.25.)

Geoffrey Marshall, a fellow at Queen's College, Oxford, has made a valuable contribution to the Clarendon Law Series which the Oxford University Press has been publishing in recent years. Well written and superbly analytical, his book reflects both a broad understanding of Anglo-American constitutional law and a longstanding interest of political science in the state as a legal system. Of course, contemporary political scientists in both the United States and Britain are less concerned with law, and more with political behavior, than was formerly the case. Thus it is good for our profession that once in a while a scholar writes a book to remind us that whatever else the state may be, it is the chief organ for the definition and application of law.

The very short first part of the book considers such basic concepts as the nature of the constitution, the state, and sovereignty. The second deals with the separation of powers. The third part, comprising the second half of the book, deals with civil rights, concluding with a perceptive essay on civil disobedience. The materials for the first two parts are largely drawn from English experience, whereas the analysis of rights rests more heavily upon American sources, chiefly decisions of the United States Supreme Court.

A chief cause of difficulty in seeking to rationalize basic concepts of English public law is the use of very ancient terminology in seemingly irrational ways. As Marshall points out, the English refer to the "National Coal Board," the "Royal Navy," "Her Majesty's Stationery Office," the "British Broadcasting Corporation," the "Public Records Office," and "Ministers of State." Of course, for most Englishmen it is simply a matter of habit; to call the "Public Records Office" the "British Records Office" would strike them as very odd. At the same time, these various usages not only defy rational explanation, but also tend to blur and confuse the meaning of very basic public-law terms. Conceding that this nomenclature is chaotic, Marshall also suggests that they may well have some positive value, and he clarifies some distinctions to demonstrate that there may be meaning and purpose in apparently irrational historical terms.

Marshall has much to say about sovereignty, the nature of which presents questions in Britain that are much less acute in the United States. There is, for one thing, the issue of the sovereignty of Parliament, and for another, the question of the legal status of such entities as Rhodesia. Whether Parliament can make a decision binding on later Parliaments seems to interest Marshall very much, and he finally concludes that on procedural matters Parliament may well impose limits on later legislative action without destroying the principle of sovereignty itself. Much would ultimately depend upon what the courts would regard as law.

While Marshall's understanding of American constitutional law principles is quite accurate, he does have occasional lapses. For example, he declares that the majority opinion in *Colegrove* v. *Green,* 328 U.S. 549 (1946) held that reapportionment was nonjusticiable (p. 110). Actually, there was no majority opinion in this case; Justice Frankfurter spoke for only three members of the Court in warning against judicial involvement in the "political thicket." A fourth Justice concurred only because he thought a satisfactory equitable remedy was unavailable on account of the lack of time before the next election. He made it clear that he thought the reapportionment issue was fully justiciable. Thus *Colegrove* did not by any means settle the issue the way Marshall thinks it was settled.

Similarly, Marshall does not explain satisfactorily the peculiar preoccupation of American constitutional law with the concept of state action in the civil rights field (pp. 149–152). His treatment is much too abstract in failing to place the state action concept in the context of Reconstruction politics. The concept rests upon a literal interpretation by the Supreme Court of the phrase in the Fourteenth Amendment, "No *state* shall . . ." Marshall's fine-spun distinctions between state and private action ignore the fact that state legislation in the civil rights field is not bound to recognize this distinction at all, and that if Congress bases its legislation upon the Thirteenth Amendment, it is now free to go a long way in protecting basic human rights against violation by private parties. In this connection, Marshall seems to be wholly unaware of the Supreme Court decision in *Jones* v. *Mayer Co.,* 392 U.S. 409 (1968), and its progeny.

In addition, I found Marshall's discussion of the clear-and-present-danger test in free speech cases somewhat less than satisfying (pp. 177–179). His explanation of the alternative to the Holmes-Brandeis version as applied in *Dennis* v. *United States,* 341 U.S. 494 (1951), lacks amplitude and clarity, and it was something of a mystery to me that he neglected to explain the views which Justice Sanford advanced in *Gitlow* v. *New York,* 268 U.S. 652 (1925). The issues involved in these two versions of the clear-and-present-danger test were not as abstract as Marshall seems to suggest. Furthermore, the delegation issue is posed largely as one involving the spelling out by the legislature of suitable standards (pp. 114–116), whereas a far more realistic and more important question is the presence or absence of effective safeguards, a point which Professor Kenneth C. Davis has developed so well in his recent book on *Discretionary Justice.* Or, to cite another example, Marshall alludes to the well-known views of Justice John B. Gibson of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, who, in *Eakin* v. *Raub,* 12 Sergeant and Rawle 330 (1825), wrote out a classical argument against the validity of judicial review. It would have been interesting to point out that twenty years later, as Chief Justice, Gibson backed away from his earlier position, writing in *Norris* v. *Clymer,* 2 Penn. St. 277, 281 (1845): "I have changed that opinion for two reasons. The late [state constitutional] Convention, by their silence, sanctioned the pretensions of the courts to deal freely with the acts of the legislature; and from experience of the necessity of the case."

All in all, however, this book is the work of an extremely able scholar. His discussion of the problems inherent in the concept of equality under the law is especially discerning, and his analysis of the right to disobey the law is almost equally satisfying. And for those political scientists who still find it useful to analyze such ancient concepts as the state and sovereignty, this rewarming of the Coke-Blackstone-Austin-Maitland-Dicey coals is especially interesting.

DAVID FELLMAN

University of Wisconsin

European Socialists and the American Promised Land. By R. Laurence Moore. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970. Pp. 257. $7.50.)

This book, originally written as a doctoral dissertation, is a carefully documented account of the reaction of European socialists toward American capitalism during the years 1880 to 1917. In his scholarly description of the many facets of socialist response to developments in America throughout the Second International, Professor Moore, who received Yale University's John Addison Porter Prize for this book in 1968, draws heavily upon the extensive holdings of the International Institute of Social History in Amsterdam. Confining his analysis largely to the writings of German, English, and French socialists, the author demonstrates considerable facility in handling a number of languages other than his own.

Ever since the first hardy adventurers brought back intriguing tales of America's unique beauty and wealth, Professor Moore points out, many Europeans had been in the habit of viewing the new world as a place of possible refuge when social, economic, or political conditions should become untenable at home. Socialists, to be sure, put little stock in the safety valve theory that came to be associated with the American frontier, for they came not to save capitalism but to find signs of its impending demise. But America presented many different appearances to European socialists, depending upon the particular stance her various viewers took, and it is out of this kaleidoscopic phenomenon that Professor Moore portrays the wide range of opinion that divided the socialist movement.

Thoroughly urban in his outlook on things, Marx, prior to the Civil War, viewed Americans as so many country fellows, caught up as they were in the idiocy of their agrarian lives, and thus he tended to dismiss America as an important factor in the transition to a communist society. Professor Moore points out that Marx's attitude changed drastically with the dramatic upward spurt of industry and capitalist expansion after the war, and by 1880 he had come around to the view that American developments might just be the tonic needed to cure European socialism of the lethargy it was then exhibiting. Thirty-two years previously Marx along with Engels had proclaimed in the *Communist Manifesto* that the collapse of capitalism was imminent, and still the clouds of revolution had not perceptibly darkened European skies; perhaps events as they were shaping up in America would loosen the long awaited revolutionary deluge and sweep capitalism away to oblivion as the *Manifesto* had seemed to prophesy. One thing Americans had in their favor was the absence of a deeply entrenched feudal system with its aristocratic culture to keep men plodding in the timeworn social furrows of the past. When Marx closed his eyes for the last time in 1883 he was of the opinion that the revolution would come in America rather than in England as he had first predicted.

In the Fall of 1886 the American Socialist Labor party invited Dr. Edward Aveling, Eleanor Marx, and Wilhelm Liebknecht to tour the country on a fund-raising lecture series, and these stars of European socialism took the opportunity to assess conditions in America with regard to the coming of the revolutionary storm. Unhappily, they brought back conflicting reports, and socialists in the old world were left once again in the dark. The one bright spot in the Marxian outlook was the growth of the giant American trusts which led to the rapid increase of wealth concentrated into fewer and fewer hands, thereby giving credence to the theory that capitalism contained the seeds of its own destruction. If Marx's prognostications were correct, the monopolization of wealth and industrial control by so few people was a sure sign that the collapse of capitalist civilization was soon to follow. It was this promise that kept European socialists' hopes up during the last years of the nineteenth century and the first few years of the twentieth.

Professor Moore points out that ironically, America also served as a source of encouragement and inspiration for the newly born revolutionary forces of Russia that had been released by the uprising of 1905 and subsequent events. This, of course, was confusion twice compounded, for not only did it make no sense that proletarian revolution should come first in an underdeveloped feudal society such as Czarist Russia but after the revolution the leaders of the Bolshevik movement persisted in looking toward America, the leading capitalist nation of the world, for the model of their own revolutionary design. But when we understand the psychology underlying the attraction of America for the Bolsheviks, according to Professor Moore, the confusion disappears. Directed more by pragmatic considerations than they were by Marxist ideology, Lenin and other leaders admired the efficiency of American capitalism even while they hurled moral barbs at those who controlled it, and hence they copied many of the patterns found in American industrial life in an effort to attain instant modernity. This leads Professor Moore to observe that "if the United States had cashed in on Russian admiration for American efficiency and accepted the invitation to open official contacts, a basis might just have been laid which in time would have improved Soviet-American relations" (p. 187). This, unfortunately, is one of the few judgments Professor Moore permits himself; had he been bolder in this respect, his book would have been more valuable.

The most outstanding feature of this book, aside from its thorough documentation, is the series of intimate vignettes of Marx's daughters and their mates which Professor Moore interjects into the text of his argument from time to time. Since history is forged out of the ideas and actions of people, it is helpful to receive some intimate information concerning the characters and personalities of those we are concerned with. On the debit side of the ledger is the rather prosaic thesis around which the author chose to structure his study of European socialist thought. The more information we have about any ideological movement, the better we understand it, of course, and so we are happy to have this account of the subjective reactions that Marx and other scientific socialists experienced as they waited for revolutionary events to unfold. But does it significantly advance our basic knowledge of socialism to focus upon the supposed failures of the movement without at least some discussion of the possible alternate interpretations that can be made of these events? It would appear that at least part of Professor Moore's design in structuring his study in the way that he did was to demonstrate that Marxism has failed because things have not worked out precisely as Marx and Engels predicted they would. This is a very hackneyed argument, as well as an extremely complex one, and Professor Moore cannot hope to resolve it in any intelligent way in so short a book, especially since he has not directly addressed himself to a consideration of that thesis.

WILLIAM O. REICHERT
Bowling Green State University

Voting and Collective Choice: Some Aspects of the Theory of Group Decision-Making. By Prasanta K. Pattanaik. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971. Pp. viii, 184. $10.00.)

The first thing to say about this book is that it cannot be read and must be studied. Pattanaik has made absolutely no concessions to casual readers, no matter how good their mathematical background. Indeed, simply memorizing the notational system he uses would involve a substantial investment of time. Further, in spite of the elaborate use of mathematical notation and presentation, there are occasional minor errors in the material, which means that it must be studied with great care. As just one example, he gives Inada credit for having discovered the "single-caved preference curve," although Inada's article appeared in 1964 and Vickrey had presented the same basic concept under the title "single-trough" in 1960. Rather peculiarly, the 1960 Vickrey article is discussed in various parts of the book, but not in connection with "single-cavedness."

Second, the subtitle, "Some Aspects of the Theory of Group Decision-Making," is more descriptive than the title. The book deals with only a small part of the modern theory of collective choice; specifically it is a summary of part of the research which has been done by mathematicians on the problems raised by Arrow's impossibility theorem. Pattanaik's emphasis is on "resolving Arrow's paradox." At no point does he really discuss the possibility that the Arrow paradox *may* be unresolvable. Since he does not in fact resolve it, this is an important omission, but it does not differentiate Pattanaik's book from many other studies in the same general area. On the jacket of the book, the editors say that, "He stresses the importance of the similarity of individual preferences in facilitating social decisions and examines sufficient and necessary conditions in terms of similarity of individual preferences. . . ." I take it this can be regarded as Pattanaik's own choice of what he regards as the most important aspect of the book. If one looks at the actual emphasis, however, two other methods are suggested for avoiding the Arrow problem. There is a somewhat muddled discussion of ethics, and this ethics is then reintroduced in the last chapter in which he discusses the possibility of making use of the differences in intensity of preferences. On a personal note, he succeeds in discussing political aspects of intensity of individual preferences for a whole, long chapter, without ever mentioning either *The Calculus of Consent* (Buchanan and Tullock, 1962) or other discussions of logrolling. But this is characteristic of the book, and is one of the reasons for emphasizing that it deals with only a rather narrow portion of the modern theory of collective choice.

In addition to summarizing a great deal of work done by his predecessors, Pattanaik does add a number of proofs, lemmas, and theorems of his own. It is not clear, however, that the contribution to human knowledge is very great. At the end of the book, the only positive conclusion he has come to is that if individual preferences are similar enough, then social decisions are easier. This is not a new point, and, indeed, in literature not cited by Pattanaik, there actually are some theoretical measures of the desired degree of similarity. It is possible that the mathematical work produced by Pattanaik and his predecessors will be the foundation for further mathematical work which will indeed "resolve the paradox." It is also possible that it will not. Looking at the matter from my own personal standpoint, it seems to me that relatively few people should take the time to study this book carefully. No one should read it casually, because it does not lend itself to casual reading. It is possible that ten years from now we will look back on this book as an important link in the development of a new and better political theory. It seems to me, however, the odds are heavily against this, and ten years from now those who have heard of the book will regard it as another step down a blind alley.

GORDON TULLOCK
Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University

Struve, Liberal on the Left, 1870–1905. By Richard Pipes. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1970. Pp. 415. $10.00.)

Is there anything that lends more than narrow, specialized interest today to the subject of this book—a stormy petrel of Russia's intellectual and public life at the turn of the century? The answer is yes. In the widest sense, the interest lies in the central issue of how different kinds of societies get to where they are now, how they come to be "modern." Much of Struve's long life and prodigious writing was devoted to precisely this issue.

Russia's experience stands out, Malia reminded us of late, "as the first nation to make it from the 'third world' to the 'second'—indeed as the pivotal case in this fashionable division of the world . . ." More than that, Russia's experience is of particular interest and Struve was aware of that much of the time because "In Russia it was the state which, over the long haul, replaced Marx's dynamic Anglo-French bourgeoisie, forcing society into a competitive 'modernization' that society was unable to generate on its own" (Martin Malia, *New York Review of Books*, October 7, 1971).

Is this broad context, the biographical study that Richard Pipes offers is in part most helpful, and in part not. The present volume amply covers the first half of Struve's life, the tumultuous and in the main hopeful years up to the 1905 revolution. While still in his twenties, Struve made a great name for himself as a brilliant and prolific polemicist, and as an economist, historian, and philosopher of unusual erudition and range. Most controversially of all, Struve was widely known first as a Marxist and then as a no less active and vocal anti-Marxist, having meanwhile become a leading constitutional liberal. The author promises a second volume, in which he will deal with Struve's later life as a "liberal on the right."

The present volume consists of three parts. The first deals with Struve's family background, his intellectually precocious youth, and his early turn to Social Democracy. The longest part takes up the united front between various kinds of Russian Marxists at the turn of the century, notably the close ties that then existed between Struve and Lenin. Finally, Pipes tells the story of *Liberation,* the famous émigré journal that Struve put out; inside Russia, it served as a rallying point for liberals and many radicals on the eve of the 1905 revolution and was often likened to Herzen's *Bell.*

Struve, Liberal on the Left is exhaustively researched and documented. Pipes did a lot of work in the long closed Soviet historical archives, and makes excellent use of whatever he could find there and also in a trickle of recent Soviet and Western monographs on related topics. The book reads easily and well, and seldom will a reader not privy to things Russian feel out of place. For some time to come, this is bound to be the definitive study of a bizarre, contradictory figure who ranked second to none in his concern with his country's passage to modernity.

To the author of this study, however, the broad issue of national and comparative development is not really central. This is disappointing, and in a way puzzling. For throughout the book Pipes shows a strong interest in the overall politics and intellectual life of Russia, and does not hesitate to relate them to events and trends in the West. But in the book the battles of the day crowd out the underlying problems of social change. Broad social analysis is nowhere emphasized, and instead the story of Struve is told as a mixture of personal, political, and intellectual pursuits. This is all the more disappointing and puzzling because the hero of the story was indeed continuously wrestling with the broader issue. And his long record as a stormy petrel itself centers as much on the classical issue of Whither Russia as on the more transient battles of the day.

What accounts for the narrower focus of the book? Two answers suggest themselves to this reviewer, and they are closely related to each other. If I am right, Pipes built his analysis on two assumptions of his own which reflect Struve's life and thought in part, but far from completely. And it is these two assumptions that would account for the author's unwillingness to treat his hero in a broader context.

First of all, this book rests on what strikes me as untroubled, unquestioning liberal Westernism, a traditional faith that the West of the past century or two offers a valid and probably the only valid model for the rest of the world. Without saying so, the author seems to subscribe to the Whig interpretation of history, in Herbert Butterfield's sense of viewing and recording the past in terms of those events and ideas which add up to a steady march toward liberalism. For in this book the coming of some kind of liberalism to Russia appears as both desirable and plausible. Peter Struve himself was torn between a similar faith and all sorts of doubts and alternatives. If the author had paid more systematic heed to these doubts he would have inevitably, I think, come face to face with the broader issue to which Malia points.

Another reason this book treats Struve as it does probably stems from its author's attitude toward Marxism and Leninism. Struve was an early and quite original if erratic revisionist à la Eduard Bernstein and the Fabians, and this book gives that fact its due. Yet Marx appears here as little more than the rigid, deterministic true believer that Communists as well as anti-Communists make of him. Recent studies, notably those of Shlomo Avineri and Bertell Ollman, draw a much sharper line between all later true believers and Marx himself. Pipes still follows the oversimplifications so reminiscent of the Cold War at its worst.

The same is true in regard to orthodox Russian Marxists and especially Lenin. As against liberalism, the author treats them as the children of darkness of his story, and keeps coming back to this Manichean view. This imparts to the first half of his biography a peculiar Cold War narrowness that downgrades or at least oversimplifies Struve's revealing doubts and zigzags which Pipes himself details.

How, indeed, can one expect an author to dwell on the broader context when a good many times he speaks of his hero in terms such as these: Struve "was the first victim of that commitment to revolution for revolution's sake which after 1917 was to become in Russia the policy of the Bolshevik government and to find application on a national scale, claiming victims by the millions" (p. 236). This is how another chapter ends: "Fanaticism, in the words of Santayana, consists of redoubling one's efforts after one has forgotten one's aims" (p. 279). That's a long way from what Malia rightly stressed. Since this is a fascinating subject and an otherwise fine book, I wish the author had not strayed that far.

George Fischer

Richmond College and Graduate School,
City University of New York

People in Politics: Observations Across the Atlantic. By Richard Rose. (New York: Basic Books, 1970. Pp. 251. $5.95.)

People in Politics is made up of eight lively and informative lectures on "the state of political sociology" given by Richard Rose at Cambridge University in 1967. His listeners very likely came away with a heightened sense of the dimensions of politics, and of social science as a human venture, but no clear idea of the metes and bounds of political sociology—or indeed of whether that concept is useful in ordering and advancing our knowledge of Rose's main preoccupation, the authority of modern regimes. The term serves him nevertheless as a handy rubric for exploring a number of themes of interest equally to the social scientist and to the man of affairs, among them national identity and political culture, political socialization, political participation, the roles of politicians, the perplexities of political communication, the quest for meaningful concepts of power and authority, the changing nature of governmental activity, and theories and prospects of political change.

It is expecting a great deal that in one exercise anyone can lay out the critical issues implicit in these topics, review the major literature on them, add something of one's own, and whet students' appetites for social science as a corrective to conventional wisdom. It is testimony to Rose's skill and self-confidence that he succeeds to a commendable degree in each of these aims, and in fairly brief compass. All of us who have had to prepare lectures on similar themes know the difficulties, and the points at which we are open to criticism. On the one hand, by casting so wide a net one is exposed to the charge of important omissions. (For example, I was surprised that in such sweeping coverage Rose had so little to say about interest-group behavior as an aspect of participation and policy making, or about the political sociology of radical alternatives to the authority of regimes.) On the other hand, to add even more to what is already an elaborate catalogue of issues and studies risks attenuation of overall effect—the well-known dilemma of surveyism. The present work is already tilted in that direction, so rather than ask for even greater coverage one is more disposed to think it might have gained by sacrificing some admittedly apt and witty asides to make room for more sustained treatment of a limited number of central themes. How many of us have heard (and given) lectures of impressive comprehensiveness which somehow fall short of lingering impact because of this very virtue?

Rose does reduce the agenda somewhat by concentrating on Britain and the United States, the countries which he knows best (and which, I would add, have gone farthest in developing the kind of social science he finds productive). Without adopting a rigorously comparative format, he manages to pile up enough useful comparisons to elucidate nicely the substance and atmosphere of politics in these two societies and to fit their differences into patterns transcending the parochial study of either single system. Furthermore, his penchant for the sharp epigram often scores direct hits (e.g., p. 194, ". . . it is better to be ill than ignorant in Britain, and better to need education than medical treatment in America, unless you are rich as a doctor.") His declared aim of illustrating concretely "the insights that can be gained from looking at two industrial societies simultaneously from the inside and from afar" (p. 15) is largely met, even though his choice of illustrations reflects a more balanced familiarity with the British than the American side. American politics are often depicted more as emanations of racial conflict and presidential leadership than as economically distributive in nature; and the consideration of political power narrows a bit too quickly to a critique of Dahl's *Who Governs?* It should not be assumed, though, that Rose is fixated with generalizations sprung only from matters Anglo-American. Throughout he draws upon recent cross-national research for wider comparative observations. And in his final chapter, which is concerned with the ingredients for a theory of political change, he breaks his Atlantic moorings for a thoughtful treatment of regime development and stability in many lands. Inevitably, it is the least lighthearted part of the book.

On the hook of British and American politics Rose hangs a number of telling observations about social science in general and political science in particular. It is this, rather than new interpetations of political phenomena in the countries in question, that makes his book provocative. His appreciation and advocacy of behavioral approaches is tempered by skepticism over some of the ways they have been employed; his preference is for practical-minded eclecticism rather than grand theorizing, which he seems to regard as too far departed from the guts of political life. He makes a good case for role analysis in preference to elite analysis as more likely to encapsulate the variables needed for an understanding of policymaking. In passages reflecting the growing fashion he pinpoints a number of shortcomings in the happy pluralist school of community power analysis, not least its tendency to be "much more concerned with *how* decisions are made by those who govern, than with *how much difference* they make to the people being governed" (p. 205, italics in original). It is a pity that he did not choose to devote more space to ideas about how the latter disparity could be righted by social scientists.

Considering the amount of information and references it contains, *People in Politics* is relatively free of factual errors. I caught only two minor slips: an uncertainty over the size of Lane's Eastport microcosm (given as sixteen on pp. 46–47 and, accurately, as fifteen on p. 75), and the inclusion in this book published in 1970 of the statement that in West Germany one party has always been in office since the present regime was formed.

At a more important level it is a pleasure to note that this book joins the virtue of American organizational clarity with the pungency of British prose. The essay form does not come easily to the modern social scientist. It is Rose's achievement to demonstrate that it need not be the monopoly of those in the "softer" areas of the discipline.

James B. Christoph
Indiana University

The Radical Alternative. By Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber. (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1971. Pp. 204. $6.95.)

The Radical Alternative is a response by a leading French Radical to the problems of France and other advanced industrial societies. J. K. Galbraith suggests in his introduction that the book is far more than a parochial polemic. The subsequent political failures of the author permit several evaluations: Either this is a book that no professional politician ought to write, or he should suggest better alternatives. The problem is simply stated: Despite the potential of sustained economic growth, industrial societies are beset by innumerable problems—frustration, tension, aggressiveness, and violence to name a few. Their citizens, exploited and depreciated, are enslaved by the economy that ought to liberate them. Somewhere the wrong path was taken. Servan-Schreiber puts forth *The Radical Alternative* as another path.

The paradise implicit in sustained economic growth has been corroded by the encrustations of past policy. Government incrementalism is the major villain. The economic forces unleashed by liberalism remain entrenched in political power. As a result the industrial and political competitiveness needed to survive in the postindustrial world is limited. Political power protects the economically weak and consumes the surpluses that should be used to supply the public goods and services needed in advanced industrial societies. Minor villains are the politicians and planners of the past who have borrowed their "reforms" indiscriminately from other, larger states. Whether this borrowing has been applied to economic planning and development or defense planning, all the wrong parts of the economy have been stimulated. Although most would assume that the defense and economic goals of postwar France were above all political, for Servan-Schreiber they were not, and this was the reason for their failure. When he argues for an increased politicization of French life, this means an extensive reexamination of previously settled political and economic issues.

The Radical reforms are pre-eminently designed to alter the character of French society (and presumably they are also relevant to the problems of other advanced industrial states). Economic power is to be separated from political power. The withdrawal of state subsidies will bankrupt the uncompetitive parts of the economic system. The surviving sectors will be neutralized through the countervailing power of renovated trade unions. Moreover, even within firms, control is to be lodged in an electoral college composed equally of owners, managers, and workers. Another major reform involves drastic changes in the inheritance laws to end hereditary economic control. Inherited control preserves the economic elite and fosters values inimical to growth. Along with these attacks on the economic elite, the reforms aim to increase access to social equality through changes in the educational system. The alterations proposed by Servan-Schreiber begin at the preprimary level with infant day-care centers and extend to an elimination of the classic examination systems and a vast change in the pattern of higher education. A French version of VISTA is tucked in for good measure. Servan-Schreiber also seeks a redistribution of public power through a reinvigoration of local and regional government. Looking in the other direction, he envisions a European federation with extensive powers and responsibilities as well.

Basically, this volume extends the author's argument in *The American Challenge,* that is: Sustained economic growth requires a new set of allocation rules. *The Radical Alternative* is primarily concerned with these new allocation rules. Continued economic growth is assured if the subsidies buttressing inefficient economic operations are eliminated. The state funds saved will permit an expanded social security system, increases in the minimum wage, vast changes in the educational system, and mammoth assistance to the human victims of modernization. Perhaps the amounts spent on subsidies can finance social reforms, but the specific guidelines suggest otherwise. For example, subsidies "designed to improve urban and rural areas and promote research," are to be retained. Are there any existing subsidies that cannot be justified in this clause?

The Radical Alternative identifies some problems very well, and some of the suggested reforms are interesting and perhaps even workable, but the consequences can not be predicted. Moreover, despite the author's admonitions to the contrary, his alternatives also reflect rather promiscuous borrowing from other political systems. More seriously, the matter of transition from problem recognition to completed reform is largely passed over. Servan-Schreiber seeks to pre-empt for the Radical Party, unhampered according to him by the old orthodoxies of left and right, a role as "revitalizers" of postindustrial France. But the Radicals, even assuming there was some unity of outlook and agreement on action, seem unlikely candidates for the job. The essence of Radicalism—the belief in reason, in experience governed by rationality—can be viewed as pragmatism or opportunism. These are characteristics very congenial to the incrementalism that Servan-Schreiber decries in past decision making. The better life promised by economic growth is undermined by entrenched interests. Somehow these interests are going to be displaced by new majorities and Radical politicians, or they are going to undergo some rigorous conversion. He assumes that the threat of competition from the EEC and abroad is going to provide the shock for conversion. But Servan-Schreiber is so persuasive about the consequences of interlocking economic and political directorates that his strategies for overcoming the general institutional resistance to reform seem terribly weak.

The Radical Alternative doesn't make a case for Radicals as reformers and it neglects several other possible alternatives. Perhaps the existing economic and political change may be a required response to external pressures without the reforms he suggests. Perhaps politicians are irrelevant, and technocratic solutions will be silently imposed. More than anything else, *The Radical Alternative* illustrates that even the most intelligent politicians can offer no more than pedestrian solutions to the very real problems of advanced industrial societies.

KEITH R. LEGG

University of Florida

Decision Theory. By D. J. White. (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, 1969. Pp. 185. $7.95.)

The concern of this book is rational decision making for business enterprises. It is not a work that will interest the political scientist whose focus is public policy and decision making. It is, however, useful for specialists in decision theory.

What makes the book of interest is, first, the author's attempt to synthesize the work of Shackle, Savage, Marschak, Good, Von Mises, Von Neumann, Carnap, and Raiffa. He pulls from each what he feels are the key theoretical elements, then adds his own view of Decision Theory (his caps) and "decidability." ("Decidability as used in the true mathematical sense, is concerned with the 'proof' of a proposition, or its negation, based on a set of axioms and the usual two-value logic" [p. 84].) The author then attempts to "ascertain the content of Decision Theory" (p. 5) and seeks to understand the practical difficulties in its use. In particular, he stresses problems of information collection, selection, and use, and some of the difficulties encountered in applying mathematical models.

The second aspect of interest for the political scientist is the way in which an operations research scholar and mathematician views decision theory, an area which both disciplines recognize as important. The portrait that emerges is conservative. The author is aware of the problems of information bias; he notes the analytical dilemmas caused by the use of advisors and experts and by the reliance on highly processed information. In recognizing this, as well as the inherent bias, subjective assumptions, and complexity of such information for both decision maker and analyst, he concludes it is at present unprovable that better information leads to better decisions. He would apparently limit both the scope and focus of decision theory. For White, decision theory is concerned with choice not consequences. It does not aim to limit uncertainty or to improve the choice process directly. It simply seeks to improve the rational consistency of choice.

Improved consistency of choice would simplify the analysts' models. Perhaps it would also lead to improved business decisions, that is, if one takes the traditional view of corporate decision making as opposed to, say, Townsend's perspective in *Up the Organization.* But the very thought of improved consistency in politics raises a covey of normative and empirical questions which should bring both the dissertation seeker and the seasoned professional up shooting, or at least taking notes.

As I have tried to suggest, this is a framebreaking book and perhaps as such worth reading. But since time constraints often cause professionals to read book reviews before books, two caveats are in order. First, the author's prose is at times more demanding than his equations. The book could have used a good editing. Second, while its advertising recommends it for the many—"in undergraduate as well as graduate courses, in departments of economics, statistics and psychology, as well as schools of business and engineering"—I can recommend it only to those few who regard decision theory, or empirical theory focusing on problems of choice and choice modeling, as their central concern.

PETER A. LUPSHA

University of New Mexico

From Thurmond to Wallace, Political Tendencies in Georgia, 1948–1968. By Numan V. Bartley. (Baltimore and London: The John Hopkins Press, 1970. Pp. 117. $6.95.)

This slim volume is a highly readable, skillful analysis of the electoral response of Georgians to the changing structure of political competition in the state during the twenty-year period from 1948 to 1968. By using precinct data from urban centers (Atlanta and Macon), and by computing election percentages as well as Pearson product-moment correlations for presidential, congressional, and gubernatorial candidates, the author has provided a deeper understanding of the voting behavior in this important southern state.

The introduction gives an appropriate historical setting, noting the characteristics of the "southern one- or non-party system" which prevailed for generations following the end of the conflict between North and South until industrialization and urbanization began to emerge as vital forces in the late 1950s and early 1960s. The sweeping changes shaping Georgia with the rise of the Republican party, the re-entry of Negroes into more active political participation, the demise of the county unit system, and the increase in voting turnouts are well presented by use of statistics and appropriate references to pertinent works of other political scientists and historians. More information might have been provided, however, on the types of economic and professional interests as well as on the sources of financial support that have contributed to the development of a strong Republican party in the urban areas of the State. More discussion of the specific methods and techniques used by both political parties would have strengthened the author's contention that the G.O.P. had a more effective party organization. In a straightforward style, Professor Bartley illustrates with numerous examples how voter participation in the state during the 1960s was closely related to events and political developments such as the sit-in movement, civil rights demonstrations, and freedom rides occurring nationally and in the South.

The first two chapters on "The Politics of the Countryside" and "The Politics of the City" capsulize for laymen as well as scholars some important observations on political attitudes in the three major sections of the state, and in the towns and urban centers. Definitions of such often confusing terms as "conservatism" and "progressivism" are carefully explained, as voting habits of Georgians in the mountainous Piedmont north, the black belt of central Georgia, and the south are depicted. The author effectively supports his contention that rural voters throughout the state and townsmen of south and central Georgia are the most conservative voters, consistently supporting white supremacy and the county unit system. Readers will find Bartley's description of the base of support for the Talmadge faction of the Georgia Democratic party colorful and picturesque. This incisive work depicts voter response on such key issues as the 1952 constitutional amendment to constitutionalize the county unit system, the substitution of private schools for public schools in 1954, and the 1960 ballot on whether or not electors to the National Democratic Convention should be "pledged" to support the national ticket.

In his examination of voting attitudes in Atlanta and Macon, the author grouped by seven categories using socioeconomic characteristics to show that lower-status whites were the most conservative group while Negroes were politically the most liberal. The pertinent issues selected for analysis included for county unit system in 1952, for private schools in 1954, against liquor by the drink in 1964, and against fluoridation in 1968. The author notes that the rise of the Republican party is beginning to threaten the alliance of wealthy whites and poor blacks which has maintained progressive leadership for the state's largest city.

In Chapter 4 on "Republicanism and Mr. Goldwater" Bartley has given a judicious, economical, clear presentation of facts and events to show how as the national Democratic party became stronger on social issues, the more conservative Democrats in the state switched their political allegiance and joined Barry Goldwater and the Republican camp in 1964. Chapter 5 on "Democracy and Mr. Maddox" illustrates the exciting political developments which in 1966 produced a Republican plurality in the governor's race.

The 1968 elections described in Chapter 6 point to the disintegration of national Democratic party influence in Georgia under the Humphrey banner, and note the further isolation of Negro voters from effective political influence that was evident in 1966 with their failure to elect Ellis G. Arnall as governor. One of Bartley's descriptions of George Wallace's base of support is worth quoting for its apparent relevance in 1972 throughout much of the South: "He combined racism and a (white) common-man campaign style with a general defense of rural-southern-small town values" (p. 85).

The final chapter on "Some Trends and Prospects" pinpoints problems facing the Georgia Democratic party in building on a base of small town white voters and liberal Negroes to counter Republican efforts to attract the same group of low-income whites by emphasizing social conservatism while keeping the support of affluent whites by advocating economic conservatism.

J. David Palmer

Georgia State University

The Politics of Civil Rights in the Truman Administration. By William C. Berman. (Columbus, Ohio: Ohio State University Press, 1970. Pp. 261. $8.00.)

The Presidency and Black Civil Rights. By Allan Wolk. (Cranbury, N.J.: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1971. Pp. 276. $10.00).

It is noteworthy that only recently have any books been published dealing primarily with the presidency and civil rights. These two volumes are welcome additions to this growing body of literature.

The two books are alike in that they both emphasize the President's central role in the civil rights area. Moreover both authors largely dwell on efforts to improve conditions of southern blacks. At the same time, they point up the continued recalcitrance of southern white congressmen and their constitutents in the face of the ever-present gap between the rhetoric of democracy and equality on the one hand and the realities of American society on the other.

The works are also different. Berman's book is more general in scope. On the other hand, Wolk, though he considers the presidents from Eisenhower to Nixon, deals largely and rather uniquely with several implementation units and the political environment in which they operate.

Professor Berman, a historian, has done an enormous amount of research in his book on the Truman administration. Aside from the usual documents, books, periodicals, and the *New York Times*, he made extensive use of black newspapers, NAACP papers, and interviews with involved individuals. Moreover, he spent considerable time in analyzing materials in the Harry S. Truman Library.

Berman traces the political career of former President Truman noting the role of blacks in Truman's rise to higher office. Although Missouri was anything but progressive in race relations, Truman paid close attention to black voters in St. Louis and Kansas City, since their votes were crucial in his senatorial campaigns. While championing certain modest gains for black people, Senator Truman drew the line at social equality.

Most blacks apparently opposed the replacement of Henry Wallace by Harry Truman as F.D.R.'s running mate in 1944. Truman was regarded as the more conservative of the two on the race issue. Indeed, for a time after assuming the presidency in 1945 Truman was rather passive in the area of civil rights. After the Republican victories in 1946, however, President Truman realized that he would need black votes to win re-election in 1948. Moreover, once the Cold War ensued, it served the nation's image abroad to favor civil rights. The President attempted to cultivate black support through rhetoric and token executive actions.

Among other things, Truman created a Committee on Civil Rights, and in his message of February 2, 1948, he called for a number of reforms, including the FEPC. But he did not push his program for a time and sought to mollify growing white hostility in the South. Much to his dismay, the Democratic National Convention adopted a stronger civil rights platform than he wanted, with the resulting walkout by the southern delegates.

Faced with three opponents Truman issued two executive orders dealing with discrimination in the armed forces and federal employment. Moreover, he called Congress into special session and urged it to adopt his proposals of February 2. Congress failed to act, and Truman made it a campaign issue laying the blame on the Republican-controlled Congress. Truman was narrowly elected and black votes were crucial in several key states.

After his election the President resubmitted his program to Congress but to no avail. The Korean War began in 1950, and domestic issues receded into the background. Concerned about party unity and his possible defeat, Truman chose not to seek re-election in 1952.

In this splendid book Professor Berman makes it clear that Truman took what few civil rights actions he did only as a result of pressure from blacks and from white liberals. Though Truman never did make a full commitment, he helped bring civil rights to the forefront where it has since remained. Things were different then, however; the northern backlash had not developed and blacks seemed more patient.

Wolk, a political scientist, has, like Berman, made extensive use of individual interviews along with the usual books, documents, and periodicals, but he did not examine black newspapers or NAACP papers. The author directs most of his attention to the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, focusing on such enforcements units as the Civil Rights Division in the Justice Department (CRD), the Community Relations Service, the Office of Civil Rights (OCR), and the Equal Education Opportunity Program. In his analysis of the implementation units the following factors are examined: conditions existing at the time of the unit's inception, the locale in which it was placed, its philosophy, and its relations with other political actors. Wolk finds the CRD and the OCR to have been the most effective.

In describing the central role of the President, Wolk does not make light of the difficulties he may encounter in controlling the bureaucracy. Nevertheless, he argues that if the President—even in the area of civil rights—decides "it is worth his time to follow up a policy decision, it is very difficult for those in lower echelons to resist his queries" (pp. 46–47). No President, however, has ever given civil rights the highest priority, though some have done more than others. One major weakness has been the lack of a viable coordinating unit under the direction of the President. Ineffectual efforts were made by Kennedy and Johnson to remedy this situation.

Wolk points out that whenever civil rights groups have been united and have coordinated their activities with those of congressional and administrative allies, they have been fairly successful in passing civil rights legislation. Civil rights enforcement, however, has been hamstrung by bureaucratic hostility or indifference, resistance of white southerners in and out of Congress, and the inability of civil rights proponents to muster the same degree of pressure in the implementation of laws as in initiating them.

To improve enforcement efforts, Wolk recommends that implementation proceedings by the executive branch be institutionalized, and that a permanent commission with an ombudsman function be established to oversee compliance efforts. Moreover, strong presidential leadership will be needed until the concept of black civil rights is thoroughly institutionalized. Thus far, none of his recommendations seems to be forthcoming and an end of discrimination is not in sight.

In sum, the two books represent useful additions to our knowledge about civil rights since World War II. Both authors provide ample documentation of the perennial inability or unwillingness of American political leaders and society to solve "The American Dilemma" Gunnar Myrdal wrote about in 1944.

JAMES C. HARVEY

Jackson State College

The Ticket-Splitter: A New Force in American Politics. By Walter De Vries and V. Lance Tarrance. (Grand Rapids, Michigan: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1972. Pp. 149. $2.45.)

On December 4, 1971 the *New York Times* summarized a new book whose thesis, it reported, is that "swelling numbers of split-ticket voters, well-informed and suprisingly resistant to televised advertising, hold the key to the elections of the seventies." *The Ticket-Splitter* —written by two Republican strategists, Walter De Vries and V. Lance Tarrance—was, the *Times* continued, attracting considerable interest among strategists in both parties.

De Vries and Tarrance argue three themes. The first is that split-ticket voting is dramatically increasing in the United States, particularly in the last decade. Their data come from such sources as Milton Cummings's *Congressmen and the Electorate*. They have updated previously published statistics, however, and augmented them with data from state elections and survey research. De Vries and Tarrance do not stop to consider explanations of this increase in ticket-splitting, but one might expect that ticket-splitting would increase in periods of party alignment as people transfer loyalties from one party to another. However, the historical data in *The Ticket-Splitter* show no such increase in ticket-splitting during the New Deal realignment.

De Vries and Tarrance note that this perplexing increase in split-ticket voting has received scant attention from political scientists. Not content to underscore our neglect, they suggest that the problem inheres in measures of party loyalties. Influenced by Michigan's Survey Research Center Studies, political scientists have defined ties to parties in terms of attitudinal allegiances rather than by voting choices. De Vries and Tarrance sharply criticize these self-designated measures of party identification as having created confusion about the social characterisitics and political rationality of the independent. In fact, it is De Vries and Tarrance who have contributed to the confusion. In recent years academic writers have tended to settle on definitions of different forms of flexible ties to parties. A floating voter is what Key called in *The Responsible Electorate* a switcher —a person who votes for different parties in different elections. A ticket-splitter is one who votes for different parties in the same election. An independent is simply a person who calls himself one. These are similar but distinct concepts, and there is no reason to expect that the same people would fall in each of these categories. Yet, De Vries and Tarrance create the illusion of a disagreement in the literature on independents by using the terms synonymously at times. For example (p. 45), "Citing evidence from such classic voting studies as *Voting* and *The American Voter*, Daudt neatly disproves their major hypotheses about the floating voters (i.e., independents). . . ." But, of course, floating voters and independents are not the same concepts. Or another example (p. 47), ". . . Key developed a different concept of the switch voter, or one who changes his party vote (i.e., splits his ticket) from one election to the next. . . ." Key, in fact, has nothing to say about ticket-splitting in *The Responsible Electorate*. Rather than billing the book as a challenge to the Survey Research Center studies, one wishes that the authors had said, "We know very little about the split-ticket voter. We are trying to remedy that."

The book's second theme is an examination of the social, economic, and political characteristics of the ticket-splitter. They discover (p. 61) that ". . . the ticket-splitter is slightly younger, somewhat more educated, somewhat more white-collar, and more suburban than the typical middle-class voter." This description relies heavily on a 1967 Market Opinion Research survey conducted for the Romney for President committee. Like Romney's candidacy, the analysis encounters its difficulties. No comparisons with middle-class voters are actually presented. Further, if one compares the ticket-splitters with the total sample (pp. 62–64), few of the socioeconomic differences between the typical voter and the ticket-splitter would survive a test of statistical significance.

The authors' basic problem is that their percentage tables are computed in the wrong direction. Their tables tell us the proportion of ticket-splitters contributed by each social group. Thus, we can see that most ticket-splitters are females, protestants, and high school graduates, who are between 50–59 years of age, who are not in the labor force, and whose family income is between 10,000 and 14,999 dollars. This is hardly a composite of a voter that is younger, more educated, and more white collar than a typical middle-class voter. Presumably, De Vries and Tarrance want to highlight the socioeconomic groups that contain the highest proportion of ticket-splitters rather than define the proportion of ticket-splitters contributed by each social group. One cannot recompute the book's tables because marginal frequencies are not included. I suspect, however, that recomputed tables would show the contrasts the authors imply—namely, that a greater proportion of middle- and upper-status voters than lower-status voters vote split-tickets.

The book's final theme is a discussion of modern campaign strategy. The authors' thesis is that the factors which voters *say* influence their voting decisions (such as television newscasts and newspaper stories) cannot be controlled by the candidates. Thus (p. 92), "The way to win elections is not through traditional television advertising that 'sells' the candidate, but through an overall communications strategy linking the candidate and the target groups which constitute the 'crucial minority' that will decide the election." Demographics, media markets, continuous opinion polling—all are interestingly melded into a coordinated campaign strategy aimed at the ticket-splitter.

On balance, the book is not the challenge to conventional political science that the authors imply. Nevertheless, the initial chapter on the increase in ticket-splitting and the concluding chapters on political campaigning are well worth reading. In between are enough interesting points—and interesting mistakes—to make it a good book to teach. And anyway, if one wants to read the books that inspire political strategists, *The Ticket-Splitter* heads the current list.

RICHARD W. BOYD

Wesleyan University

The School Prayer Decisions: From Court Policy to Local Practice. By Kenneth M. Dolbeare and Phillip E. Hammond. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971. Pp. xi, 164. $6.50.)

In 1949 Philip Selznick wrote at the conclusion of his *TVA and the Grass Roots:* "For the things which are important in the analysis of democracy are those which bind the hands of good men. We then learn that something more than virtue is necessary in the realm of circumstance and power." The strength of Professors Dolbeare's and Hammond's new book, which examines what the authors nicely call the "banality of noncompliance" in several midwestern jurisdictions, lies in its reinforcement of the wisdom of Selznick's conclusion.

The authors initiated this study of four small-town school districts in a midwestern state designated "Midway" in hopes of gauging the influence of public attitudes toward the Court and its decisions upon the degree of compliance with the school prayer decisions. But when their initial investigation produced no evidence of significant public controversy over the issue at any site and revealed "flagrant noncompliance" in all four (despite assurance from officials in two of the four communities that they were complying), the authors began to ask why "failure to comply was so prevalent and so easy to maintain with impunity" (p. x). The authors suggest four reasons why state and local officials, "good men" possessing "unquestioned integrity," nevertheless successfully deflected the "national mandate for change" (p. 5):

(1) Each official, state and local, "has what is to him a good reason" for avoiding personal responsibility for implementing the Court's decisions. One local school official must win voter approval of a new bond issue, another must secure acceptance of a school consolidation plan that will dismantle rural high school basketball teams in which citizens take "religious" pride. The official who initiates implementation of the prayer decisions in strongly Protestant areas accustomed to school-house religion risks scuttling plans to improve educational quality (pp. 6–7 and Chaps. 4–6).

(2) Officials rationalize away the necessity of insuring compliance. Some officials refuse to initiate search for evidence of noncompliance and then presume total compliance in the absence of contrary information. Others honestly interpret the rulings to permit voluntary prayers in the name of the Constitution's guarantee of religious freedom (p. 7 and Chaps. 4–6).

(3) The local "power structure," uniformly close-knit in the four small communities (roughly 5000–10,000 population) and somewhat more pluralized in a fifth community of roughly 45,000 which the authors added for comparative purposes, seeks to avoid conflict "at almost any cost. . . . Their preference is to keep decision-making within their ranks and thus to suppress all issues that threaten such smooth-working processes" (p. 7). This characteristic, the authors add, may produce a "far-reaching denial of democratic participation" (p. 8).

(4) No institutionalized procedures exist short of initiating expensive and, in small communities, highly visible and potentially isolating law suits, to force officials or interest groups to take a position on the issue. Local ministers were divided; the Civil Liberties Union and the Council of Churches "saw no available and economically feasible route to put the issue onto an official agenda" (p. 8 and Chaps. 4–6).

At least for those of us, myself included, who concur with Mr. Justice Holmes's preference for continuing re-education in the obvious over the "elucidation of the obscure," these points are well worth making. The book outlines persuasively several systemic circumstances in which law fails to constrain political action, and teachers seeking an effective vehicle for convincing their students, particularly beginning students, of the tenuous hold of law in America should very seriously consider assigning it. More experienced students of local politics and of Supreme Court impact will, however, have to contend with several frustrating loose ends.

Some of the frustrations are more or less mechanical. The authors provide no examples of their interview schedules, and, if their interviewing was entirely open-ended, they do not defend the choice of that technique or describe interview settings and contexts. We never learn precisely which officials in which districts were interviewed. The authors treat each interviewee in isolation, giving us little feel for his relationships with other political actors so that precise patterns of cause and effect do not emerge. We never learn just how much school prayer and Bible reading occurs in the five sites. The authors give few details concerning the composition of the "power structure." They make dramatic but essentially anecdotal use of their interview findings and ask us, in short, to take on faith the bulk of their conclusions.

Perhaps the publisher insisted on a short book, but that insistence would not explain the occasional imprecisions in argumentation. Some of these imprecisions are minor. Technically a judicial decision binds only parties to that lawsuit, and the distinction between a moral and a legal obligation to comply calls for an elaboration of the descriptive phrase "national mandate." And the statement on page 4 that the gap between law and practice "exacerbates already strained social and political relationships" needs to be reconciled with the statement two paragraphs later that "no doubt" the same gap is, in part, "a functional means whereby power brokers can preserve the fragile accommodations that hold the society together." More important, however, the authors' four explanatory categories have about them a universal quality which will leave the reader dangling in search for explanations of conceded compliance in similarly situated midwestern communities. Finally, the authors' use of elite/nonelite terminology blurs the critical distinction between elite defined as community power structure and elite defined as those favoring a given point of view on a specific issue. The reader will sense the authors' eagerness to document the pervasiveness of small-town, tight-knit power structures and of the independence of these structures in determining community policy. Yet their findings would suggest that, regarding school prayers, at least, elites were neutral or inclined to accept the decisions but refused to act in anticipation of negative public reaction. Late in the game, the reader discovers that when the authors refer to the "impotence of non-elites," they refer to Midway's small percentage of Jews, Jehovah's Witnesses, and other religious minorities who might seriously object to continuing proscribed practices. (They do not document any cases of such objections.) To use the term "elite" to include, at minimum, 95 per cent of the population does violence to the conventionally accepted meaning of that term.

In short, the authors' concern (and occasional hints of justifiable anger) for the failure of elites to engineer compliance at times obscures a central point: that it is not the isolation and independence of elites but their very responsiveness to widely held mass opinion that most threatens protection of minority rights.

LIEF H. CARTER

University of Tennessee at Chattanooga

Benjamin Rush: Revolutionary Gadfly. By David Freeman Hawke. (Indianapolis and New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1971. Pp. 490. $15.00.)

Specialists in American civil-liberties history and in public health-medical history, have attended spottily to Benjamin Rush. He rates more than this modest place in scholarly literature. As public health pioneer and as commentator on Pennsylvania loyalty tests, Rush spans gaps from revolutionary to modern America. With respect to preventive, mass public-health needs, especially epidemiological controls, Rush wistfully prophesied that one day, governments on all levels of the federal system would place this responsibility among their highest priorities. Among his contributions to civil liberties, in 1785 Rush forecfully opposed Pennsylvania's vexatious anti-Tory loyalty oath requirement.

Now Professor Hawke provides the very useful service of drawing together these seemingly disparate strands of Rush's public life, in form of a semibiography ("semi" because Hawke chose to end his book in 1790 when Rush retired from politics, though he lived on until 1813). Assembled and interwoven under Hawke's skillful control, numerous strands of Rush's wonderfully busy, fruitful careers merge, much as they must have done during his lifetime. The result is a far more rounded description of Rush's life and times, showing far better insight than anything heretofore available.

Hawke reveals Rush as a man blessed—cursed, his detractors had it—with compelling social concerns, unresting energy, and a sharp voice and pen. A semi-eccentric, Rush practiced medicine throughout the decades from 1770 to 1790 while participating very vigorously in patriotic political action. Rush was endlessly involved in rancorous professional and public-policy disputes, and was active in an astonishing variety of associations and institutions. His career offers useful illustration of the processes by which extralegal private protest associations transformed themselves into shadow local governments and then into legitimized public authorities. Rush's medley of commitments offer a rich sense of the quality of life in revolutionary America for men of his compelling civic sense and special talents; a sense particularly valuable for readers of this journal. In a single relatively brief period, Rush was local correspondence committeeman, Continental Army civilian surgeon, Continental Congressman, and Philadelphia city councilman—some of these, simultaneously.

Hawke's *Rush* illuminates also a responsibility of historical creation too often ignored in scholarship: to ascertain evils and distresses of which men in the past were aware and, as here, sought eclectically and sporadically to correct in light of existing standards, alternatives, and institutions. Rush was a veritable polygamist of good causes. He was almost compulsive in his sensitivity to what Emerson later called society's putrid spots. Antimonarchical revolutionary, medical reformer, antislavery pioneer, penal improver, liquor prohibitionist, and champion of a national university, Rush was indeed a gadfly to his generation. This intelligently constructed and literate study, though unfortunately overpriced, deserves widespread attention and transdisciplinary employment.

HAROLD M. HYMAN

Rice University

The Politics of Finance: The House Committee on Ways and Means. By John F. Manley. (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1970. Pp. xvii, 395. $4.25 paper.)

For seven years now those in the profession who read the leading journals have known that John Manley knows a great deal about the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives and can convey that knowledge articulately and interestingly. On three separate occasions (in this *Review* in December 1965, and June 1969, and in the *Journal of Politics* in November 1968) Manley has demonstrated his prowess. The present book incorporates the essence of those three articles plus a great deal more.

This book adds substantially to our knowledge of the Committee, of the House, and of Congress. It is not "just another committee study" that can be dismissed as relatively unimportant. In the straightforward organization of his chapters, Manley lays out the scope of his study, makes some comments on the pieces of theory and the methods he is using, talks about the members of the Committee through the vehicle of investigating their recruitment, explores integration and social exchange within the committee, analyzes the crucial role played by the present chairman of the committee, investigates the relations between the committee and the full House of Representatives, the Senate, and the executive branch. While he does not have a separate chapter on interest groups, he discusses them frequently throughout the last part of the book, rightly judging that a separate chapter would have been redundant.

In short, the book is thorough, well organized, well researched, well written, and interesting. Anyone interested in Congress in a serious way should read it with reasonable care.

Nevertheless, several serious questions can be asked about the book. First, how adequate is the theoretical underpinning of the book? Manley himself suggests some displeasure with the adequacy of his theory. He indicates, for example, that "similarity between the original research design and the final product is virtually nonexistent" (p. 3). He also indicates that he began his work with an "absence of any dependent variable of overpowering interest" (p. 5). These two facts alone almost inevitably mean that the research will not make a major theoretical contribution (a contribution that, in all fairness, Manley did not set out to make).

The utility of the bits of theory he does present is a separable question. Most of those bits appear in Chapters 3 and 4 and are drawn from sociological literature on systems, organizations, and small groups. Yet these bits of theory do not really lead to explicit hypotheses that are either explored or tested. The few specific hypotheses in the book do not seem to be derived from theory; and the theoretical materials that are used appear to help guide basically descriptive passages.

Manley certainly has a good deal of theoretical and methodological sense. For example, he wisely rejects role theory and he also gives a brief but persuasive defense of participant observation as a valid method for the kind of mapping exercise in which he is engaged. But the theory he uses does not allow him to reach a set of well-developed conclusions at the end of the book. On balance, the theory may be more distracting than helpful, but it might ultimately contribute to theory building by stimulating other scholars.

Second, does the book tell us anything new about the making of public policy by Congress?

The answer to this question is a clear yes, although Manley certainly did not set out to make a scientific analysis of the policy impact of the committee. Nevertheless, he contributes conclusive evidence that (1) the committee does indeed produce relatively conservative policy (he defines "liberal" and "conservative" in meaningful terms for the committee; and he also uses roll-call evidence on the conservative coalition to bolster his point substantially); (2) the committee faithfully reflects the general policy preferences of a majority of the members of the House; (3) the relations between the committee and the Senate vary significantly between the three major parts of the committee's jurisdiction (taxes, social security, and trade); (4) the relations between the committee and the executive branch also vary significantly between the three major areas of concern; and (5) particularly in the field of taxation, interest groups have great impact, although that impact may be felt in either the Treasury Department or in Congress (and members of Congress do perceive some pressure).

Third, does the book use history in an insightful way? Here again, the answer is yes. Manley certainly has not set out to write a history of the committee. But he has a variety of data on committee operations from 1933 to the present and he uses these data well.

Manley combines with good effect some features of classic history (material used for detailed study and understanding of a limited period of time bounded by specific dates) and case history (material used to present a case from a definite past and relatively short period of time). For example, by paying serious attention to historical materials he is in a position to make it clear that things do change—the committee in the 1930s and in 1947–48, for example, was highly partisan, whereas the present committee operates under a norm of restrained partisanship. Too much political science research, including a lot of the research on Congress, has been ahistorical, with the result that a description of a contemporary phenomenon has often been assumed to hold for the past as well and delimit an immutable reality.

RANDALL B. RIPLEY
The Ohio State University

Federal Tax Policy. Rev. ed. By Joseph A. Pechman. (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1971. Pp. 344. $7.00, Cloth; $3.25, Paper.)

The revised edition of *Federal Tax Policy* by Joseph A. Pechman accomplishes only a part of its stated purpose. According to the author, "the purpose of this volume is to explain the intricacies of the tax systems so that the interested citizen may better understand and contribute to the public discussion and to the resolution of the main issues." The book does explain the intricacies of the major taxes used in the United States. It does not contribute much to our understanding of how tax decisions are made or how the major tax issues could be resolved.

The book has two distinct parts. The first part discusses the economics of tax policy and the tax legislative process. The second part consists of chapter-long discussions of the major taxes used in the United States. The second chapter entitled "Taxes and Economic Policy" is a concise and well-written introduction to the "new economics." It explains, with the help of many carefully drawn figures, the rules of modern stabilization policy, and introduces the reader to such concepts as "full employment surplus," "built-in stabilizers," "fiscal dividend," "fiscal drag," and "debt burden." With a careful reading of this chapter even a political scientist could masquerade as a Monday morning economic adviser.

Noneconomists should be careful about one point in the chapter, however. The author implies that the appropriate stabilization program involves manipulation of the full employment budget surplus. He advises:

> When private demand is high, a large full employment surplus is called for; when private demand is weak, a small full employment surplus, or even a full employment deficit, is required. Efforts to achieve a larger surplus or a lower deficit than is consistent with full employment would depress employment and incomes. If the budget called for too small a full employment surplus, total demand would be too high, and prices would rise (p. 15).

One must not conclude that policy makers can directly control budget surpluses or deficits, even those at a hypothetical full-employment level. In pursuing the economic goals of price level stability, full employment, a balance in our international payments, and an adequate rate of economic growth, fiscal policy makers can raise or lower taxes, expenditures, or transfers, and manipulate the issuance and redemption of government debt. The full-employment surplus is a consequence of the fiscal actions the government takes. It is, in other words, an intermediate goal, and not a means or instrument of economic policy.

For Pechman, the politics of taxation consists primarily of the sequence of barriers a tax bill must clear in Congress to become a law. Only two pages are devoted to the preparation of tax bills in the executive branch, although executive agencies are responsible for the economic analyses and many of the political analyses which go into a major tax proposal. The reader will not learn how federal tax policy is made; how tax problems are identified; how alternatives for solving tax problems are generated; how rules of thumb—or economic wisdom—are used to choose among tax alternatives; or how major political considerations are taken into account. Nor will the reader learn how the major institutional characteristics of the American political system—federalism, the separation of powers, seniority rule, and party system, etc.—affects tax policy.

The chapters on each of the major taxes of the United States combine descriptions of the structure of the particular tax and discussions of the economic consequences of the tax, the major economic issues surrounding the tax, and the most frequently mentioned proposals for reforming the tax. The book is up-to-date and includes material on most of the current tax proposals, such as the negative income tax, the value added tax, and alternatives to the property tax. There is an abundance of clearly presented information for citizens interested in the individual income tax, the corporation income tax, consumption taxes, payroll taxes, estate and gift taxes, and state and local taxes. In general, while the author frequently alludes to the need for greater equity in the tax system, he appears to believe that the present tax system works very well and that proposed changes should be considered with caution.

Pechman's book, in summary, is more useful for citizens interested in taxes than for political scientists interested in tax policy. While one can learn a great deal about income taxes, and payroll taxes, etc., one will not learn why President Nixon rejected the tax prescriptions outlined in Chapter 2 in favor of wage and price controls. Perhaps it is expecting too much of an economist, even one as familiar with Washington politics as Dr. Pechman, to consider the political as well as the economic realities of federal tax policy.

LAWRENCE C. PIERCE

University of Oregon

The Coming to Power: Critical Elections in American History. Edited by Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. (New York: Chelsea House in association with McGraw-Hill: 1972. Pp. xxi, 550. $12.50.)

The Voice of History occasionally speaks as though muffled by a handkerchief, and through a pay telephone. This may be one such occasion. This book consists of fifteen short narrative accounts describing sixteen presidential elections in American history. The fifteen chapters are selected from a comprehensive set of forty-six published in four volumes last year under the compelling title *History of American Presidential Elections.*

What distinguishes these sixteen elections? The editor attempts to make a case for the proposition that these were "critical elections," appropriating the late V. O. Key's phrase for an election in which basic and lasting shifts in party alignments take place in the electorate. Key's two great examples were the 1896 and 1928 elections. This selection omits 1928, but includes 1896, as well as several other elections that were not critical by Key's standard or, so far as I can see, any other.

As a matter of fact, very little space is given over in any of these essays to discussing electorates at all. American elections surely entail the well-publicized maneuverings of political elites. But what these elites are after is the favorable attention of voters, whose varied responses have been difficult to ferret out and interpret. The advancing craft of public opinion analysis, coupled with increasingly sophisticated studies of aggregate voting statistics over the last 30 years, has made the dispositions and behavior of electorates progressively less mysterious. No retrospective account—particularly of a recent election—that fails to give careful attention to this body of knowledge about voters is likely to be worth much. Only one of these accounts (Barton Bernstein's, on the election of 1952) does; in the other recent ones this is a fatal weakness.

Among the contributors to this volume are distinguished historians. I do not know enough about all periods of U.S. history to be able to tell if we are getting absolutely vintage Marcus Cunliffe on the Federalist era, or Noble Cunningham on 1800 or Frank Freidel on 1932, but their performances—and many of the others—are comfortingly authoritative. For people who are looking for straightforward narratives about who said what in speeches and in encounters among leaders, this collection can serve acceptably. As we draw closer to the present time, however, the era of Theodore White, Jules Witcover, and other industrious reconstructors of presidential elections, the usefulness of such an enterprise diminishes. The lack of theory, of comparative perspective, begins to tell, and the collection begins to resemble what Maitland called "a merely curious collection of odds and ends, . . . precarious odds and questionable ends."

Moreover, the credentials of contributors become less compelling. The selection of Kennedy speechwriter Theodore Sorensen to write the 1960 chapter is the worst example. Sorensen's essay provides a singularly inappropriate outlet for his penchant for judiciously balancing a Kennedy beam against an opponent's mote. It is clearly a weakness in a purported work of disinterested history when any statement that a particular author may make favorable to one side is ipso facto self-serving. One can marvel for example at Sorensen's pains in singling out John Kennedy's speeches as particularly praiseworthy (p. 445).

In the end, one must ask for whom this book was produced. Credulous libraries, sophisticates, and masochists will certainly prefer the comprehensive coverage of the four-volume version. Beginners and the idly curious might well begin with these little essays, but if their interest in one or more presidential election is somehow tickled, the lack of footnotes and bibliographies will stymie attempts to go farther. There must be a better way than this to stimulate thought about presidential elections.

NELSON W. POLSBY
University of California, Berkeley

A Mind of one Piece: Brandeis and American Reform. By Melvin I. Urofsky. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1971. Pp. 210. $10.00.)

Professor Urofsky, who is editor of the Brandeis Papers, has drawn upon new as well as existing sources to persuade us, "children of the Leviathan" (p. xi), that it is the "seamless life and thought" of Brandeis (p. xii), rather than the specific content of that thought, which holds "meaning for the society we live in today" (p. 151). Brandeis, Urofsky argues, was above all a moralist who utilized his extraordinary skills in the public service of that morality. Its essence was a belief in the principles of Jeffersonian democracy, "a society founded upon a small-unit economy; the state serving only to insure that no man would injure his neighbor; . . . a frontier faith in cooperation among men" (pp. 100–101). Only such a *polis* could develop the capacities of its citizens, for the "division of wealth, labor and responsibility among as many people as possible assured to each not only a voice, but also a stake . . . in society" (p. 55).

This "mind of one piece" (the words are Paul Freund's) is examined from aspects of Brandeis's life—friend to the Boston Brahmins; counsel to the affluent and "people's attorney"; advisor to Woodrow Wilson; Zionist; Justice; "Linchpin of Reform" (chap. 7). The book, which cannot supplant, but does supplement, Alpheus Thomas Mason's biography (*Brandeis: A Free Man's Life*, 1946), consists of seven short essays—variations on a theme. The best-integrated, "The Economist as Moralist," by illuminating Brandeis's economic thought, explains the reasons for his disagreements with policies of the New Nationalism and the New Deal. Brandeis, we are told, thought that big government as a counterpoise to big business was a cure as bad as the disease. His proposal for minimal federal regulation of competition among small-unit producers was nothing less than a survival plan for traditional, and threatened, values. He would have answered that "criticisms of his . . . philosophy were irrelevant. . . . To a moralist, nonmoral considerations are secondary; to Brandeis, the economic and technical arguments for bigness were insignificant . . . to the democratic need for smallness" (p. 67).

Brandeis's methods were as consistent as the principles they served. He *taught*. While the "Brandeis brief" provides the classic example, there were others. He took a case only when convinced of the "legitimacy" of his client's position and the "moral soundness" of his own (p. 37). He came first to know his clients, then tried "to get them to understand the problem from the overall viewpoint rather than from their own parochial stance" (p. 33). When he was finished they had been shown a connection between their interests and a Brandeisian concept of reform. Employers saw the advantages of profit-sharing plans; the 70,000 members of his Massachusetts State Savings-Bank League, by lobbying for, learned about, savings-bank insurance. It was as a teacher that Brandeis attempted to help Woodrow Wilson—first as candidate, later as President—sharpen his views on the trust question; it was as a teacher that he summoned American Jews, in the name of progressivism, to the cause of Zionism. And so it went on the Court as well. The concise discussion of well-selected cases portrays a justice anxious to "guide . . . American law on how to adjust to new conditions without forsaking old beliefs" (p. 147).

The book should have a wide audience: laymen seeking information; scholars in search of fresh insights; graduate and undergraduate students of history, economics and political science. My criticisms are minor and are made primarily in the interests of undergraduate readers: Students might be confused by Urofsky's efforts to explain Brandeis's practice of judicial self-restraint, admittedly a complex subject. And on occasion a flat assertion is made without documentation, such as that voters in 1912 expressed a "choice of economic policy" (p. 79). But such flaws are minor and understandable considering the vast amount of material so elegantly compressed. Urofsky has made his point that Brandeis remained true to himself. And it is altogether fitting that he should have closed the book with Felix Frankfurter's final tribute to his mentor: "He walked," in the words of the Hebrew prophets, "in peace and equity." He was "as the shadow of a great rock in a weary land" (p. 168).

Mary Cornelia Porter

Barat College

Public Policy Preference in the States. By Ronald E. Weber. (Bloomington: Indiana University Institute of Public Administration, 1971. Pp. 112. $2.50, paper.)

The comparative analysis of politics and public policies in the American states has become increasingly sophisticated in recent years, but so far it has dealt inadequately with those issues of theory that link public attitudes, beliefs, or preferences with the actions of politicians. Some research has dealt gingerly with aggregate measures of voter turnout, party strength, or interparty competition. Other research has dealt entirely with the activities of government officials and has avoided issues of democratic control. This volume offers a potential solution to those who would look directly at the popular component of state politics or policy making and probe deeper than is feasible with indices of turnout and competition.

The problem for the state analyst is that national or regional surveys of public opinion do not include representative samples of each state's population. Some states have ongoing survey units, and ambitious projects have sampled the populations of several states. For most of the time and for almost all of the states, however, there is no feasible way to survey their populations' attitudes or behaviors.

Ronald Weber is one of several political scientists who has derived measures of state-by-state attitudes and behaviors from the results of nationwide surveys. The group developed under the leadership of Frank Munger at Syracuse University, and has circulated its techniques and findings largely through the medium of papers delivered at professional meetings.

In order to move from national survey data to state-by-state estimates, Weber scores each state according to traits of its population that seem likely to affect political attitudes and behavior: region, occupation, urbanism, race, sex, age, and religion. Using the makeup of each state on these traits, Weber then estimates the incidence of attitudes and behaviors among its citizens, on the basis of attitudes and behaviors shown by each type of respondent in the national survey. There are numerous technical problems and alternate means of moving from the national survey to the state estimates. Weber pursues twelve procedures with varying assumptions and outcomes, and he settles on one procedure that seems to work best.

How can one determine which procedure works best to estimate state attitudes or behaviors? Weber validates his technique indirectly. He uses it to estimate state scores for presidential voting and for the educational attainments of state adults, then compares these estimates to the real state-by-state data. The better the fit between estimates and reality for these data, the more confidence he has in estimating the policy attitudes and preferences for state residents on the basis of policy items on national surveys.

Weber makes some impressive claims for his method. He writes that it will meet the needs of political scientists who would add the dimension of popular preferences to their models of state policy making, and the needs of policy makers who "now . . . have the ability to ascertain what the publics of their state desire."

While Weber's method offers undoubted promise for further experimentation and refinement, any policy maker or political scientist must be wary of its present limitations. In his efforts at validation, Weber found coefficients of simple correlation between estimated and real data for his "best fit" models ranging from .64 to .86, with many of them hovering at the .70 to .75 level. Thus, his accuracy ranges between 40 and 75 per cent and it is usually at the 50 per cent mark. Not bad for a start, but hardly suitable for policy decisions.

In his final chapter, Weber reports "opinion/policy congruence" scores, which attempt to measure the fit between estimated state opinions and actual state policies. Idaho and New York tie for having the greatest congruence between opinions and policies, and Maryland comes in last. This is fascinating stuff with several anomalies: Oregon ranks somewhere down the list of opinion/policy congruence despite its frequent use of referenda, and Minnesota and Wisconsin rank close to the bottom despite their reputation for having "moralist" political cultures that (in Elazar's terms) should maximize popular demands and official responses for social services. At present, however, we should be less concerned with exploring these anomalies than with improving our estimates of state public opinion. Weber suggests some tools of crucial importance for the further understanding of state politics. Yet his validations are too close to the 50 per cent mark for much confidence in research at this stage of development.

IRA SHARKANSKY

University of Wisconsin, Madison

The Transformation of Palestine: Essays on the Origin and Development of the Arab-Israeli Conflict. Edited by Ibrahim Abu-Lughod. (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1971. 522 pages. $15.00.)

Given the passions surrounding the current Arab-Israeli conflict, any book covering political events in the Holy Land during the past, say, half a century or more is likely to have charges of bias and partisanship leveled against it. This book will undoubtedly be no exception, particularly in view of the known political preferences of some of its authors. To dismiss this scholarly and analytical volume with such a blanket indictment, however, would do its editor and many contributors a grave and undeserved injustice. For while admittedly the work does in the final analysis put forth the "Arab case," as Arnold Toynbee quite candidly states in his foreword, there is nothing in the presentation which could be characterized as gratuitous or tendentious. After all, that Zionists systematically sought through every means possible to acquire full control of Palestine is hardly subject to debate. And that to that end they courted and cajoled the imperial powers of the day is furthermore beyond question. And that they ultmately succeeded in transforming a predominantly Arab country into a Jewish state is also an incontrovertible fact. What the authors do is not lament this occurrence, but rather examine the process by which this transformation took place, and assess some of the consequences which emanated from it.

Put this way, the topic, one could argue, has been fairly thoroughly ventilated in scores of articles and books stretching over several decades. What makes this volume unusual, however, is that unlike some others, it focuses primarily on Palestine and the impact that Zionism has had on its land and people. So much of the current literature has dwelt on the ending of belligerency between Israel and the Arab States, the modalities of Israeli withdrawal from conquered Arab lands, rectification of boundaries, demilitarization of zones, American and Soviet involvements, etc., that the fundamental issue from which all other questions derive—namely, the dispossession of the Palestinians and the transformation of their country into the State of Israel, is often ignored or glossed over. Indeed, even when events leading up to the creation of Israel have been chronicled, rarely has substantial attention been paid to developments within Palestine. The period of the Mandate has been frequently presented as one in which two rival and antagonistic communities jockeyed for ascendancy, with Britain straining to reconcile what ultimately proved to be irreconcilable aspirations. Only scant attention has ever been given to the Palestinian nationalist movement, to its anticolonialist nature, and to the forces which were systematically employed to bring about its ultimate subjugation.

It is therefore particularly refreshing to find a work whose major portion is devoted to chapters dealing with such topics as "Dynamics of Land Alienation" by John Ruedy; "The Demographic Transformation of Palestine" by Janet Abu-Lughod; "The Failure of the Nationalist Resistance" by David Waines; "The Revolt of 1936" by Barbara Kalkas; and "Arab 'Disturbances' and the Commissions of Inquiry" by Richard Verdery. Indeed, one wishes that the remaining two sections of the book had continued in the same vein, rather than digressing into other spheres. For while the history of Palestine has of course been inextricably intertwined with "Sovereign Conflicts" and "International Perspectives," the inclusion of these topics in the book have the net effect of detracting from its main thrust. This is especially true of the last section which ranges far and wide to cover not only Soviet and American policies toward Palestine but Asian and African attitudes to boot. The result is an inevitable superficiality of treatment, and a digression into tangential realms. For instance, while Ali Mazrui's analysis of "Zionism and Race in Afro-Semitic Relations" is in itself quite interesting, it does not seem to have a direct bearing on the core of the book's concerns. Surely, an analysis of, say, the treatment of the Palestine Question within the confines of the UN would have been a bit more germane. This, however, is a minor point which should in no way detract from this well-conceived and imaginatively executed work.

SAMIR N. ANABTAWI

Vanderbilt University

Nationalities of the Soviet East: Publications and Writing Systems. Edited By Edward Allworth. (New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1971. Pp. 440. $17.50.)

Soviet Nationality Problems. Edited by Edward Allworth. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971. Pp. 296. $9.95.)

These two books, both edited by Professor Edward Allworth, though differing widely in content, have the common purpose of stressing the crucial importance of nationality problems in the study of the Soviet Union and the need to redress the relative neglect of this subject in the U.S. Nationalities of the Soviet East is essentially a work for the specialist with a knowledge of the Turkic and Iranian languages of the Soviet Union. A hasty reading of the title without proper attention to the subtitle might lead the unwary reader to think that this is a work dealing with Soviet nationalities policies. In fact, it is no such thing but strictly a scholarly, bibliographical dictionary (1818–1945) listing the titles by language and discipline, e.g., General, Anthropology, Economics, Art, Philosophy . . . of works located in U.S. libraries. Transliteration tables for writing systems of these Eastern languages and for Russian are also included.

Aided by a group of specialists, Professor Allworth has undertaken this extremely onerous task because he believes that such a dictionary is essential for the deeper studies of the Soviet East now being undertaken by American scholars. He is also convinced that it is important to replace or at least supplement the usual Soviet Russian sources by material in the respective native languages if light is to be thrown on "the local citizen's attitude toward what was happening in his own cultural, social and political milieu" (p. 6). I venture to suggest (with all respect for Professor Allworth's impressive scholarship) that he rather overstates the value of this Soviet native language material (which after all is controlled by the same censors as the Russian documentation). Exceptions to this stricture would possibly be materials published in the period up to the early 'thirties and the glimpses of national feeling and national consciousness emerging in literary-historical works in the native languages. Nevertheless, these interdisciplinary specialists (and they are unlikely to be a majority) who do add Turkic or Iranian languages to their professional equipment should be very grateful to Professor Allworth and his assistants for providing this detailed guide to the holdings of American libraries in this field, thus saving them much time and trouble in their bibliographical researches.

In the Introduction to this dictionary, Prof. Allworth makes some interesting observations on the comparative scope of these collections of Turkic-Iranian materials. Volga-Tatar, he tells us, seems to lead in publications concerning philosophy and religion. It likewise heads the list in the overall number of titles located in American libraries, followed by the Azeri works (Azerbaijanian). Among those at the bottom of the language list are Karakalpak and Uighur.

The other book under review, *Soviet Nationality Problems*, discusses a number of important aspects and implications of the nationality question in the Soviet Union and includes a useful background survey of Russian Imperial policy toward the nationalities by Marc Raeff. It originated in a research seminar on Soviet nationality problems at Columbia University (N.Y.) and contains ten essays from a selection of papers presented to the seminar. There are also a number of useful maps, charts, and tables and the preliminary data of the all-Union Census (1970) on population reproduced in Russian from the Soviet press. In the Economic Regions 1961 map, Yakutiya is correctly shown as part of Eastern Siberia. This might be misleading without a note to explain that since 1966 Yakutiya has belonged to the Soviet Far Eastern Regon. I found these essays of widely differing interest and readability. Some seemed so obfuscated by technical jargon and even pompous overstatements of the obvious that I hurried on to the more lucid essays. The contributions by Professors Hazard, Brzezinski, Alexandre Bennigsen, and Marc Raeff are a pleasure to read and offer some new and stimulating points of view. In particular, I was interested in Professor Hazard's ideas on the place of the republics in the legislative process and the fluctuations in the degree of decentralization allowed them in the formulation of legal codes and texts. In defining specific crimes other than state and military, Prof. Hazard concludes that there has been considerable divergence among the practices of the various republics. He mentions in particular crimes against the personal property of citizens and homosexuality.

Though differently focused, all these articles show a consensus on the increasing need to consider the attitudes and needs of the non-Russian nationalities in the formation of Moscow's national policies. These analyses further suggest that the future relation of these nationalities to the centralized power of Moscow is far from static. For example, Professor Bennigsen foresees "a curious result" of the great differences in the demographic patterns of the

Slav and Soviet Muslim groups, the Slavs now having extremely low rates of increase while the Soviet Muslims have rates among the highest in the world. "If this trend continued," he states "in the year 2000 the Soviet Union would probably have a Turkic and Muslim majority and a Russian and even a Slavic minority" (p. 174). The political results of this situation are indeed intriguing to consider.

The "subsidiary questions" raised by Professor Brzezinski before any judgments can be made about the relation of the nationalities to the central administration provide an excellent framework for seminar research into the whole problem and reveal the amount of study required before any but the most arbitrary views can be expressed. As of now, however, Brzezinski is of the opinion that "the nationality question acts as one of the major sources of restraint inhibiting the Soviet political elite and other relevant groups from embarking on a road of constitutional as well as broader political reform" (p. 76). To this pregnant thought, I believe, far too little consideration has hitherto been given in Soviet nationality studies. Unlike some contemporary commentators, Brzezinski has little belief in the secessionist capability of any Soviet nationality, even in the unlikely case of a domestic crisis involving a conflict between the key institutions, the police, the army (p. 77).

Space does not permit more detailed comment on various other essays in which expert students of Soviet nationalities problems throw welcome light on this intriguing and often elusive subject. As national consciousness develops among many peoples scarcely conscious of their national identity in Tsarist Russia—peoples such as the important Muslim groups of Central Asia—it will undoubtedly be accompanied by increasing political ambitions. The subject is thus worthy of the closest attention by qualified scholars for its national and international implications, as is claimed by the contributors to this book.

VIOLET CONOLLY

London, England

The Administrative Process in Britain. By R. G. S. Brown. (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1971. Pp. 349. $4.00.)

The Fulton Report, published in June, 1968, capped a decade of rising disenchantment with the British higher civil service. Its findings were wide-ranging, hard-hitting, and unsparing. Apart from the morale and integrity of civil servants, Fulton found little to extol. On its view, the civil service had markedly failed to keep up with the times and its changing tasks. Its structure, its mode of operations, above all its cult of the generalist, were still deeply embedded in Victorian habits; and the result was defective—even fumbling—performance in far too many administrative matters.

Mr. Brown, a former civil servant, does not deny the charge of inefficiency. At some points, in fact, his book lambastes his former colleagues with as much vehemence as Fulton ever summoned. Nonetheless he is unhappy with the report; its harsh tone and fault-finding bent strike him as needlessly polemical and erroneously conceived. Erroneously conceived? On this point Mr. Brown is emphatic. What chiefly ailed the investigating committee, in his eyes, was its unsystematic—indeed "opportunistic"—approach to the problems of public administration.

By opportunism Mr. Brown means Fulton's failure to analyze these problems in the light of recent organizational theory. His lucid, stimulating book tries to make good this deficiency. In two concise chapters he outlines a framework for analyzing organizational behavior (adapted from Simon, Crozier, Blau, and Price among others); in several subsequent chapters he then applies this framework to the structures and tasks of the civil service. The framework is not excessively sophisticated or original, and in truth Mr. Brown disowns any claim to great originality or sophistication. But his application of it to the British scene is deftly carried out. It results in a provocative assessment of the civil service, and this assessment differs from Fulton's in several respects.

Of these differences, three are pivotal:

First, Mr. Brown charges that Fulton did not distinguish sufficiently between administration in the industrial and public sectors. Instead, imbued with a "business-managerial philosophy," the committee concentrated on the technical tasks of the civil service—as though the efficiency of its operations could be isolated from the need for political accountability and coordination. But of course such isolation is impossible; and from Mr. Brown's viewpoint, accordingly, certain key Fulton schemes such as a thoroughgoing "managerializing" of civil service procedures are unworkable, at odds with the irremovable requirements of ministerial responsibility. Second, Mr. Brown argues that Fulton's swipes at the general administrators and their amateur ways were ill-informed. These administrators, in his opinion, perform indispensable functions that make the Whitehall machine run smoothly: they *facilitate* day-to-day operations, they *mediate* conflicts among sectional views, and they help *arbitrate* high-level decisions in ways that serve the wider political aims of accountability and coherence. Hence, take away these generalists, and the machine will simply not operate so effectively despite the greater availability of technical expertise. Third, Mr. Brown is worried about the human costs of rapid and undiluted Fultonization. To overhaul a large-scale bureaucracy according to narrow technical and economic criteria, the better to optimize scarce material resources, is to risk engendering acute social and psychological strains among its members. At some point these strains may become intolerable, and the consequent human havoc will undermine the cause of efficiency to which the reformers are so zealously committed.

It is not that Mr. Brown is totally opposed to the Fulton Report. With several of Fulton's reform proposals he is willing to go along. But these reforms are mainly of secondary importance and do little to alter the extent of the gulf dividing Mr. Brown's and Fulton's fundamental approach to the civil service. As he sees it, Fulton did not grasp the key principle of organizational theory—to wit, that changes in one part of an organization will always entail costs elsewhere—and equally important he is skeptical whether the time-honored conventions of ministerial responsibility permit large-scale tampering with the structure of the civil service, with the relations between civil servants and ministers, and with the anonymity surrounding civil service operations vis-à-vis the public. At most, therefore, he endorses changes of a fairly noncontroversial sort, such as creating a separate civil service department outside the Treasury's purview, or abolishing the old and ineffectual three-class hierarchy, or hiving off routine functions to separate bureaux.

How persuasive is Mr. Brown's call for cautious and incremental change? That he has produced an intelligent, vigorously argued book is beyond question. In many ways the book is an uncommonly perceptive survey of the civil service's problems; it may even be a better survey, from an analytical viewpoint, than the Fulton Report itself. Nonetheless the question of persuadability remains.

The doubts in this connection are twofold, one minor and one major. The minor doubt is whether Fulton's bluntness would not better serve the cause of reform than Mr. Brown's hedging cautiousness, with all its social science qualifications and incrementalist convictions. After all, if organizational theory has revealed anything, it is the lesson that changes in a large bureaucracy will invariably falter without the stimulus of continuous, massive, outside pressure. The major doubt is whether either Fulton or Mr. Brown has got to the heart of Britain's problems in policy making. After all again, the civil service machine is only part of that policy-making process, and Mr. Brown is therefore right to criticize Fulton for neglecting the wider political environment. But Fulton really had no choice; its terms of reference precluded its entering into such delicate issues as the conventions of ministerial responsibility. Mr. Brown himself suffers from no such disability, and the question is whether he has made as encompassing and probing a sweep of these delicate issues as he might have.

Does Britain enjoy weak or strong party government? Are Cabinet posts filled in ways that match skills to needs? Can Parliament mobilize public enthusiasm without greater scrutiny of the administrative process? And does the system of pressure-group bargaining add up to a formula of pluralistic stagnation? These are the issues that really count, and it is only when placed firmly in this broader context that policy making—including the civil service's role in it—can be properly assessed. About these larger issues Mr. Brown has some things to say, and some of what he says is more than a little shrewd. Nonetheless his observations on this level somehow remain stuck on the periphery of his analysis; they do not seem to have influenced very deeply his approach to the civil service. In the end, therefore, one wonders whether the reforms that he envisages for the civil service would really make much of a difference to the way the political system now functions.

MICHAEL GORDON
University of California, Santa Barbara

Judicial Review in the Contemporary World. By Mauro Cappelletti. (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1971. Pp. 117. $8.50, cloth; $4.50, paper.)

If, indeed, "[t]he most distinctive feature of judicial review in America is its ambiguity," as Professor Mauro Cappelletti so appropriately observes (p. 84) in his deceptively brief volume, *Judicial Review in the Contemporary World,* there is nothing ambiguous, whatsoever, about the contribution this important tome makes: it is outstanding! One can regard the book as a reference work (replete—perhaps too much so—with footnotes, paragraph signs, headings, and subheadings), as an analytical and evaluative treatment, or as an expository work. In any case, this expanded version of a series of lectures and seminars given beginning in 1965 at Universities in Mexico, Italy, France, Austria, and the United States, constitutes a superb lexicon of the *raison d'être,* the genesis, the *dénouement*, and the justification for the existence and application of judicial review. Professor Cappelletti—Professor of Law at Stanford and Professor of Law and Director of the Institute of Comparative Law at the University of Florence (Italy)—avows (p. vii) that his study "is primarily meant for students." Perhaps so, but we older students and teachers of public law can and should make profitable use of it as well. It says what needs to be said on the subject of comparative judicial review, and it does so with unfailing accuracy and perception and with economy, if not elegance, of language.

The book is divided sensibly into five tightly written chapters that address themselves to the heart of the issue(s). First, to judicial and political controls of constitutionality—to that "exciting and perplex encounter between legislator and judge, between statute and judgment" (p. 1). By focusing on a host of diverse systems —including France, Italy, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, the United States, Mexico, Switzerland, Austria, and West Germany—the author wisely demonstrates that judicial review is but a part of a much larger whole; that *political* review often operates alongside or instead of *judicial* review; that control is exercisable not only retrospectively but prophylactically—i.e., before the law comes into force. Thus recognizing a sometimes exaggerated "importance of *formal* judicial review of statutes as a barrier to arbitrary state action" (p. 23), certain states (e.g., France, Italy, the USSR), perceiving the political nature of such a barrier, rely on a variety of political institutions to accomplish it. Yet while political and other "special" remedies exist in the United States as well, in the final analysis we Americans have always looked to the institution of judicial review as the ultimate authority of our own brand of constitutionalism.

Professor Cappelletti makes the latter clear in his excellent second chapter, which concentrates on the historical antecedents of judicial review. He not only agrees that the game-like argument about the presence and validity of judicial review under the American system has been settled decisively by history (after all, it has been a patent fact of our governmental life throughout its existence), but he also calls attention to an often ignored collateral fact: The American version of judicial review, first expounded formally by John Marshall in *Marbury* v. *Madison* in 1803, was the "logical result of centuries of European thought and colonial experiences, which had made western man in general willing to admit the theoretical primacy of certain kinds of law and had made Americans in particular ready to provide a *judicial* means of enforcing that primacy" (p. 25). The belief in the need to subordinate certain acts of the law-making power to higher, more permanent, principles is thus not confined to our own time! It is traceable, through the Enlightenment philosophers, the English courts of equity, the French *Parlements,* the medieval scholastics, and early Church fathers, to its earliest direct origins—in Greco-Roman civilization.

Organs of control in modern systems of judicial review represent the heart of the third chapter. Usefully, if perhaps somewhat too neatly, the author distinguishes two broad types of judicial control over the constitutionality of legislation. One, which he styles as the "American" system of control (also characteristic of Canada, Australia, Japan, and India), is the "decentralized" type, under which the power of control is given to *all the judicial organs* of a given legal system. The other, seen by Professor Cappelletti as prevalent in Austria, Italy, West Germany, Turkey, and Yugoslavia, is the "centralized" type, which confines the power of review to *one single judicial organ;* it reflects a different conception of the separation of powers, the absence of the principle of *stare decisis,* and the unsuitability of traditional civil law courts for judicial review. In the next chapter the author applies his dichotomy to the *process* of control explaining it thus:

> While the decentralized system encourages private parties to introduce constitutional issues before ordinary tribunals in connection with regular judicial proceedings (review "incidenter"), the centralized approach tends, at least in its archetypal form, to emphasize presentation of constitutional issues before the special constitutional courts via special actions initiated by various government authorities (review "principaliter") (p. 69).

That leaves the treatment of the *effects* of control for the final chapter and the conclusion that follows. The latter is one worthy of this searching and profound explication of a practice so vital to the governmental process. Professor Cappelletti acknowledges that notwithstanding his dichotomies, he perceives a demonstrable convergence and diffusion of differences between them, and that, in effect, judicial review has nearly universal appeal (even if it is called something else). Yet it remains an enigmatic institution, indeed. It does indeed operate

> [P]rincipally in states with democratic philosophies; yet it claims the right to frustrate, in certain situations, the will of the majority. Its decisions are often pre-eminently political, yet they are made by men not themselves responsible to the electorate. The theoretical power of the judge of constitutionality is awesome; yet in the end he has "neither sword nor purse" and must depend on others to give his decision meaning (p. 98).

Enigmatic or not, I, for one, continue to regard the presence of the power of judicial review—at least under our system—as the greatest institutional safeguard we possess for the translation of abstract into constitutional commands. I can conceive of no viable substitute. And Professor Cappelletti makes a superb case for a broad-gauged justification of its continued existence under our system.

HENRY J. ABRAHAM
University of Virginia

Rhodesia: A Study of the Deterioration of a White Society. By Frank Clements. (New York: Frederick Praeger, 1969. Pp. 286. $6.50.)

Frank Clements was a successful journalist, broadcaster and author. He also made a name for himself at one time in Rhodesian politics, serving as mayor of Salisbury. He was a supporter of the now defunct United Federal Party, the old Rhodesian Establishment group whose mildly reformist policies he continues to support in the present work.

As the author sees it, there was hope for Rhodesia before the Rhodesian Front assumed office in 1962. But the "fruits of independence" after 1965 were bitter, not only for the Africans but also for the Europeans. The quality of the white population deteriorated as many liberal Europeans left the country; the University College of Rhodesia, once a stronghold of liberalism, lost much of its vitality; the police became more brutal in their methods; good sense in politics gave way to an unreasoning anticommunism which makes Harold Wilson out to be a flaming Red!

The author writes well; he also has a "feel" for the men and the methods of the old United Federal Party. It is refreshing, for instance, to read an account which does justice to Sir Edgar Whitehead, whose record as Prime Minister was in fact far more liberal than that of Garfield Todd, his more photogenic and better-publicized predecessor. But despite Clements's journalistic abilities, the men on the other side—the Rhodesian Front supporters—somehow never come to life. They remain faceless men, irrational, misguided, and—one would imagine—foredoomed to failure.

Unfortunately, Clements's book, like similar interpretations, does not explain why the Rhodesian Front should have consistently confounded the experts and stayed in power. At the time of UDI (the Unilateral Declaration of Independence) in 1965, prestige journals like the London *Economist* and the *New York Times* confidently predicted rapid collapse. For several years thereafter, a good many academicians, journalists, television commentators, and informed clergymen continued to speculate just how quickly the hated regime would break down. But in actual fact, Ian Smith and his colleagues displayed a much better understanding of the Central African power realities than so many of their critics, who continued to underestimate what they regarded as a "Cowboy Cabinet" from the backwoods. The irrational Right, as represented by bodies like the Candour League or publications such as *Rhodesia and World Report*, never got into the running.

Students of modern Rhodesia still lack an analysis which gives adequate consideration to the strong, as well as the weak points of settler society. Such an appraisal would have to take into account the relative stability and efficiency of the civil service and the public corporations, the comparative resilience of the Rhodesian economy under pressure, the cohesion and morale of the armed forces, and similar factors. Clements's present work unfortunately does not fill the gap.

LEWIS H. GANN
Hoover Institution, Stanford University

Election Campaigning Japanese Style. By Gerald L. Curtis. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971. Pp. xviii, 275. $10.00.)

Professor Gerald L. Curtis has written an important book on election campaigning in Japan. In 1966 the author went to Japan to study the electoral process and met a conservative Diet candidate named Satō Bunsei. Having moved into the latter's home as a house guest, Professor Curtis spent the next nine months observing Satō's activities as the latter plotted his strategy, built his organization, and carried out his campaign.

A major portion of this book is devoted to the analysis of two principal campaigning methods used by Satō: *jiban* and *kōenkai*. *Jiban* is usually translated as "bailiwick" or "support base," and it refers to a method of gathering votes utilizing a network of local politicians who are organized along the administrative district system. The *jiban* system is widely used in the campaign in the Japanese countryside, and it generally produces a "hard" vote—a vote that goes consistently and repeatedly to a certain candidate.

While the *jiban* primarily seeks to secure the support of local politicians (since it is assumed in this case that voters' support will automatically follow), the *kōenkai* seeks to reach individual votes at the grass roots level directly and to mobilize them in behalf of a particular candidate for whom the *kōenkai* was created. The *kōenkai* system is normally used in urbanized areas, and its objective is to produce a "gathered" vote from a "floating" vote which can potentially be mobilized for different candidates in different elections.

Election campaigning in Japan generally does not rely upon a regular party organization. Because of Japan's multimember constituency system, it is impractical to use or even to develop a viable party organization at the district level. There were 123 election districts when Satō first won a Diet seat in the 1967 general election, and all but one of them returned three to five Diet Members each to the House of Representatives. Since large political parties such as the Liberal-Democratic Party nominate two or more candidates and win two or more seats in many of these districts, it is impossible to mobilize a party organization for an election campaign without splitting it into pieces and practically destroying it. Instead, most candidates in Japan develop organizations of their own and wage their campaigns on that basis. The *jiban* and *kōenkai* are two basic methods used to create such organizations.

As Prof. Curtis correctly points out, these two methods of campaigning reflect two important aspects of the present phase of Japan's political modernization. On the one hand, in the countryside we find very tightly organized communities, and the voting behavior of residents of these communities is strongly influenced by local leaders and notables. On the other hand, in urbanized areas we find only loosely structured or even unstructured communities, and many members of these communities can only be effectively reached and mobilized through modern organizational techniques. As reported in this book, Satō carefully distinguished communities along these lines and selectively applied the *jiban* and *kōenkai* methods to them.

The book also discusses several other important topics. One of these is social organizations. In addition to the *jiban* and *kōenkai*, a serious Diet candidate must seek support from a variety of organizations, e.g., chambers of commerce, various trade organizations, agricultural cooperatives, professional organizations, school alumni organizations, sports clubs, and the like. In Satō's case, as in the cases of many other Liberal-Democratic candidates, the role of these organizations was not very important. But for candidates of other parties, these organizations tend to be significant. Thus, for Socialist or Democratic-Socialist candidates, trade union organizations are critically important, and candidates of the Clean Government Party are almost completely dependent upon its parent religious organization, the Sōkagakkai.

Another interesting topic treated by Prof. Curtis is the politics of party endorsement. Although it is tempting to assume that the process of nomination is tightly controlled by the national party headquarters, this book makes it clear that a considerable amount of local pressure is involved. This is particularly true in the case of Satō, because Satō is essentially a locally oriented rather than nationally oriented politician, and the forces that existed at the prefectural level played a decisive role in his successful attempt to obtain a nomination.

The book ends with a brief and somewhat anticlimactic discussion of the official election campaign. The official campaign period lasted for only 21 days, and a very large part of the campaign had already been completed by the time the official campaigning period began. Because Satō had already succeeded in establishing solid *jiban* and *kōenkai* organizations by this time, it was assumed from the beginning that he was probably going to be elected. As the official campaign period unfolded, Satō's standing in opinion polls gradually rose, and he eventually received the largest number of votes in his district.

Before concluding this review, I should like to offer a few general comments. First, this is unquestionably an outstanding political study using the method of participant observation. As one carefully examines this book, one finds it difficult not to be impressed by the author's unusual ability to observe and analyze numerous relevant events and to report them in a highly organized way. In many respects Curtis's book follows and updates *Village Japan* by Beardsley, Hall, and Ward and *City Life in Japan* by Dore. Second, the book is remarkably well written. In an age in which extremely technical terms and concepts dominate political science literature, it is refreshing to read a political study which is narrated in a polished English style.

Third, this study would probably have been more informative had it made a more extensive use of statistical techniques. After all what counts in voting research is the quantitative analysis of the way in which a candidate's votes are distributed. In assessing the effectiveness of the *jiban* and *kōenkai* systems, Prof. Curtis would have done well to strengthen his predominantly descriptive approach by the use of statistical analysis. Finally, this book could have shed greater light upon some of the basic questions which may be raised by many specialists in Japanese voting behavior: Why did Satō receive the largest number of votes in his district although this was only the second time he ran for a Diet seat and was the first time he was elected? Was this due to the strategy that Satō had originally laid out and was reported in this book or was it due to some other factors? If Satō's strategy did indeed work, which aspect of it was most effective, and which least effective?

Some of the above comments, however, should not obscure the fact that this is one of the most informative books ever written on campaigning in Japan. Probably many political behavioralists would readily admit that an anthropological approach of this type appropriately supplements the information derived from studies based upon the survey research technique. Professor Curtis is to be commended for this welcome addition to the growing literature of the study of Japanese politics.

Akira Kubota

University of Windsor

Immigrant Voters in Israel: Parties and Congregations in a Local Election Campaign. By Shlomo A. Deshen. (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1970. Pp. xxv, 239. $9.00.)

This is an anthropological study of an Israeli immigrant town and of the behavior of its population during the 1965 local elections. Called here Ayara (i.e., "townlet"), it is in reality Kiryat Gat, in Israel's south. This development town was established in 1956; in 1965, it numbered about 17,000 people. Obviously, both political scientists and political sociologists are interested in what goes on behind the scenes and how voters are persuaded to cast their ballots as they do. Nonetheless, the small details that make up the behind-the-scenes political contacts have scarcely been investigated, particularly concerning the Jewish population of Israel. (One monograph has been devoted to Israel's Arab inhabitants, Abner Cohen's *Arab Border-Villages in Israel,* Manchester University Press: 1965.) The present study was affectionately sponsored and supported by Professor Max Gluckman, of the University of Manchester, who wrote the Foreword.

In order to obtain pertinent, accurate data on what really goes on in local politics, S. A. Deshen of Tel-Aviv University's Department of Sociology and Anthropology settled with his family in Ayara, a while before the 1965 elections. He then joined one of the parties, Mafdal (National Religious Party), became a member of its local administrative committee and, as he aptly puts it, switched from the role of "participant observer" to that of "observant participant" (p. 7). The resulting disadvantages are clear, but because of his commitment, he procured much information that makes good reading. What gives the study a more enduring quality is the fact that, in addition to a description of particular situations, reported with inside knowledge, the author tried to discover the regularities governed by the election campaign. Indeed, the main subject of his analysis was how the inhabitants interacted during this campaign in matters of religion and ethnicity. Since religion is an important strand in Israeli life and politics, and since the ethnic background of Jews in a development town peopled by immigrants from various lands is significant, Deshen's approach seems well-taken, indeed.

After examining the material setting of Ayara, Deshen delves into the ways it was affected by the political intensity that is almost ubiquitous in Israeli life. Political competition in Ayara not only reflected national politics, but was tied to local interests, sometimes identified with a particular ethnic group, while at other times cutting across ethnic ties. Actually, the ethnic element, although important in the nomination of candidates, was not the only one. Deshen's revealing account of how the Ayara local branch of the Mafdal haggled over the nomination of its candidates and made its decisions, shows that the outcome was a blend of *Realpolitik* with ideological-religious and ethnic considerations. In addition to the degree of religiousness of potential candidates and their ethnic ties, personal rivalry played a preponderant role.

It was not a coincidence then, that the head of Mafdal's slate in Ayara was the manager of the local branch of Mafdal's bank.

> The local branch is entrusted with the accounts of many citizens, not all of them party members. The latter are attracted by the personality of Leivee, now manager, and they enjoy the "personal touch" of the bank. The bank is accommodating to individuals and financially shaky institutions such as synagogues; it readily advances loans. Some of its major customers are public bodies. . . . The arrangement is one of mutual interest. The bank (and through it the party) enjoys the advantages to be

gained from satisfied customers, and the clients enjoy the bank's efforts to accommodate itself, obviously within limits, to the individual needs of customers. (p. 83)

Mobilization of election workers and techniques of campaigning appear to be characteristic of a politically alert population, which sets also great value on individual contacts and personal bestowal of honors. These attitudes were borne in mind by politicians, who directed most of their effort at the as yet uncommitted voters. The latter were quick to sense the advantages they might derive from the situation and presented various demands. It is particularly interesting that the campaign (in both the propaganda of the politicians and demands of the voters) carried a strong religious undertone. Much of Mafdal's campaign was conducted on festive religious occasions at the homes of prominent community members. Torah scrolls were donated to various synagogues. Competing parties attempted to use religious feeling to their advantage, and Mafdal reacted by exposing them. Nevertheless, although the campaign was saturated with religious content, religion as an institution does not seem to have been weakened by the intrusion of politics. Unwritten rules appear to restrain everyone in Ayara from cheapening religious feeling and services. Whether institutionalized religion was actually enhanced by the election campaign, as claimed by Deshen (p. 210), is, however, debatable.

Deshen might also have delved profitably into the Ayara campaign for parliamentary elections in 1965 (held the same day as the local ones). He merely lists (p. 224) the results of the 1965 elections; a detailed comparison of both campaigns would have afforded the reader additional insight. Also, a more balanced picture would have been achieved by drawing into the circle of Deshen's observation not only the Jewish communities of Afro-Asian background, but also those of Roumanian and Polish extraction, living in Ayara at the time. Nonetheless, Deshen's book provides us with an insider's view of small-town local politics and an analysis which, it is to be hoped, will be even further enhanced in value by similar studies undertaken elsewhere in Israel.

JACOB M. LANDAU

The Hebrew University, Jerusalem

What Mao Really Said. By Philippe Devillers. Translated by Tony White. (New York: Schocken Books, 1969. Pp. 317. $2.95 paper.)

What Mao Really Said was first published in the German language in 1967 under the title *Was Mao Wirklich Sagte*, by Verlag Fritz Molden, Vienna. Its aim is "to present the reader with a significant, however limited selection of Mao Tse-tung's thought as it is being currently disseminated . . ." (p. 12). The book begins with a forward, a list of major dates in Mao Tse-tung's life, and a poem "Kunlun" by Mao. The main body of the book is divided into twelve chapters dealing with nationalism and Marxism, social classes and evolution in China, the revolutionary potential of the peasantry, guerrilla warfare, strategy in revolutionary war, philosophy of the revolution, new democracy, the struggle from Yenan to Peking, Mao Tse-tung and the United States, imperialism, Mao Tse-tung and Khrushchevism, and the Cultural Revolution. It ends with a conclusion, bibliographical notes, a list of references and sources, and an index.

The materials selected in this book are based on official English translations published by the Foreign Languages Press in Peking. The excerpts are arranged topically according to the titles of the chapters. In each chapter, the subject matter is presented chronologically. The author gives a brief description of the historical background of each of Mao's writings. Chinese words and proper names are kept to the minimum to make for easier reading.

There is definite need for a good book on the thought of Mao Tse-tung for readers who are not serious students of Chinese communism and yet who are interested in learning the essence of the teachings of Mao. Devillers has succeeded in presenting Mao's writings in a more readable manner by deleting many Chinese names and terms which require sophisticated knowledge of Chinese affairs to understand, while still preserving the essentials. His historical account of events is specifically related to Mao's particular writing, helping the reader better appreciate the meaning and purpose of Mao's thesis. This is a useful book for the general reader.

This book is not, however, a serious scholarly work. To begin with, its approach is basically descriptive and narrative with very little theoretical analysis and evaluation of Mao's writings in the framework of Communist ideology. It would have been more meaningful if Devillers had examined Mao's views on the major doctrines of Marxism and communism as compared with those of the leading theoreticians of international communism such as Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin. He should have devoted more space to the evaluation of Mao's thought in terms of its originality and contribution to the world Communist movement, especially in the post-World War II period. In some chapters, the author's remarks are too short and the quotations are unnecessarily long. It would have been a much better book had it been long in analysis and short in quotations.

Furthermore, there are several serious errors and oversimplifications in the author's interpretation of events in China. For instance, in discussing the relations between the Communists and the Nationalists, he gives the reader the impression that the German-Soviet pact of 1939 was an important factor which led to the Kuomintang (KMT) "reverting to its previous distrust and even hostility" toward the Communists (pp. 159–60). In reality, this pact had no such profound impact on the KMT's policy toward the Communists. The Nationalists and the Communists never genuinely trusted each other in the first place. Another example of the author's simplistic interpretation is his contention that Mao Tse-tung believes in democracy and the decline of Mao was caused by his "Hundred Flowers" campaign (p. 193). To say Mao believes in "democracy" without defining this term in the Communist tradition is very misleading. Although Mao's "Hundred Flowers" campaign was one of the reasons for his decline in the Party power structure, it was by no means the only reason, nor was it the most important reason.

The most disappointing part of this book is chapter 12, on the Chinese Cultural Revolution. It contains mainly tedious details with very little significant interpretation and analysis of the complexities of this nationwide turmoil in terms of ideological, political, economic, social and cultural conflicts inside China. The author maintains that the Cultural Revolution was triggered by American military threat in Vietnam (pp. 262–64). This is indeed a gross simplification of a highly complex phenomenon which represents the culmination of many years of internal tension and external pressure after the revolution of 1949.

Several parts of the book suffer from a lack of clarity on issues. For example, the author tells us that the army forced the removal of Lin Piao's supporters, such as Tao Chu, during the Cultural Revolution, but fails to explain why the army was opposed to Lin (p. 273). If Lin did not have control over the army, who did? Who were opposed to Lin in the army?

There are also some factual errors in the book which ought to be pointed out. For instance, Devillers states that in 1954 Liu Shao-chi assumed the Party presidency (p. 184). To my knowledge, Liu Shao-chi did not officially become the leader of the Party in that year. Several well-known Chinese names are misspelled, such as Kang Cheng (should be Kang Sheng), Tao Chou (should be Tao Chu), and Ho Long (should be Ho Lung). These do not seem to be typographical errors because they are used consistently throughout the book. There are also misprints. For instance, the Treaty of Wanghia was concluded in 1844, not 1944 (p. 205).

The author's perception of Peking's global revolutionary strategy in the conclusion part of the book is interesting. He compares the whole of China today to the old Yenan base. China is now the principal "base area" for waging "protracted war" on a worldwide scale against the enemy. He feels that the Yenan spirit is a key point in the understanding of the present Chinese vision of the world (pp. 286–289).

Although this book is basically a descriptive catalogue of Mao Tse-tung's writings and has broken no new ground in the study of Mao's thought, it is a welcome addition to the literature on Chinese communism.

GEORGE P. JAN

The University of Toledo

Modernization in Ghana and the U.S.S.R.: A Comparative Study. By Robert E. Dowse. (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul; New York: Humanities Press, 1969. Pp. 107. $2.75.)

This is a courageous attempt to tackle the comparisons many political scientists prefer to leave in the realm of theory. Both the Soviet Union and Ghana experienced a period of rapid social change at the end of World War I and World War II respectively. The revolution in Russia and decolonization in Ghana were both purposively planned, each led by a small elite which was in control of a party subscribing to a new ideological framework for society. Dr. Dowse takes this original point of departure and extends it in the three remaining chapters of this monograph to discuss a "Prelude to Control," "The Politics of Control," and "Control: Success and Failure." The approach is a natural one and follows, by implication, the work of theorists who have concerned themselves with discerning the various "stages" of revolutions (e.g., Crane Brinton, Chalmers Johnson). In the comparison, "the basic proposition of the book is that in an underdeveloped country the range of possible economic and political strategies open to the leaders is relatively narrow" (Preface).

This is a very important (if vague) proposition which is unfortunately never adequately demonstrated for either country. In fact, the exact opposite emerges in some instances. When Stalin took over from Lenin, he was pressured by various wings of the Communist Party and finally resorted to a course of "speedy and forced industrialization." Nkrumah did the same after the adoption of the Seven Year Plan in 1962. Both were responding to a certain segment of political and economic opinion in their respective countries.

Yet surely this response was not one of a narrow set of constraints both leaders were forced to follow. Similar conditions of underdevelopment existed in China and Tanzania, to draw two more examples from the respective continents under discussion. Their approach to solving these problems, however, showed considerable variation.

The question of the very comparability of these two countries is not ignored, but it is ducked by a disclaimer from the General Editor who assures us in the Introduction that "In a future volume Dr. Dowse will discuss some of those problems of comparability at length." Comparability, again, is a very important subject, and occasional hints at the way it might be treated do come through.

The author notes that both Lenin and Nkrumah were internationalist in their ideological point of view, yet when ideology no longer fit with practice, Stalin was able to withdraw, and the Soviets could adhere to the doctrine of "Socialism in One Country." This was because "Russia constituted a potential autarchical market needing very little from outside and with a consumer bulk sufficient to maintain an industrial basis of enormous size and complexity . . . Ghana if it was to industrialize, had to look beyond its borders" (p. 21).

Size is obviously a crucial factor that differentiates some Asian from most African countries. Russia and China, for instance, consist of large land masses, whereas Tanzania, Ghana, and many other African countries were carved into tiny entities with limited natural resources. Nkrumah was quite convincing on this point in *Neo-Colonialism*, where he went further than just stating the truism of exploitation; instead he offered possible alternatives like the rational industrialization of the entire continent according to resources and needs. Situationally, the leadership in the two countries was in a very different strategic position. Unfortunately, few of these differences are explored by Dr. Dowse.

Brevity is a serious handicap in this case. A book which seeks to compare Ghana during the CPP era and the USSR under Lenin and Stalin cannot be complete in 96 pages, especially not with this author's approach. He makes many general statements which could not be tested or contradicated by anyone except an expert on the respective countries. Even specialists would have difficulty taking exception because the author seldom comes down to specifics. If the general statements had been *explained,* the book would perforce have been much longer, but also clearer and more relevant.

For example, the author asserts that any underdeveloped country needs an attitudinal revolution for economic development—a statement many students of social change might agree with *if* they knew exactly what attitudes were at issue (the only one Dowse touches on is the attitude toward time). In another instance the author asserts that "both parties were primarily urban political parties in overwhelmingly rural countries" (p. 13). Seventeen pages later we read that "the party in Russia was far more urbanized in membership than the CPP" (p. 30). The last statement would seem to contradict the earlier, but in context it does not. In fact, this is the central flaw in the book. There are simply too many general statements whose implications are left hanging.

What is needed is a more systematic statement of propositions from the development literature and a strict and full comparison of the two countries as they relate to the propositions to see if the theories are relevant. This is a stringent task, but anything short of it will aid neither the researcher nor the scholar nor the student.

HEIDI SCHUHR ERLICH
Fordham University

Icon and Swastika: The Russian Orthodox Church under Nazi and Soviet Control. By Harvey Fireside. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971. Pp. 242. $8.00.)

During World War II substantial segments of the Russian Orthodox Church came under German rule; others remained under Soviet control. This analysis of the experiences of the Russian Orthodox Church during the period 1941–44, therefore, throws light on the systems of social control of both the Soviet and Nazi state. It represents one of the few studies of the Russian Orthodox Church by a social scientist and provides us with significant new insights. The author writes well and without unnecessary jargon; the book is sensibly organized and readable.

In several background chapters Fireside discusses the development of Soviet and Nazi religious policy. From the beginning, the new Soviet state was committed to the ideal of an atheistic state and the eventual withering away of religion. Hence any concessions made to the Church were of a purely tactical nature and merely prepared the ground for new attacks upon a progressively exhausted opponent. Still, by the time of the 1937 cenus two-thirds of the village population and one-third of the city residents (roughly a half of all citizens) still considered themselves adherents of the various churches. The author suggests that this surprising strength shown by organized religion was due in part to the thirst for spiritual benefits, including the promise of eternal rewards, at a time when more earthly rewards such as decent housing and clothing were in short supply. The religious congregation also provided its members with the feeling of belonging to a brotherhood of believers: it promised to everyman what the party gave to a chosen few, casting a spell of kinship without fear of purge or denunciation. Thus while there was widespread loss of faith among Soviet youth—the primary target of Communist indoctrination—religion very clearly still had substantial roots in the older generation.

The religious policy of the German authorities in occupied Russia exhibited the same indecisiveness that had characterized the regime's policy toward the German Protestant churches. The latter had run the gamut from a fifth-column attempt to seize control, to a state-sponsored scheme to impose unity on the different denominations, to defamation and outright terror against those refusing to be "coordinated" and attempts to foster dissension behind the scenes. Even more than in Germany, the development of a coherent religious policy in Russia was undermined by the power struggle among competing bureaucracies with intersecting fields of authority.

Fireside's book provides additional new evidence of the incredible administrative chaos that existed behind the facade of a monolithic state governed with iron discipline. German policy in occupied Russia was refracted through no less than seven agencies, and as a result we find in place of a single religious policy seven different approaches. Tables of organization and lines of authority meant little. What mattered was the personal connection which officials could trace to the camarilla surrounding the Führer. "By the arbitrary favor of this court, subordinate could dictate to chief, a government minister be consigned to the futile job of issuing unanswered memoranda" (p. 76). The latter was the fate of Alfred Rosenberg, the head of the *Ostministerium*, whose grand schemes for manipulating the aspirations of the non-Russian nationalities were shortcircuited by the ruthless rule of the commissioners for the eastern territories whose only aims were the economic exploitation and political repression of the Slavic *Untermenschen*. As a result of these harsh measures, the leaders and members of the Russian Orthodox Church soon came to adopt a hostile attitude toward their conquerors. Active collaborators among the priesthood constituted a distinct minority and the great majority of Orthodox believers did not follow the lead of the few clerical puppets the Nazis were able to find and support.

Arbitrary as it was, the Nazi system of cultural control did not match the pervasiveness of the Soviet network, and the German-occupied territories consequently experienced a substantial religious revival. Fireside suggests that the dramatic reversal of Soviet religious policy during the war years was primarily a reaction to this development in the lands under German rule. This so-called "New Religious Policy" was needed to keep the population in the path of the advancing German armies from welcoming the Nazis as liberators and it had to steer the resurgent believers in the occupied territories away from the temptation to collaborate with the Germans. Moreover, the acceptance of the Church as a junior partner of the state helped to close domestic ranks in an hour of supreme stress, just as the excision of virulent atheism removed a chronic irritant from Soviet international relations and facilitated the search for Western allies.

Fireside's theoretical conclusions are stated modestly. Despite contrasting methods, the author finds a common denominator in the Nazi and Stalinist policies toward the Church—the insistence of a totalitarian regime on subordinating all social institutions and forcing even an inherently nonpolitical religious body like the Russian Orthodox Church to choose sides. At least in the field of the sociology of religion, it would seem, the concept of totalitarianism is more than an invention of cold warriors and can still play a useful role.

GUENTER LEWY
University of Massachusetts, Amherst

The Soviet Academy of Science and the Communist Party, 1927–1932. By Loren R. Graham. Studies of the Russian Institute, Columbia University. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967. Pp. 255. $6.50.)

Venerable European academies are glorified clubs—honorary societies of distinguished scholars.

The new importance of science for national affairs has caused changes in the role of many Western academies, particularly the National Academy of Science in Washington; but they still have no direct function in scientific research. In the communist East, academies have become central organs of administration of the whole scientific effort of the nation.

The Imperial Academy of Sciences was founded in St. Petersburg by Peter the Great in 1725, and given its first impetus by that self-taught, versatile genius, Michail Lomonosov, the Russian counterpart of Benjamin Franklin. In the spirit of its two founding fathers, the Academy was eager to play a role in stimulating technical education, and research and its practical applications in Russia; it early acquired museums, observatories, and research establishments.

This was, however, only a modest beginning compared to the giant network of research institutions which the Academy spawned after the communist revolution. After 1917, many academicians escaped to the West; but others stayed on. The Soviet government offered them research support on an unprecedented scale, and closed its eyes to their ideological sins, such as the orthodox religiosity of the great physiologist, Ivan Pavlov.

Despite civil war, hunger, and lack of elementary infrastructure, the Soviet research, guided by these men, entered a period of rapid growth—largely under the sponsorship of the Academy (moved in 1925 to Moscow, and renamed "All-Union Academy of Sciences").

The leading academicians were unreconstructed liberals, jealously guarding the independence of the Academy; but the Soviet government, engaged in what the Nazis later called *Gleichshaltung* (bringing into line) of all public institutions could not accept the independence of an organization intended to play a major role in socialist reconstruction. A tug of war ensued, lasting from 1927 to 1932. It ended in a compromise. The administrative leadership of the Academy became dominated by communists. Some new academicians were nominated for this purpose by the party. Still, they had to be elected by secret vote of all academicians. In the first election in which party-sponsored candidates were proposed, three were rejected. They were elected a year later; but several party hacks, proposed later, never made it.

The social sciences divisions of the Academy were the most strongly affected. Alexander Vucinich ("The Soviet Academy of Sciences," Stanford, 1956) dealt mainly with these divisions, and concluded that the Academy was ruined in the 'thirties by political pressure. But the main function of the Academy, by which it must be judged, is leadership in natural sciences; and in this area, the Academy has preserved its intellectual integrity while undergoing phenomenal growth. Some research continues in Soviet universities; much of the applied research, foisted upon the Academy in the 'thirties, was transferred in the 'fifties to relevant ministries; academies of Medicine and Agriculture have taken over responsibility for research in these areas; academies have proliferated in member republics of the USSR; but the All-Union Academy continues to direct the mainstream of the Soviet effort in basic and in fundamental areas of applied science. It has created hundreds of research institutes, employs the foremost scientific talent, publishes scores of scientific journals. The Academy has contributed importantly to the triumphs of Soviet technology—atomic weapons and power stations, earth satellites and space ships.

The recent Academy presidents—the botanist Komarpv, the physicist Vavilov, the organic chemist Nesmeyanov, the applied physicist and mathematician Keldysh—outstanding scientists in in their own fields—have staunchly defended the scientific integrity of the Academy. Even the biological division withstood the attacks by Trofim Lysenko, when he wrought havoc in the Academy of Agriculture and agricultural experiment stations throughout the Union.

In this process, the Academy acquired immense prestige. Academicians are the priviledged elite of the Soviet Union. They are paid a large bonus simply for being academicians; they have government-supplied apartments and summer homes; they travel abroad; they are patrons of unorthodox painters, poets and novelists. They are among those who keep up intellectual ferment in the midst of conformity. But, with few exceptions (unlike some rebellious writers, artists, and humanists), they are not enemies of the system which supports their work on a uniquely lavish scale.

Loren R. Graham's book covers the years 1927–32, when the Academy first faced a drive to convert it into a tool of socialist planning. It chronicles this confrontation with obvious authority, objectivity, and scholarly judgment. In doing so, it offers exciting reading despite the highly special and already remote events with which it deals.

The first chapter deals with "pre-history" from 1727 to 1927, including the first decade of the communist regime, in which the Academy continued its prerevolutionary existence.

The second chapter deals with discussions, during this decade, of the role of science in communist society, of the necessity—and possibility—of planning science, along with suggestions to create new organs for this purpose. Attempts to do so remained half-hearted and were later abandoned. Instead, it was decided to convert the old Imperial Academy into a central organ to direct science in the Soviet Union.

Chapters 3, "The Siege of the Academy," and 4, "The Seizure of the Academic Structure," are blow-by-blow accounts of the struggle that ensued between communist activists outside and inside the Academy and senior academicians such as the geochemist Vernadsky, the chemist Ipatiev, and the physiologist, Pavlov. The two fronts were the rewriting of the Academy's statutes, and the enlargement of its membership by candidates such as the communist theoreticians Bukharin and Riazanov, the Marxist philosopher Deborin, and the historian Pokrovski. It took three years until the Academy was "brought into line," admitting the suggested communist candidates, and adopting a charter which included, as the Academy's central responsibility, participation in the building of socialist economy and industrailization of the country. In the last stage of the struggle, in 1930, some academicians from the humanitarian divisions were "purged" and arrested. (Later, Lysenko's attacks led to the disappearance also of some biologists, including the outstanding geneticist N. I. Vavilov.)

In the fifth chapter, Graham reviews the expansion of the Academy after the take-over. Between 1927 and 1933, twenty-nine major new organizations appeared in the structure of the Academy, its staff grew from 150 to 1,600, and its budget jumped from 1 to 22 million rubles.

In the last chapter, Graham contrasts the success of Communist leadership in expanding the Academy's activity, with its failure to create a "communist science" different from "capitalist science"—in particular, to make Soviet science a centrally planned enterprise. "The great accomplishment of the Academy of Sciences in the 1920's was"—Graham concludes—"the preservation of academic standards and the traditions of scientific creativity."

One of the reasons for survival of a—relatively—free academy was that the Communist scholars introduced by the government into the Academy, such as Bukharin, Deborin, Volgin, and Pokrovsky, themselves became victims of purges. On the other hand, natural scientists, introduced by the party into the Academy's administration, mostly as scientific secretaries (the first Communist president of the Academy is the current one, Mstislav Keldysh), became identified with the striving to maintain the scientific integrity of the Academy.

The book ends with organization tables of the Academy in 1926 and 1932, its membership as of December 1932, and a bibliography of about 250 books and 300 articles.

A detailed Russian history of the Academy is in the process of publication; only two volumes, bringing it up to 1917, have appeared at the time when Graham's book was prepared (during his year as exchange scholar with the Historical Faculty of Moscow University). Thus, the book had to be based on the author's own study of reports, books, and articles. As is usual with students of recent history, the author was not given access to relevant archives and had to rely on Soviet scholars who have had such access.

Amidst the tragic events of Russian history since 1917, the struggles of the Academy may seem of minor importance, but in the long run, the Soviet decision to retain at the top of Soviet scientific establishment an independent organization, instead of foisting upon it a "Ministry of Science," may prove of momentous importance. It perpetuated, in a central position in the Soviet system, a prestigious body dedicated to search for objective truth—even if wide preserves remained exempted from this search. The Academy, bound by ties of common origin and common understanding, to the western communities of scientists, shares with them the belief in intellectual freedom and concern for the future of mankind in its new scientific and technological habitat. It undoubtedly exerts some influence in helping to reduce the dogmatism of Soviet society and its alienation from the Western world.

EUGENE RABINOWITCH
State University of New York at Albany

The Economic History of Iran: 1800–1914. Edited by Charles Issawi. A publication of the Center for Middle Eastern Studies, No. 8. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971. Pp. xv, 405. $17.50.)

This volume is a companion to an earlier historical study of the Middle Eastern economy which was published in 1966 but did not include Iran. It consists of several introductory chapters on the historical and social setting of Iranian society during the 19th century and an epilogue on the post-World War I period. Sandwiched between the two is a large collection of documents and manuscripts from numerous sources in half a dozen languages covering various aspects of the subject. Though by no means a coherent history of the Iranian economy, Issawi's book is a useful reference work for future scholars attempting such an undertaking.

His overall treatment of the historical path of economic development for Iran is concise and grounded in a firm grasp of economic analysis, used most tellingly in the section on very recent times (1954–1969), and for the twentieth century in general. The discussion of the earlier stages of economic development in his section on historical background leans heavily on qualitative, almost noneconomic terms to describe the formation of the economy. In this sense his narrative falls within the "older economic history" tradition (and for Issawi's purposes, this is adequate). The entire epilogue, which deals with the modern period, changes both the pace and the technique of economic analysis. Issawi has woven data and an economic evaluation of development policy into a concise, analytical picture of twentieth century progress in Iran.

The sections on agriculture appear weak in their explanatory power, at least when compared with the overall description of economic development. While Issawi presents a clear interpretation of social overhead capital formation for transportation during the 1927–1938 period, he does not make a parallel analysis for the agrarian sector of the economy. Issawi notes the difficulties of water resource projects in early introductory comments. But he fails to draw out the basic similarities between the economic decisions and consequences of water resources and those involved in transportation, as investments in social overhead capital. There are in fact divergences between private and social costs and returns in both transportation and in irrigation projects. In such cases the government or some public collective group must take on such projects. The failure of the governments in earlier periods to consider the benefits from economies of scale in water resources is not explained.

At other points Issawi's analysis includes a description of the development efforts as "inefficient" (in particular, he speaks of various inefficiencies and waste during the years before World War II). Yet there is no treatment of the nature of the inefficiency. "There was considerable waste in ostentatious, ill-conceived, or insufficiently studied projects. The neglect of agriculture had most unfortunate consequences" (p. 379). Efficiency or inefficiency in economic analysis is always a relative measurement. There are no absolute standards of efficiency grounded in economic principles. To claim a project was handled in an inefficient manner, suggests that the author has better alternatives in mind. In other words, either fewer resources could have been put to better use to achieve exactly the same ends, or the resources could have been put to better use in some entirely different project. But Issawi does not spell out how the resources could have been utilized with greater economic rationality. Nor does he suggest alternative projects with a higher social return, in terms of greater future production. A comparison with some other country's treatment of similar areas of economic development would have gone a long way toward providing the reader with the implicit criteria of efficiency used by Issawi.

A further difficulty with his treatment of agriculture is the lack of empirical data, again compared with his analysis of industrial production and various forms of social overhead capital. As a result, it is difficult to grasp the particular economic problems or successes of agriculture. More important, we miss out on the unique relationship between agriculture and industrialization in modern-day Iran, as well as in the past. All countries that choose industrialization are faced with the constraint of agriculture—"*the* economic problem" of classical political economy. Issawi fails to detail this aspect in his otherwise effective appraisal of economic growth in modern Iran.

It would have been interesting had Issawi provided a brief analysis of how private capital has begun to play an increasingly important role in growth. He mentions several of the industries in which an Iranian middle class has gained economic power, but a few more details might have enhanced our picture of the current situation in Iranian development policy.

These qualifications do not substantially diminish my generally favorable assessment of Issawi's very competent economic analysis.

SEPEHR ZABIH

Saint Mary's College of California and University of California, Berkeley

The Church and Social Change in Latin America. Edited by Henry A. Landsberger. (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1970. Pp. xiii, 240. $9.50.)

This volume contains contributions from four Roman Catholic clergymen, a Presbyterian minister and theologian, three sociologists, including the editor, one historian, and the director of the program of Latin American studies of the University of Notre Dame. The list of contributors obviously lacks the balance of disciplines and backgrounds needed to insure a truly objective interdisciplinary inquiry. Nevertheless, the book contains many interesting insights into the views and activities of progressive Roman Catholic clergymen and laymen in Latin America, although the prognoses offered by most of the contributors for church reform and participation in social change seem overoptimistic to the reviewer.

The volume includes papers prepared by participants in Cornell University's Latin American Year (1965–1966) "and essays written later at the editor's invitation"; but the editor does not list the essays written after 1966. Internal evidence and sources cited suggest that the papers of Professors Ivan Vallier and Emanuel de Kadt and the editor's chapter on Chile were prepared for the book. The contributions of Professor Frederick B. Pike and Cecilio de Lora Soria, S.M., have at least been updated and may have been solicited. Professor Richard Shaull's article first appeared in a German theological journal in 1967 but may have been read at Cornell. The additional contributions give the volume more conceptual unity than collections of papers read at symposia normally display, but this device does not, of course, eliminate the unevenness inherent in a collective effort.

The editor's introduction stresses the importance of the Roman Catholic church in Latin America and its great vitality. It notes that the contributors include both men of policy and scholars, and that the latter "have more freedom to enter into detail" (p. 6). Landsberger suggests that the volume be regarded "as an interim progress report on action in certain critical spheres." A sociologist, Ivan Vallier, then analyzes various forms of church influence and suggests a five-stage typology of change in the church and its approach to the social problem. He admits that the fifth or "pastoral" stage of his typology is only beginning to emerge. Since evolution to this stage would almost inevitably result in the withering away of the church as an institution, I do not share Vallier's confidence that the wheel will turn so far. Indeed, little real progress in very few countries has been achieved toward the fourth or "servant" church stage, as defined in the article.

Part Two of the volume contains three historical essays: Renato Poblete, S.J., surveys briefly major events in the history of the church in Latin America, relying mainly on secondary sources. Professor Frederick Pike compares ecclesiastical developments in Argentina, Chile, and Peru since the turn of the century; his article, based on primary sources and recent monographs, concentrates on the role of the church in the political life of the three states. Professor Landsberger's essay focuses on social doctrine as formulated by the Chilean hierarchy. His contribution rests on analysis of pastorals and synthesis of monographic work. The Pike and Landsberger essays have been overtaken, of course, by recent Chilean events.

The third section of the volume deals with doctrinal and lay ideological developments related to social change. An essay by the Very Reverend Mark G. McGrath, Archbishop of Panama, outlines the impact of Vatican II on church doctrine in Latin America. Abbé François Houtart discusses problems encountered by the church in trying to serve as an agent of social change and offers a typology of clerical attitudes toward change. Both of the immediately preceding essays are undocumented. Professor Richard Shaull emphasizes (perhaps overemphasizes) the revolutionary ferment at work in Latin America and the difficulties that all churches identified with the traditional culture and order have in accommodating forces of renewal. In light of this background, he finds the degree of clerical and lay involvement in the "revolutionary struggle" to be surprising. He also compares the Christian Democratic movement with what he calls the "New Christian Left," emphasizing the latter group's identification with the masses. His essay is documented in part, but he notes that many of his observations derive from personal contact.

The final section of the book groups three diverse topics. Professor John J. Kennedy attempts a synthesis of the history of the legal status of the church in Latin America, categorizes the several national situations, and analyzes in some detail the Venezuelan concordat of 1964 and the Argentine concordat of 1966. He attaches considerable importance to these agreements as precedents and as "evidence that change can be achieved even in cases where until recently all the factors involved denied any such possibility" (p. 72). The historical section of his essay rests principally upon secondary sources. The analysis of the concordats focuses on their constitutional and political implications. Cecilio de Lora Soria, S.M., offers an undocumented historical sketch of the origins, structure, and activities of the Latin American Episcopal Council (CELAM), the concrete achievements of which may not appear quite as impressive to an observer as to one engaged in overcoming the great obstacles to progress in this area. The final essay by Professor Emanuel de Kadt traces the development and activities of Catholic lay action groups in Brazil. Based on primary sources and recent monographs, this article contributes substantially to our knowledge of a subject of great interest.

The articles by Houtart, Shaull, De Kadt, Pike, Landsberger and Kennedy probably will be found most useful for required or collateral reading in lecture courses or seminars on the sociology, history, or comparative government of republican Latin America. The volume is well edited and presented, but it is unfortunate that a university press should use end-notes rather than footnotes. In light of this economy and the book's modest size, its price seems excessive.

RICHARD A. JOHNSON

New Braunfels, Texas

Reminiscences of Lenin. N. K. Krupskaya. Trans. by Bernard Isaacs. (New York: International Publishers, 1970. Pp. 553. $6.95.)

Lenin on the United States: Selected Writings by V. I. Lenin. Compiled by C. Leiteizen. Preface by James S. Allen. (New York: International Publishers, 1970. Pp. xxii, 674. $8.50.)

Publishers generally make excessive claims for their books, but in asserting on the jacket that Krupskaya's *Reminiscences of Lenin* is "by far the outstanding biography of Lenin" and "indispensable for understanding Lenin's life and work," International Publishers carries the practice beyond acceptable bounds. The volume is not a biography at all. It is, rather, as Krupskaya herself says of the section dealing with the years 1917–1919, a "very fragmentary and episodic" account (p. 380), written in three stages, of her recollections of her husband, Vladimir Ilyich Lenin.

Such an enterprise could, of course, be fascinating as well as revealing about the personality of a great revolutionary. Unfortunately, Krupskaya seems not to have had the talent or inclination (or, perhaps, the freedom) to produce a sensitive and candid portrayal of her husband. Lenin emerges from the *Reminiscences* as a wooden figure. His opinions are characterized as having always been correct, his motives as invariably unimpeachable; his opponents were inevitably craven opportunists. To be sure, Krupskaya tells us that occasionally Lenin was depressed or upset—sometimes he could not sleep for several nights—but she almost never discloses what he said during such periods of despondency. We are not given any insight into his state of mind during the many crises he endured. What is perhaps most surprising, the book contains very few memorable anecdotes that might illuminate Lenin's character. In short, there is little difference between the Lenin known to us through his writings and public appearances and the Lenin described by his most intimate companion.

Although Krupskaya mentions most of the stirring events in which Lenin played a prominent role, she never enlarges our knowledge or perception of them. A case in point is her treatment of the Second Congress of the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party in 1903, where the split between the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks took place. After a brief and pedestrian account of the debates at the gathering, she concludes with the following words: "And the substance was this—that the comrades grouped around Lenin were far more seriously committed to principles, which they wanted to see applied at all cost and pervading all the practical work. The other group had more of the man-in-the-street mentality, were given to compromise and concessions in principle, and had more regard for persons" (p. 96). No reader of these memoirs would realize that one of the most crucial questions considered at the congress was whether Russian Marxism was to be an elitist or democratic movement.

Much of the writing is so cryptic as to border on the inane. For example, Krupskaya reveals that on a boat trip in 1907 she "met Dan, Lydia Zederbaum [prominent Mensheviks], and a couple of S-R's [Socialist Revolutionaries]" (p. 161). The reader who awaits further discussion of her encounter with these political enemies does so in vain. Elsewhere in the book Krupskaya points out that in 1911 Lenin traveled from Paris to Zurich "and on this trip Ilyich read a number of papers in Switzerland" (p. 226). Since she does not mention the content of the papers, it is puzzling that she bothered to record the trip at all.

Finally, the book is not a trustworthy source on the history of Russian Marxism. Krupskaya claims that "what most divided Lenin and Trotsky all the time" was that the latter "failed to grasp the democratic spirit, the democratic principles of socialist construction" (pp. 330-331). Now it would surely be wrong to depict Trotsky as a man who was deeply and consistently committed to democracy, but he was among the first to warn that Lenin's organizational principles, if implemented, would lead to dictatorial regime in the Russian party. Even ore striking is Krupskaya's failure to mention rotsky's part in organizing the Bolshevik sei-ure of power in November 1917. She cites ree participants (among them Stalin) in the ork of the Military Revolutionary Committee, hich directed the coup. But she does not say a ord about Trotsky, unquestionably the guid-g spirit of the Committee. It is possible that hese distortions were forced on Krupskaya by talin, who was already in power when the *eminiscences* appeared in print.

It is also possible that the entire tenor of the olume was dictated by Stalin, who, against rupskaya's wishes, embarked upon the most rimitive glorification of Lenin after the latter's leath in 1924. Whatever the reason for the uality of the work, it is regrettable that Krup-kaya did not publish more thoughtful and inci-ive memoirs. Her husband was a far more in-eresting, complicated, and imposing figure han this volume suggests.

If Krupskaya's *Reminiscences* fails to do jus-ice to Lenin's personality, the second volume nder review fails to do justice to Lenin's intel-ectual powers. The founder of Bolshevism wrote some provocative pamphlets and books on tactics and strategy and on socioeconomic onditions in his native country. But his comments on the United States of America are not interesting enough to justify a book of 674 pages. A sizable number of selections, in fact, deal only peripherally with the United States, whereas several are letters to American workers concerned primarily with explaining the situation in Soviet Russia and within international socialism. The compiler of the selections obviously considered Lenin's *obiter dicta* on every subject to be so significant as to deserve the widest possible circulation. The result is a potpourri of Leninist pronouncements.

On the one hand, he praised the United States as the "most advanced country in the world, which has almost complete political liberty, where democratic institutions are most developed, and where tremendous progress has been made in labour productivity" (p. 90). Lenin was also impressed by the Public Library in New York, which, he noted, was visited by 1,658,376 readers in 1911. "Such is the way," he concluded, "things are done in New York. And in Russia?" (p. 81).

Yet in 1912 he also asserted that about one third of the national wealth of the U.S.A. "belongs to *two* trusts, those of Rockefeller and Morgan, or is subordinated to these trusts! Not more than 40,000 families making up these two trusts are the masters of 80 million wage-slaves" (p. 51). A few years later he spoke of the "brazen rule of a handful, not of millionaires, but multibillionaires, while the people are in slavery and servitude" (p. 349). He was sure that in the not too distant future the American working class would begin to press for fundamental economic and social changes. In what appears to have been his only extensive analytical work on the United States, written in 1915, Lenin came up with the correct, though not original, conclusion that small-scale farming was declining.

That Lenin's knowledge about conditions in the U.S.A. was not very extensive is borne out by a prediction he made on March 12, 1919: "We see that the Soviets are gaining popularity in the West, and that the fight for them is going on not only in Europe, but also in America. Soviet-type councils are being set up everywhere, and sooner or later they will take power into their own hands. The present situation in America, where such councils are being set up, is extremely interesting" (p. 386). Lenin based this fanciful forecast on information he had received about the creation of a General Strike Committee that had led a five-day general strike in Seattle in February 1919.

The sixty-one pages comprising the explanatory notes and name index abound with polemics and inaccuracies, and should therefore be used with extreme caution. The Mensheviks, for example, are described as "an opportunist trend among Russian Social Democrats" who in 1917 supported the Provisional Government's "imperialist policy" and after the Bolshevik assumption of power "fought against the Soviet people on the side of the counter-revolutionary capitalists and landowners" (p. 617). Not one of these charges can be substantiated. Nor is it true that Pavel Borisovich Axelrod, one of the Menshevik leaders, "called for armed intervention against Soviet Russia" (p. 643). And it is pure slander to accuse Trotsky of having been the "worst enemy of Leninism," a man who "fought against the Bolsheviks on all questions of the theory and practice of the socialist revolution" (p. 671).

In publishing the two books—one about Lenin and one consisting of selections from his works—International Publishers clearly intended to make available to the English-speaking public writings that would enhance the stature of the founder of Bolshevism. In reality, however, the company has done him a disservice. Some of Lenin's works are vitally important, but these are not included in the anthology. Familiarity with Lenin's personality and activities is both desirable and necessary for an understanding of Communism, but the reader of his wife's recollections is more likely to be bored than enlightened.

ABRAHAM ASCHER

Brooklyn College

Struggle for Democracy: Sung Chiao-jen and the 1911 Chinese Revolution. By Kit Siong Liew. (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1971. Pp. viii, 260. $8.75.)

The October 10 Revolution of 1911 marked the beginning of the political revolution in twentieth century China. Its outbreak caught the revolutionaries by surprise, and within a short time power had devolved into the hands of the military leader and opportunist Yuan Shih-k'ai. After his death in 1916, the political disunity of China, compounded by warlord disruption of powerless civilian governments, continued until the Kuomintang's Northern Expedition of 1926. The exact import and significance of 1911 in terms of political history will be good for argument for many years to come. Kuomintang official history centered the event upon the work of the absent Sun Yat-sen, and tended to rank other contributors in terms of their agreement or cooperation with him. Hsüeh Chün-tu's *Huang Hsing and the Chinese Revolution,* which appeared in 1961, redressed some of this bias to the advantage of the Hunan leaders who did not agree with Sun Yat-sen's Kwangtung-centered group. The complexities of the period have received their best treatment in English in the work edited by Mary C. Wright, *China in Revolution: The First Phase, 1900–1913,* whose title suggests a downgrading of 1911.

The work under review returns to the 1911 events, but without the emphasis on Sun Yat-sen that this dating suggests. Sung Chiao-jen, the subject of this volume, was a member of the Hunan group of revolutionaries. He was a leader in the student movement in Japan during the first decade of the twentieth century and in the *T'ung-meng-hui* (referred to here as the Chinese League), and he emerged as the leading figure in the abortive movement toward parliamentary democracy in 1912. After launching a speaking tour in which he attacked Yuan Shih-k'ai and attained considerable popularity, Sung was murdered on Yuan's instructions in Shanghai on March 20, 1913.

Sung Chiao-jen disagreed sharply with Sun Yat-sen on the desirability of an open, parliamentary system as opposed to a more tightly controlled and centrally led political organization. Sun took his rival's murder as a sign of his error, and preferred to work for a structure whose members would take oaths of personal loyalty to him. Kuomintang historians have also tended to play down Sung Chiao-jen's role. His person, career, and diary nevertheless provide important and inviting topics for research, and one welcomes this additional contribution to the history of a turbulent period.

Mr. Liew covers a good deal of familiar territory in treating his subject, and the chapters on the Tokyo scene and the immediate post-revolutionary maneuvering mark his principal contribution. He has not had access to the volume edited by Professor Wright, and he makes no effort to discuss the bibliographic terrain he has traversed. Yet no one so far has taken the constitutional efforts so seriously. Consequently the author's gloomy conclusions about the significance of his subject's failure deserve note. They are that "the concept of democracy was itself not a suitable ideology for revolution in China. For, with its emphasis on individuality and individualism, it was not compatible with a revolution in the Chinese setting, which demanded a high degree of discipline" (p. 198). Consequently, when he goes on to say that Sun Yat-sen "was democratic in words but never in action" (p. 200), this implied criticism cannot obscure Liew's basic agreement with Sun's position and procedure.

MARIUS B. JANSEN

Princeton University

Panchayati Raj: A Study of Rural Local Government in India. By Henry Maddick. (London: Longman Group, Ltd., 1970. Pp. 402. $9.50.)

Is it merely unfashionable to present a detailed, descriptive and prescriptive study, no matter how well done, of an ongoing political institution, or are there ultimately compelling reasons for political scientists' concern with explicit theory-building and methodological sophistication? This book by Henry Maddick, part of a series being published in conjunction with the Institute of Local Government Studies at the University of Birmingham, brings the question to mind, but does not, in and of itself, provide an answer.

On the one hand, Professor Maddick has amassed in a carefully organized fashion detailed information about India's rural local government system, called *Panchayati Raj.* Furthermore, he has done so comprehensively and with a discerning eye for India's historical patterns and the need to solve essential policy problems with respect to local government.

On the other hand, the description is confined so strictly to the structural conditions of the Indian system that any reader must determine purely for himself, out of his own knowledge of politics elsewhere, whether the information provided contributes to an understanding of political life generally. I believe it does, in part, but the overwhelming bulk of the material presupposes a special knowledge of, or at least a special interest in, local government in India.

What does seem to be lacking is a theoretical base to explain the significance of this particular kind of rural local government. India's history may have produced these types of political arrangements which today are called *Panchayati Raj*, but of what are they an example? What do they represent? Are the conditions which yielded these structures unique in time and space?

Not only is there a dearth of the kind of propositions which might serve as explicit "lessons" drawn from the special case, but there is also no mention of the fact that even surface parallels exist in the world, no attention to the more obvious comparisons with the identically named *Panchayati Raj* in Nepal, the Basic Democracies system of Ayub Khan's Pakistan, and even some aspects of *kampong* development in Malaysia, to mention a few. More broadly, and perhaps more significantly than the surface parallels, is the need continually to make explicit the implicit comparisons of local governments which affect so much of the lives of individuals and groups in every nation.

Ironically, part of such an approach is indicated by Maddick in a brief "Note on Research and Study," at the end of the text, in which he lists 17 suggested research projects. Most of these would go a long way toward posing questions for an extensive comparative approach. Others which come to mind are the relation of power distributions in rural India to patterns of *Panchayati Raj* and the relation of varying ideologies to policy-outcome differences. In fact, several of Maddick's suggestions involve highly interesting comparisons of regional variations within India, an almost ideal framework for potential generalizations which could have truly far-reaching implications for a variety of comparative political studies.

Maddick, therefore, has shown that he is well aware of the significance of such implications, but his intention, which he has faithfully carried out, has been simply to lay the groundwork for such later studies by pulling together in one volume most of the available information on the constitutional and legal status and processes of the *Panchayati Raj* system. This task he has performed in a systematic and painstaking fashion.

Maddick unfolds a remarkably complete study of the background structure and function of India's rural local government system. This system evolved out of historical precedent, constitutional directive, and nationwide community development efforts since 1948. The growth of the integrated new system, termed *Panchayati Raj* by Prime Minister Nehru, is generally attributed to the wide-ranging "Mehta Report," named for the late Balvantray G. Mehta, who was chairman of a study team set up by the Committee on Plan Projects of the National Development Council.

In essence, as Maddick describes it, the *Panchayati Raj* system consists of three tiers of local councils, dominated by elected representatives working with government officials, at the village, block, and district levels. Although most of the development functions are geared to the block (or *panchayat samiti*) level, the system is not rigidly uniform throughout the country, because it is essentially under control of the states, with the central government providing technical and financial assistance.

In addition to his descriptive-historical account, Maddick reserves a major portion of the text for what he terms "Reflections." In this section he examines the problems and implications growing out of the relationships described in the earlier portion of the book.

Drawing on his considerable experience in India and other countries, Maddick dissects some of the vital relationships between the elected rural bodies and various governmental agencies, making penetrating recommendations for change, but always with a sympathetic belief in the basic viability of the system. An illustration of how far-reaching some of his recommendations are may be seen in his description of a possible new nationwide administrative service embracing "all the administrative and executive posts in the local authorities" and aimed at "achieving the standards and repute of the I.A.S. and other Union cadres" (pp. 294–300). Those familiar with the prestigious and powerful position of the I.A.S. in the Indian government will recognize the scope of such a recommended change.

The discussions throughout are bolstered by a great number of tables and charts, both in the body of the text and as part of 14 appendices. Although Maddick completed the writing in 1967, the comprehensiveness of the material presented and the slowness of essential change in India's rural local governments combine to make this what may prove to be a standard reference work on the subject for some time.

Harry J. Friedman

University of Hawaii

"Che" Guevara on Revolution. Edited by Jay Mallin. (Miami: University of Miami Press, 1969. Pp. 225. $7.95.)

This is not an easy book to analyze and evaluate. The selection of Guevara's writings is well chosen and the book's introduction includes some very perceptive insights into Castro's revolt and final triumph. So much so that the introduction constitutes a brief but valuable contribution to the history of contemporary Cuban politics. But the overall impression one gets is that the purpose of the book is more to attack Guevara than to analyze his political contributions. It is not that Guevara's actions and ideological conceptions are beyond criticism: as a political philosopher and strategist Che Guevara was uninformed and unimaginative, and as an independent guerrilla leader he was a failure. Furthermore, as his writings on guerrilla strategy testify, Guevara never quite understood the nature of the Cuban revolt. Fidel Castro, who understood the struggle, has never supported Guevara's interpretation of it. Indeed it is difficult to escape Mallin's conclusion that Guevara "was neither an original nor a profound thinker" (p. 44).

The main criticism that can be made against Mallin's book is that Guevara's failures as a revolutionary leader and as a theoretician are not balanced by the examination of other aspects of his political career, both in Cuba and outside the island. The development and use of Guevara as a political symbol throughout the world, for example, is left unexplored, as is Guevara's role in Cuban politics from January 1, 1959 until he left the country in 1965. Perhaps the incorporation of such material would have produced a book different from that which the editor had in mind.

Mallin's selection of Guevara's works is sufficient to give us a clear view of Guevara's ideas as a political thinker and as a guerrilla strategist. Guevara's "Message to Tricontinental" (pp. 150–162) offers the application of the Cuban solution as the key to world anti-imperialist strategy. Shallowness and lack of creativity and imagination are clearly evident in his thought. The same vices, with a great deal of naïveté, are also detectable in the "Bolivian Diary" (pp. 166–184). This is indeed a pathetic human document. Here is Guevara, who had ridden to victory in Cuba for reasons he mistakenly thought he had grasped, trying in vain to make his theoretical scheme determine reality. The pages of his diary show his unwillingness to question his beliefs and to cast a realistic glance at the situation in which he found himself. The account of the Bolivian experience written by Ciro Roberto Bustos (pp. 186–224) complements in a dramatic manner the notes of Guevara. The fact that Bustos wrote his account while under the custody of the Bolivian army and with the intention of procuring their good will adds, if anything, to the contrast. Bustos tries hard to point out the unreal character of the adventure and the almost childish logic and fervor upon which it was based. He presents a human-sized picture of Che Guevara.

Guevara's life and writings testify to his failure. In "Guerrilla Warfare: A Method" (pp. 88–102) we can see how his misunderstanding of the Cuban revolt is used for the development of general principles of guerrilla warfare. He claims that the Cuban revolution's first fundamental contribution to the mechanics of revolutionary politics in Latin America was the idea that "popular forces can win a war against an army." Whether the general principle may or may not have a certain validity is beyond the point. One of the essential characteristics of the Cuban struggle against Batista was the inner corruption of the armed forces, which rendered them incapable of fighting. From a tactical point of view this belief was Guevara's fundamental mistake. It led countless youths to their deaths throughout the continent and eventually it cost him his own life.

Guevara's account of the Cuban revolt (pp. 48–67) also testifies to his misunderstanding of Cuban political reality. After reading Guevara's theoretical disquisitions, and if we are aware of the real nature of the Cuban fight against Batista, we realize that he made a basic interpretative mistake. He did not see that the struggle was essentially a middle-class urban one. As a foreigner with no prior knowledge of the country, his enforced isolation in the mountains did not help him to understand the actual situation. But a more perceptive observer would have seen that most of the fighting took place in the cities and not in the country. He should have seen that what made the Sierra Maestra a sanctuary for the guerrillas was the reluctance of the Cuban army to go after them. It should not have been difficult for him to realize that Castro became the center of attention and propaganda because he enjoyed more freedom and mobility than those fighting in the cities—among other things his relative safety gave him absolute control over radio broadcasting, the only nation-wide means of propaganda. At the very least he should have taken notice that when urban fighters needed a rest they were sent to join Fidel in the mountains.

Mallin's book offers the English reader a good view of Guevara's political thought and a realistic glance at the guerrilla leader. The work seems to fulfill its own objectives, but it is also a reminder that a thorough analysis of Guevara, and of the Cuban insurrection against Batista, is still to be done.

FRANCISCO JOSÉ MORENO
New York University

The Tempest Within: An Account of East Pakistan. By Dom Moraes. (Delhi: Vikas, 1971. Pp. 98. Rs. 12.50.)

Bangla Desh, A Struggle of Nationhood. By Mohammed Ayoob, Anirudha Gupta, Rahmatullah Khan, G. P. Deshpande, R. Narayanan, and Sisir Gupta. (Delhi: Vikas, 1971. Pp. 194. Rs. 20.)

Both of these books have the breathless style of the journalist covering a fast-breaking crisis. Moraes intends no more, and his almost poetic narrative alternates between historical analysis and a highly personal account of the days between the Great Cyclone of November, and the Great Political Landslide of December. But it is a remarkably engaging, educating book, full of insight, humanity, and reportorial fidelity. In a scant 100 pages, it manages to convey what East Bengal is like, socially and politically, and that is a great achievement.

He portrays the tension between East and West Pakistan, and between Muslim and Hindu. Essentially, the problem between East and West was one of neglect: "The separation [of the two wings] wouldn't have mattered so much if the industrial complex around Calcutta had come to Pakistan, but as it was there was little incentive for the West Pakistanis to interest themselves in their Bengali brothers" (p. 23). As contact between the two wings grew, many Bengalis echoed one informant of Moraes: "We do not like West Pakistan, but we hate Hindustan" (p. 25). Many West Pakistanis, treating the Bengalis as inferior because of their underdevelopment, deserves Moraes comment: "the West Pakistan attitude was stupid and insensitive but not incomprehensible" (p. 29).

As the Awami Party swept the polls, the issue was clear; either East Pakistan would have to be given autonomy and hope in its own development or there would be civil war: "The East, if it is kept dependent, will be forced to break away" (p. 44). And as the future of the state was at stake: The two wings, to quote Auden, "must love one another or die" (p. 88).

In the pathos of the cyclone and in the excitement of the December election, Moraes portrays both East and West Pakistanis as diverse, complicated, and utterly believable people. They were not calculating instruments of the purposes of one province or another, but weary, frustrated, and often angry human beings. The book finishes on a note of rare insight into the wellsprings of the Awami League's great support, and its great task among the Bengali young. "It must be terrible to be young and not be able to realize any of your ambitions" (p. 98); and in a land of natural and human catastrophe, politics alone seems to hold promise.

The other book is "a result of the spontaneous reaction of a group of scholars at the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University," and bears the imprint of rushed prose. Haste notwithstanding, it is a surprisingly good compendium and offers a valuable source on what expert Indian scholars were thinking *before* the Indian invasion of East Bengal in 1971. "History as it might have been," written as it was happening, is a good way to discourage facile historicism and misplaced determinism.

Mohammed Ayoob is India's principal expert on Pakistan, and his chapter is not so much novel as substantive. The close-grained analysis of the political role of Z. A. Bhutto, however (pp. 37–42) is extremely good. Anirudha Gupta's chapter is a curious amalgam of political philosophy, mostly radical, and a critical view of exaggerated claims by all parties in the civil war. More than any other author in the volume, Gupta portrays how important confusion and uncertainty were in Pakistan's reaction to the Awami League's moves. Rahmatullah Khan has explored the legal dimensions of the Bangla Desh situation in depth and in detachment, but the international legal norms relating to such a case are so much in flux that he is able to present a brief for both the branches of Pakistan and India as well.

G. P. Deshpande no doubt regrets the publication of his quite erroneous forecasts, but for the analyst, this chapter is among the most interesting in the book because his assumptions, before Indian intervention, were quite reasonable. In particular, his analysis makes it clear that Soviet policy was pulled along in the Indian wake, and not vice versa. The inclusion of the Podgorny to Yayha Khan message of April 3, 1971 (pp. 128–129) is a useful reminder of Soviet policy before India's decisive moves in November-December.

It is easy to sympathize with R. Narayanan in his search for American policy in this crisis; apparently the profile was so low, in the beginning, that it was nearly invisible. By a careful reading of the major newspapers, Congressional debates, scholarly petitions and official pronouncements, he concludes that the Bangla Desh insurgents could expect no aid from the United States.

As one could have anticipated from his past writings, however, it is Sisir Gupta who proves most perceptive and prophetic. He foresaw the possibility that the Pakistan army would arm groups in East Pakistan and turn group against group (pp. 171–172), that "if the struggle in Bangla Desh has to be waged on many fronts, it cannot be conducted by moderates alone" (p. 172), that President Nixon would be pro-Pakistan in the crisis, both to serve his China policy interests and because of his background, and in spite of his problems with the Democrats and Congress (p. 182), and that the Russians, considering India the centerpiece of their South Asian policy, would go along with India (pp. 190–191). It only remained for him to make the obvious case, "only an utterly cynical [foolish?] Indian Government could refrain from extending its sympathy to [the] struggle" (p. 194).

It is paradoxical that the self-admitted, nonspecialist, journalist's account of the origins of Bangla Desh should have so much "staying power," and the symposium of expert scholars appear to be so fragile. It is perhaps that Moraes has written about the Bengalis rather than about the relationships between governments, and as Bangla Desh attempts to pull itself together, it is the Bengalis who must do it. Sisir Gupta's concern about factions other than moderates capturing the struggle may, in the short run, be no less important than Moraes' observation that Hindu-Muslim relations are poisonous and that Indian soldiers, administrators and diplomats will soon run into that reality. But it serves us all well to consider Anirudha Gupta's observation that "The task of a future historian of Bangla Desh will be by no means an easy one" (p. 51). These books, happily, represent impressive first steps.

WAYNE WILCOX

Columbia University

Singapore's People's Action Party: Its History, Organization and Leadership. By Pang Cheng Lian. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971. Pp. 87. $4.75.)

This brief monograph, written by a graduate student at the University of Singapore, offers a limited amount of fresh data on the insufficiently studied People's Action Party. It is based on extensive interviewing of PAP leaders, Opposition, and former PAP members, but Party leaders appear to have supplied most of the pertinent comments. Pang's restricted access to membership records at PAP headquarters is the basis for his more significant findings. The modest scope of this study with very selective treatment of the Party's organizational and leadership characteristics is justified as providing a "springboard for further researches" on Singapore's parties.

In his introductory treatment of PAP history, Pang correctly stresses the clash between the moderate and the procommunist factions, which led to the secession of the extreme leftists in 1961. When the moderates regained control of the party machinery in the 1957 leadership struggle, their adoption of the cadre system proved the major organizational device in insuring their ultimate victory. In the PAP a decisive distinction is drawn between rank-and-file members and the "cadre" group, which Pang estimates as about 3 per cent of a total of 14,800 members. Only cadres are permitted to participate in the biennial Party conference and elect the powerful Central Executive Committee, which monopolizes the policy-making function. Since the CEC itself controls entry into cadre status, it is largely a self-perpetuating body. At the same time, PAP recruits members and maintains financially autonomous branches in Singapore's 58 electoral constituencies, which Pang argues makes the PAP a kind of cadre-mass party amalgam. He describes the revealing fund-raising activities of the branches, which include the operation of kindergarten classes taught by Party members but open to non-Party families; souvenir publications carrying lucrative advertising; and fund-raising dinners which many non-Party community leaders attend. Since the PAP constitutes the Government and since the Opposition is impotent, few outsiders resist these appeals to augment Party finances. Only one-eighth of the Party dues which the branches collect go to

Party headquarters. This marked financial autonomy does not, however, seriously modify the Party's basically centralized character, as Pang makes clear. The CEC approves all branch committee members, and Singapore's small size facilitates easy communication and hence control of the branches by Party headquarters. Since the CEC carefully screens parliamentary candidates with an eye to ministerial caliber, the MP's home constituencies do not become an independent power base.

A useful aspect of this study is the fairly detailed statistical comparison of certain salient characteristics of the PAP leadership, especially the powerful CEC, and the Party's general membership. Both the CEC and general Party membership clearly reflect the racial distribution of the wider population, with substantial Chinese majorities, the general membership having, however, a disproportionately large Indian membership. The English-educated have consistently dominated the CEC where the number of university graduates has steadily increased. Substantially more of the general members are Chinese-educated and have less education than their English-educated counterparts. Predictably most CEC members are professionals and white-collar workers, while blue-collar workers predominate in the general membership. In his study of post-1961 changes in party membership, Pang finds that the present PAP membership has become more heterogeneous, the Chinese majority has been reduced and fewer Chinese-educated are included. The wider implications of the membership data are cursorily examined. Pang's study is useful mainly as a supplement to the slowly developing body of political studies on Singapore.

C. Paul Bradley
University of Michigan, Flint

Cultivating Revolution: The United States and Agrarian Reform in Latin America. By James F. Petras and Robert LaPorte, Jr. (New York: Random House, 1971. Pp. 469. $10.00.)

Revolution Next Door, Latin America in the 1970's. By Gary MacEoin. (Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1971. Pp. 243. $6.95.)

Books on Latin America that focus on "revolution" are by now legion. Yet, whereas in the past most such books stressed the necessity or desirability of reform in order to head off revolution, those works appearing in the last several years have more often emphasized the virtues or inevitability of revolution in the wake of the purported failures of reform and "reform-mongering."

The two books under review fall into this latter category. The political sympathies of the authors of both books are clearly with the revolutionary Left. They view the reforms of the Alliance for Progress era as inadequate. They are both concerned to point up the deleterious (i.e., anti-revolutionary) consequences of the dependency of Latin America on the United States. But the similarities end there. "Cultivating Revolution," by political scientists James Petras and Robert LaPorte, is the more substantial of the two. It will find its readership primarily among students of Latin America and of agrarian reform. Gary MacEoin's "Revolution Next Door," on the other hand, fits the rubric of journalistic commentary and will be of interest primarily to the "concerned citizen."

"Cultivating Revolution" deals with two interrelated problems in agricultural development. The first, and the more extensively analyzed, is the internal efforts of certain Latin American regimes to carry out agrarian reform and/or peasant mobilization. The regimes examined are the "electoral bargaining" systems of President Belaunde's Peru and Eduardo Frei's Chile, together with the "nonbargaining" politics of Peru's current military junta and Fidel Castro's Cuba (with the mobilizational aspects of the Fei regime accounted as "nonbargaining" as well). The second concern of the authors is with the policies and attitudes which the United States has adopted toward these regimes and their agrarian programs.

In brief, Petras and LaPorte argue that the political and administrative methods which they subsume under the term electoral bargaining can produce only marginal increments of change in the agrarian sector. It is only by the revolutionary politics of a Cuba or, more qualifiedly, through something like the "revolution from above" undertaken by the military in Peru that substantial change in the crucial area of land tenure can be achieved. (It is in this context that the authors argue the revolutionary potential of the efforts of both the Christian Democrats and the Marxist Left in Chile to mobilize the peasants, despite the otherwise reformist stance of the Frei government.) Finally, the authors show that, except for occasional rhetorical flourishes in the early years of the Alliance, the United States has stressed agricultural productivity over genuine change in the Latin American countryside.

There is much that is persuasive in this entire argument. Clearly it has proved especially difficult, not only in Latin America but elsewhere as well, to make extensive changes in land ownership by means of the standard practices of constitutional democracy. The experience of Venezuela in carrying out significant shifts in land tenure patterns and in achieving high levels of peasant mobilization under democratic auspices should nonetheless give some pause in this connection. More important, the authors do not assess the high costs (political as well as economic) of genuinely revolutionary agrarian reform. Still, the authors have presented plausible evidence that, at least in the short run, the bargaining mode of politics is not readily compatible with thoroughgoing change in property ownership or class relationships.

Moreover, despite occasional simplistic statements (for example, that Latin American elites are "agents who implement U.S. policy" —p. 433), the book largely avoids polemics. The long chapter on the Peruvian military junta, covering much besides agrarian policy, is perhaps the best summary statement of that regime's performance that we have. The treatment is basically sympathetic, but not uncritical. There is also much useful material on the provisions of agrarian reform laws and on the agrarian reform agencies in Peru and Chile, with several helpful organizational charts and tabular data on administrative personnel.

The book is not, however, without its problems. It is too long and somewhat repetitious, while much of the early part amounts to little more than extended summaries of the reports of international agencies or study groups, and of the positions of various parties and politicians, on the subject of agrarian reform. The several sections of the book are curiously disparate in the manner of their presentation. The chapters on reformist Chile and Peru, for example, contain detailed examinations of legislation and administration. The chapter on the Peruvian junta, on the other hand, is much broader and more analytical in its conception. The chapter on Cuba is quite brief and adds little to our knowledge. In fact, the whole argument of the book is not as tightly put together as it might be.

Cultivating Revolution, then, has various flaws in its construction which detract somewhat from its impact and readability. Nor does the book entirely convince us that reform through democratic processes is impossible or that revolutionary change is really worth the cost. But the authors do present us with a persuasively argued case, backed up by considerable documentary material.

Gary MacEoin's *Revolution Next Door* is most notable for its effective presentation both of the plight of the Latin American masses and of the potential for radical change (hardly thinkable as recently as a decade and a half ago) in such institutions as the Church and the military. Though he does not project an "imperialist conspiracy," the author tends to lay the major responsibility for the ills of Latin America at the door of the United States.

The argument is a bit too simplistic throughout, while the solutions proffered comprise a rather fuzzy blend of violent revolution and a "to the people" kind of education and community organization. The author is also occassionally careless of the facts (for example, he places the *bogotazo* in August 1949). He is, in short, better at arousing our indignation and giving us a feel for some of the fundamental changes taking place in Latin America than he is at providing us with a substantiated argument or with convincing solutions.

In sum, the two books under review may be placed, with only minor qualifications, among those that view some form of revolution as "the way out" in Latin America. One suspects, however, that Latin America is too complex, and too variable both over time and among nations, to warrant a judgment that revolution—or democratic reform, for that matter—is either inevitable or always the better solution.

ROBERT H. DIX

Rice University

Comparative Judicial Behavior: Cross-Cultural Studies of Political Decision-Making in the East and West. Edited by Glendon Schubert and David J. Danelski. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969. Pp. 412. $7.95.)

Crossnational studies of judiciaries are rare. Many texts on comparative politics either pretend that courts do not exist or present only the barest formal description of them. Few foreign scholars examine their own or others' courts as part of the political system they address. Therefore, one comes to this book with high expectations.

I read it with growing disappointment. The opening chapter by Glendon Schubert is a catalogue of the substantive essays. It tells us how many are about Japan or about Canada, how many are by American authors and how many by indigenous authors; how many are simply descriptive, how many use cumulative scaling, how many use multivariate analysis, and how many attempt to apply causal modeling. The catalogues betray the conceptual sterility that fatigues the reader as he goes from chapter to chapter. Many of the chapters do not place their subject matter into cultural, historical, sociological, or political context. We are presented, for instance, with chapters about the Japanese Supreme Court with only marginal references to the political culture in which it operates, the political conditions which faced it, or the legal system of which it is a part. Danelski's chapter on Japan and Gadbois's on India give us merely snatches of information about these matters.

When comparing judiciaries operating in Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Canada, Australia, and Hawaii, one wonders whether they are doing the same kinds of things. What functions do they perform? Out of the totality of political conflict that emerged in those political systems since 1945, what proportion involved the courts, and in what ways? How do the recruitment systems for the courts compare to the recruitment patterns for other political positions in those nations? What impact do these supreme courts have on the lives of their nationals and what barriers do they face in obtaining compliance with their rulings? Such problems are not systematically addressed by the chapters of this book.

Perhaps that is too much to ask from a group of scholars working in a new field. It would be enough if the fragments they provide fit into a framework so that other scholars would be stimulated to fill the gaps and develop more complete descriptions and theoretical understanding. But such expectations are also not met. No framework is presented. Despite the book's title, the chapters are rarely comparative or crosscultural; most deal with single countries. The crosscultural component of many chapters is the application of measures or labels developed in the United States or England to Australia, Canada, the Philippines, India, or Japan. The authors, however, pay little attention to problems of crosscultural validity. I find Dator's application of Eysenck's conservatism measure, originally devised for England and slightly modified by him for Japan, very questionable. He presents no reliability or validity analysis to support his use of the scale in the Japanese context, even though material in his footnotes raise many doubts about the validity of his conclusions. Other authors (notably Samonte for the Philippines and Fouts for Canada) apply the labels conventionally applied by American judicial behavioralists to Supreme Court voting patterns—Economic Conservatism for one scale of cases and Civil Liberties for another. These authors do not provide sufficient contextual detail to assure the reader that those labels describe the same phenomena as in the United States. By contrast, I found Pyong-Choon Hahm's description of the judicial process in Korea the most informative because it gave the most contextual detail.

Readers who already possess considerable expertise about the countries discussed in this volume may find their country-chapters of some use. Those who wish to embark on the task of crosscultural analysis of judicial behavior or judicial processes will find this volume relatively disappointing. Judicial behavioralists (as defined by Schubert) may find some delight in the application of their methods to foreign judiciaries.

HERBERT JACOB

Northwestern University

Old Hatreds and Young Hopes: The French Carbonari Against the Bourbon Restoration. By Alan B. Spitzer. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971. Pp. 334. $12.50.)

This multifaceted study of "a movement that failed" places the French Carbonari movement of 1821–1823 in fresh historical perspective. Through what the author terms an "odd organization" of his varied materials (p. 9) we see the Carbonari's origins in the particular milieu of Restoration politics and as part of a wider European "post-revolutionary" experience. The conspiracy is reconstructed as the police knew it, as the conspirators saw themselves both during and after the event, and as it appeared publicly following an abortive rising near Saumur and subsequent political prosecutions in Paris, Tours, Nantes, Colmar and elsewhere. From such overlapping but disparate images Spitzer recreates the secret society's brief, unhappy career whose significance, he finds, transcends the Saumur fiasco and the Carbonari's few years of organized life.

French Carbonarism was a response to the groundswell of reaction by the "Ultras," which moderates were unable to repel by legal parliamentary opposition. Modeled rather superficially after its Italian namesake, it was a pragmatic search for a viable revolutionary apparatus by men of diverse political views whose moral imperatives drove them to secede from the Restoration system and illegally to attempt a seizure of power. Membership, perhaps 50,000 by 1822, included "complex overlapping elements." There were students and clerks; nobles, bourgeoisie, and workers; liberal republicans, "blurred" bonapartists, and "pre-Orleanists"; soldiers and civilians; youth and age; obscure men and such notables as Lafayette. These became an "amalgamation of generations and temperaments" (p. 275) only fleetingly linked by the tactic of revolutionary conspiracy and a vague republicanism which was not consensus but "a sum of aspirations" (p. 275). Amidst regional differences, political nuances left by the Great Revolution vied with liberalism and Saint-Simonianism of the 1820s and co-existed with harbingers of future Orleanism. The Carbonari's only common rationale was faith in the social contract and popular sovereignty, both of which they saw ravaged by the Restoration and hence retrievable only by "direct illegal action" (p. 295).

Assisted by the police, the Carbonari themselves contributed to their failure. Lacking a mass base, tactically inept in conspiracy and action, they tolerated too great a disparity between insufficient means and "vast and ill-defined goals" (p. 293). The very nature of their organization "inevitably divided it" (p. 263). Ironically, their ill-starrred actions strengthened the reaction.

Is the Carbonari story more than a minor case history of failure? Spitzer uses the story to illuminate a stage in French politics and to illustrate a wider European pattern of protest against post-1815 disenchantment by reformers who still discerned their moral duty in the right of revolution. He shows that their Carbonari experience became, for some at least, the matrix of other approaches to social change thereafter. The book abounds in details, but the author's method and conclusions develop clearly and convince the reader.

Howard C. Payne
Washington State University

The British Ombudsman. By Frank Stacey. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971. Pp. 351. $13.00.)

In the preface to his book on the British Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration, Frank Stacey, an English student of the subject, asserts that he has written three books in one. "It is a study of the policy-making process; it is a study, in depth, of the legislative process; and it is a study of a major reform in our system of government" (p. v). The author, who tends to be strong on narration and weak on analysis, makes no attempt to elucidate the curious distinction between policy making and the legislative process, although from the context he appears to equate the former with the campaign of nongovernmental groups and individuals for a new government policy. The campaign leading up to the decision of the Wilson Government to establish a Parliamentary Commissioner to investigate complaints from the public about maladministration is dealt with in four short chapters based mainly on interviews with some of the major participants and published materials such as the annual reports of *Justice*, the promotional interest group of reformist lawyers which is more responsible than any other private organization for Britain's having an ombudsman.

More than half the volume is devoted to Mr. Stacey's "second book," most of which is a lengthy account of the PCA bill's passage through Parliament. It is difficult to justify the seven chapters, entitled "The Second Reading in the Commons," "The Committee Stage in the Commons—the First to Fifth Sitting of the Standing Committee," and so on, which do little more than summarize easily accessible published debates and which contain so little analysis. The author concludes that his legislative history does not support the widely accepted thesis of S. A. Walkland's *The Legislative Process in Britain* (1968) that the chief deliberative stage of legislation is carried on between interest groups and government departments. Mr. Stacey makes two points. First, although interest groups were important in influencing Labour party elites to adopt an ombudsman policy, in preparing their White Paper and the subsequent bill, Labour Government ministers and civil servants did not consult with any groups. Actually this fact fits in very well with Walkland's generalization that promotional groups, lacking most of the political and economic sanctions of sectional groups, are consulted much less frequently than sectional groups by governments contemplating legislation. Mr. Stacey's second point is that, contrary to the view that Parliament plays a very minor part in legislation, his study indicates that the discussion there on the PCA Bill "led to important changes in the Bill, both in the Commons and the Lords." Here again, however, it would appear that the facts presented fit within Walkland's generalizations. Although Walkland does maintain that "legislation is not now effectively a Parliamentary function," he immediately goes on to say, "Parliamentary participation in legislation is restricted to attempts to engineer minor adjustments to the Government's plans, and the main purpose of the Parliamentary stages is to dissect and expose the Government's intentions and to clarify the consequences of them for the electorate" (p. 8). Harold Wilson was so certain that no radical changes would be made in the PCA bill that he appointed a Commissioner-designate before it was even discussed in Parliament. About 25 modifications were made in the bill during its passage through Parliament, most of them of a very minor nature. None appreciably changed the way in which the new institution was to operate. The Government was twice defeated in standing committee but easily able to reverse the defeat on the floor of the House of Commons in the case of the amendment to which they continued to object. All this, of course, does not mean that the parliamentary consideration of the bill was a waste of time, for the changes made were viewed as improvements by nearly all concerned including the Government.

Mr. Stacey's "third book" opens with a chapter on the first months of the Commissioner's activities, about half of which is an account of the much publicized Sachsenhausen Case. This is followed by a long chapter on the Parliamentary Select Committee to which the Commissioner reports. The author is undoubtedly right in stressing the importance of this committee, which is more influential than the legislative committees attached to other national ombudsmen. He concludes with a rambling evaluative and prescriptive chapter which among other things sets forth suggestions for strengthening the new British institution. Like many other commentators on the British ombudsman, Mr. Stacey believes that he falls short of the much admired Scandinavian models in not frequently finding fault with the quality of "unreasonable" discretionary decisions. What such critics fail to realize is that the Scandinavian ombudsmen in this respect in fact resemble their British counterpart more closely than the image of them held by British reformers.

William B. Gwyn

Tulane University

The May Movement: Revolt and Reform. By Alain Touraine. Translated by Leonard F. X. Mayhew. (New York: Random House, 1971. Pp. 373. $8.95.)

The French Revolt of May 1968 was a political failure but a resounding literary success. More than three hundred books and thousands of articles and commentaries have been devoted to that remarkable episode in just three years. One of the first books in print was written by Alain Touraine, then professor of sociology at Nanterre. Touraine had witnessed the agony of his university and participated in key negotiations between students and administrators during the night of the barricades. *Le Mouvement de mai, ou le communisme utopique* has now been made available in an American edition. The author is not well served by a wooden translation. Apart from four pages on university reform, the book has not been updated or reworked in the light of the vast literature that has since appeared. As an account of the events, it has been supplanted by any number of more comprehensive treatments—to mention only one, Adrien Dansette's recent *Mai 1968.*

The main interest of this American edition is to present to a larger audience Touraine's view of the May Revolt as a "thunderbolt announcing the struggles of the future" in France and all other advanced industrial societies. Touraine considers the Revolt as a specific French expression of the instability and conflict inherent in postindustrial societies. He reverses the "decline of ideology" thesis, arguing instead that in late modernization a new form of class struggle erupts, replacing and transcending the old clash between workers and capitalists. "The stake in the struggle is no longer merely profit-making, but control of the power to make decisions, to influence, and to manipulate" (p. 24). For Touraine the May Revolt signifies a rupture within French society; it was a rebellion not by marginal elements (ethnic minorities or the oppressed and demoralized poor) but by those at the very heart of the productive process—the students being groomed for positions of command in the technocratic society. The new revolutionaries refuse to accept the dehumanizing consequences of technical civilization, though Touraine argues that they do not reject modern society as such. Their goal is to enable individuals to control their own destinies; hence the characterization of the May Movement as "utopian communism."

Most observers of the May Revolt distinguish between a student phase and the general strike by millions of workers, and conclude that the students played the role of "detonator." Touraine flatly rejects this thesis. Both students and workers, he says, were rebelling against the same evil—control of society by a "techno-bureaucracy." Despite the participation of a variety of revolutionary organizations, he sees the May Movement as really unified. Indeed, he explains: "The profound unity of the movement was due to the fact that it was no longer fighting a ruling group defending private interests but generalized power over social and cultural life" (p. 58).

One major drawback of Touraine's argument is the ambiguity of the key concepts. We are assured at first that modern society is controlled by "generalized power," which elsewhere becomes a "techno-bureaucracy," and at still another point "large organizations." There is quite a difference between these concepts and, to boot, no evidence is presented to support any of the conflicting assertions. It must also be pointed out that Touraine's description of the structure of the May Movement simply does not square with reality. This may be of little concern to militants, who wish to change reality in order to attain political goals, but it may be annoying to social scientists and even to ordinary mortals just trying to put the pieces together. In Touraine's account the unsuspecting reader catches a glimpse of such exotic creatures as situationists, Trotskyists, Maoists, and anarchists. But aside from affirmations about their "profound unity," Touraine never explains who they are, how they viewed modernization, and how the individual achieves self-government in the authoritarian systems admired by at least some among them. In actuality the May Movement was riven by conflict over every major issue of political and social life, including the larger goals of economic development.

As if to reply to criticism ahead of time, Touraine states that any departure from his analysis (for example, to view the May Revolt as a crisis of French society or an ensemble of crises of modernization and change) would have to be "inspired by conservatism." To consider the May Movement in any sense as resistance to changes imposed by the logic of modernization, he continues, would serve the interests of the "rising ruling class" (p. 77)—presumably, the technocrats or "generalized power." Let us assume for the sake of argument that conservatism is inherently evil. Is it being conservative to point out that some of the active participants in the May Revolt repudiated modern life, questioned science, rationality, and technology, and glorified instead the unity of primitive societies, the mysterious, the accidental, the emotional, and the surreal? Surely it is not wicked to call attention to an intriguing phenomenon that somehow must be explained. Suppose we observe that many self-styled libertarians in the May Movement were actually quite authoritarian, in spite of their slogan, "*il est interdit d'interdire*." One student leader, for example, singled out Raymond Aron as a bourgeois apologist who would not be permitted to teach in the future. If we take note of such expressions of intolerance, do we thereby become malicious conservatives? Touraine's logic may lead to the absurd conclusion that opposition to modernization is progress, suppression of freedom of thought is liberation, and political ideology is political analysis. On the last page of his book Touraine calls for theoretical work that will "develop a social movement and foster its conflict with the powers that rule society"; and in the next paragraph says that his goal is to grasp the meaning of what happened. He not only fails to reconcile these two goals; apparently he is unaware even that there may be a contradiction between them.

BERNARD E. BROWN
City University of New York, Brooklyn

The Anarchist Prince: A Biographical Study. By George Woodcock and Ivan Akumovic. (New York: Shocken Books, 1971. Pp. 465. $3.95.)

As Ivan Akumovic's contribution to this book is not specified, I trust I will be forgiven if below I refer only to George Woodcock, for the style is recognizably his. It is not an arresting style, not in any way comparable to Kropotkin's own in *Memoirs of a Revolutionist,* in Woodcock's own words "a classic in this literary genre," written by "an autobiographer of rare vigour and expressiveness." Though Woodcock can occasionally be succinct, as at the beginning of chapter 3, where the gradual process that led Kropotkin to anarchism is neatly summed up, the book is slow-moving and the narrative too often broken, now with minute detail, now with extensive digressions. Yet the book is very readable and at the same time scholarly. The thoroughness with which the material has been collected and selected leaves very little scope to a future biographer of Kropotkin.

No recorded event of significance in his life has been omitted, and so many contemporaries' impressions of Kropotkin are reported that in the end we seem to know about him all that there is to know. He was from all accounts a most charming and likable man, though there is no telling how much this appeal owed to his being an anarchist and how much to his being a prince. Something is missing in the picture, and that is not just a question of his having been reticent in all matters of sex, a trait he shared with Tolstoi and Russian writers as a whole. We have no key to the mainsprings of his devotion to the anarchist ideal; his faith in anarchism remains as much of a mystery as his hatred of the Germans which, rationalize it as much as he would, still betrays a visceral origin. What need was this acknowledgedly gentlehearted man satisfying with that hatred that all but ruined his reputation? If, as with some other anarchists and most politicians, Kropotkin's life and utterances had not been so geared to their possible public repercussion, an answer to this and similar questions would be possible, and our feelings for him would be much warmer. But if we found him remote and somewhat unreal in many pages of this biography, when we read of his last years in Bolshevik Russia a great sadness and admiration overcomes us.

As for Kropotkin's thought, Woodcock traces its development and gives an outline of the books and main articles in which it was expressed. Kropotkin's has been the most diffuse, though not the most profound influence on anarchist thought. Woodcock duly emphasizes its positive aspects, but hardly touches upon its real weaknesses, notably its failure to account, with any depth of understanding, for the variety and vitality of evil in human affairs.

I met Woodcock twice, soon after the war, once at Freedom Press and then at the flat of Maria Luisa Berneri, to whom this book is dedicated. Woodcock was then considered an anarchist, but he has since come to write that anarchism is dead. He may have had his reasons, justified or not, for being dissatisfied with anarchists in Britain, and his description of their movement in this book (which does no longer apply) is not flattering. He left them, and my guess is that he decided he could do a better service to the anarchist cause by working as a free-lance to make it known to the general public. Be it as it may, the series of books he has since written have contributed more than any other individual factor to attract the attention of politically conscious people to the alternative anarchism offers to the Marxist ideology.

Very aptly the book closes with a mention of the publication of a new edition in Russia of Kropotkin's "Memoirs." The introduction is by V. A. Tvardoskaia, the same who wrote about Bakunin in "Istoriciskie zapiski" [History notes] and "Voprosy istorii" [Questions of history]. As accounts of Kropotkin's thought in Russia (as in the "Ocherk istorii etiki" [A sketch of the history of ethics] by B. A. Chagina and others) continue to be summary and distorted, the best tribute now to be paid to his memory is indeed to hope that his message be made soon fully available in the country which he loved so much.

GIOVANNI BALDELLI

London

Latin American International Politics: Ambitions, Capabilities and the National Interest of Mexico, Brazil and Argentina. Edited by Carlos A. Astiz. (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1969. Pp. 343. $9.95.)

The potential reader of this volume, scanning its title, might reasonably hope at last to find comprehensive coverage about a relatively neglected subject. That such expectations remain unsatisfied is not wholly the fault of the author; in part, the disappointment springs from a scarcity of good primary material. It may be that the subject has been and to a large extent continues to be neglected because there is not enough information available with which to flesh out a full-length book.

Admittedly, "national interest" is an elusive concept, which is all the more reason why it cannot be revealed through the juxtaposition of a few official explanations or apologies for specific policy positions. The reader will look in vain for a satisfactory definition of the national interests of the three countries as well as a survey of the resources available to each of them for achieving their goals.

In spite of these drawbacks, some of the selections provide valuable insights into the internal dynamics of Latin American politics which often frustrate their ablest statesmen. "The 'Latin American Crisis' and its External Framework" by "Espartaco" falls into this category. Its author points out that three factors have inhibited the recent development of foreign policy in the whole region; lack of an integrated domestic force of sufficient strength to back up a demand for a significant change in the foreign policy of any Latin American country; lack of international integration of elites in pursuit of agreed-upon goals; and failure to develop regional alliances because of the bilateral ties of each country with the United States.

This analysis of "Espartaco" reinforces the conclusions of some other observers that the foreign policies of Latin American nations are chiefly concerned with the management of powerlessness. To a large extent their aims have been peripheral to the flow of action among the big powers of the world. For nearly a century, the main question of interest to Latin American policy makers and their publics has been the extent of shift in their alignment with the United States. The alignment has ranged from utter subservience to a certain amount of coolness toward the northern neighbor.

It is taken for granted by most of the native commentators and foreign observers whose articles are reprinted in this collection that a break with the United States would not mean an autonomous foreign policy based on a new definition of national interest but instead would constitute the prelude to an alignment with another power hostile to the United States. Alignment and national interest are assumed to be indissolubly linked. Even in the excellent historical article by E. Bradford Burns, Brazil's foreign policy in the twentieth century is shown chiefly as a conflict between the choices of submission or rebellion.

The selections that constitute policy statements by representatives of Latin American governments could have been enhanced if the editor had provided the reader with explanations of the international context in which the statements were made. Thus, the footnote on page 89 states simply that Luis Padilla Nervo's contribution was originally published in the May-June (1961) issue of *Cuadernos Americanos*. The author should have mentioned that this was the transcript of a speech to the United Nations made, some time before its publication in journal form, by the head of the Mexican delegation during the period when the United States was trying to marshal unanimous approval of its anti-Castro policy among the nations of Latin America.

With books like this the question always arises whether a collection of articles and speeches reprinted from other sources and tied together by "introductory essays" (which in this case consist mainly of paraphrases of the material that follows) can satisfactorily substitute for a series of comprehensive essays commissioned especially, and worked out jointly within a conceptual framework agreed upon in advance by all participants. While we are waiting for such a book to appear, the present one may prove a convenient reference for readers who do not have ready access to the original material.

EVELYN P. STEVENS

Shaker Heights, Ohio

Gunboat Diplomacy: Political Applications of Limited Naval Force. By James Cable. (New York: Praeger, 1970. Pp. 251. $14.00.)

Henry Kissinger—self professed sex symbol, "megalomaniac" and secret statesman—is also supposed to have said that in his White House tenure he has had to live off the intellectual capital he acquired before coming into office. George Ball—noted "devil's advocate" in another administration—has observed since leaving office that we are still indebted to the seminal works on military strategy and arms control written in the late 1950s and early 1960s for guidance, food for thought, and understanding of national security policy. No new theories since prisoner's dilemma.

James Cable's book opens the door a crack to what national security policy might look like without the burdens of intellectual debts acquired ten or fifteen years ago—debts acquired, one might add, during the Cold War. Even to consider gunboat diplomacy for book-length treatment is rather daring. When limited war theory was fashionable, gunboat diplomacy was considered a puny use of force. Now, however, in the 1970s, when we will not have the North Vietnamese "to kick around any more," Cable argues that gunboat diplomacy may become more respectable.

While Cable does not dwell on the theory or history of limited war, he obviously is keenly aware of it. Limited war has been a fulsome use of military power, applied in a peculiarly political way. Military operations were constrained by political leaders who were seeking to make a point rather than simply to win battles or overrun territory. These were leaders who desired to reach an accord with "the other side," but who relied on acts of war or the absence of such acts, e.g., bombing or bombing pauses, to move opposing leaders toward a settlement. "The other side" suffered the same malaise, being masters of political warfare, and took advantage of the bombing raids and bombing pauses to improve their political and military position. Limited wars have tended to be limited only in the sense that sanctuaries are honored, no nuclear weapons are used, and third parties are not attacked. Even these rules are most difficult to follow in practice when the fog and confusion of war prevail.

The important thesis of Cable's book is that war and diplomacy ought not to be confused. He clearly labels limited war as warfare and gunboat diplomacy as diplomacy. Gunboat diplomacy compares with a policeman's stick or his ability to "shoulder through." He has a very British view, assuming as he does that a truncheon will do the trick. Police in America have a more controversial image. Nevertheless, he insists with considerable effect and rich historical detail that limited naval force can be usefully applied short of war. And he is, after all, a senior official in the British Diplomatic Service who with aplomb and disdain keeps the Admiralty at safe distance: "Coercive diplomacy is thus an alternative to war and, if it leads to war, we must not only hold that it has failed. We may even doubt whether it ever deserved the name" (p. 20). Cable defines gunboat diplomacy as

> the use or threat of limited naval force, *otherwise than as an act of war,* in order to secure advantage, or to avert loss, either in the furtherance of an international dispute or else against foreign nationals within the territory or jurisdiction of their own state (p. 21, my emphasis).

The distinction he makes between war and diplomacy requires him to spend some effort in his first chapter untangling gunboat diplomacy from warfare, which is not easy because of the habits of mind we have acquired in the cold war: "Peace and war, however, have become regrettably hard to distinguish" (p. 18). He settles upon a distinction of motives to show the difference. In peacetime, force is used "to gain something for the initiating state." In war, force will be used to "injure the foreigners or their state" (p. 19). Any distinction will be left with problems, but, argues Cable, to ask the purpose of an act of force, as seen by the assailant and the victim, is more useful than mechanically "to count the forces involved, the shots fired, or the casualties sustained" and to set an arbitrary line above which the forces, shots, or casualties are warlike and below which they are diplomatic.

The value of Cable's attempt to distinguish motives in gunboat diplomacy and in war lies in his assumption that "governments no less than reasonable men, must be presumed to intend the predictable consequences of their acts . . ." (p. 20). If only this assumption were true! Recent wars have tended to fall into campaigns of attrition in which both sides suffer enormous losses and the motive to "injure the foreigners or their state" is lost. Similarly, recent diplomacy has been intent on negotiation for the sake of negotiation, with an emphasis on process rather than on results. But if Cable's assumption were true, if it could be construed as an ethic for reasonable men rather than as a flat assumption, he would be able to lead us all into acquiring new intellectual capital, distinguishing between the very different purposes of war and diplomacy, and enjoying a new sense of direction in our national security policy. He might even help us to avoid taking actions whose consequences are either unpredictable or whose predictable consequences are undesirable.

Cable strips the theory of limited war of any intellectual appeal it still might have. Limited war, considered an alternative to total war, understandably attracted adherents. Cable offers gunboat diplomacy as an alternative to war that should attract many adherents, more soberly and skeptically, to be sure. Gunboat diplomacy seems to have attracted Henry Kissinger. Coercive diplomacy used to be a synonym for limited war, a synonymity Cable now denies. The categories he devises to discuss a typology of gunboat diplomacy are strikingly reminiscent of the categories of limited war theory: definitive force, the *fait accompli* which places responsibility for escalation squarely on the shoulders of the victim; purposive force which shares with compellence the application of force against an obstinate leadership; catalytic force, which de-escalates the situation, or at least prevents it from getting worse; and expressive force, the demonstrative act to impress a home or foreign audience.

Gunboat Diplomacy places all the old categories in a fresh context. The book will be helpful to the student of history because of Cable's case studies of gunboat diplomacy. Critics of the defense budget will find grist for their mills in his criticisms of large expensive general purpose force navies designed to fight limited wars. Naval buffs, however, might relish his suggestion of a new gunboat for what purpose you need not guess—gunboat diplomacy. But most strikingly, the book represents Cable's attempt to put the genie of limited war back into the bottle. Some readers will conclude that he fails. Other readers who find no room for mixing peace and force, because permanent peace is more attractive, will not be happy either. But it is clear, in any case, that Cable has tried to show the way toward peace in the context of the current international system.

JACK M. SCHICK

Washington Center of
Foreign Policy Research

When Battle Rages, How Can Law Protect? Working Paper and Proceedings of the Fourteenth Hammarskjöld Forum. Edited by John Carey. Published for the Association of the Bar of the City of New York. (New York: Oceana Publications, 1971. Pp. 115. $7.50.)

The title of Professor Levie's working paper on "Some Major Inadequacies in the Existing Law relating to the Protection of Individuals during Armed Conflict" describes more accurately than that of the book the object of this symposium.

Each of the four propositions of the working paper calls for examination. The *first* is the assertion of the nonexistence of and need for a method for the automatic determination that a particular inter-State relation requires the application of the law of armed conflict. Granted. Yet, how is this to be achieved in a world system of power politics in disguise which leaves it to every subject of international law to decide for itself whether an armed conflict is of an international or internal character? If this international system is to be changed so as to make this reform possible, how is this change to be brought about?

The *second* proposition is the assertion of the nonexistence of and need for a method which will ensure the presence in the territory of each State party to an armed conflict of a Protecting Power or an international body with adequate authority to police compliance with that law. Granted again. Yet, how is it possible for world society, organized as it now is and is likely to be in the foreseeable future, to go beyond the optional patterns provided in the relevant Geneva

Conventions? It would have been interesting to hear from the participants in the forum what they consider to be the likelihood of any of the world's leading powers concurring in such a proposal.

The *third* proposition is the assertion of the nonexistence of and need for a total prohibition of the use of chemical and biological weapons in armed conflicts. It is probably the better view (although not shared by the U.S. defense establishment) that these weapons are illegal under international customary law. This aspect of the matter might have received closer attention in the forum proceedings. The contributors show similar discretion on the issue of the legality of nuclear weapons under the customary laws of war, and at this point, the reforming zeal of the participants appears to flag. Yet, with the *fourth* proposition it soars again, culminating in a statement on the absence of and need for a complete code governing the use of air power in armed conflict, with emphasis on the "outright prohibition of any type of bombing which has as its basic target the civilian population" (p. 14). Splendid. Yet, in an era in which air warfare increasingly tends to merge into amorphous rocket warfare, even in wars between middle powers, this proposition may be of but passing interest.

Appropriately, the editor's foreword and the chairman's introductory remarks both emphasize that this forum was held on the second anniversary of the My Lai massacre. It would have been instructive to learn from at least one of the participants whether any of the reforms of the law of armed conflict suggested in the working paper or the discussion would have assisted in preventing this and other massacres that were committed by both sides in the Vietnamese War or, at least, would have led to commensurate retribution.

What is wholly admirable is the selected bibliography, the work of Mr. A. P. Grech, the Librarian of the City of New York Bar Association.

G. Schwarzenberger
University College, London

The Polish Question in the Russian State Duma. By Edward Chmielewski. (University of Tennessee Press, 1970. Pp. 187. $7.50.)

Professor Chmielewski has given us an interesting glimpse into a little-studied aspect of Russian history in the years before the first World War—parliamentary politics. What does it reveal about the nature of what has variously been called the semi- quasi-, or pseudoconstitutional system of late imperial Russia and its chances for solving the problems of a multinational state?

We learn that Great-Russian nationalism was not the exclusive property of the government or simply a device it used to divide and rule; that national suspicions and hostilities could afflict and divide even critics of the regime; that the initiative for protecting or furthering the interests of Great Russians in the border or non-Russian areas of the Empire could come from public as well as from official sources; and that the Emperor's chief minister, although responsible only to his master, was not indifferent to the support political parties (the Nationalists in Stolypin's case) could give him in the Duma, in the country, and at court, and that he therefore cultivated them.

Yet this is only part of the picture. For what this book also shows, although not as emphatically as it might have done, is the unrepresentative character of Russia's representative institutions. This does not mean that the men who sat and voted in the third and fourth Dumas represented no one, simply because they were elected on the basis of a most restricted and complicated electoral law which was specifically designed to yield an assembly that was Great Russian in spirit. But in a politics so rarefied as that conducted in the Russian Duma after 1907 one wonders inevitably just what forces, groups, or interests the parties and their deputies represented. Without some answer to that question, it is difficult to know how the "strong nationalist current that affected a broad spectrum of opinion in Russia" (p. 171) was distributed and how powerful it was.

In any case, the author makes clear that given an inflexible government and a largely conservative and chauvinist legislature, prospects for meeting even the modest demands of the Poles were poor. The constitutional Empire under an autocratic Tsar was incapable of solving its nationalities problem. Nor did it dare to mobilize the nationalism of the masses on its behalf. This study illustrates Tsarism's uncertainty about its own character and future and the immobilizing effect of that uncertainty. Within the limits the author has set for himself, and those set for him by his materials, he has been eminently successful.

Hans Rogger
University of California, Los Angeles

Yalta. By Diane Shaver Clemens. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970. Pp. 356. $8.50.)

Twenty-seven years have now passed since the Yalta Conference, and seventeen since the United States published the basic documents which made possible the first scholarly analyses of it. In the intervening years, a vast quantity of American, British, and, to a lesser extent, Soviet documentation on the diplomacy of World War II has become available. There has also developed, during the last ten years, a large body of revisionist work on the origins of the Cold War—work which has challenged, at times convincingly, always provocatively, previously held assumptions about the onset of that conflict. The time is right, therefore, for a reassessment of Yalta, both from the standpoint of newly opened records, and from the perspective afforded by revisionist scholarship.

Professor Diane Shaver Clemens of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology has attempted such a reassessment. Her book seeks to do two things: first, "to compare and contrast the positions, proposals, agreements, disagreements, and changes of positions of the leading diplomats at the Conference"; second, "to view the decisions of Yalta against the larger framework of military-strategic developments during the war, the struggle for power in eastern Europe, and the long-range perspectives of Soviet, British, and American policy-makers" (p. vii). Two other features of the book deserve mention: It employs Soviet diplomatic records and memoir material, and it attempts to view the conference as a negotiating experience by utilizing the techniques of decision-making analysis.

As a retelling of what transpired at Yalta between February 4 and 11, 1945, the book is competent enough, though it adds little to what we already know. The Soviet documents which Professor Clemens cites are more interesting for their omissions than for any new information. Clemens's efforts to analyze and (on page 286) to diagram decision making at Yalta are labored and obscure. Her conclusion that the Soviet Union assumed a cooperative attitude at the conference and actually made more concessions than did the Americans or the British is not new. It was, as she acknowledges, recognized by many observers at the time, and provides the main line of argument of at least two of the earliest accounts of the conference, those of Robert E. Sherwood and Edward R. Stettinius, Jr. In sum, Clemens has told us little about what happened at Yalta which we could not have learned from reading the Department of State's Yalta documents, published in 1955, or the analysis of them which John L. Snell edited, *The Meaning of Yalta* (1956).

Professor Clemens's second objective is more worthwhile: to relate Yalta to the larger context of World War II politics, strategy, and diplomacy. Summitry does not take place in a vacuum. We cannot fully understand the behavior of negotiators at the conference table unless we are aware of the broad range of pressures, both domestic and international, to which each policy maker is subject. Arno J. Mayer's work on the Versailles Peace Conference of 1919 shows what can be done; unfortunately Clemens's book does not come up to his standard. Admittedly Clemens, dealing with a more recent topic, had fewer sources to work with than did Mayer. But in her zeal to utilize relatively thin and unrevealing Soviet material, she neglected important and easily accessible American documents which would have shed much light on constraints that limited the options of Roosevelt and his advisers.

Clemens cites none of the annual volumes in the Department of State's *Foreign Relations* series; instead she relies exclusively on the special conference volumes which, though they document the meetings at Teheran, Yalta, and Potsdam, do not provide a complete picture of policy-formulation on such issues as Germany, Eastern Europe, France, or the United Nations. Nor did she consult unpublished Department of State records, which were open through 1945 when she was writing. The important collections at the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library would have been useful to her, as would the papers of such influential advisers as Henry L. Stimson, William D. Leahy, Joseph C. Grew, Cordell Hull, and Bernard Baruch. The voluminous wartime diaries of Henry Morgenthau, Jr., may not have been opened for research in time for the author to see them, but John Morton Blum's published excerpts from them have been available since 1967 and would have clarified considerably her discussion of the Morgenthau Plan. The most surprising research gap is Clemens's failure to use public opinion polls; her attempt to survey American opinion on the Polish question by examining articles appearing on the front page of the *New York Times* (page 181) is, at best, unsophisticated.

Clemens accepts the conventional view that the Cold War arose out of conflicts over implementing the Yalta accords, but, unlike conventional historians, she blames the United States, not the Russians, for abandoning these agreements (pp. 269–270). Her evidence for this point of view is thin. It rests chiefly on Gar Alperovitz's claim that Truman, upon becoming President, immediately reversed Roosevelt's policy of cooperation with the Russians, a view now repudiated by more sophisticated revisionists like Gabriel Kolko (whose interpretations Clemens generally follows on other issues). A more convincing line of argument might be that neither the Russians nor the

Americans intended to violate the Yalta agreements, but that these accords were so vague that each side perceived their meaning differently. Given the importance of this issue, it is regrettable that the author devoted only twenty out of almost three hundred pages to post-Yalta developments.

Diane Clemens deserves credit for trying to break away from the narrow reliance on American sources which characterizes the work of so many students of World War II diplomacy (this reviewer not excepted). But a true multiarchival account requires depth as well as breadth; in *Yalta* the former has been unnecessarily sacrificed.

JOHN LEWIS GADDIS

Ohio University

Conflict in Laos: The Politics of Neutralization. By Arthur J. Dommen. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1971. Pp. 454. $12.50.)

Arthur J. Dommen has substantially enlarged his political study of the agonized kingdom of Laos in this second edition of *Conflict in Laos.* The first edition was published in 1964, and it effectively terminated with the events subsequent to the "settlements" of 1961–62 that were to neutralize the country among its many tormentors, great and small. Its central theme was that the United States could—given greater understanding, wisdom and organizational sophistication—apply its power (force and influence) to create conditions for an independent and neutral Lao state. Such a state would only be possible given management, principally by the U.S., of dynamic external influences, specifically by detaching the Pathet Lao faction from North Vietnam. The first edition quite properly became a standard text on Laos.

Seven years later, Mr. Dommen, like many of us who observe the Southeast Asian political landscape, has learned many new things. These lessons have been exposed in added chapters on "Unfulfilled Expectations," "The Secret War," "Vietnam, Laos and the Hegemony of Indochina," and a new concluding chapter, "The Contest of Wills." Out of these materials he has developed a new theme which is clearly stated in the opening and closing paragraphs of the last chapter:

> Since the departure of the French, there have been two radically different perceptions of the situation in Laos: North Vietnam and the United States started from different premises and have interpreted events in a different manner. Thus, when they exchanged accusations, it was as if they were talking about two different worlds, for there was total misunderstanding between them . . . (p. 380).
>
> The neutralization of Laos, and possibly of the other countries of Indochina, has become part of a vast international diplomatic operation whose beginnings can still be perceived only dimly in 1970. Peace in Indochina, like the war, is indivisible (p. 406).

In short the commitment of Vietnam (North) in Laos derives from and is vitalized by their view of national interest and strategic security, rather than fervor for revolutionary uplift; its profound roots can be discovered in the distant as well as the recent past; and its future is in pawn to the fate of South Vietnam. Dommen develops this theme with the detailed and documented evidence that skillful and responsible journalistic investigation can produce.

The one major flaw in Dommen's development of this political tragedy is his neglect of the overarching irony of the position of the United States. In this era of proxy wars and the presumed entrapment of client states by great power imperialism, the United States finds itself in Laos the proxy for Thailand. If, indeed, the issue is Vietnamese hegemony over Laos or not, Thailand is the state whose chestnuts are in the fire. Without denigrating either the contributions of the Thai, nor the allusions by Dommen to Thai participation, such a curiosity of great power politics deserves more detailed investigation. Nevertheless, the second edition of *Conflict in Laos* is rich in information and understanding and should replace the earlier edition as the standard text.

DAVID A. WILSON

University of California, Los Angeles

The British Press and Germany, 1936–1939. By F. R. Gannon. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971. Pp. 314. $10.50.)

In this readable and absorbing book, Franklin Reid Gannon has sought to build a case for reversing the conventional interpretation of appeasement. His effort, however, is ultimately unsuccessful. Substantively, Gannon has placed more weight upon the structure of his evidence than it can sustain; and, methodologically, the weaknesses of the book reflect the limits of the author's highly traditional analysis.

The study deals with British attitudes toward Germany in the interwar years. The author has examined these attitudes primarily by reading ten leading British newspapers for every day between January 1936 and September 1939. Crisis by crisis, he chronicles the viewpoints expressed by the major papers during the events leading to the outbreak of World War II. From this examination of European events and newspaper reactions, Gannon derives a controversial thesis:

> It is unfortunate that the ideological context in which the British newspapers approached each other in the 1930's made it difficult to perceive the essential similarity of their attitudes to Hitler's Germany. The fact is that despite their disagreements on [other] questions . . . , every British newspaper with the idiosyncratic exceptions of the *Daily Mail* and *Daily Express* shared an overwhelming similarity of view about Germany (pp. 300–301).

The first major difficulty with Gannon's thesis lies in his failure to operationalize explicitly the concept of appeasement. He declares that there was no alternative between urging preventive war and adopting Neville Chamberlain's orientation of yielding to successive Nazi demands in the interests of peace. But the assertion that the press followed the single policy of appeasement is actually based only on the fact that none urged an immediate preventive war against Nazi Germany. Reduced to this level, the proposition is not entirely edifying, and it does not provide a sufficient basis to sustain the remainder of the author's argument. Newspaper attitudes toward Germany were similar only in a very limited sense, and Gannon's juxtaposition of the choices of appeasement or war is far too simple. Thus we learn that during March, 1938, the *Daily Herald* urged that Britain provide a guarantee to Czechoslovakia, and the *News Chronicle* advocated that Britain pledge to fight for the Czechs (pp. 158–9). Subsequently, as the Czech crisis worsened, the *Daily Telegraph* argued that a show of determination by Britain, France, and Russia would force Hitler to stay his hand (p. 191). The *News Chronicle* adopted a similar position and opposed any agreement by Britain to satisfy German claims against Czechoslovakia. Later the paper angrily argued that the alternatives had not been war or the Munich agreement, but rather that common action would have saved Czechoslovakia and prevented war (pp. 206–13). The policies of several papers therefore differed sharply from the appeasement approach of the British Government and of papers such as the *Daily Mail, Daily Express, Observer,* and *The Times.* In other words, Gannon has overlooked the position which, in contemporary terms, we would call deterrence.

Gannon's underlying purpose is to refute what he terms the "orthodox" version of appeasement, but he never presents a systematic statement of the prevailing interpretation. Hence, apart from the radical journalist, Claude Cockburn, he does not identify the proponents of this view. Gannon is so intent on debunking Cockburn's "fiction" of the Cliveden set that he neglects to deal with specifics. And even while attacking Cockburn, he refers to the very close relations between Geoffrey Dawson (editor of *The Times*) and foreign policy makers (pp. 59, 130–35); he also quotes Dawson's private correspondence of May, 1937, in which Dawson mentioned how he had done his "utmost, night after night, to keep out of the paper anything that might hurt their [German] susceptibilities," and in which Dawson also referred to his own practice of "dropping in little things which are intended to soothe them" (pp. 114–15). There is, in addition, Dawson's *Times* editorial of September 7, 1938 which grievously undercut the Foreign Office's official position by raising the possibility that Czechoslovakia cede the Sudetenland to Germany. Cannon even acknowledges the existence of speculation that Halifax and Chamberlain supported this position against that of the Foreign Office. Finally, Gannon quotes a January, 1939 opinion poll which revealed that in the event of a Nazi-Soviet war, 59 per cent of the British public preferred a Russian victory, 10 per cent opted for a German one, and 31 per cent held no opinion. Of those answering the poll, pro-German sentiments were most pronounced among Government supporters, the wealthy, and the old (p. 27). Thus, even if the interpretation of appeasement as a policy emanating from a closed circle of government leaders, *The Times*, Cliveden, and the British upper classes were inaccurate or simplistic, this would hardly be self-evident from the case Gannon presents.

These limitations exemplify the book's more general problem of evidence and proof. By concentrating upon the newspapers, the author tends to assume the obviousness of the issues and events upon which the study touches, and he omits any detailed sequence of the key events of this period. Thus, it is difficult to appreciate fully the important differences of nuance and interpretation held by the papers during the Czech crisis. The Versailles Treaty is branded an unmitigated evil, but its wrongs are not systematically detailed, and legitimate German grievances are not clearly differentiated from excessive demands. Gannon also calls attention to the paradox that papers most sympathetic to Germany were strongest in urging British rearmament. Yet there is no hint of discrete issues or programs, nor of spending levels, and we get no evidence on the specific defense questions about which the press may have differed.

These problems bring us back to the question of methodology, for this is the kind of book that would have benefited from a more systematic approach. A self-conscious specification of indicators and variables, a more systematic treatment of events and policies, and the use of techniques such as content analysis could have provided substantial benefits in the explanation of Britain's interwar attitudes and policies.

In sum, because of substantive and methodological limitations, Gannon's detailed study of the British press does not meaningfully support the controversial thesis he asserts. Nonetheless, the author has made a useful contribution by compiling a wealth of information about the attitudes and policies of the British press in a period of considerable political and historical interest.

ROBERT J. LIEBER
University of California, Davis

Foreign Trade in the Economic Development of Small Nations: The Case of Ecuador. By Charles Gibson. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1971. Pp. xxii, 428. $17.50.)

This is a book in the Praeger Special Studies series; that is, it is a monograph on a specialized question in international or development economics, printed by an inexpensive photographic process and retailing at a very high price. The book is a revision of a doctoral dissertation but is only moderately technical; I only had to skip about a half-dozen pages of formulas. The book has a thesis, which is in essence that Ecuador's failure to derive maximum economic advantage for growth purposes from its foreign trade is due to internal problems—economic and otherwise—and not to external constraints growing out of the structure of international trade and world capitalism, as might be argued by supporters of the Prebisch thesis.

Dr. Gibson builds a strong case and his catalogue of the deficiencies of the Ecuadorean economy, polity, and policy structure is long and dispiriting. A few of the major deficiencies in the economy are the lack of quality control and standardization in the production of goods that on the basis of price alone could compete successfully in international trade; the complete inadequacy of the transportation and communications system, which means that valuable resources go unexploited for lack of access roads; the absence of storage facilities for agricultural products, which leads to considerable spoilage and wide price fluctuations; and the irrational distribution of the little credit that is available. Government bears a heavy share of the responsibility for the failure of the economy to grow. Government finances are totally chaotic—some departments receive only a fraction of the amount budgeted for them, while many independent agencies receive more money than they can use because a stipulated percentage of public revenue is earmarked for them by law. It should be noted, however, that under the military *junta* of 1963–66, the tax system was simplified and partially rationalized, and an income tax is now on the books that, although only sporadically enforced, does raise an increasing amount of revenue. But overall, the thrust of government policy quite clearly hampers economic growth, in its fiscal and price control policies and especially in two areas on which Gibson places special emphasis: the fostering of import-substituting industries by protectionist measures, and the complete neglect of the agricultural sector.

The book's value, however, lies less in any general theoretical significance of the Ecuadorean case than in the wealth of Ecuadorean data it provides. To be sure, some of the figures are now fifteen years old, and the most recent ones date from 1968, but the book contains a prodigious quantity of material not readily available elsewhere.

It should be added that where Dr. Gibson makes comments in passing on Ecuadorean society and politics they are likely to be naive and tendentious. One shudders at conclusions such as "Continued irresponsible behavior of legislative, executive, or judicial branches must be punished at the polls or at the very last result [sic] by revolution" (p. 270). How does one punish "irresponsible behavior" of the judicial branch at the polls if judges are not elected? Is it irresponsible of the legislature to earmark a percentage of public funds for a specific agency if otherwise the agency is unlikely to receive the funds budgeted for it? And why should one think that yet another revolution (revolutions occur about as frequently in Ecuador as elections do, anyway) would help the situation?

There are also some errors of fact on non-economic points. Thus there is evidence (for example, in Whitten's study of the town of San Lorenzo) that in fact Negroes are accorded higher social prestige than Indians, although Dr. Gibson ranks them together (p. 39).

As it happens, the Ecuadorean economy stands today on the brink of a profound transformation. Petroleum in large quantities has been discovered, and predictions have been made that within a few years Ecuador will be an oil producer perhaps on the scale of Venezuela. Typically, oil wealth flows to a restricted sector of society but creates inflationary pressures that mean a deterioration in the standard of living for those not receiving income from oil—a potential disaster for the Ecuadorean masses, whose caloric intake averages less than the minimum "subsistence" standards established by international organizations. In this sort of situation it is imperative that government play a key role as the intermediary through which revenues from oil taxes can be channeled to increase agricultural production, to provide productive employment in industry, to build an infrastructure on which the economy can grow, and to provide levels of social welfare that can mitigate the effects of the higher prices and more unequal income distribution that the petroleum boom will bring. As this book makes clear, it is, to say the least, an open question how effectively an Ecuadorean government can organize itself to do any of these things.

MARTIN C. NEEDLER
University of New Mexico

America and Russia in a Changing World, A Half Century of Personal Observation. By W. Averell Harriman. (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, 1971. Pp. xix, 218. $5.95.)

America and Russia in a Changing World is an expansion of the Blaustein lectures which W. Averell Harriman delivered at Lehigh University. Harriman's association with Russia dates back to his work there in 1926 in connection with a manganese concession. Since then his many contacts with the Soviet Union have made him one of the best informed and most closely associated observers of American-Soviet relations. He is a critic of Russia and communism, but his writings avoid the moralizing self-righteousness of other diplomats. A content analysis of his speeches would undoubtedly differ considerably from the results of Holsti's study of Dulles. At the same time his analysis of recent American history would be displeasing to the revisionists. The burden for the Cold War falls more heavily on the Russians than the Americans. Harriman discusses the great American military force which we "dissipated" after World War II, while the Russians strengthened their forces. The American monopoly of the greatest force of all is dismissed because Stalin was giving priority to the development of Russia's own nuclear weapons. Harriman disparages revisionist historians whom he claims "create myths about what happened and what our objectives were" (p. 70). Harriman does praise "those thoughtful analysists who, with the advantage of hindsight, point out more clearly the significance of events and perhaps mistakes than was possible at the time" (p. 70).

Harriman had personal dealings with Trotsky, Stalin, Molotov, Khrushchev, and Kosygin, among others, and is an astute judge of both their strengths and weaknesses. He expresses the firm belief that Khrushchev was ousted primarily because of his handling of domestic affairs and cautions against the American inclination to interpret Russian internal policies in terms of foreign policy events.

Harriman views John F. Kennedy as a leader committed to avoiding war and as equaled only by Roosevelt among recent presidents in his worldwide image as a man of peace and hope. Harriman argues that Kennedy recovered from the Bay of Pigs blunder and became a constructive and imaginative foreign policy decision maker. He points to the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and Kennedy's handling of the Cuban Missile Crisis as examples of statesmanship at its best. He is convinced that Kennedy would not have become as heavily committed in Vietnam as we now are because even in the early '60s, Kennedy believed we had already become over involved. According to Harriman, Kennedy never sought military solutions in Asia and had early in his administration made it clear to Harriman in connection with Laos that a military involvement was not to be considered and that a compromise solution with a neutral Laos should be the objective. The Harriman estimate of Kennedy sharply contrasts with two recent evaluations of Kennedy's role in cold-war foreign policy (*Cold War and Counter-Revolution: The Foreign Policy of John F. Kennedy* by Richard J. Walton, and *The Kennedy Doctrine* by Louise FitzSimons). These two authors view Kennedy as an anti-communist imperialistic crusader who almost blundered the United States into a nuclear holocaust. They would therefore regard Harriman as another apologist of the Kennedy inner circle, adding his contribution to the Kennedy myth. It is undoubtedly true that Harriman's estimate of Kennedy must be tempered by his own personal involvement, party loyalty, and personal friendship, along with the tragic death of the much younger man, but Harriman casts serious doubt on any conclusion which holds Kennedy responsible for Vietnam, and which does not allow for the possibility that Kennedy as President might have sought a nonescalating solution to the Vietnam dilemma.

Harriman speaks with understandable frustration about the Paris meetings with Hanoi in which five months of patient, discouraging bargaining was about to bring the North Vietnamese to the negotiating tables when Thieu decided at the very last minute to sabotage the meetings. Thieu was "counseled" (Harriman does not tell us by whom) that negotiations would aid Humphrey and that the election of Nixon would better serve his interest. Harriman believes that in the very close 1968 elections the beginning of actual negotiations might have made the difference, and that with Humphrey as President we would now be out of Vietnam.

NAOMI B. LYNN

Kansas State University

Red Star Over Bethlehem: Russia Drives for the Middle East. By Ira Hirschmann. (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1971. Pp. 192. $5.95.)

One would expect good things from the personal observations of a man who has run diplomatic errands for FDR and who has circulated among government and UN personnel. Ira Hirschmann's comments, however, are immensely disappointing.

There are perhaps three major themes running through the nineteen chapters of this little book. The first is that the Soviet Union is the bête noire of the Middle Eastern conflict, having prime responsibility for the 1967 war (p. 39), the Libyan coup (p. 153), and the Jordanian civil war (p. 141), among others, and having become "increasingly dominant" (p. 42) to the point of taking under "control the populations of more than 80,000,000 Arabs in Egypt, Sudan, Algeria, Syria, Libya, Iraq, and Yemen."

The second theme is that the United States has allowed this to happen through vacillation rather than standing firm (p. 181). Where allegedly the U.S. has resisted Russian moves, as in Lebanon in 1958, Cuba in 1962, and Jordan in 1970, the Russians have backed down. Where the U.S. has vacillated, as during the 1956 Suez crisis, the Russians have gained. Hirschmann suggests the U.S. should sail into the Black Sea and negotiate the agreement that if we got out of the Black Sea the Russians would get out of the Mediterranean (pp. 154–155).

The third theme is that "It is this tiny nation [of Israel] which is blocking their [Russian] take-over of Suez and preventing further consolidation of Russia's hold on the Middle East" (p. 27). The Arab states are presumably being unwittingly used for Russian goals, while only the Israelis see the true nature of the problem.

It hardly needs stating that there are difficulties with these themes. Walter Laqueur among others has noted the meager results the Soviets have had in achieving their objectives in the Arab world. John Badeau has noted the dangers to American interests from fully supporting the entire spectrum of Israeli policies. And as a high official of the Nixion Administration remarked recently in a private conversation with me, perhaps the most troubling problem for the U.S. is not the use of the Arabs by the Soviets, but the possibility that the Egyptian army might decide to launch a strike across the Suez, figuring the Soviets would have to follow suit or lose their investments in Egypt.

Red Star Over Bethlehem is perhaps useful as an example of a certain Zionist viewpoint that tends to equate U.S. support for Israel with support for U.S. national interests (as at page 178). It is also an example of the viewpoint that the Soviets only respond to force (as at page 188) and that all U.S.-USSR compromise is appeasement à la Munich (as in Chapter 12).

Sections of the book dealing with Soviet support for the creation of Israel and with the impact of the 1956 Israeli withdrawal from Suez on current Israeli attitudes are relatively accurate. But, unfortunately, much of the book is factually inaccurate, as at page 166, where Hirschmann asserts that all Security Council resolutions are legally binding. Much of the book presents a noncontextual analysis, as in Chapter 14, where the author notes that the *fedayeen* are subsidized indirectly by UNRWA, without noting either that the Arab host governments are responsible for "law and order" or that the phasing out of UNRWA without a general, negotiated settlement would probably not help U.S. efforts to stabilize the region. And much of the book is inconsistent: Hirschmann notes how badly Ben Gurion misunderstood Nasser's popularity in 1956 (p. 24), then later states that the Israelis understand the Arabs very well (p. 187).

One expects personal observations to be subjective. But when Nasser's eyes are said to be "fanatical" (p. 21) and when Kennett Love, formerly of the *New York Times*, is said to be a dupe of Arab propaganda, we are dealing with polemics. Hirschmann's basic point—that the U.S. should more fully align itself with Israel—will need more support than offered in this book to be persuasive for most students of Middle Eastern politics.

DAVID P. FORSYTHE
Georgia State University

Australia and the Colonial Question at the United Nations. By W. J. Hudson. (Honolulu: East-West Center Press, 1970. Pp. 214. $8.00.)

In the wake of colonialism's dismantling and America's gradual disengagement from Southeast Asia, Australia's foreign policy and role in the region must change in terms of Australian initiatives and in relation to the evolving interests and perspectives of other nations in the region. This study is timely, therefore, because it traces Australia's slow yet perceptible growth toward diplomatic maturity with respect to colonialism, an issue of tremendous importance to its neighbors, as reflected in twenty-five years of debate in the United Nations. Although limited as a case study of Australian foreign policy, the book raises questions about the hegemonial roles of small states and the salience of the colonial question for states that have been neither objects of colonial domination nor managers of large empires.

Contrary to the facile assumption that Australia's foreign policy can be adequately explained by the historic identification of Australian security with the health of the British Empire or an American police presence in Asia, Hudson's analysis suggests that Australia has been equally concerned to maintain its own little empire in Papua and New Guinea. British decolonization, and the decolonization process in general, not only removed the British protective umbrella but also undermined the legitimacy of Australian authority in an area considered since World War I and especially since its occupation by Japan in World War II to be indispensable to Australian national security. However dubious may be the proposition that Papua-New Guinea is of strategic value to Australia, it lay behind the Australian position on colonialism from the beginning to the present. In spite of its small size and status as a noncolonial power, Australia's security interests have given rise to imperial concerns quite distinguishable from those of extra-regional Great Powers. The author is not directly concerned with the question of empire, especially in the currently emotion-laden sense of the word, but the issue emerges from his book nonetheless.

One of the central problems in determining the sources of any multiple-party system's foreign policy is ideological differences among the parties, and Britain's experience provides ample reason to assume that these differences may be important with respect to colonialism. Hudson points out that the Australian Labor Government of 1941–49 was decidedly more supportive of self-determination than London's Conservatives; Australian delegates to the San Francisco Conference were in the forefront of anticolonial members in proposing that all dependent territories be placed under international control; and the Labor Party supported the Indonesian Republic, contrary to the opinion of the Liberals that expulsion of the Dutch would leave Australia without Western friends in Southeast Asia. After the Labor Party was removed in December 1949, Australia took an increasingly intransigent legalistic position on colonial questions, a position that toward 1960 found it in the company of Spain and Portugal. Although these facts would appear to support the assumption that ideological differences between the parties were important determinants of the Australian position, Hudson argues persuasively that these differences were never so salient as the general agreement on the requirements of security, particularly with regard to Papua-New Guinea. On Indonesia, for example, the only case of Australian interference in relations between a European power and one of its colonies, Labor leaders were "anticolonial" primarily because the Dutch had been unable to prevent the Japanese occupation, hence unable to protect Australia.

The author further observes that the "broad constructionism" of Australian delegations in the first years of the UN actually was limited to innocuous resolutions. On proposals that questioned the prerogatives of administering powers, the Australians invoked legal literalness to oppose informal expansion of the UN's powers bearing on dependent territories. This tactic was the best available defense in an organization, increasingly dominated by ex-colonies, whose constitution was virtually impossible to amend. By 1960, Australia stood only to increase her isolation, and since then she has joined in condemnations of Portugal and has been more conciliatory toward proposals that would increase the UN's authority on colonial questions.

Hudson's method of analysis is to identify (in sometimes tedious detail) Australia's position on resolutions before the General Assembly or auxiliary committees and to relate this position to Australia's larger security interests and administration of Papua-New Guinea. The limitations of this approach are correctly stated toward the end of the book (p. 172): "In oversimplified hypothetical terms, what does an Assembly vote equal?" Votes can establish the extent to which Australia's position has coincided with that of its traditional allies or Asian neighbors and can indicate the degree of Australian alienation from the new nations. But even when supplemented by the accompanying arguments, votes cannot measure Asian alienation from Australia (a point the author concedes while suggesting such alienation must occur) or reflect the full range of Australian thinking on national security, political change in Asia, postcolonial Great Power peace-keeping, and other questions related to colonialism and imperialism and the changing international environment in Southeast Asia. Although on several occasions the author effectively locates the Australian position within a broader international context, his methodologically admirable restraint has an inhibiting effect on the total analysis. With Australia's contributions to the Malayan Emergency and the Vietnam War in mind, a more daring exploitation of the subject might have led the author to consider his unstated definition of "diplomatic maturity" (a concept desperately in need of an explicit, usable definition) at greater length.

William S. Turley
Southern Illinois University

The Sandino Affair. By Neill Macauley. (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, Inc., 1971. Pp. 319. $2.95, paper.)

Guerrilla activities in Southeast Asia, Cuba, and other parts of Latin America have fascinated Americans for the past decade and more. The mobility, resiliency, stamina, and the seeming underdog role of these movements, have won both admiration and fear. United States experience with guerrilla warfare is not a recent development; one such encounter came forty-five years ago during the second marine intervention in Nicaragua, when an enigmatic young Nicaraguan defied his own government and thousands of United States troops to galvanize anti-American feeling throughout the world, particularly in Latin America. This is the topic of Neill Macauley's *The Sandino Affair*, now in paperback edition.

Augusto C. Sandino, despite urgings from fellow Liberal generals, refused to accept U.S. terms for ending a revolution in Nicaragua. With a small band he retreated into the mountainous jungles of northern Nicaragua. There he organized a guerrilla force which opposed the American-trained Nicaraguan national guard, the American-supervised elections, and the American-supported government until the marines withdrew in early 1933, when Sandino made peace with the Sacasa administration. Taking advantage of favorable terrain and population, he used hit-and-run tactics to keep the movement alive even though his activities could not seriously disrupt the American promises made to end the revolution in 1927. Sandino's major impact on United States policy was his ability to survive in the face of sophisticated, but relatively ineffective, military technology, such as extensive use of air power. He was an embarrassment to American policy makers and probably contributed more than any other person or force to the growing disillusionment with intervention. The gradual retrenchment in Nicaragua was not always easy for President Hoover and his Secretary of State, Stimson, but their determination prevailed. Fortunately, they were able to withdraw with a fair amount of grace and without losing face since what they had built was not immediately torn down—even if the long-term results were not what they had envisioned.

Relying heavily on marine corps records, Macauley chronicles in detail primarily the military aspects of the affair, including sufficient coverage of the diplomacy to give a full account of what marines and their Nicaraguan national guard associates faced in their struggle with the guerrillas. The story has meaning for current events. The author notes that Fidel Castro owes much to Sandino and that Ernesto "Che" Guevara had been impressed by stories of Sandino's inspirational leadership and guerrilla tactics. Sandino demonstrated that a people's army could successfully resist the military forces of an industrial power and that while such an army might not drive out the enemy, it could undermine the enemy's will to continue the war effort. Time and patience are on the side of the guerrilla. Macauley also suggests that Latin Americans, taking the path of social revolution and influenced by the spirit of Sandino and hatred for yankee imperialism, might well provoke the United States to self-destructive reaction. It is an idea worth pondering by Americans.

Macauley's narrative occasionally bogs down in excursions from the main theme and in what at times seems too much detail. There are at least two misstatements of fact: Emiliano Chamorro was not the Nicaraguan foreign minister during negotiations for the Bryan-Chamorro Treaty (p. 24): he was the minister in Washington; and the United States did not supervise the 1924 Nicaraguan election (pp. 24, 129). One may also question the implication of an informal deal in the author's statement that there is "no evidence of a formal deal between Somoza and American officials for the murder of Sandino and the establishment of the Nicaraguan dictatorship" (p. 258). But these are minor points, and the important lessons about the United States, nationalism, social revolution, and guerrilla warfare are clear and not to be ignored.

William Kamman
North Texas State University

A Latin American Economic Community: History, Policies and Problems. By Nino Maritano. (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1970. Pp. 265. $9.95.)

In the absence of a single comprehensive account of recent efforts by the Latin American republics to achieve some measure of regional economic integration, this book clearly fills an informational gap. Its substantive scope is extensive, covering various functional and political institutions as well as the more narrowly economic ones. To my knowledge, the author's short chapter on "Agriculture and Economic Integration" is a virtually unique treatment of a topic usually left unmentioned. The book even includes a summary of Caribbean integration activities, although it concentrates on the Central American Common Market (CACM) and the Latin American Free Trade Area (LAFTA). Recent subregional efforts (the Andean Bloc and the River Plate Basin Group) are barely mentioned, however. The author makes extensive use of available documentation (but no use of aggregate data or interview material), provides translations of several of the most relevant treaty provisions, and concludes with an excellent bibliography.

Despite these not inconsiderable virtues, I must register my general disappointment with the study. To those already working intensively on Latin American integration, Maritano is likely to prove uninteresting. Those tempted to exploit these cases from afar for comparative analytical purposes will not only find him conceptually and theoretically barren, but may find him misleading in both empirical and evaluative content.

One of Maritano's prime purposes is to introduce the North American reader to Latin America's "new intellectual elite," the *técnicos*, and to the "structural economics" of the Economic Commission for Latin America, the so-called ECLA Doctrine. This, of course, has been done before—but perhaps never in such an unsubtle manner. In his attempt to counter the generally unfavorable reaction which ECLA's ideas have generated from orthodox ("monetarist") economists, the author loses all critical acumen. But more serious than his facile propensity for attributing "brillance," "originality," and "daring," and his marked unwillingness as an economist even to discuss the empirical validity or predictive accuracy of crucial assertions in the Doctrine, is his insistence on attributing to ECLA and the *técnicos* great internal coherence and unanimity of support. We are led to believe that ECLA has articulated *the* approach to and become *the* spokesman for economic development in Latin America; that it has successfully combined sociology and economics into some viable alternative to capitalism and socialism; and that it has "won the sympathy and adherence of the social scientists and students of the department of social science of most universities in the region" (p. 6). In short, the Doctrine and its agents are presented as the exclusive intellectual victors and demiurge guiding contemporary economic policy in Latin America and, more specifically, the course of its regional integration.

Space limitations preclude substantiating my counterclaim that ECLA's Doctrine has never attained such a unity of theory and, especially, practice; that it has been continuously, sharply, and rather successfully contested by intellectuals of both the right and left; that it has had relatively little impact upon national economic policies; that it never controlled or even guided the operations of the LAFTA and has had a decreasing influence on the course of the CACM; and that currently ECLA is widely perceived within the region as intellectually directionless and politically moribund. Whatever (undeniable) impetus it did give to the genesis of the integration process, this has been largely spent (except ironically for that LAFTA spin-off, the Andean Bloc, which Maritano barely mentions).

Rather, to demonstrate how ambiguously and tenuously his argument is constructed, I will take a single segment (page 5) from his discussion of this new elite. As an authority for his contention that the *técnicos* have successfully merged sociology and economics, he cites Daniel Cosío Villegas (misspelled Villegar and erroneously identified as an economist). Had Maritano read Cosío Villegas's article in the same volume, he would have found a rather scathing indictment of Latin

American economists for their lack of deep conviction, for their failure to awaken public consciousness, and for their persistent political opportunism. (Cosío Villegas, "Programmed economic development and political organization" in *Social Aspects of Economic Development in Latin America,* edited by Egbert de Vries and José Medina Echavarria [Paris: UNESCO, 1963], pp. 243–259.) Elsewhere on the same page (after erroneously identifying Caio Prado Jr. and Paulo de Castro as economists), he cites Roberto de Oliveira Campos on the need for authentically "Latin Amercan developmental models." Or, the very same Campos during his tenure as Minister of Planning in Brazil was the architect of an economic policy diametrically opposed to the prescriptions of ECLA, one of whose major tenets was a return to orthodoxy in relations with the international monetary, financial and trading "communities"! In fact, it has been the relative economic successes of this rightist "liberal" experience in Brazil and of the leftist "state socialist" model in Peru which have cast such a shadow on the centrist "bureaucratic capitalist" thrust of the ECLA Doctrine. Much as I agree with Maritano's plea for new models of Latin American reality and share his confidence that Latin American social scientists are most likely to produce them, his simplistic elimination of important policy differences and insensitivity to deep-rooted political diversity is an insult to those engaged in these pursuits.

After several competent chapters outlining the history of recent integration efforts, the author broaches the topic of political unity. To the extent that he has a theory of its relation to economic integration, it is a watered-down version of functionalism *à la* David Mitrany. Impelled by economic imperatives and propelled by the ECLA consensus, eventual political unity is impeded only by "strife, petty jealousies, rivalries, and intrigues" (p. 199). It is even suggested that it is also "the only answer to . . . traditional political chaos and economic instability" (p. 202) and would beneficently produce (1) decisional decentralization, (2) a proper atmosphere for "a massive local and foreign [*NB*] private [*NB*] investment effort" (p. 202), (3) an end to unemployment (p. 203–4) and domestic capital outflow (p. 205), (4) a better distribution of benefits from foreign trade (p. 205), and (5) a savings of "billions of dollars now squandered on fanciful military needs" (p. 206). Given these fantastically high benefits and the author's (equally fantastic) low assessment of costs, it comes as no surprise that Maritano finds the trend promising.

Fortunately, for the future of Latin American integration, those directing it have a much more realistic appreciation of the entrenched interests and attitudes to be overcome. If the area is ever to recuperate its long-lost unity, it will be despite rather than because of panegyric treatises such as this one.

PHILIPPE C. SCHMITTER
University of Chicago

New Orientations: Essays in International Relations. Edited by E. F. Penrose, Peter Lyon, and Edith Penrose. (New York: Humanities Press, 1970. Pp. viii, 136. $7.50.)

The editors of this work believe that on the one hand, "the informal and indirect pressures on individual thinkers working in institutions are probably more powerful and more subtle than ever before," and, on the other, that "the need for sustained free thought and criticism on international relations, unrestricted by official connections and institutional pressures, has never been greater" (p. vii). Accordingly, with this volume they are launching a series of books intended to offer a forum for essays on political and economic aspects of international relations which both are "critical" and "express forward looking, often 'revisionist' points of view" (p. vii), not excluding new interpretations of the past. It is less than clear to me how those connected with institutions or susceptible to their pressures are going to free themselves of their alleged shackles simply by writing for an independent publication. I also doubt whether the outlets for critical thought are as restricted as the editorial troika implies, and fear for the economic health of an enterprise which charges almost two dollars per essay. Nonetheless, it is always good to see the flag of intellectual freedom run up the mast, whatever the design of the vessel or the reasons for its construction.

"The Great Globe Itself" is the title of the book's opening essay, in which Dr. Peter Lyon looks, initially, at the evolution of the present international system. He suggests that it came to full flower as late as 1962 and is the product of four historical phases, the earliest of which began with the Renaissance. Unfortunately, he finds space to deal with only the first two of these, as he also wishes to introduce his readers to geopolitical thinking which is relevant for an understanding of American foreign policy in the twentieth century. This he does by surveying the work of Mahan, Mackinder, Spykman, and Kennan. The essay concludes with some observations on the contemporary international scene. In all this there is a great amount of learning, which commands respect. It is, however, hard to identify the essay's overall orientation.

Professor E. F. Penrose presents no such difficulty. His essay (twice as long as each of the others) is on "Britain's Place in the Changing Structure of International Relations," and consistently proclaims that, apart from the sphere of decolonization, Britain's international performance since 1945 has been faltering and irresolute. He attributes this vacillation to the carrying over into peacetime of "the wartime habit of estimating power in terms of the number of army divisions and the number of aeroplanes . . . modified by the addition of atomic bombs" (p. 28), adding that "such oversimplified approaches to international relations have naturally led to pessimistic and unconstructive conclusions regarding Britain's future role in the world" (p. 29). He illustrates this theme by referring to Britain's wartime policy on the future of atomic energy (arguing that a different Anglo-American policy might have averted the Cold War); the postwar shunning of the European movement ("Never in the history of British foreign policy were so many great opportunities lost in so short a time" [p. 44]); Britain's attitude to the new states of the Commonwealth (which would have been "rejuvenated" [p. 49] if Britain had taken armed action against Rhodesia in 1965); and her general willingness to follow "the false steps of the United States" (p. 57) regarding communism. But all is not yet lost, for if Britain realizes the error of her ways she still has time to play "a supremely important role" (p. 74). All of which is fine swashbuckling stuff, "revisionist" certainly, but too sweepingly so for some tastes.

The only noneditorial contribution to the volume comes from Jacques Decornoy, a French journalist, and here too one has no difficulty in following the thread of the argument. He writes on "Vietnam: the Real Issues," and presents a left-wing analysis: "Wishing to pass over the necessity of the political and social liberation of the Vietnamese and of a revolution in their agrarian system, the Occident confused East Germany or Czechoslovakia, where communism was imposed from outside, with Vietnam, where the revolt cannot be explained by reference to Marxist Powers" (p. 81). M. Decornoy argues that in Vietnam, communism and nationalism are inextricably intertwined, and, further, that the United States has been mistaken in assuming that Hanoi fomented and controls the struggle in the South. His writing is fluent, as befits his profession, but his theme can hardly be said to be new, not even when one takes into account that the essay was written in 1969.

The final essay is a very useful examination of "International Economic Relations and the Large International Firm" by Professor Edith Penrose. She suggests that foreign economic interests probably exercise, on their own initiative, a good deal less political influence than is often supposed; but, as in the case of American firms, these interests may sometimes be used in an effort to further their governments' foreign policies. She goes on to consider the problem of economic exploitation and other issues arising out of the presence of foreign firms, looking in particular at the experience of oil companies in India and Ceylon. She thinks that the only way of retaining the economic and political advantages arising out of the independence of large international firms may be through "international arrangements which permit the firms to become truly independent of any one country . . . and thus more acceptable to countries fearing that foreign control, especially from the large and more powerful countries, will undermine their independence" (p. 134). The essay is clearly structured and tightly argued, and deserves to find its way on to many undergraduate reading lists.

Thus, the various parts of this volume are all of interest. However, they have nothing in common with each other, beyond being about international relations, and so make no collective impact on the subject. Nor do any of them present such a subversive or unusual train of thought as to preclude publication in the relevant journals. Indeed, on this showing, *New Orientations* is an occasional hardcover journal of general professional interest.

ALAN JAMES

The London School of Economics

Coexistence and Commerce: Guidelines for Transactions Between East and West. By Samuel Pisar. (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1970. Pp. 558. $17.50.)

Over the past two years there has been a growing interest in the United States in improving commercial relations with the communist countries. This development reflects, at the political level, the atmosphere of détente as represented by the SALT and Berlin negotiations, as well as by presidential visits first to Romainia and Yugoslavia, and subsequently to Peking and Moscow. A largely independent force has been the somewhat belated initiative in the business community to head off any long-term dominance by Western Europe and Japan in the potential growth markets of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. If the efforts of one private individual in this latter category stand out, that person is the international lawyer Samuel Pisar, in his numerous public statements, and most importantly through this influential book.

Coexistence and Commerce is a lengthy tract on the way business is conducted between East and West. It is divided into two "books," each subdivided into two parts, dealing respectively with the economic and political context, the commercial setting, the legal framework, and the settlement of disputes. The content varies considerably: The bulk of the book, particularly the second half, is a fairly technical description of commercial and legal procedures, including the many inconsistencies and hidden pitfalls in day-to-day commercial relations between centrally planned and market economies; the first four chapters, in contrast, provide a broader view of the political context of East-West trade which has evolved from the ideological impasse to normal economic relations of the early postwar period to the increasingly pragmatic "bridge-building" phase of recent years; the chapter entitled, "American Dilemmas in Trade with the East," is largely obsolete only two years after writing, an indication of the pace of change toward the positive in attitudes in the United States.

One is left with the impression that business-to-business relations between East and West are evolving steadily in a pragmatic way and may perhaps be advancing faster than government-to-government accords. This is consistent with Pisar's view that growing business contacts support the hypothesis that "capitalism and communism are actually creeping toward convergence" (p. 8). There is even the temptation to see an analogy with the multinational enterprise in Western nations which has often been allowed to force the pace of national economic policies. The difference, of course, is that the industrialized countries of the West start from a base of broadly shared political objectives and internationally compatible economic systems, while ideological hostility and economc noncompatibility pervade relations between East and West.

Particular public attention has been given to Pisar's concluding chapter, in which he sums up his survey with a proposed code of fair practices composed of eighty specific suggestions, ranging from general issues such as public attitudes, to issues of major trade significance—credit restrictions, most-favored-nation treatment, international dumping—to the many lesser matters involved in commercial transactions. The approach of an informal code, which might begin with the preparation of an optional set of provisions without legally binding force, is chosen as the most practical route for improving commercial relations after considering the economic and ideological problems with alternative possibilities, such as bilateral treaties, standardized agreements between enterprises, or worldwide unification of laws dealing with foreign trade.

Perhaps an informal code is the most practical next step, although recent high level political interest in improving East-West commercial relations may lead to greater formalization. More important than the form, however, is the political basis for "normalized" and reasonably reciprocal commercial relations. On this point Pisar is clear that for some time to come bilateralism will prevail: "It is doubtful, therefore, that Western countries will, in the foreseeable future, consider it prudent to confront national trade monopolies of the East without the benefit of certain mutual undertakings explicitly expressed in bilateral agreements" (p. 171). As for the unrealistic provisions of the multilateral General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT),

> it has gradually become clear to all market economies accustomed to dealing with one another on GATT principles that a classically conceived exchange of most-favored-nation treatment promises with total state-trading countries is, at best, a one-sided trade concession; at worst a palpably dangerous one (p. 102).

Pisar presents much hard fact about how the state-trading countries can bring economic leverage to bear on Western firms, but he does not examine thoroughly the broader issue of bilateralism versus multilateralism. There is, after all, a wide range of possibilities between the remote GATT provision that state-trading enterprises shall make purchases or sales "solely in accordance with commercial considerations" (Article XVII) on the one hand, and explicit undertakings incorporated in bilateral trade agreements on the other. Pisar refers only briefly, for example, to Yugoslavia as a possible model for future multilateral East-West trading relations. The chapter on joint ventures is illuminating but does not analyze fully the implications of such longer term trade/investment/marketing arrangements. The consequences of a common European Community trade policy with the East, or of alternative forms of possible bilateral agreements between the United States and communist countries could also have been more fully discussed.

In short, *Coexistence and Commerce*, with its wealth of detailed information on East/West trade, is particularly useful as a primer to businessmen, officials, or others involved in dealings with the state traders of the East. For the broader audience, even a cursory reading will help achieve a more balanced perspective that discounts broad economic principles of little practical import, and focuses the more specific and relevant issues of commercial law such as arbitration procedures, industrial property rights, and the meaning of commercial *force majeure* in a centrally planned economy.

ERNEST H. PREEG

U.S. Department of State

The Amerasia Papers: Some Problems in the History of U.S.-China Relations. By John S. Service. (Berkeley: Center for Chinese Studies, University of California, China Research Monographs #7, 1971. Pp. 220. $4.00.)

The author of this study proved his abilities in several careers, first as a foreign service officer in China during World War II, second as a business man when temporarily out of government employ in the 1950s, and since his retirement from the Foreign Service as a research center administrator at Berkeley. He now shows his competence as an historian as well, analyzing in retrospect the practical alternatives facing the United States vis-à-vis the Chinese Communist movement in the mid-1940s. He winds up asking, "Does realism have a place in foreign policy? The answer, in China, was negative" (p. 162). As we can see now, realism was doomed by the operation of power considerations in an era colored by ideological fear. The so-called realism that emerged was that of the Cold War transposed from Europe to China. In the simplest terms, the policy makers of the day knew something of Europe and feared Soviet totalitarianism while they knew little of China but transferred their fears to it nevertheless.

This ideological theme is well illustrated in the first 52 pages of Mr. Service's monograph, which is devoted to a careful and crushing refutation of defamatory statements made by a certain Dr. Anthony Kubeck and published by the United States government in February, 1970 with a fanfare of advertising in the usually staid Government Printing Office Bulletin. This latter-day McCarthyism was shocking at the time even to hardened observers of American right-wing politics. Mr. Service dissects the evidence presented by Kubeck and traces the sources that have been falsely represented and misused.

Fortunately the major part of this monograph, some 140 pages, offers scope for Mr. Service's talent as an historian. Its successive chapters are entitled "Chinese Unity through American Command," "Ambassador Gauss Offers Neutral Advice," "General Hurley Sustains Chiang," "Washington Insists on Flexibility," and finally, "The Rejected View from the Field." The study focuses on the question of just where and how our policy making got off the track onto the dead-end road of support only for the Nationalist Government, to the exclusion of any cooperation with the Chinese Communists in the war effort against Japan.

In the section "Washington Insists on Flexibility," Mr. Service pulls together the long series of a dozen or so State Department and other policy papers, produced during the year between May 1944 and May 1945, which specified that United States support of the Nationalist Government should be conditional and not the blank-check, thick-and-thin type of support that Ambassador Patrick J. Hurley after Roosevelt's death declared to be the policy. In the same vein as these various policy papers, in March 1945, shortly before his death, Roosevelt told Edgar Snow that in China "I've been working with two governments . . . I intend to go on doing so until we can get them together."

Mr. Service concludes that the very secret Yalta agreement of February, 1945, which FDR specially commissioned Hurley in liaison with Stalin to announce to Chiang Kai-shek, effectively overshadowed the State Department's established concept of flexibility in our relations with Chiang and Mao.

In "The Rejected View from the Field" Mr. Service lays out a classic dilemma, how to wage a war in a country where an allied government is losing popular support to an insurgent rival. The Foreign Service Officers concluded in February, 1945 that "military necessity requires that we supply and cooperate with the Communists and other suitable groups who can assist the war against Japan" (p. 188), i.e., Chiang should no longer have a veto control over American China policy; and the possibilities of flexible cooperation with and aid to both Chinese parties should be tried out. Mao and Chou had asked for this, and it might have let us end the war in a position of genuine neutrality within China.

For those in the field who had some background understanding of Chinese life, it did not seem that the American national interest could fruitfully run counter to the long-term interest of the Chinese people. But Hurley's support of Chiang was buttressed by ideological fears which produced the essential unrealism: that the American interest must deny the Chinese interest. If Warren Cohen (*America's Response to China: History of Sino-American Relations* [New York: John Wiley, 1971]) is correct in the thesis that our China policy has seemed a vital interest to us only when connected with our European policy, then the fear of communism as represented by Soviet power and its ideological crusade evidently required as early as 1944 that we sacrifice the interest of the Chinese people. Vietnam was already in the works.

JOHN K. FAIRBANK

Harvard University

The Shaping of Foreign Policy: The Role of the Secretary of State as Seen by Dean Acheson. By Ronald J. Stupak. (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, Inc.—The Odyssey Press, 1969. Pp. vii-xxvii, 132. $2.95.)

The role of Secretary of State Rogers and National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger in the Nixon Administration once again raises the question of the proper relationship between the President and Secretary of State. What difference does it make, one might ask, who ultimately controls foreign policy so long as he is responsible to the President and so long as the President is responsible to the people?

In a very important sense Professor Stupak's book provides an answer to that question. He sees Dean Acheson's definition of the role of the Secretary of State as one model of the relationship that might exist between the Secretary and the President. While there are other models, Stupak contends that "any Secretary of State must manipulate the variables analyzed . . . into an interacting, coordinated whole if he is to maximize the policy-making potentials of the office" (p. 116).

Stupak sees the role of the Secretary of State as being defined by the Secretary's perceptions of international relations, his role as head of the Department of State, and his relations with the President, the Congress, the press, and public opinion. He divides his study into a vivid analysis of Acheson's definition of the Secretary's responsibilities under each of these categories. Only when the Secretary's role in relation to each of these areas of responsibility is seen as a whole does it become apparent how dubious is the present practice of downgrading and fragmenting the Secretary's authority over foreign policy. What follows is the gist of Stupak's treatise.

Acheson saw the Secretary's role as a totality, and he argued that a deficiency in any one part would have adverse consequences for the intelligent and consistent conduct of America's foreign relations. By its nature and by virtue of the powers entrusted to the President, Acheson believed that the formulation of foreign policy must emanate from a single constitutionally prescribed source. The Founding Fathers had recognized this when they made the President preeminent in the exercise of power in foreign relations. Acheson also believed that the President, who could not normally be an expert on international relations and run the Department of State himself, should be advised by one person upon whom would devolve responsibility for producing a unified and consistent body of policy.

Since something as complicated and delicate as foreign policy does not lend itself to formulation and conduct by more than one agency, it devolves upon the Secretary of State to pull it together and to see that presidential decisions are carried out with the utmost energy and fidelity. A country cannot afford to have different foreign policies—one for diplomacy, one for strategy, one for public opinion, one for one's allies, and another for one's enemies. Since a foreign policy's impact depends upon its overall unity and coherence and upon the precision of the expectation that it conveys to other powers, everything depends upon its expressing a unified and publicly supported body of ideas.

A subject as critical as foreign policy therefore requires an unparalleled degree of confidence and intimacy between the President and his principal adviser. Therefore the Secretary of State must enjoy a presidential relationship not only of absolute confidence and intimacy, but he must have the last word with the President on any and all matters bearing on foreign policy. To deserve the last word, the Secretary of State must be among the most knowledgeable of the President's foreign policy advisers; he must have the final say, so that even if the President rejects his advice the Secretary will know that it was based upon overriding Presidential judgment and not upon lesser considerations.

To deserve this relationship, the Secretary's advice must ordinarily be the best obtainable and to be the best, the Secretary must obtain the best results from his department. State Department personnel are picked for their expertise in matters involving the design of American foreign policy and judgments about the nation's interests. They must be given every opportunity to have their views heard and incorporated into the President's decision. Only a Secretary thoroughly conversant with world affairs can judge the merits of their advice. They, too, are the ones who must execute policy and must therefore feel sufficiently committed to it to give it their best support.

For these reasons Acheson believed that the Secretary has to know the thinking of his department, participate in the deliberations of its members, make clear where and why he disagrees with them, and then be prepared to back their collective judgment both with the President and against others. Acheson left no doubt that

> . . . a Secretary of State must convince the President one way or another that the State Department will implement a Presidential decision with precision and dispatch. This can only be done by direct supervision of his Department by the Secretary himself. The Secretary's less tangible power bases, such as personal competence and intimate friendships, gain an institutional foundation through demonstrated ability of the Department to make a verbal policy operational in an efficient manner (p. 112).

The intimacy and confidentiality of the relationship is indispensable, according to Stupak, because the Secretary "must not merely persuade the President but press him with all the means at his command to use the Presidential influence, authority, and command *to accept* policy recommendations from the Secretary and the State Department" (p. 81) which he would not accept if the Secretary is viewed as just another adviser.

Acheson also believed that the Secretary of State has an obligation to keep the relevant Committees of Congress informed and to educate public opinion wherever possible to the rationale of American foreign policy. Congress must know that the Secretary's is the authoritative voice. As Stupak points out, Acheson had a deep but troubled commitment to public opinion. He did not believe that the U.S. could have a successful foreign policy without an informed and supportive opinion—at least from the so-called attentive public. What he said in public was also what he said in executive sessions of the House and Senate Committees. Unless one questions the decision not to ask for a declaration of support for the Korean decision—something Senate Majority Leader Scott Lucas advised the President against on the grounds that public and Congressional support were self-evident—Acheson never shirked his obligation to defend his policies before the Congress. He simply did not believe that American foreign policy could carry weight and conviction without public support. Stupak does an excellent job of putting to rest the canard that Acheson disregarded public opinion.

By collating Acheson's writings on various aspects of the Secretary's role with interviews of Committee Chairmen and of Acheson's colleagues, and with the behavioral evidence from Acheson's performance, Stupak has done a scholarly and even an exciting job of showing how one Secretary's role definition had numerous positive consequences for American foreign policy. Role studies are often excessively organizational and arid in content. This one is not. By choosing a highly self-conscious and dynamic Secretary, Stupak presents us with a concrete and vivid assessment of how a Secretary's definition and execution of his role contributes to the unity, efficiency, and constitutionality of foreign policy.

Admittedly Stupak has chosen as his subject a distinctive and highly individual Secretary of State. He concludes that "[a]mong all the generalizations to be drawn from this investigation, none is more clearly and universally important to the role . . . than the variable of personality. Personality is the intangible thread that holds together all the other more visible elements of Secretary of State's power base" (p. 113). But this emphasis enhances rather than weakens the value of Stupak's study because it shows us how the role must deal with all its aspects if it is to achieve the unity, efficiency, and legitimacy essential to an effective foreign policy. At a time when the relationship of Secretary Rogers to Mr. Kissinger and to the President is an issue both inside Congress and within the Department of State, Stupak's study makes a significant contribution. Regardless of whom the President might be or how determined to be his own foreign minister, it is perfectly clear that he must have an ultimate adviser. Stupak's study suggests that it would be desirable if the President's principal and most trusted adviser was the man who presided over the State Department and not over the Department of Defense or the National Council. Mr. Kissinger may have been a necessary antidote to the sterility and paralysis of the Department under Rusk and Rogers, but is the responsible answer letting things deteriorate rather than trying radically to improve them?

DAVID S. McLELLAN
University of California, Riverside

Human Rights, The United Nations and World Community. By Vernon Van Dyke. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970. Pp. 292. $7.00, cloth; $3.75, paper.)

This book will be read with great profit by the initiated and uninitiated alike. Professor Van Dyke addresses himself with knowledge and insight to the three categories of questions which have traditionally been regarded as basic to an understanding of international human rights: the nature and definition of such rights; the form and substance of the international obligations for their promotion and protection; and the limits of their enforcement. He rightly devotes a special chapter to self-determination and minority rights—a subject which is in urgent need of re-examination and further analysis. This is essentially an analysis of the whole range of human rights and the different measures of their implementation as they emerge in the several international and regional texts, and of their meaning and reality in the light of contemporary events and developments. But it is the running commentary liberally provided by the author that lends the book its special distinction.

We need to be reminded every so often that although we are still far from universal agreement on the meaning and application of each of the rights and freedoms enunciated in the international texts adopted over the past twenty-five years, these texts do constitute, as Professor Van Dyke suggests, a minor revolution in international affairs; they have made human rights and fundamental freedoms a matter of common concern. Nor can we minimize the first hesitant steps toward their international enforcement, even though we know only too well that the power of the international community to enforce its decisions is not yet in the offing. These steps are an integral part of the revolution in international affairs and are their own justification. We must allow the reality of the idea to break forth even in circumstances which too often stand in contradiction to its message.

Professor Van Dyke's approach, which he describes as empirical, is conventional enough to bring a recognizable perspective to his work. But it is necessarily a limited perspective, and the book therefore lacks a theoretical focus for judging the relationship and the relative importance of facts and events. Thus, viewed as a compelling generalization of the congruence of the cares and burdens of a self-conscious humanity, the emergence of international concern with human rights is much more than a minor revolution in international affairs. It goes far beyond the mere juridical recognition that what were once matters of exclusively domestic jurisdiction are now declared to be of common concern; it possesses enormous predictive and operational qualities as a means of refashioning the world in an entirely new image.

For ultimately, the solution of all problems of the human condition is a function of human rights. Their total realization and defense invites commitments and actions which are a once cause and effect of the transformations i the affairs of man that are necessary to brin peace, freedom, and justice to our trouble world. Nothing delineates better the world i conflict and concord and relates with greate cogency to the fundamental issues of the ag than international concern with human rights both as a vehicle for international cooperatio and an instrument for the advancement of human welfare. It is the point at which all me are joined together at the deepest and simples level of response.

Unless international concern with huma rights is conceived broadly and projected as a exhilarating vision of the future, it cannot hop to influence the course of events more tha marginally. It must come forth as a coherent forceful, and well-wrought idea that flows wit inner life and inspires action, or it cannot outlast the passions aroused by political creeds and persuasions of all kinds, as well as by vested interests hostile to it. It must be presented a the point of convergence of all moral imperatives, or it is bound to remain intellectually unimportant and practically impotent.

Unfortunately, few of those who are concerned with the question as participants or observers, scholars, jurists or commentators, have ventured to exercise their creative imagination beyond their own immediate experience to recognize in international concern with human rights potentialities of great import for the human condition. This helps to explain why, after twenty-five years of public debate, the subject of international human rights lacks not only a theoretical focus, but also the intellectual dimension to command attention.

It is to be hoped that Professor Van Dyke's excellent summation of existing problems in the field of international human rights will serve as a taking-off point for the greater exploration of the subject in its farther reaches. As a political scientist, the author himself has broken new ground.

Moses Moskowitz

Consultative Council of Jewish Organizations, New York

Foreign Policies in South Asia. Edited by S. P. Varma and K. P. Misra. (Bombay, Calcutta, Madras, New Delhi: Orient Longmans Limited, 1969. Pp. iv, 403. $8.00.)

This is a startling book to have emerged from a University Press (Rajasthan) and to bear the imprint of a well-known publisher.

The correction of proofs has been careless in he extreme. Punctuation marks are printed erratically while words are missing or run together. Sentences are unstopped and quotations eft open. Footnotes are misnumbered or simply missing: N. R. Deshpande's chapter has flagrantly suffered in this respect. References are mauled in citation. There appears to be no conistent method of citing sources, and some of hose used do not inspire much confidence. We ind "Chana," "Russinas," "Pakisthan" and 'Pakistad," "Isreal" and "Keshmir." There is a *'coupd'etal,'* an "ideolology," a "foreign halcy" and a *"Colographers' Transachans."* Mispellings run distractingly through these pages ike a private language or a child's efforts at his primer: "adumberated," "ceasation," "consoium," "embitterness," "foregin," "harted," 'mnst," "warld," "worte."

This disfigured book enters the public domain accompanied by claims to be a pioneer study by South Asian scholars of their own region, from a critical, comprehensive and objective viewpoint. But the very definition of a South Asian viewpoint raises large questions of critical detachment which this book does not successfully tackle. The effort is comprehensive: perhaps too much so, for it includes the minutiae of discussions at an all-India seminar at Jaipur in February, 1968. Some editing was necessary to impose a sense of resolution upon his material. We read that the rigors of bipoarity have been softened and several pages ater that the era of bipolarity is now being enered. Again, within a few paragraphs, India is nescapably judged to be a major power, and urged to accept her responsibilities as such, as well as an undeveloped medium power, which might eventually aspire to become a major power. The papers range widely in quality and n their critical and objective capacities; and here are too many assertions. It may well be asked whether the super powers really do get nto a "state of panic" whenever conflict occurs n any part of the world.

The lack of any cool, balanced South Asian analysis of Pakistan's situation and outlook is to be regretted. In this respect, the sophisticated methods of analysis which have been introduced with varying degrees of success in these pages have not always been a sufficient check against prejudice and the loose play of assumptions. Western analyses and models are heavily relied upon in the papers. These models are handled diffidently and with a lack of initiative; n some instances they are little more than window-dressing, and in others there are acknowledgments of the serious limitations of the usage or of its "half-baked" character. One rough and tentative model does not "involve an evaluation of the foreign policies of the South Asian states": *it abstracts from reality to show certain* unique and common characteristics. Quantification is held in too much reverence and becomes an elaborate byway to judgments that could otherwise be reached more directly and prosaically: "These equations have been used to suggest that Pakistan's foreign policy makers have adopted a fairly pragmatic approach from the beginning" (p. 79).

Professor Misra comments frankly on the difficulties and handicaps which currently beset this kind of attempt. He mentions those "nationals who, by and large, are marginally equipped to undertake sound academic obligations on account of a variety of reasons. . . . Briefly, the entire academic ethos runs counter to academically worthwhile writing on foreign policy" (p. 89), and judges that "a herculean effort is needed to raise the standards of study and research in this subject" (p. 90). A central part of the problem, as he sees it, lay in the theorizing activity. "It may also be said that, situated as the South Asian scholars are, they should realise that direct and deliberate pursuit of theory in the writing of foreign policy is less promising than the study of particular problems and phenomena, with the intent to exploit any theoretical insights that may arise out of such studies. According to this view, those who are after theory may not succeed whereas those who seek first to analyse substantive issues that command their interest may find that theoretical blessings are added in to them" (pp. 85–6). We have to be cautious, he adds, "in applying Western models of study to the study of South Asian problems" (p. 86), but he stresses the importance of the general conceptual framework in these political studies. The book bears out the force of these strictures.

More than mere techniques of study seem to be involved in the criticisms. There is a current of opinion in favor of an "inward looking point of view," requiring a conscious effort to change the whole perspective of South Asian political studies from global to regional preoccupations, to give greater weight to circumstances nearer home and domestic situations. A keynote address raises this question which is taken up again as a problem-solving approach as well as a program of study. The world is seen to be moving towards regionalism. The idea might have provided a theme for a dialectic within the book. It is admitted that the countries of the region are drifting apart in their political systems and their foreign relations. In what sense is South Asia a region—as distinct from an Indian sphere of interest where Indian claims are contested and where India, it is said, has neglected opportunities to settle problems with her neighbours? The argument for a new approach derives not only from a sense, clearly expressed here, of lost Indian opportunities but also from the belief that Indian policy in the recent past has been obsessed with the wrong things, with global issues, and unmindful of important local considerations. It is an aspect of a peculiarly Indian problem: to redefine the Indian role in the Asian context and in so doing to recast the possibilities of the South Asian region itself.

D. E. KENNEDY

University of Melbourne

Germany's Ostpolitik: Relations Between the Federal Republic and the Warsaw Pact Countries. By Lawrence L. Whetten. (London: Oxford University Press, 1971. Pp. x, 244. $6.50.)

The "era of negotiation" which has succeeded the Cold War in Europe raises difficult problems for the writing of contemporary history. Diplomacy has become more genuinely multilateral than at any time in the past: the waning of bipolarity has not meant that the dominant roles of the superpowers have now been shared out among the former great powers. Rather, the minor players are now assuming more distinctive roles than ever before, as is brought out by Lawrence Whetten with respect to Eastern Europe. Furthermore, the recent period in Europe is above all one of diplomatic maneuver; it is not simply a question of relaxing tensions or normalizing relationships, but of doing so in ways which improve one's options, and increasingly this involves a process of reformulating one's interests as well as reformulating issues, breaking down old stereotypes and connections and probing for new ones.

But how is such a process to be described in all its complexity, and analyzed? The problem is not so difficult for the analyst of a single relationship or issue area. But Whetten attempts the more difficult task of giving an account of the complex relations of West Germany with the members of the Warsaw Pact in the period of the Ostpolitik, since 1966. The task is easiest, and the book most successful, when there is a specific outcome to be explained or a specific issue to be elucidated. Thus the account of the bargaining leading to the signing of the treaties with the Soviet Union and Poland is highly informative, and brings out the implications o the terms of the treaties with skill and authority. Similarly, the issues in a Berlin settlemen (not concluded when the book went to press) and in the abortive West German-Czech negotiations are clarified with the same mastery o detail. More generally, the author presents full and for the most part entirely convincin account of the differentiation of the policie and roles of the East European states mos closely involved with West Germany: Romania, Poland, and East Germany. The only general caveat is a matter of emphasis: it i scarcely plausible that Romania's influence i East-West and Warsaw Pact diplomacy was a great as he suggests.

This points to a central problem in the author's approach: How are interpretations to be evaluated when the unstated rule appears to be to "let the facts speak for themselves"? The problem is especially acute in the case of multilateral diplomacy of maneuver where many of the issues are as yet without outcome. At times too many of the moves appear to be accepted at face value, and the strategy or the constraints are underplayed. More fundamentally, there are two types of interpretation, the one implicit in much of the detailed narrative, the other superimposed on it in occasional comments, some of which go against the tenor of the work as a whole.

To take the most important example, for most of the book Soviet policy is presented as reactive, and this has the great merit of bringing out how much diplomatic effort Moscow has expended in attempting to coordinate the diplomacy of its Warsaw Pact associates. For example, Soviet interest in a European security conference is presented in terms of responses to moves by the East Europeans: the question of Soviet objectives, strategies and priorities is largely bypassed. Yet in explaining the emergence of détente diplomacy in Europe, the author points to nuclear strategic parity as "the most important single influence" and refers to "the new power asymmetry in Central Europe strongly favouring the Soviet Union" (p. 2). These suggestions are not followed through.

Faulty projections are an occupational hazard of the student of contemporary politics, but Whetten's failure to anticipate the political difficulties of the Brandt government or the strength of West German opposition to the Treaties reflects a systematic weakness in his analysis of West German politics, i.e., a tendency to neglect the importance of domestic issues (foreign policy did not as he implies dominate the 1969 election). There is also the tacit assumption that the strength of the rational case for the Ostpolitik, as well as the enterprise and persistence with which the Brandt government has pursued it, can automatically be translated into political support. But the political strength of the Christian Democratic opponents of the treaties is quite a different question from the validity of the tortuous arguments of CDU intellectuals which he discusses at some length. Another, not unrelated, gap in the analysis is the very fragmentary treatment of economic relations between West Germany and East Europe, and their significance.

Nonetheless, as a work of detailed scholarship the book will remain valuable for some time, either as an account of the first phase in a new orientation of Central European politics or, as appears increasingly likely, as an interlude of unfulfilled promise.

J. L. Richardson

University of Sydney

Germany and the Management of Détente. By Philip Windsor. (New York, Washington: Praeger Publishers for the Institute of Strategic Studies, 1971. Pp. 207. $8.50.)

At a time when Chancellor Brandt's "Neue Ostpolitik" has made it possible for about two million West Berliners and West Germans to visit relatives in the "other Berlin" and "the other Germany," a book with this title seems timely and important, if only from the standpoint of human personality and sentiment.

True, political scientists and historians have spent a great deal of time and training in the discipline of being "objective," and they have used the relations between the former Cold War actors in Western Europe and in Eastern Europe as a major laboratory for their observations. This book is another case in point.

Mr. Windsor has done a painstaking job of researching Germany's constructive and destructive role in European history since 1871. When I use the word "history" I use it purposefully, since I think this book is the work of a historian rather than of a political scientist. The author has gone back three generations and detailed in meticulous background narrative the source of conflict and the hope of reconciliation between the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic. He also has tied that whole problem into the deeper question of reconciliation between East and West Europe. He makes it clear, time and again, that the German conflict is only a symbol of the problems besetting all of Europe.

When Mr. Windsor in his second chapter speaks of the fragmentation of German interests, he proves to be a poor historian. German interests have always been fragmented, just as those of the entire European continent. Fragmented interests unite the two Germanies and the Eastern and Western European countries. There has never been a united Germany that lasted (unless one counts the years of 1871 to 1945—a short-lived Empire, a republic that failed, and a totalitarian dictatorship which marks the all-time low in European history), just as there never really has been a United Europe, at least not in modern times, since the demise of the Holy Roman Empire.

The author writes carefully and thoroughly about the wars in Europe, beginning with the Napoleonic wars and ending with the formation of the Warsaw Pact and NATO, both of which were ostensibly forged to prevent wars and bring about détente. What is missing in this account, which I do regard as excellent diplomatic history, are the many accounts of human attempts on the parts of Eastern or Western Germans or Europeans to build bridges.

Détente, the relaxation of strained relations between states, should not only be discussed in terms of past or present military conflicts. The concept needs to be discussed within the framework of cultural exchanges, and as applied to the particular geographic setting the author selects, more emphasis needs to be placed on the building of a united Eastern Europe and Western Europe.

The author does an excellent job of focusing on the military aspects of building two blocs in Europe, but he slights (by his own admission) the diplomatic, cultural, and personal attempts being made by the current government of the Federal Republic of Germany, and the echoes those attempts have found in some of the responses by the government of the German Democratic Republic to reach some form of détente.

The statement in the final chapter of the book that "the relations between the two German states are an inseparable part of the management of détente" (p. 201) is, no doubt, the crucial theme of the book. The author's statement is a hopeful one, but the whole tone of Mr. Windsor's work does not bear out his thesis that détente can really be "managed," as he puts it, between the two German states.

When a book is written, the time between the completion and correction of the manuscript and the printing and publishing of the finished product sometimes takes longer than the negotiations and the signature of a treaty. At the writing of this review, there seems to be more hope for a rapprochement between the two

Germanies than there has been at any time since 1945. After all, the estrangement between the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Peoples' Republic never reached the degree of venomous hatred that dominated the relations between the United States and the Peoples' Republic of China during nearly two decades. At a time when two of the world's giants can come together to try their hands at working out a détente, the two states who currently represent the German people, and who are crucial nation states within the European political, economic, social, and cultural framework seem to hold out a considerable promise that détente will indeed be reached in Europe. Mr. Windsor's thesis that Germany (modified as the Germanies) will play a crucial role in achieving that goal, could well have been expressed more strongly by the author in his concerns about the management of a détente in Europe.

ELKE FRANK

Radcliffe Institute

The American Political Science Association

1527 New Hampshire Ave. N.W., Washington, D.C.

President: **Heinz Eulau, Stanford University;** *President-Elect:* Robert E. Ward, **University of Michigan;** *Vice Presidents:* Robert Martin, Howard University; Clara Penniman, University of Wisconsin; Joseph Tanenhaus, State University of New York, Stony Brook; *Secretary:* Thomas R. Dye, Florida State University; *Treasurer:* Donald R. Matthews, The Brookings Institution; *Program Chairman:* Dwaine Marvick, University of California, Los Angeles; *Executive Director:* Evron M. Kirkpatrick, 1527 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036; *Managing Editor, APSR:* Nelson W. Polsby, University of California, Berkeley.

COUNCIL (Above-named Officers *ex officiis*), 1971–1972: Chadwick F. Alger, Ohio State University; Philip E. Converse, University of Michigan; Fred I. Greenstein, Wesleyan University; Joyce M. Mitchell, University of Oregon; James W. Prothro, University of North Carolina; William P. Robinson, Sr., Norfolk State College; Dankwart A. Rustow, CUNY (Brooklyn); Gordon Tullock, Virginia Polytechnic Institute. 1972–1973: Christian Bay, University of Alberta; Samuel DuBois Cook, Duke University; Valerie Earle, Georgetown University; Richard F. Fenno, University of Rochester; Robert O. Keohane, Swarthmore College; Samuel Krislov, University of Minnesota; Gerhard Loewenberg, University of Iowa; Kenneth Prewitt, University of Chicago.

FORMER PRESIDENTS: Frank J. Goodnow, Albert Shaw, Frederic N. Judson, James Bryce, A. Lawrence Lowell, Woodrow Wilson, Simeon E. Baldwin, Albert Bushnell Hart, W. W. Willoughby, John Bassett Moore, Ernest Freund, Jesse Macy, Munroe Smith, Henry Jones Ford, Paul S. Reinsch, Leo S. Rowe, William A. Dunning, Harry A. Garfield, James W. Garner, Charles E. Merriam, Charles A. Beard, William B. Munro, Jesse S. Reeves, John A. Fairlie, Benjamin F. Shambaugh, Edward S. Corwin, William F. Willoughby, Isidor Loeb, Walter J. Shepard, Francis W. Coker, Arthur N. Holcombe, Thomas Reed Powell, Clarence A. Dykstra, Charles Grove Haines, Robert C. Brooks, Frederick A. Ogg, William Anderson, Robert E. Cushman, Leonard D. White, John M. Gaus, Walter F. Dodd, Arthur W. MacMahon, Henry R. Spencer, Quincy Wright, James K. Pollock, Peter H. Odegard, Luther H. Gulick, Pendleton Herring, Ralph J. Bunche, Charles McKinley, Harold D. Lasswell, E. E. Schattschneider, V. O. Key, Jr., R. Taylor Cole, Carl B. Swisher, Emmette S. Redford, Charles S. Hyneman, Carl J. Friedrich, C. Herman Pritchett, David B. Truman, Gabriel A. Almond, Robert A. Dahl, Merle Fainsod, David Easton, Karl W. Deutsch, Robert E. Lane.

Students, professors, and those interested in the study of politics and government are invited to become members of the AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION

JOIN APSA

membership includes:

THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW—quarterly journal of scholarly articles and book reviews in political science, and

PS—quarterly journal of association news and articles of professional concern

Opportunity to register in the APSA Personnel Service—currently lists the largest number of political science teaching and research positions.

Attend the APSA Annual Meeting, September 4-8, 1973, New Orleans.

- -

Name ____

Mailing Address ______________________________________

______________________________________ (Zip) __________

This is an application for membership. Upon receipt of this form we will mail you a membership card and begin a year's subscription to the AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW and PS.

Student	$10 ☐
Annual	
if your annual income is under $12,000	$20 ☐
$12-15,000	$25 ☐
over $15,000	$30 ☐

Please send with remittance to:

Membership Secretary
AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION
1527 New Hampshire Ave., N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036

Add $1 for foreign postage.

NEW from APSA...

CUMULATIVE INDEX TO PROCEEDINGS OF THE ANNUAL MEETINGS
Key word index to all papers included in
proceedings of Annual Meetings from
1904-12 and 1956-70. **887 p. $18.95 (prepaid)**

ALSO AVAILABLE:

APSA ANNUAL MEETING PAPERS (Hard copies, including 1971 Meeting Papers) $2.00 each

APSA ANNUAL MEETING PROCEEDINGS (microfilm reels of all papers, 1904-12 and 1956-70)

CUMULATIVE INDEX to the *AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW,* 1906-1968, $6.50 (prepaid)

AVAILABLE DIRECT FROM:
Customer Services Dept.
University Microfilms
313 North First St.
Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106

MORE PUBLICATIONS FROM APSA...

☐
POLITICAL SCIENCE ENTERS THE 70's
—abstracts of the 1970 Annual Meeting edited by Richard L. Merritt
$1.25 prepaid

☐
WOMEN IN POLITICAL SCIENCE
—reports and studies of the APSA Committee on the Status of Women in the Profession 1969-71
$2.15 prepaid

☐
BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY OF THE APSA
—published August 1968, approximately 12,000 individuals included
Now only $3.50 clothbound; $3 paperback (prepaid)

AVAILABLE DIRECT FROM:
American Political Science Association
1527 New Hampshire Ave., N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036

LOW COST GROUP INSURANCE AVAILABLE TO APSA MEMBERS

APSA INSURANCE PLANS

Group Life Insurance

- $15,000 protection with gradual reductions after age 50.
- Optional Dependent Life Coverage.

Accidental Death and Specific Loss

- Worldwide Coverage.
- Permanent Total Disability Benefits.

Hospital Cash Plan

- $20 or $40 each and every day hospitalized.
- Payable for up to 365 days for each period of hospital confinement.
- Benefits begin with the first day of hospitalization.
- Daily benefits are doubled if you are hospitalized for cancer.

For further information write to:

Director, Insurance Programs
The American Political Science Association
1527 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D. C. 20036

CHANGING YOUR ADDRESS?

If you are planning a move, please fill in the form below and return it to the American Political Science Association, 1527 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036. Address changes should be received at the Association by the 5th of the month to be included in the monthly update of the Association mailing list.

Name ____________________

OLD ADDRESS ____________________ NEW ADDRESS ____________________

____________________ ____________________

____________________ ____________________

__________ (Zip) __________ __________ (Zip) __________

JOURNALS
OF THE
REGIONAL POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATIONS

THE JOURNAL OF POLITICS

The Journal of the Southern Political Science Association

Donald S. Strong, Editor
Department of Political Science
University of Alabama
University, Alabama 35486

Price List:

Subscriptions including membership in the Southern Political Science Association:

$8.00 annually; $8.60 foreign; $5.00 students (for those currently registered for course credit).

Communications regarding subscriptions should be addressed to Manning J. Dauer, Managing Editor, Department of Political Science, The University of Florida, Gainesville, Florida 32601.

MIDWEST JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

The Journal of the Midwest Political Science Association

Samuel C. Patterson, Editor
Department of Political Science
University of Iowa
Iowa City, Iowa 52240

Price List:

Subscriptions including membership in the Midwest Political Science Association:

$10.00 professional members; $14.00 family members; $6.00 student members (must be countersigned by a faculty member); $7.50 retired members.

Communications regarding subscriptions should be addressed to Jean M. Driscoll, North Park College, 5125 North Spaulding Street, Chicago, Illinois 60625.

Non-member subscription rates:

$10.00 annually U.S.A.; $18.00 for two years and $25.00 for three years; $10.20 annual rate for Canada; $10.50 annual rate outside North America.

Non-member subscriptions should be ordered directly from Wayne State University Press, 5980 Cass Avenue, Detroit, Michigan 48202.

POLITY

The Journal of the Northeastern Political Science Associations

Lewis C. Mainzer, Editor
Thompson Hall
University of Massachusetts
Amherst, Massachusetts 01002

Price List:

Subscriptions for New England Political Science Association members (required for POLITY subscribers in New England, New York, Pennsylvania, New Jersey and Delaware): $10.00 annually; non-NEPSA members $9.00; foreign $9.50; student, U.S.A. $5.00; foreign $5.50.
Communications regarding subscriptions should be addressed to the Editor of POLITY.

WESTERN POLITICAL QUARTERLY

The Journal of the Western Political Science Association, the Pacific Northwest Political Science Association, and the Southern California Political Science Association

Donald W. Hanson, Editor
Department of Political Science
University of Utah
Salt Lake City, Utah 84112

Price List:

Subscriptions including membership in the Western Political Science Association:

$9.00 annually; students $5.00 (must be accompanied by department's statement attesting student status); foreign subscribers add $1.00 extra for postage (foreign subscribers may deduct 10% if draft payable in U.S. dollars).

Non-member subscriptions are $7.00 annually; foreign subscribers add $1.00.

Communications regarding subscriptions and membership in the Western Political Science Association should be addressed to Paul R. Murray, Secretary-Treasurer, WPSA, Department of Government, Sacramento State College, Sacramento, California 95819. Non-member subscriptions should be sent to the Editor of the WESTERN POLITICAL QUARTERLY.

1973
APSA Biographical Directory

The sixth edition of the APSA Biographical Directory will be published in December and copies may now be ordered for January 1973 delivery. The Directory will include complete, up-to-date names and addresses of approximately 12,500 individual APSA members as well as biographical information on over 7,000 political scientists. The Directory will include appendices classifying members by geographical location and fields of interest.

ORDER FORM

NAME: ____________________

ADDRESS: ____________________

____________________ ZIP ____________

PRICE LIST

APSA MEMBERS:	☐ Hardback, $10.00
	☐ Paperback, $7.50
NON-MEMBERS:	☐ Hardback, $15.00
	☐ Paperback, $12.50

Send form with payment (prepaid) to:

1973 APSA Biographical Directory
1527 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D. C. 20036

The International Political Science Association Invitation to Membership

The International Political Science Association welcomes political scientists as members. The Association, founded in 1949, is composed of three categories of members: individuals, institutions and national associations.

Membership in the Association of $10.00 a year entitles members to receive the Newsletter giving information about IPSA activities and meetings; to purchase material published under IPSA auspices—including the International Bibliography of Political Science, published annually by Stevens in London and sets of papers submitted at IPSA meetings at reduced cost; and to register at IPSA meetings at lower rates.

Individual members who pay a higher membership fee of $12.00 a year are, in addition, entitled to receive either the International Political Science Abstracts published quarterly by Basil Blackwell at Oxford or the International Social Science Journal, the quarterly organ of the Department of Social Sciences of UNESCO. To join the Association send your name and check to the International Political Science Association, 27 rue Saint-Guillaume, Paris 7e, France.

JUST PUBLISHED BY APSA

A GUIDE TO GRADUATE STUDY IN POLITICAL SCIENCE
1972

The first authoritative compilation of Ph.D. and Masters programs in political science, containing information on admissions policies, costs and financial aid, and fields of specialization.

$2.50 (prepaid)

Available Direct From:

American Political Science Association
1527 New Hampshire Ave., N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036


THE HAWAII HOCHI
The Star
AILY WOR
The Tokyo Nichi Nichi
Truth
WAR NEWS
CENSORSHIP
PROPAGANDA
COMMUNIQUE
RUMOR
Looking for the Well Known Needle

Arno Press Announces the Publication of

INTERNATIONAL PROPAGANDA AND COMMUNICATIONS

A 31 title reprint collection which traces the role of communications media — newspaper, film, radio, television, telephone, telegraph — in international diplomatic relations and crises during the last decades of the 19th and early years of the 20th century.

International Propaganda and Communications is edited by Christopher H. Sterling, Professor of Communications at Temple University. He is editor of the *Journal of Broadcasting* and *BBB: A Mass Media Publications Reporting Service.*

Serving on the editorial advisory board are:
Morris Janowitz, Professor of Sociology, University of Chicago
John M. Kittross, Professor of Communications and Assistant Dean, Temple University
Bruce Lannes Smith, Professor of Political Science, Michigan State University

For a complete descriptive brochure of this collection, write to:

ARNO PRESS
A New York Times Company
330 Madison Avenue
New York, N.Y. 10017


"I ASSURE YOU AGAIN AND AGAIN AND AGAIN THAT NO AMERICAN BOYS WILL BE SACRIFICED ON FOREIGN BATTLEFIELDS."
FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT
OCT 31, 1940
中國朋友：
我們的飛行員
ЭКОНОМИ
ЖИ
ВЕЧЕРН
МОСКВА
ЗА ИНДУСТРИАЛИЗАЦИЮ
ПРАВ

INSTITUTIONS AND IDEOLOGIES IN TWO BOOKS FROM ADDISON-WESLEY

Government in American Society, Second Edition by Eugene P. Dvorin and Arthur J. Misner, California State University, Los Angeles. This introductory American government text is purposely short to allow the student to grasp quickly the essentials of the American system of government and allow the instructor more flexibility in determining course emphasis and choosing supplementary reading. The revision gives more emphasis to civil liberties, behaviorism and voting patterns, and interstate relations, and less to reapportionment, than the original text.

In press—ready March

Containment and the Cold War: American Foreign Policy Since 1945 edited by Thomas G. Paterson, University of Connecticut. This reader focuses on the containment doctrine and the central role of its chief architect, interpreter, and later critic, George F. Kennan. The readings trace the historical development of the doctrine and debates over containment or disengagement in Europe in the 1950's and Asia in the 1960's, and speculation on the status of the doctrine in the 1970's. Among the 13 authors of articles in this reader are Kennan, Acheson, Kissinger, Dulles, Rusk, Lippmann, and Fulbright.

In press—ready February

Write to Mary Clare McEwing for your examination copies.

Addison-Wesley
PUBLISHING COMPANY, INC.
Reading, Massachusetts 01867
THE SIGN OF EXCELLENCE

SOCIAL CHANGE AND URBAN POLITICS: READINGS

DANIEL N. GORDON, University of Oregon—This new text contains selections dealing with changes in various areas of urban politics. Some of the areas covered are the changes in formal and informal leadership, changes in governmental structure, changes in mass participation, and recent developments in urban politics.
1973 approx. 320 pp. paper $5.95 (013-815712-X); cloth $9.95 (013-815738-3)

DILEMMAS OF POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

Edited by ROBERT T. GOLEMBIEWSKI, J. MALCOLM MOORE, and JACK RABIN—This volume deals with major issues associated with political participation, as both concepts and experiences. Simulations throughout the book confront the student with situations—as in simulated jury duty, where he can experience various varieties of political participation. 1973 approx. 320 pp. $4.95 (013-214262-7)

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION:

Prentice-Hall
ROBERT JORDAN, DEPT. J-520,
ENGLEWOOD CLIFFS, NEW JERSEY 07632

NEW PAPERBACKS FROM PRAEGER

INSIDE THE SYSTEM

A *Washington Monthly* Book

Third Edition

Edited by Charles Peters and John Rothchild

Soon after the publication of the first edition of INSIDE THE SYSTEM, teachers of American government discovered that this anthology has a special value for the classroom – it provides a lively, yet effective way to show students how our political system works. The writers of *The Washington Monthly,* in displaying their unusual talent for getting under the skin of American politics, reveal how the principles of American government are often lost when politicians and bureaucrats attempt to put them into practice.

January, 1973 352 pp. ca. $3.95

COMPARING POLITICAL SYSTEMS

Jean Blondel

Jean Blondel's previous writings on comparative government are already well known and widely respected by members of the profession. IN COMPARING POLITICAL SYSTEMS, Dr. Blondel turns his attention to the undergraduate taking a first course in comparative government and politics. This concise volume, which is ideally suited as a core book for use with other paperbacks, lays the groundwork for the study of specific countries by introducing students to the scope and purpose of comparative government.

October, 1972 270 pp. $3.50

praeger

College Department,
111 Fourth Avenue, New York 10003

MAN, STATE, AND SOCIETY IN THE SOVIET UNION

Edited by Joseph L. Nogee

The successes, problems, and tensions of contemporary Soviet society are juxtaposed against the Soviet ideological heritage in the selections chosen for this book. Among the topics covered are political and judicial processes, bureaucratic structure, Communist Party and state apparatus, rural change, and family, intellectual, and minority life.

November, 1972 608 pp. $5.95

AN INTRODUCTION TO CHINESE POLITICS

Harold C. Hinton

This concise, authoritative book by a leading scholar meets a longstanding need for an introductory text on Chinese politics, but its original interpretations will also interest scholars. Professor Hinton provides three incisive chapters on political history from 1949 to 1972 as background for his analysis of ideology, leadership, the Party, the state, the army, techniques of political action, the economy, the people, foreign policy and foreign relations, Taiwan, and the outlook for the future.

March, 1973 ca. 336 pp. ca. $3.95

JAPAN AND EAST ASIA: The New International Order

Donald C. Hellmann

As the third greatest world economic power, Japan will play an increasing role in East and Southeast Asia in the 1970's. In this stimulating and controversial book, the author discusses the internal and external political, economic, and security factors that are likely to lead Japan to develop nuclear weapons, and he analyzes the shape of the developing East Asian regional system.

October, 1972 255 pp. $2.95

Now in Paper—

The new Second Edition of the text with a "political culture" approach

THE AMERICAN DEMOCRACY

By C. Peter Magrath, The University of Nebraska; Elmer E. Cornwell, Jr., Brown University; and Jay S. Goodman, Wheaton College, Massachusetts

In response to scores of requests the new Second Edition of *The American Democracy* has been extensively revised and now appears in paperback. It contains several new chapters and, as before, is designed as a basic text for freshman and sophomore American government courses. The text includes structural aspects of government and the processes by which political decisions are made; it devotes more attention to "political culture" and "public policy" than any other current textbook in the field. Adhering to a "critical pluralism" point of view, the authors point out how competing groups can balance each other, and show evidence of unequal opportunities for many citizens. The case studies opening each chapter again appear in this edition. Along with many tables, graphs, cartoons and charts the authors include lists of suggested readings.

1973, approx. 736 pages, paper, prob. $6.95

". . . this is a competent and professional manuscript. . . . Its great strength is its readability; it is definitely one of the two or three best-written textbooks I have read in recent years. Students should enjoy it and for that reason it is likely to be an effective teaching tool. . . . I like the idea of a political culture approach to the subject. It is likely to make much more sense to the students than the systems analysis framework which pervades many other books."
—*Joel B. Grossman, University of Wisconsin*

"Very readable, excellent case studies and competent authorship—just a superb text!"
—*Lynn Brenneman, Cleary College (Michigan)*

The controversial new text that has been stimulating students across the country

THE PERVERTED PRIORITIES OF AMERICAN POLITICS

By Duane Lockard, Chairman of the Department of Politics,
Princeton University

Why do we pay wealthy farmers billions of dollars for not planting while millions of poor go hungry? Why is this one of the last major nations to adopt a government-supported health plan? Professor Lockard raises these and other disturbing questions in a unique discussion of the moral dimensions of political decisions and structures. Designed for introductory American government courses, the text focuses on the major institutions of government: parties, federalism, Congress, the courts and the presidency. Each of these institutions is examined in light of its contribution to what the author, after twenty years of teaching and writing about politics, regards as perverted priorities.

Adhering strictly to the canons of scholarship, the author has striven for objectivity, but, as he points out: "There is no such thing as scientific neutrality when dealing with moral and political issues of the kind set forth here."

1971, 337 pages, paper, $4.95

"Excellent! Just what is needed. Main strengths: comprehensive, incisive, readable. Will make the basic American Government course more interesting and challenging." —*Leigh E. Grosenick, University of Virginia, Charlottesville*

"It's about time someone wrote this book. Duane Lockard has written an exciting and relevant text." —*Gerald A. Weiner, Loyola University of Chicago*

"Excellent. Passionate in its feelings, but lucid in its insights."
—*Robert Melson, Michigan State University*

For further information write to:

THE MACMILLAN COMPANY
Department C, Riverside, New Jersey 08075
In Canada, write to Collier-Macmillan Canada, Ltd., 1125B Leslie Street, Don Mills, Ontario

Significant New Political Science Texts from Macmillan

CONCEPTS IN POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY

Edited by Richard E. Flathman, The University of Chicago

Professor Flathman's anthology is designed as the main text for courses in political philosophy. Representing the newer "conceptual" approach to teaching political theory, it aims a the discussion and clarification of a number of concepts and terms used in political discourse. This type of analysis has prevailed among contemporary political theorists for fifty years.

1973, approx. 600 pages, prob. $10.95

THE RELATIONS OF NATIONS Fourth Edition

By Frederick H. Hartmann, Naval War College

The new Fourth Edition presents, as did the earlier editions, a systematic overview of the field of international relations. A careful and consistent blending of theory with factual content and analysis equips the student with a framework for understanding developments in world politics. The new edition has been thoroughly revised, and each chapter has been reworked to include detailed coverage and interpretation of events and issues since the publication of the previous edition in 1967.

1973, approx. 700 pages, prob. $9.95

WORLD IN CRISIS Fourth Edition

By Frederick H. Hartmann, Naval War College

This reader is designed to accompany Professor Hartmann's basic text in international politics—*The Relations of Nations,* Fourth Edition. It contains enough material to provide supplementary reading of Professor Hartmann's, or any other basic text. There are 42 selections, 28 appearing for the first time. This is a very thorough revision.

1973, approx. 432 pages, paper, prob. $4.95

WAR AND POLITICS

By Bernard Brodie, University of California, Los Angeles

1973, approx. 400 pages, prob. $8.95

GHETTO REVOLTS:
The Politics of Violence in American Cities

By Joe R. Feagin, University of Texas at Austin, and
Harlan Hahn, University of California, Riverside

1973, approx. 320 pages, prob. $8.95

Macmillan's Other Timely Texts

COMPARATIVE POLITICAL SYSTEMS Managing Conflict

By Morton Gorden, Development Sciences, Inc.

The author identifies the major variables involved in the management of conflict and creates a general model applicable to political systems of the United States, Japan, India, France, Britain, China, and the Soviet Union.

1972, 284 pages, paper, $3.95

POLITICAL THEORY AND POLITICAL SCIENCE
Studies in the Methodology of Political Inquiry

By Martin Landau, University of California, Berkeley

This text for courses in political analysis is one of the very few books devoted exclusively to political inquiry. Focusing on current issues, it examines the arguments which have been urged against the scientific study of politics.

1972, 256 pages, $6.95

AN INTRODUCTION TO AMERICAN GOVERNMENT Second Edition

By Erwin L. Levine, Skidmore College, and Elmer E. Cornwell, Jr., Brown University

This introductory text provides a brief, lucid, and descriptive overview of American national government. The Second Edition continues to focus on the structural, organizational, and procedural aspects of government. A unique chapter on the military establishment is now included, along with much new material.

1972, 270 pages, paper, $4.25

THE CONSENT OF THE GOVERNED Third Edition

By John C. Livingston and Robert G. Thompson, both, Sacramento State College

Designed for students of American government and theories of democracy, this extensive revision argues that there is a serious crisis in American politics—a crisis stemming from a gap between traditional democratic ideals and American pluralistic political practice.

1971, 562 pages, $8.95

THE DISSENT OF THE GOVERNED Readings on the Democratic Process

Edited by John C. Livingston and Robert G. Thompson, both, Sacramento State College

This book of readings may be used with any introductory American government text, but is especially effective with *The Consent of the Governed,* Third Edition. The 62 selections help students define and judge for themselves the current crisis in American politics.

1972, 416 pages, paper, $5.25

COMPARATIVE POLITICS A Distributive Approach

By Alexander J. Groth, University of California, Davis

This text analyzes the dispensation of various "political goods" or outputs by democratic and authoritarian political systems, and examines the significance of these outputs to the systems as a whole.

1971, 289 pages, paper, $4.95

FIVE LATIN AMERICAN NATIONS A Comparative Political Study

By Peter Ranis, York College of The City University of New York

Designed for courses in Latin American government, this text studies political change since independence in Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, Chile, and Peru. It examines contemporary levels of political development; the role of political culture, systems, and forces; and the sociological and economic obstacles to modernization.

1971, 337 pages, paper, $4.25

For further information write to:

THE MACMILLAN COMPANY, Department C, Riverside, New Jersey 08075
In Canada, write to Collier-Macmillan Canada, Ltd., 1125B Leslie Street, Don Mills, Ontario

New from Columbia

PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE SECRETARIES-GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS
Volume 2: Dag Hammarskjöld, 1953-1956
ANDREW W. CORDIER AND WILDER FOOTE, EDITORS
The second volume in this series, and the first of four to be devoted to Hammarskjöld, covers a key period in his development of the office and its influence on the foreign policy of all nations. $22.50

JOHN FOSTER DULLES:
A Statesman and His Times
MICHAEL A. GUHIN
A reassessment of Dulles which shows a man above all responsive to his times, whose approach was constructed on the pragmatic standards of statesmanship and was not distorted by moralistic premises or narrow ideological considerations. $12.95

POLITICAL GROUPING IN THE CZECHOSLOVAK REFORM MOVEMENT
VLADIMIR KUSIN
A detailed study of the many politically active groups in the Prague Spring of 1968. Reform-oriented, the groups rigidly opposed a new kind of Communist control, but had no time to establish other organizational patterns.
Political and Social Processes in Eastern Europe $11.00

SOCIAL CHANGE AND STRATIFICATION IN POSTWAR CZECHOSLOVAKIA
JAROSLAV KREJCI
A study of basic changes in the structure of Czechoslovak society after World War II. The measures responsible for ethnic and socio-economic changes are reviewed; stratification patterns are analyzed in economic, legal, and social terms.
Political and Social Processes in Eastern Europe $11.00

JEWISH NOBLES AND GENIUSES IN MODERN HUNGARY
WILLIAM O. McCAGG, JR.
A stimulating essay in social history that attempts to analyze the reasons why Hungary's nineteenth and early twentieth century bourgeosie gave birth to a generation of internationally-known scientists.
East European Monographs $9.00

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS
Address for orders: 136 South Broadway, Irvington, New York 10533

NEW PERSPECTIVES

ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL STRATEGIC SYSTEM

edited by RICHARD ROSECRANCE; Cornell University

"...clearly the top choice for rigorously analytical essays on the strategic implications of a number of foreseeable developments in the international system."—Vincent Davis, *University of Kentucky*

This study deals with the probable transformation of the present bipolar international system based on nuclear weapon capability into a multi-nuclear system in the future. Two basic questions are considered—"What will a multipolar strategic world be like? And, what can be done to insure stability despite nuclear proliferation?"

1972, 219 pp., $4.75 (paper)

SYSTEMS AND ACTORS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

edited by LeROY GRAYMER, University of California, Berkeley

*Two major conceptual frameworks provide the focus of this book. The first uses selected historical materials to illus*trate how "systems concepts" can clarify the general pattern of relations among nations. In the second framework, case studies involving different political systems show how internal political processes and the backgrounds of national leaders help shape foreign policy decision-making. **1972, 202 pp., $2.95 (paper), $5.50 (cloth)**

ON POLICY-MAKING

PUBLIC POLICYMAKING REEXAMINED

by YEHEZKEL DROR, Hebrew University

"It is especially gratifying to me to see a new wave of concern for an approach to policy that is at once fully contextual, problem-oriented, and methodologically differentiated."

—Harold D. Lasswell, POLICY SCIENCES (March 1972).

1968, 379 pp., $9.00 (cloth)

THE WHITE MAN'S BURDEN

by MATTHEW HOLDEN, JR., University of Wisconsin, Madison

This book offers concrete proposals for achieving social peace through interracial accommodation in the United States today. These proposals deal specifically with such areas as: political economy, public safety including arms control, and politics. ***January 1973, approx. 293 pp., $5.95 (paper)***

THE PENTAGON PAPERS AND THE COURTS: A SURVEY IN FOREIGN POLICY-MAKING AND FREEDOM OF THE PRESS

edited by MARTIN SHAPIRO, Harvard University

The people's right to know versus the desire of an administration to conduct its foreign policy in secret poses a chronic problem for democratic governments. In this detailed examination of the recent conflict over publication of the Pentagon Papers by the **New York Times** and the **Washington Post**, Professor Shapiro shows the difficulties and complications involved in protecting the people's right and, at the same time, providing the government with the right to perform its duties with discretion. **1972, 131 pp., $2.95 (paper)**

AN INTRODUCTION TO SUPREME COURT DECISION-MAKING: REVISED AND EXPANDED EDITION

by HAROLD J. SPAETH, Michigan State University

A self-contained explanation of Supreme Court decision-making is presented within a context which emphasizes the political features of Supreme Court activity. **1972, 87 pp., $1.95 (paper)**

VIOLENT CONFLICT IN AMERICAN SOCIETY

by LYNNE B. IGLITZIN, University of Washington

Professor Iglitzin probes the root causes of violence in American society and discusses its impact on our political system. She examines the attitudes conducive to violence with special emphasis on racism and sexism, and the peculiar double standard that has been applied to violence in American history. **1972, 164 pp., $2.95 (paper)**

TOWARD A NEW PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION: THE MINNOWBROOK PERSPECTIVE

edited by FRANK MARINI, Syracuse University

A group of distinguished young public administration specialists considers the innovations and developments that are reshaping the study and practice of public administration in the United States today.

1971, 372 pp., $4.50 (paper), $7.00 (cloth)

PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION IN A TIME OF TURBULENCE

edited by DWIGHT WALDO, Syracuse University

This collection of essays provides new perspectives on public administration problems in the United States in a period of rapid change and social disintegration. **1971, 310 pp., $4.50 (paper)**

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION, WRITE:

CHANDLER PUBLISHING COMPANY
An Intext Publisher
257 PARK AVENUE SOUTH, NEW YORK, N.Y. 10010

more ¢¢ible texts

American Government and Politics:
A Critical Introduction
Blanche Blank, *Professor of Social Sciences, CUNY — Hunter College*

This book weaves together three major ingredients: a concise but comprehensive description of American political institutions, an overview of contemporary conflicts about the way in which these institutions are operating, and an argument about the style of thinking that can most usefully be adopted in analyzing and changing them. The two central questions on which the book focuses are the two questions that are central to modern political consciousness: To what extent do our political institutions actually provide the services we require of them and how can their effectiveness be increased? To what extent are those institutions genuinely responsive to the needs of each of us, and how can the sensitivity and promptness of their response be improved?

By beginning with a description of the discipline of political science and its own internal controversies, the author makes clear her own biases and those of the field. She delineates the ambiguities and tensions that surround our basic political myths, including a full discussion of the Constitution and the contradictory values embodied in it. Succeeding chapters are organized around the policy-making institutions of our government: the judiciary, legislature, executive public bureaucracy, and our system of pressure groups and political parties.

The book will be invaluable to students and others seeking a brief, literate and comprehensive overview of the American political system; it describes the basic institutional facts, the analytical styles, and the current controversies surrounding our political life. At the same time, a unique and provocative point of view is ventured throughout, providing for the reader (whether instructor, political theorist, or interested participant) a foil for argument, a position to attack or defend, or as a basis for further considerations of the various serious issues that we and our nation confront.
256 pp. $9.75, cloth $2.95, paper. March

Aldine Publishing Co.
529 South Wabash Avenue
Chicago, Illinois 60605

from Aldine

Power and Politics in Africa
Henry L. Bretton, Professor of
Political Science, SUNY—Brockport
408 pp. $12.50, cloth $5.95, paper. March



HARVARD UNIVERSITY
FACULTY OF ARTS AND SCIENCES

DEPARTMENT OF GOVERNMENT
CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS 02138

April 14th, 1972

Dear Mr. Morin:

Henry Bretton has produced a first-class manucript on African political systems. The unique features of the study are manifold, among them being:

1. A clear specification of the material constraints within which different types of African states operate. This specification is not, moreover, merely descriptive but conceptual and functional.
2. The interplay, rather than divergence, of tradition and modernity is stressed throughout.
3. What African elites articulate as self-serving descriptions of their actions and decisions are treated critically. Here the manuscript displays a level of realism and intellectual courage (honesty) that is rare in writings on African political systems.
4. The behavioral constraints on political actors and groups are delineated and disected, viewed always in comparative perspective.
5. In all parts of the manuscript the political system as such is kept clearly in focus while specific attributes are given detailed examination. The result is that the system qua system is never lost sight of.
6. The writing is thoroughly high-level and rigorous, though always comprehensible to the non-expert reader. In this the manuscript serves at one and the same time the student and the expert on African political affairs.

I conclude, then, that Henry Bretton's manuscript fills a wider range of purposes than any book currently available in African political systems. As such it stands out as a text book; it should capture a large section of the market for serious texts in African Studies. Aldine can undertake publication of this manuscript with solid expection of good, steady sales.

Yours sincerely,

Martin Kilson

Martin Kilson
Professor of Government

Images of Society

Essays on the Sociological Theories of Tocqueville, Marx, and Durkheim

Gianfranco Poggi. In this collection of essays, the author investigates various aspects of the sociological theories of Tocqueville, Marx, and Durkheim that have not previously been explored in detail. Through an interpretive reading of selected writings, he shows how these ideas can make a substantial contribution to contemporary sociological theory. $8.95

Atencingo

The Politics of Agrarian Struggle in a Mexican Ejido

David Ronfeldt. This detailed political study, extending from the 1920's to 1969, examines one of the largest and most productive cooperatives in Mexico. The author focuses on a long series of struggles among the peasants, powerful economic interests and government officials for control of the ejido's valuable lands and production. $10.00

Politics and Privilege in a Mexican City

Richard R. Fagen and William S. Tuohy. Breaking with the dominant tradition of community political studies, the authors of this analysis of politics in Jalapa, the capital of Veracruz, ask not so much who governs as how the city is governed—for whose benefit and with what consequences for the institutions, social classes, and individuals involved. $8.50.

Government and Politics in Kuomintang China, 1927–1937

Hung-mao Tien. This volume analyzes the Nationalists' political and administrative institutions in both the capital and the provinces, covering such topics as leadership, recruitment, and finances. It seeks to identify the country's political elites, to show how they operated, and to assess their performance in terms of the regime's goals of national unity and political order. $8.95

Stanford University Press

"Provocative thinking about today's political ideas and attitudes and where they are leading us."

—THE WASHINGTON MONTHLY

TOOTHING STONES: Rethinking the political

edited by Robert E. Meagher

14 essayists view the future of American politics and see that it is not parties, issues or candidates that are at stake, but the political dimension itself. Included are:

Obscenity and Common Sense:
Toward a Redefinition of
"Community" and "Individuality"
George Anastaplo

The Reformed University as a Third
Force in American Life
William Arrowsmith

Accounting for a Political
Generation
Elinor B. Bachrach

Slough of Unamiable Liars,
Bog of Stupidities
Joseph M. Duffy

Privacy, Libertarian Dreams,
and Politics
E. A. Goerner

A Dream Gone Rancid
John G. Hessler

In Defense of Political Liberalism
David Little

For As Long As It Takes
Allard K. Lowenstein

Creativity and Fatigue in Public Life
Robert C. Neville

In Defense of Politics
William Pfaff

America the Perpetual Adolescent
L. John Roos

The Arts of Resistance
D. S. Carne-Roos

On Public Consciousness and the
Revisioning of Political Life
Douglas E. Sturm

The Possibility of Political Morality
Aldo Tassi

Reading copies available.
($3.95 paperback coming Fall 1973)

$7.95 postpaid from

THE SWALLOW PRESS INC.
1139 S. WABASH AVENUE CHICAGO, ILLINOIS 60605

Children and War

Political Socialization to International Conflict

HOWARD TOLLEY, JR.

An engrossing study of children's beliefs about war in general and their attitudes toward and knowledge about the Vietnam conflict.

1972 274 pp. Cloth, $9.50 Paper, $4.95

TEACHERS COLLEGE PRESS
1234 Amsterdam Avenue • New York, N. Y. 10027

NATION OF CHANGE

The American Democratic System

By JOHN P. CARNEY / This introductory text describes past and present functions of American government institutions and shows how these functions are linked to political and social problems. The book reflects recent changes in the political system, and, although it is not radical in approach, it discusses where the system breaks down. 1972/496 pages/paper/$5.95.
Study Guide: $2.95. **Instructor's Manual.**

FROM AMORAL TO HUMANE BUREAUCRACY

By EUGENE P. DVORIN and ROBERT H. SIMMONS / Written as a response to the growing dissatisfaction with present administrative structures, this text offers a critical analysis of the uses of executive power and bureaucratic institutions and stresses the need for evaluating our institutions in terms that reflect human values as opposed to the single value of efficiency. November, 1972/128 pages/paper/$2.50.

CANFIELD PRESS / **A Department of Harper & Row**
850 Montgomery Street
San Francisco, Calif. 94133

Policy Sciences

Policy analysis, systems approaches and decisionmaking

Editor:
E.S. QUADE,
The RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, Calif., U.S.A.

Assistant Editor:
K.A. ARCHIBALD,
University of Washington, Seattle, Wash., U.S.A.

Book Review Editor:
Y. DROR,
The Hebrew University, Jerusalem, Israel

Chairman, International Advisory Board:
H.D. LASSWELL,
City University of New York, N.Y., U.S.A.

The objectives of this journal are threefold. First, to aid in the improvement of policymaking systems and capacities. Second, to promote the policy sciences, to encourage actively the mingling of the decision sciences with the behavioral sciences and the development of a new interdisciplinary activity. Third, to provide a forum for papers in the various policy science disciplines – political science, sociology, operations research, statistical decision theory, etc. The book review section will provide an annotated bibliography and a comprehensive review of new literature in the policy sciences.

SOME PAPERS BEING PUBLISHED IN VOLUME 3, NUMBERS 1 and 2:

Management Strategy for Economic and Social Development: Part II
Bertram M. Gross, New York, N.Y.

Toward a Framework for National Goals and Policy Research
Roy C. Amara, Menlo Park, Calif.

Measuring Unnecessary Delay in Administrative Proceedings: The Actual Versus the Predicted
Stuart S. Nagel, Urbana, Ill.

The Future of Crime in the United States from Now to the Year 2000
Joseph F. Coates, Washington, D.C.

Policy Sciences: A New Supradiscipline and Its Implications
Douglas R. Bunker, Buffalo, N.Y.

Reforming Rent Control in New York City: The Role of Research in Policy
Ira S. Lowry, Santa Monica, Calif.

Demo-Speci-Ocracy
Archie J. Bahm, Albuquerque, New Mexico

More on Health Care Paradoxes
Jon M. Joyce, Middletown, Conn.

Commonly Ignored Elements in Policymaking
Sir Geoffrey Vickers, Reading, England

Toward Formal Valuation of Scientific Research Projects: A Case Study in Population Control
Julian L. Simon, Urbana, Ill.

Selective Adaption
Dr. Jean A. Millar, Stockholm, Sweden

Multi- and Inter-Disciplinary Research – Problems of Initiation, Control, Integration and Reward
James McEvoy III, Davis, Calif.

One volume of four issues per year.
Volume 3 - 1972.
Institutional subscriptions: Dfl. 77.00, US$24.50 or £9.30. Personal subscriptions: Dfl. 45.50, US$14.20 or £5.50. Volumes 1 and 2 are still available at Dfl. 74.70 or US$23.50 or £9.00 per volume.

Cornell
University
Press

NEW AND RECENT
POLITICAL SCIENCE BOOKS
FROM CORNELL...

From Village to State in Tanzania

The Politics of Rural Development

By CLYDE R. INGLE. This study explores the crucial question of how an underdeveloped country's political system can effectively promote modernization in rural areas. By examining the political linkages between village systems and the national system in Tanga and Handeni Districts of Tanzania, the author assesses the grass-roots response to President Nyerere's program for independent and self-reliant development. $12.50

The Politics of Jacksonian Finance

By JOHN M. McFAUL. Emphasizing the central role played by party politics, this book analyzes the major banking and currency controversies of the Jacksonian era. The author describes the aims, actual operation, and successes and failures of Jacksonian banking policy. He argues convincingly that political rather than economic considerations determined the shaping of this policy. $9.75

Power and Resistance

The Colonial Heritage in Latin America

By SAKARI SARIOLA. The patterns of social and political life in Latin America from the Conquest to independence provide the framework for this ambitious study of power and change. The author indicates how those in power during any period maintain the legitimacy of the system and its unity, and he examines the strategies and compromises they use. $9.50

A new Agora Paperback

Medieval Political Philosophy

A Sourcebook

Edited by RALPH LERNER and MUHSIN MAHDI. For students of political philosophy, the history of religion, and medieval civilizations, this book provides a rich storehouse of medieval thought. "Twenty-five important works . . . give the student an appreciation at once broad and deep of the political themes treated by the three religious communities of Islam, Judaism, and Christianity." —*Catholic Historical Review.* $4.95 paper

Cornell University Press
ITHACA AND LONDON

CQ PAPERBACK TEXTS FOR 1973

The CQ Guide is an up-to-date handbook for the study of American government. It provides the most useful and instructional of actual CQ Weekly Report material, selected especially for classroom use. It is revised and updated twice yearly—in August and December—enabling the editors to include reports on the most recent significant developments in government and politics, and still have the CQ Guide in the hands of your students at the beginning of each quarter.

Spring edition available:
January 3, 1973



CQ GUIDE

CURRENT AMERICAN GOVERNMENT

Fall 1972

1972 Presidential Election • Nixon, McGovern Biographies • Party Platforms
Electoral College • 92nd Congress Legislation • Supreme Court • Lobbying

CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY • 1735 K STREET, N.W. • WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006
$3.00

Contents of the Spring 1973 CQ Guide will include: Results of Elections '72 ● Record of the 92nd Congress ● Nixon's Fourth Year ● Supreme Court Term ● Washington Lobby Report.

***plus: Glossary of Congressional Terms ● How a Bill Becomes Law ● Text of* Constitution**

January 3, 1973 about 150 pages 8½" x 11" $3.00

Also:

THE POWER OF THE PENTAGON	**$5.00**
CHINA and U.S. Foreign Policy	**$4.00**
POLITICS IN AMERICA Edition IV	**$4.00**
THE WASHINGTON LOBBY	**$4.00**

announcing

America Votes 9

A Handbook of Contemporary Election Statistics. Compiled and edited by Richard M. Scammon. Official results for the 1970 votes. July 1972. Hardbound. $22.50
Not a part of the regular CQ Service.

CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY INC.

1735 K St., N.W. Washington, D.C. 20006

A Range of '72-'73 Publications

THE MIDDLE EAST: Its Governments and Politics
Abid A. Al-Marayati, University of Toledo, and others

A team-written, comprehensive and thoroughly interdisciplinary text on the political systems of the Middle East.

July 1972. 512 pages, clothbound. Glossary. Maps. Annotated bibliographies.

THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF POLITICAL LIFE
edited by *Samuel A. Kirkpatrick*, University of Oklahoma, and *Lawrence K. Pettit*, Montana State University

A wide-ranging survey of the recent literature on psychology and politics, carefully edited for undergraduate political behavior courses.

September 1972. 550 pages. Paperbound.

REVOLUTION AND POLITICAL CHANGE
edited by *Claude E. Welch Jr.*, and *Mavis Bunker Taintor*, State University of New York at Buffalo

July 1972. 350 pages. Paperbound.

SAVING APPEARANCES: The Reestablishment of Political Science
Henry S. Kariel, University of Hawaii

The case for transactionalism as methodology in political science. One of the truly original thinkers in the profession takes a major step forward in his continuing quest to "redraw the boundaries."

September 1972. 150 pages. Paperbound.

THE RULERS AND THE RULED:
Political Power and Impotence in American Communities, Revised and Abridged

Robert Agger (McMaster University), *Daniel Goldrich* (University of Oregon) and *Bert Swanson* (University of Florida)

A thoroughly *revised, abridged* and *paperbound* edition of a classic study in the analysis of community power.

October 1, 1972. 310 pages. Paperbound.

EVERYMAN'S PRINCE: A Guide to Understanding Your Political Problems
William D. Coplin and *Michael K. O'Leary*, Syracuse University

> *"Would we use it? Yes, we would for our Introductory Course in political science. I think a lot would also recognize its value as a "starter" in Practical Politics."*
> Paul Goodwin, SUNY, College at Oswego

> *"In my opinion it would be used by many who might want a very quick and loose way to capture the student's interest in an introductory course . . . I would use the book in Introductory American (government) along with other books."*
> Robert Craig, University of New Hampshire

May 1972. 128 pages. Paperbound.

. . . from Duxbury Press A Division of Wadsworth Publishing Co., Inc.

POLITICAL IMAGES AND REALITIES: Essays and Readings on the Concepts and Substance of American Politics
edited by *Donald R. Reich* and *Paul A. Dawson*, Oberlin College
A unique text/reader which links concepts used in studying politics, especially American politics, with substantive problems in American government. For introductory courses.
1972. 484 pages. Paperbound.

POLITICS AND ECOLOGY
edited by *Phillip O. Foss*, Colorado State University
A balanced, up-to-date reader on perhaps the most enduring problem of the '70's. A policy-oriented text for introductory courses.
April 1972. 350 pages. Paperbound.

CRIMINAL JUSTICE: Law and Politics
edited by *George Cole*, University of Connecticut
May 1972. 420 pages. Paperbound.

CAMPAIGN FINANCE IN AMERICA
David W. Adamany, University of Wisconsin
June 1972. 330 pages. Paperbound.

FORTHCOMING, SPRING '73

AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY: An Introduction to Analysis and Evaluation
William D. Coplin, Patrick J. McGowan and *Michael K. O'Leary*, Syracuse University

THE PEOPLE, MAYBE: Seeking Democracy in America, 2nd edition
Karl A. Lamb, University of California, Santa Cruz

AMERICAN POLITICS RECONSIDERED: Essays and Readings on Power and Inequities in American Society
Edward S. Greenberg, Indiana University, and *Richard Young*, SUNY, Binghamton

THE SOVIET CRUCIBLE: The Soviet System in Theory and Practice, 4th edition
Samuel Hendel, Trinity College

For review copies and information on these
and other Duxbury titles write:

Duxbury Press
6 Bound Brook Court
North Scituate, Mass. 02060

A Division of Wadsworth Publishing Company, Inc. Belmont, California

FOR YOUR JANUARY CLASSES...

New

A PREFACE TO POLITICS

David F. Schuman, University of Washington

A unique book in which the author talks directly to students beginning the study of political science. There is no attempt at indoctrination. Rather, the student is introduced to a way of thought—to attempt to discover in political terms what it means to live in America today.

Caution to professors: When examining this book, remember that it was written for the student, not for you!

December 1972 *Paper* *200 pages*

Recent and Vital

AMERICAN POLITICS: Policies, Power, and Change

Kenneth M. Dolbeare, University of Washington
Murray J. Edelman, University of Wisconsin

A comprehensive interpretation of American politics that examines the values, institutions, and processes through which power distribution and policies become viable. Instructor's Manual.

1971 *Paper* *506 pages*

New

J. F. KENNEDY AND PRESIDENTIAL POWER

by Earl Latham, Amherst College

1972 Paper 296 pages

New

NONVIOLENT POWER

by Judith Stiehm, University of Southern California

1972 Paper 132 pages

Coming—Spring 1973!

INSTITUTIONS, POLICIES, AND GOALS: A Reader in American Politics

Kenneth M. Dolbeare
Murray J. Edelman,
and Patricia Dolbeare

Politics is viewed through a political economy framework using a good mix of lively journalistic articles, case studies, and scholarly interpretations. The material centers on political and social change and prescription for change.

Spring 1973 *Paper* *304 pages*

For more information on these and other political science texts, call D. C. Heath toll free at:

800-225-1388.

In Massachusetts call 1-800-842-1211.

D.C. Heath and Company

125 Spring Street
Lexington, Massachusetts 02173

4 important new books from the dorsey series in political science

BEHAVIORAL PERSPECTIVES ON AMERICAN POLITICS by Ralph M. Goldman, California State University at San Francisco

To stimulate the student of politics and society to see familiar phenomena in the new ways and new relationships suggested by *contemporary behavioral theory.* Analyzes the major institutions of American national government from the perspectives suggested by a number of behavioral science concepts, such as organization theory, *communication, linguistics, decision making,* yet presents most of the information found in traditional American politics texts.

Paperback

AN INTRODUCTION TO SYSTEMATIC POLITICAL SCIENCE by David H. Everson, Sangamon State University, & Joann P. Paine, Southern Illinois University

A unique orientation: on how to *think* about politics, not on the factual material about the political system. Introduces students to the basic concepts of poiltical science at the introductory level, rather than waiting until upper division courses. The book is organized around concepts and contains a wide range of illustrative material in political science as examples of systematic inquiry.

Paperback

CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: POLITICAL ROLES OF THE SUPREME COURT by Victor G. Rosenblum, Northwestern University, and A. Didrick Castberg, California State University at Los Angeles

Covers the *political* relationships between the Supreme Court and other branches of government, as well as the people and *state and local government. Cases are* arranged by political significance rather than by legal substantive criteria and are not heavily edited to preserve as much of the original decision as possible.

PUBLIC OPINION: MICRO AND MACRO by James J. Best, University of Washington

To better understand micro public opinion, the author has intensively reviewed the political socialization literature and attempted to fit it within a developmental framework, to demonstrate how and why opinions develop.

Macro public opinion focuses on the aggregation and articulation of mass opinions, and concentrates on how, when, and with what impact those opinions can be fed into the policy-making process.

Paperback

Write for examination copies to

DORSEY
contemporary issues
reliable perspectives

THE DORSEY PRESS
HOMEWOOD, ILLINOIS 60430

"Taft emerges in three dimensions all the way." *

Mr. Republican

A BIOGRAPHY OF ROBERT A. TAFT

By James T. Patterson

Brown University

Given full access to the Taft papers, the author has produced the first and only work that can be described as definitive.

Marked by an exceptional intelligence, independence and vigor, Senator Taft appeared to lesser minds a paradox: he was a political conservative yet a strong advocate of public housing, racial justice, and equitable taxation.

Professor Patterson offers a revealing study of the personal and political life of a man who, though denied nomination for the Presidency, was honored as "Mr. Republican" until his tragic and untimely death.

"A well-researched biography of one of the mo important and independent political leaders of th century. Patterson not only analyzes Taft's politic career, but also perceptively delineates his chara ter. Reflecting a mature understanding of the a propriate psychological theories, Patterson mak judgments and interpretations that make this wel written book more than a traditional political bio raphy . . . The book also gives new insight into tl Republican party of the period. Patterson has effe tively used all the appropriate archival and man script collections, including the huge Taft collectio to write this scholarly and so far the best biograph of Taft." — PROF. HUBERT HUMPHREY Library Journ

768 pages • Illustrated with photographs • Index • At your bookseller, $12.50

HOUGHTON MIFFLIN COMPANY

**Publishers Weekl*

British Journal of Political Science

VOLUME 2 PART 2 APRIL 1972

ARTICLES

Community Studies and Decision-Taking. *Theresa Brown, M. J. C. Vile and M. F. Whitemore*

General Theory in Political Science: A Critique of Easton's System Analysis . . . . *Peter Leslie*

Strategic Tensions in the Scale of Political Analysis: An Essay for Philomphalasceptics . . . . *Mark Sproule-Jones*

Ethical Decision Rules for Uncertain Voters . . . . *Norman Schofield*

REVIEW ARTICLE

Biopolitics . . . . *Albert Somit*

NOTES AND COMMENTS

The Impact of the Campaign on the Results of Local Government Elections . . . . *J. M. Bochel and D. T. Denver*

The Measurement of Political Deference—Some Australian Data . . . . *John Ray*

Turnout and Marginality in Local Elections . . . . *K. Newton*

Beliefs About Democracies Among English Adolescents: What Significance Have They? . . . . *David Marsh*

Size of Place and Local Labour Strength . . . . *W. P. Grant*

Single parts £2 net in UK ($6.00 in USA). Subscription price £6 net in UK ($19.50 in USA) for 1972

CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS

Bentley House, 200 Euston Road, London NW1 2DB
American Branch: 32 East 57th Street, New York, N.Y. 10022

Oxford University Press PAPERBACKS

Democracy in Mexico

By PABLO GONZÁLEZ CASANOVA. *Translated by* DANIELLE SALTI. "The best single volume on Mexican society today." —*University Review* GB 367 $1.95

African Liberation Movements

Contemporary Struggles Against White Minority Rule

By RICHARD GIBSON. "An important and controversial book, one that should be widely read and discussed in black studies courses around the country."—BRUCE OUDES, *Washington Post. (Institute of Race Relations.)* GB 376 $2.95

The Arab Cold War

Gamal 'Abd Al-Nasir and His Rivals, 1958-1970: Third Edition

By MALCOLM H. KERR. The interplay of political tactics and ideology in Arab affairs under the dominating influence of Nasir. *(Royal Institute of International Affairs.)* GB 358 $1.95

The Politics of Conformity in Latin America

Edited by CLAUDIO VELIZ. "By far the most stimulating collection . . . on Latin American problems." —*The Economist. (Royal Institute of International Affairs.)* GB 328 $2.25

The Revival of American Socialism

Selected Papers of the Socialist Scholars Conference

Edited by GEORGE FISCHER. Wide-ranging papers on contemporary left-wing thought, including that of the "new imperialism" and neo-marxism. GB 349 $3.50

Woodrow Wilson and World Politics

America's Response to War and Revolution

By N. GORDON LEVIN, JR. Winner of the Bancroft Prize for 1968. "[Describes] brilliantly and perceptively the dynamics and long-range purposes of Wilson's foreign policies."—ARTHUR S. LINK, *N.Y. Times Book Review.* GB 309 $2.50

Origins of the Fifth Amendment

The Right Against Self-Incrimination

By LEONARD W. LEVY. Winner of the Pulitzer Prize for History in 1969. Makes the experience of centuries relevant to the legal process of today. GB 340 $3.95

The United Nations as a Political Institution

Fourth Edition

By H. G. NICHOLAS. This new edition takes fresh stock of the United Nations' development and functioning through its first twenty-five years. GB 105 $1.95

Sun Tzu: The Art of War

Translated and with an Introduction by SAMUEL B. GRIFFITH, *with a Foreword by* B. H. LIDDELL HART. "As relevant a reflection of the Chinese mind as any Confucian classic."—*The Times* (London) GB 361 $1.95

Ujamaa/Essays on Socialism

By JULIUS K. NYERERE. Tanzania's commitment to socialism, expressed in the speeches and writings of its president—"disciplined, dedicated . . . one of the rare 'philosopher Kings.'"—*New Society* GB 359 $1.75

OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS

200 Madison Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10016

Oxford University Press

The New Federalism

By MICHAEL D. REAGAN, *University of California, Riverside.* This incisive, timely analysis of a controversial public issue reassesses the concept of federalism – focusing on grants-in-aid and revenue-sharing as competing approaches to inter-governmental relationships. Professor Reagan examines the Nixon administration's plan, pointing out the weak points and suggesting an alternative policy of "permissive federalism." $5.95

The American Woman

Her Changing Social, Economic, and Political Roles, 1920-1970

By WILLIAM H. CHAFE, *Duke University.* "Carefully researched and clearly written. . . . the first serious study of the developments which have followed the ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment." – Anne Firor Scott, Duke University. "A remarkable job of historical research combined with valid insights into the forces that have made second-class citizens of American women." – Bella S. Abzug $7.95

Booker T. Washington

The Making of a Black Leader, 1859-1901

By LOUIS R. HARLAN, *University of Maryland.* "A magnificent biography of a man protean in all his strengths and weaknesses . . . beautifully written and prodigiously researched." – Arthur S. Link, Princeton University. "Impeccably researched. . . . The definitive biography . . . and a major contribution to the study of black history." – August Meier, Kent State University. *8 pages of halftones.* $10.95

The Politics of Depression

Political Behavior in the Northeast, 1893-1896

By SAMUEL T. McSEVENEY, *Vanderbilt University.* "An important contribution to our rapidly developing understanding of the drastic political shifts of the 1890s. Professor McSeveney has brilliantly combined the latest techniques of statistical analysis with careful study of the writings of political leaders to provide the most plausible explanation of these shifts I have seen so far." –John A. Garraty, Columbia University $9.75

Nuclear Politics

The British Experience with an Independent Strategic Force 1939-1970

By ANDREW J. PIERRE, *Council on Foreign Relations.* The first full analysis of Britain's experience as a nuclear power, studying it in the context of nuclear proliferation. For those "interested in the impact of nuclear science and technology on politics, national policies and international attitudes, Nuclear Politics is a classic. . . . A work of immense scholarship and gripping readability." – *New Scientist* $18.75

African Liberation Movements

Contemporary Struggles Against White Minority Rule

By RICHARD GIBSON. "A useful, concise handbook to Africa's liberation movements." – *The Economist.* "An important and controversial book, one that should be widely read and discussed in black studies courses around the country." – Bruce Oudes, *Washington Post.* (*Published for the Institute of Race Relations*)

Cloth, $9.75. *A Galaxy Book,* GB 376, *paper,* $2.95

OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS
200 Madison Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10016

Oxford University Press

Politics and the Labour Movement in Chile

By ALAN ANGELL. In few Latin American countries has the political role of organized labor been so important as in Chile. In the first part of this book the author outlines the history of Chilean labor, its size, structure, and role in the industrial relations system. The second part examines the activities of Socialists, Communists, Radicals, and Christian Democrats in the trade unions. *Map. (Royal Institute of International Affairs)* $17.00

The Study of International Affairs

Essays in Honour of Kenneth Younger

Edited by ROGER MORGAN. Published in honor of the former Director of Chatham House, this volume of essays reviews the study of international affairs during the fifty years since the Royal Institute of International Affairs was founded. *(Royal Institute of International Affairs)* $17.00

Nuclear Politics

The British Experience with an Independent Strategic Force 1939-1970

By ANDREW J. PIERRE, *Council on Foreign Relations.* The first full analysis of Britain's experience as a nuclear power, studying it in the context of nuclear proliferation. For those "interested in the impact of nuclear science and technology on politics, national policies and international attitudes, NUCLEAR POLITICS is a classic. . . . A work of immense scholarship and gripping readability." – *New Scientist* $18.75

Legal Control of Government

Administrative Law in Britain and the United States

By BERNARD SCHWARTZ, *New York University; and* H. W. R. WADE. In this comparative survey of American and English administrative law, the authors analyze the constitutions and institutions of both countries, economic and social regulations, systems of complaint and information, rule-making, ombudsmen, and the executive as judge, emphasizing administrative procedure and judicial review. $10.25

The Politics of the Powerless

A Study of the Campaign Against Racial Discrimination

By BENJAMIN W. HEINEMAN, JR., *Law Clerk to Associate Justice Potter Stewart, United States Supreme Court.* The brief and bitter history of C.A.R.D., the first multiracial civil rights organization in Britain, from its inception in 1964 to its demise in 1967. *(Institute of Race Relations)* $15.00

The Aberystwyth Papers

International Politics 1919-1969

Edited by BRIAN PORTER. A collection of papers by fourteen leading international scholars, this book is divided into two parts. The first treats the development of international politics and its theory since 1919; the second deals with various aspects of world politics over the past half century. $18.75

OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS
200 Madison Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10016

Oxford University Press

The Impact of Supreme Court Decisions

Empirical Studies *Second Edition*

Edited by THEODORE L. BECKER, *University of Hawaii, and* MALCOLM M. FEELEY, *New York University.* Along with the increasing interest in policy studies within the discipline of political science has come the growth of the sub-field of impact analysis. In keeping with this growth, the editors have thoroughly revised this book; adding nine new selections and a completely new section, "Toward a Theory of Impact."

February 1973 250 pp. paper $2.95

Government Lawlessness in America

Edited by THEODORE L. BECKER *and* VERNON MURRAY, *New York University.* "An unusually useful introduction to the varieties of oppressive experience encountered in the United States. . . . The book is attractively comprehensive and complete. It deals with the major institutional sources of oppression and details the phenomenon of oppression by using material from a wide range of sources. . . . The case study method is a crucial asset."
— JOHN POLLOCK, *Livingston College, Rutgers University*

1971 446 pp. paper $4.95

The New Federalism

By MICHAEL D. REAGAN, *University of California, Riverside.* This incisive, timely analysis of a controversial public issue reassesses the concept of federalism and the significance of Nixon's "New Federalism" in the American political system. It concludes that formal textbook federalism is dead, but that its successor — intergovernmental relations — constitutes a vital and lively arena for federal-state interaction.

1972 (paper, Spring 1973) 192 pp. cloth $5.95 paper $1.50

Freedom and the Court

Civil Rights and Liberties in the United States *Second Edition*

By HENRY J. ABRAHAM, *University of Pennsylvania.* "It is the best up-to-date textual summary of the civil liberties field. Very well written." — STUART S. NAGEL, *University of Illinois.* "Abraham is consistent. *Freedom and the Court,* like his earlier work, *The Judicial Process,* is the best text on this subject. He is crisp, incisive, accurate, and illuminating."
— LEONARD W. LEVY, *Claremont Graduate School*

1972 400 pp. cloth $12.50 paper $3.50

Administering Federalism in a Democracy

By ARTHUR W. MACMAHON, *Columbia University.* "An extremely valuable little book that traces the conversion of American federalism from a legal relationship to an administrative relationship. It should be read by all persons interested in federalism and intergovernmental relations." — GEORGE S. BLAIR, *Claremont Graduate School*

1972 208 pp. cloth $6.50 paper $2.50

A Textbook of Jurisprudence

Fourth Edition

Edited by GEORGE WHITECROSS PATON, *formerly, University of Melbourne, and* DAVID P. DERHAM, *University of Melbourne.* This standard introductory textbook on jurisprudence, first published in 1946, has been revised to include treatment of contemporary issues which draw attention to the relationship of law to morals — homosexuality, obscenity, suicide, and abortion. It also covers controversial economic aspects of modern legislation on such topics as restrictive trade practices and trade unions.

1972 640 pp. $15.00

OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS
200 Madison Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10016

Oxford University Press

Word Politics

Verbal Strategy Among the Superpowers

By THOMAS M. FRANCK *and* EDWARD WEISBAND, *both of the Center for International Studies, New York University.* "A fascinating and highly stimulating study which makes a point of considerable practical significance for U.S. foreign policy. It is cogent, pungent and very well written." – STANLEY HOFFMAN, *Harvard University*

1971 192 pp. cloth $5.95 paper $1.95

International Administration

Its Evolution and Contemporary Applications

Edited by ROBERT S. JORDAN, *State University of New York, Binghamton.* "The volume is a very useful survey on origins and concepts of international administration. Teachers of the field must each have a copy of this carefully presented volume."
– DAVID W. CHANG, *Wisconsin State University*

1971 304 pp. paper $3.95

Multinational Cooperation

Economic, Social, and Scientific Development

Edited by ROBERT S. JORDAN. Eight original essays explain how multinational organizations operate. Each of the first seven essays discusses a specific area of multinational activity, including international administration of space exploration, uses of oceans, the International Monetary Fund and developing countries, and a study of UNESCO. The last essay examines international administration from a behavioral science viewpoint.

1972 415 pp. paper $4.95

In Defense of Sovereignty

Edited by W. J. STANKIEWICZ, *University of British Columbia.* This is not an anthology in the usual sense but a symposium presented as a "round table" discussion, and an important contribution to the debate on sovereignty. Professor Stankiewicz makes a plea for a "neo-classical" approach to the concept conceived as a logical statement ("if there is to be order, then there must be a supreme power") and interpreted in terms of its ability to relate power, obligation and social order to each other.

1969 305 pp. paper $2.95

Between Ideals and Reality

A Critique of Socialism and Its Future

By SVETOZAR STOJANOVIC, *Belgrade University. Translated by* GERSON S. SHER. This important statement by a Yugoslav Marxist uses the principles of Marxism as a tool to examine the so-called Marxist governments in Europe. He sees the "statist myth of socialism" as "the greatest and most influential myth of the twentieth century" and he shows how it grew chiefly out of Stalinism and is now linked with an exploitive class system in many socialist societies.

Spring 1973 230 pp. cloth $7.00 paper $2.95

Canadian and Australian Politics in Comparative Perspective

By HENRY S. ALBINSKI, *Pennsylvania State University.* This book describes the governments of Canada and Australia through a comparative approach. The material is developed within a framework of political processes, and the author analyzes the societal basis for the governments, their political organization, and the processes of public policy.

Spring 1973 448 pp. cloth $12.95

OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS
200 Madison Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10016

PRENTICE-HALL examines today's political scen



AN INTRODUCTION TO POSITIVE POLITICAL THEOR
William H. Riker, University of Rochester, and Peter
Ordeshook, Carnegie-Mellon University. The first cor
prehensive text about decision-theoretic models
political life. Brings together into a coherent system
thought such topics as—game theory, voting theor
spatial models of party competition, and the theory
public goods. 1973/ 400 pp./ 013-493064-9.

IN QUEST OF FREEDOM: American Political Thoug
and Practice, 2nd Edition, 1973. *Alpheus T. Maso*
Princeton University, and Richard H. Leach, Dul
University. Completely revised—Based totally on sourc
materials, the book is organized around issues precip
tating change—from the great debate leading to th
Declaration of Independence to Nixon's "New America
Revolution." 1973/ 432 pp./ 013-453712-2.

STATE COURT SYSTEMS. *Henry R. Glick, Florida Sta*
Univ., and Kenneth N. Vines, SUNY at Buffalo. A con
parative analysis of the study of state court systems i
the U.S. Explores new topics never before considere
in the analysis of state courts, including—the politic
of court organization, the judicial role, and polic
making. 1972/ 128 pp./ paper 013-842997-9.

For more information, please write: Robert Jordan, Dept. J-52
College Division, Prentice-Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, Ne
Jersey 07632

west **EAST**

LEFT **right**

Scientists in the Quest for Peace: A History of the Pugwash Conferences
by J. Rotblat
foreword by H. Alfren
$12.50

War:
Patterns of Conflict
by Richard E. Barringer with the collaboration of Robert K. Ramers
foreword by Quincy Wright
$13.95

War: Patterns of Conflict/ Technical Manual
by Richard E. Barringer
$5.95

History and Class Consciousness:
Studies in Marxist Dialectics
by Georg Lukács
translated by Rodney Living Livingstone
$8.95 hardcover;
$2.95 paperback

The Transformation of Communist Ideology:
The Yugoslav Case, 1945-1953
by A. Ross Johnson
$15.00

The Changing Party Elite in East Germany
by Peter C. Ludz
$12.50

National Science Information Systems: A Guide to Science Information Systems in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Yugoslavia
by David H. Kraus, Pranas Zunde, and Vladimir Slamecka
$12.50

The MIT Press
Massachusetts Institute of
Technology
Cambridge, Massachusetts
02142

PRAEGER SPECIAL STUDIES

THE POSTWAR REARMAMENT OF JAPANESE MARITIME FORCES, 1945-71. *James E. Auer*, Lt. Cmdr., U.S. Navy. Challenges many popular assumptions concerning Japan's naval disarmament, the timing and causes of the rearmament of its maritime forces, and the character and future prospects of these forces. Jan., 1973, 372 pp., maps, tables, charts, bibliog., $21.50.

MODERNIZATION AND POLITICAL-TENSION MANAGEMENT: A SOCIALIST SOCIETY IN PERSPECTIVE—Case Study of Poland. *Dennis Clark Pirages*. Based on opinion studies and original data collected in Poland, analyzes the effects of industrialization on a modernizing socialist country. Examines the social, political, and economic tensions generated despite stress on stabilization and consolidation. 1972, 216 pp., tables, bibliog., $16.50.

CONTEMPORARY BRAZIL: ISSUES IN ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT. Edited by *Jon Rosenbaum* and *William G. Tyler*. An interdisciplinary inquiry by Brazilian and American scholars into such problem areas as foreign trade and external indebtedness, sectoral growth disparities, underdeveloped regions, agrarian reform, inflation, education, the Church, labor movements, urban guerrillas, and population policies. 1972, 460 pp., $20.00.

THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY IN THE 1970's. Edited by *Steven Joshua Warnecke*. Focusing on the EEC as an increasingly important force on the world scene, its potential economic and political developments, scholars and officials from both sides of the Atlantic consider the prospects for cooperation or rivalry between the Community and the U.S., and suggest policy alternatives. 1972, 228 pp., index, $15.00.

SOVIET DECISION-MAKING FOR DEFENSE: A Critique of U.S. Perspectives on the Arms Race. *Matthew P. Gallagher* and *Karl F. Spielmann, Jr.* Points out the difference between Soviet and U.S. defense decision-making systems and shows how assumed analogies between the two can result in misleading conclusions and faulty predictions. Dec., 1972, 112 pp., index, $12.00.

THE POLITICS OF ECONOMIC REFORM IN THE SOVIET UNION. *Abraham Katz*. Based on published Soviet sources and the author's experience as a former Counselor for Economic Affairs at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, this study investigates the politics of the Soviet economic reform program adopted in 1965 and its results through 1971. Includes a survey of economic development in the U.S.S.R. since 1917. 1972, 242 pp., bibliog., $15.00.

order directly from
praeger
111 Fourth Avenue
New York, N.Y. 10003.

POLITICAL KALEIDOSCOPE 1973

UNDERSTANDING AMERICAN POLITICS THROUGH FICTION

Myles L. Clowers and **Lorin Letendre,** both of San Diego City College

Organized around the traditional areas of the American government course, this fascinating anthology of fiction pulls together exciting selections from the novels of such authors as Dos Passos, Burdick, Bullins, Michener, Rand, Drury, Knebel, Pearson, Hadley and Wambaugh all keen observers of the American political system.

276 pages, paper. Instructor's Manual

POLITICAL AND SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY:

Traditional and Contemporary Readings

J. Charles King and **James A. McGilvray,** both of Pomona College

An anthology offering a balanced selection of writings by historical and contemporary academic authors together with the works of more popular writers who deal with issues of special current interest. Chosen for their flexibility and scope, these readings provide instructors with approaches to teach political philosophy in any manner they wish.

544 pages, cloth

THE UNITED STATES IN WORLD AFFAIRS

Paul Seabury, University of California, Berkeley

As a supplement in American government courses, this brief U.S. foreign policy text emphasizes long-range policy decisions and the spectrum of possibilities involved in policy decision-making. It delineates the kinds of necessities, resources, options, as well as the constraints on the exercise of influence and power which play upon the United States as a super-power.

144 pages, paper and cloth

CONGRESSIONAL POLITICS

Leroy N. Rieselbach, Indiana University

Providing a systems approach to the study of the United States Congress, the author uses an analytic framework with which to focus upon both the congressional system and the environment in which it operates. Interrelationships are illustrated among the participants in congressional activity — the president, interest groups, the public, and the lawmakers.

480 pages, cloth

THE STUDY OF POLITICS, Second Edition

Andrew Hacker, Queens College of The City University of New York

Designed for supplementary use in American government and introductory political science courses, this brief, non-quantitative introduction to politics presents the Western political tradition and focuses on the American system to demonstrate how political theory, political institutions, and political behavior relate to each other and to American government.

144 pages, paper and cloth

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: Peace or War?

Richard Rosecrance, Cornell University

A class-tested core text for undergraduate courses in international relations demonstrating how each of three key determinants of war — systems, objectives, and techniques — has been the cause of conflict both historically and theoretically. Drawing from advances in social science and historical thought over the past twenty years, the book uses a macrocosmic approach for understanding the impacts of the international system on foreign policy and peace.

348 pages, paper and cloth

THE AMERICAN SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT, Twelfth Edition

THE AMERICAN FEDERAL GOVERNMENT, Twelfth Edition

John H. Ferguson, The Pennsylvania State University

Dean E. McHenry, University of California, Santa Cruz

Presenting fewer details and with more emphasis on the analysis of current public policy questions, the revisions of these leading texts provide a public policy problem of contemporary relevance at the end of each chapter, followed by questions and readings. An analysis of the 1972 national elections is included.

Instructor's Manual System: 854 pages, cloth. Federal: 736 pages, cloth.

CONFLICT, POWER AND POLITICS IN THE CITY: A Geographic View

Kevin R. Cox, The Ohio State University

A lucid and critical examination of locational problems and their effect on the political issues of the American city. The book focuses on the political geography of the city and represents an extension of the spatial viewpoint to this subject.

154 pages, paper and cloth

McGRAW-HILL BOOK COMPANY
1221 Avenue of the Americas
New York, New York 10020

All prices subject to change.


MAJOR FOREIGN POWERS
the government of the Soviet Union
GWENDOLEN M. CARTER
the government of the United Kingdom
the government of Germany
the government of France
SECOND EDITION
GWENDOLEN M. CARTER
The Governments of Great Britain / France / Germany / Soviet Union
MAJOR FOREIGN POWERS
GWENDOLEN M. CARTER AND JOHN H. HERZ
SIXTH EDITION

The new **Sixth Edition** of this classic textbook presents

. . . a dynamic view of government

. . . a truly comparative approach

. . . important new information and evaluations that reflect significant events of the last four years

743 pages. $11.95

MAJOR FOREIGN POWERS is available in a one-volume hardbound edition and four separate paperbacks:

The Government of the United Kingdom
Gwendolen M. Carter *225 pages. $3.95*

The Government of France
Gwendolen M. Carter *141 pages. $3.50*

The Government of Germany
John H. Herz *208 pages. $3.95*

The Government of the Soviet Union
Gwendolen M. Carter *143 pages. $3.50*

HBJ

Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc. New York / Chicago / San Francisco / Atlanta

"Here, Sir, the people govern"
Alexander Hamilton

"Oh, really, Mr. Hamilton"
Dye and Zeigler

The Irony of Democracy 2nd edition

An Uncommon Introduction to American Politics

Thomas R. Dye, The Florida State University
L. Harmon Zeigler, University of Oregon

Continuing as a best-seller, this unique text offers a penetrating, often iconoclastic, reinterpretation of American politics from the viewpoint of ELITE THEORY. It is designed as a "core" or supplementary text for basic American politics courses and has been hailed for its straightforward, well documented presentation, and for its student appeal.

The revised edition refines and extends the authors' provocative thesis that *"government by the people"* of the United States exists only where *elites* choose to govern wisely.

1972. 396 pages, flexible binding. A thoroughly revised instructor's manual, prepared by Robert Leonard and John Pickering, Florida State University, and including hundreds of graded test items, is available on adoption.

Also by Dye and Zeigler, a new reader to accompany THE IRONY OF DEMOCRACY, 2nd edition.

THE FEW AND THE MANY: Uncommon Readings in American Politics

A carefully edited selection of the best and most teachable literature on elite/mass interaction as it is pertinent to the teaching of introductory American politics, and as it parallels the organization of the authors' text.

1972. 350 pages, paperbound.

For review copies and information on these and other Duxbury titles write:

Duxbury Press
6 Bound Brook Court
North Scituate, Mass. 02060

A Division of Wadsworth Publishing Company, Inc. Belmont, California

New Free Press Paperbacks

THE INVENTION OF THE AMERICAN POLITICAL PARTIES
A Study of Political Improvisation

By Roy F. Nichols, Professor Emeritus, University of Pennsylvania

". . . in his direct muscular prose he has provided a readable as well as a provocative interpret tion of the shaping of our political institutions."—James MacGregor Burns, *The New York Time Book Review*

1972 416 pages $3.9

DEMOCRACY

By Carl Cohen, University of Michigan

". . . the finest modern exploration of the subject by an American and it deserves the widest pos sible audience. Cohen has a rare talent for brilliant, thoroughgoing analysis and lucid expositio —just the qualities needed for this task."—Carey McWilliams, *The Nation*

1973 302 pages $3.9

PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS
Power and Policy

By Louis Fisher, Library of Congress

"Louis Fisher has produced a quiet rare study that covers familiar material and brings to it under standing and insights that have not previously been presented or have been presented less viv idly." Howard R. Penniman, *Perspective*

1973 224 pages $3.4

LENIN

By Michael Morgan

"The author has an unusual grip on the subject matter. His portrait of the man, of his ideas, an of his actions should be an excellent introduction to what deserves to be a more extensive an detailed study."—Max Shachtman

1973 256 pages $2.95

THE LEGISLATION OF MORALITY
Law, Drugs, and Moral Judgment

By Troy Duster, University of California, Berkeley

"At a time when drug addiction and related problems are of increasing local and national concern, the philosophy of the author concerning the problem deserves serious consideration."—*American Bar Association Journal*

1972 274 pages $2.95

THE METHODOLOGY OF COMPARATIVE RESEARCH

Edited by Robert T. Holt and John E. Turner, both, University of Minnesota

". . . the essays in this volume range from sophisticated discussion of technical problems involved in cross-national (or cross-cultural) research to trenchant critiques of the major theoretical systems presently in vogue."—*Social Forces*

1973 419 pages $3.95

POLITICAL MAN

By Robert E. Lane, Yale University

". . . the most serious sustained effort among political scientists in the last 15 years to develop empirically certain psychological aspects of politics, especially in the fields of personality analysis."—Earl Latham, *Perspective*

1972 329 pages $3.95

New Free Press Books in International Relations

THE UNITED NATIONS
Past, Present, Future

Edited by James Barros, University of Toronto

A concise, yet in-depth analysis of the political and functional roles of the six major organs of the UN. Each essay, written by an expert in his field, explains the continuity between the League of Nations and the UN, deals with the past and present activities of each organ, and projects what ts future role may be.

1972 279 pages $8.95

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
New Approaches

By David B. Brobrow, University of Minnesota
Foreword by James N. Rosenau

An effort to bridge the teaching-research gap in international relations. A brief summary of the reasons for dissatisfaction with the "old" approaches to international relations, and a valuable exposition from the analytic frameworks of analogy, history, theory, and engineering.

1972 95 pages $2.50, paper

INTERNATIONAL CRISES
Insights from Behavioral Research

Edited by Charles F. Hermann, Ohio State University

The most important behavioral research yet conducted on international crises—how they are perceived among nations, their causes, their common properties and courses of development, and their probable consequences.

1973 400 pages $12.95

WEAK STATES IN A WORLD OF POWERS
The Dynamics of International Relationships

By Marshall R. Singer, University of Pittsburgh

An exploration of how power functions. The author discusses the relationship between weak and powerful states, but contends that the same power dynamics operate in all relationships, whether *among individuals, groups, or states.*

1972 431 pages $10.95

PRINCIPLES OF WORLD POLITICS

George Modelski, University of Washington

"The arguments presented are persuasive and the writing style is clear and uncluttered. Here, *obviously, is a penetrating mind that soars above the existing confines of a political science too* often concerned with what is rather than what is possible."—William R. Tucker, *Perspective*

1972 370 pages $10.95

Fp THE FREE PRESS
A DIVISION OF THE MACMILLAN COMPANY
Department F, Riverside, New Jersey 08075

Successful Simulations from The Free Press

CLUG
Community Land Use Game

By Allan G. Feldt, University of Michigan

CLUG provides an urban laboratory for participants to try out old ideas and discover new ideas on how cities do and should function. Although the emphasis is on private enterprise and land-use, *CLUG* can be used in a wide variety of fields, including sociology, history, geography, law, city planning, economics, politics, and regional planning.

Player's Manual: 1972	256 pages	$4.95
Instructor's Manual: 1972	88 pages	gratis

SIMSOC
Simulated Society

Second Edition

By William A. Gamson, University of Michigan

SIMSOC, a unique social process game, creates a situation in which participants must actively question the nature of the social order and examine the processes of social conflict and social control. Participants deal with a variety of issues, including interpersonal trust, leadership, "deviant" behavior, social protest, and power relations. This Second Edition has been thoroughly tested and contains rule changes based on actual experience, new concepts, and new reading selections.

Participant's Manual: 1972	176 pages	$4.95
Instructor's Manual: 1972	188 pages	gratis

Timely Free Press Books in Political Science

REBEL LEADERSHIP

By James V. Downton, Jr., University of Colorado

Within general theories of leader-follower relations, commitments, and revolutionary change, the author develops an understanding of the nature and function of rebel leadership. He discusses three types of follower commitments: transactional, charismatic, and inspirational; and discusses four collective movements: an "end of the world" movement, the Black Muslims, the Bolshevik revolution, and the Nazi revolution.

1973	384 pages	$12.95

ORIGINS OF PEACE
A Study of Peacemaking and the Structure of Peace Settlements

By Robert F. Randle, Columbia University

Describes the stages, procedures, and modes of peacemaking; the content of peace settlements; and the effects of a number of important variables that characterize the environment of war and peace talks.

1973 448 pages $12.95

BLACK AFRICA
A Comparative Handbook

By Donald G. Morrison, University of Ibadan, Nigeria; Robert C. Mitchell, Swarthmore College; John N. Paden, Northwestern University; and Hugh M. Stevenson, York University, Ontario

The first systematic, clear, and readily accessible compilation of comparative data on 32 independent nations in black Africa, this book is not only exhaustive but also the most authoritative and up-to-date work on the subject.

1972 512 pages $29.95

SOUTHERN AFRICA IN PERSPECTIVE
Essays in Regional Politics

Edited by Christian P. Potholm, Bowdoin College, *and* Richard Dale, Southern Illinois University

Twenty-three original essays by political revolutionaries, academic experts, and national spokesmen provide the only balanced, up-to-date and comprehensive view of the nine nations of the southern African subsystem. The book also includes chapters on Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland, which were still British dependencies when last treated in book-length analyses.

1972 421 pages $12.95

HANDBOOK OF SOVIET SOCIAL SCIENCE DATA

By Ellen Mickiewicz, Michigan State University
Foreword by Karl W. Deutsch

The only book, in any language, to bring together such a variety of high quality information on the Soviet Union: its *demography, agriculture, production, health, housing, education, elite recruitment and mobilization, communication,* and *international interaction*.

1973 250 pages $9.95

Fp **THE FREE PRESS**
A DIVISION OF THE MACMILLAN COMPANY
Department F, Riverside, New Jersey 08075

China's Turbulent Quest

(new and enlarged edition)

by Harold C. Hinton

"This is the most important book to appear in its field in several years. . . . It is clearly one of the best books available on the general subject of Chinese foreign policy."—*Journal of Asian Studies*
352 pages paper $3.50

Security in Europe

(second edition)

by Robert E. Hunter

The author combines broad historical perspective with a thorough knowledge of current events to show how European countries view their security problems, how institutions and military doctrines have influenced politics, and what lessons can be drawn for the future from an understanding of the past.
292 pages $8.95

Revolution and Politics in Russia:

Essays in Memory of B. I. Nicolaevsky

edited by Alexander Rabinowitch and
Janet Rabinowitch with
Ladis K. D. Kristof

Distinguished articles on Russian political and intellectual history, principally of the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries, written by leading scholars. Contents include biographical articles, speculative essays, and analyses of specific events in Russia.
440 pages $12.75

The Fortunes of the West:

The Future of the Atlantic Nations

by Theodore Geiger

An economist turned generalist, Geiger uses a systems-model approach and trend analysis to predict what coming decades hold for Western Europe and the United States. He throws new light on past, present, and future as he explores the origins and prospects of Western dynamism. A genuinely original book informed by wide learning.
352 pages $10.00

The United States, Communism, and the Emergent World

by Bernard P. Kiernan

This hard-hitting book challenges basic assumptions underlying American policy toward communism in the emergent world. Kiernan argues convincingly that communism is a logical and inevitable stage in the development of many Asian, African, and Latin American countries in their struggle for modernization. 256 pages $7.95

A Bibliography of German Studies, 1945-1971

compiled by Gisela Hersch

Scholars, teachers, librarians, and students will welcome this unique bibliography of publications on and from postwar Germany, both East and West. Its broad scope, workable format, and interdisciplinary approach make this a valuable tool for every researcher in German studies. 624 pages $12.50

Indiana University Press
Bloomington, Indiana 47401

NEW PERSPECTIVES ON THE PRESIDENCY

CURTIS ARTHUR AMLUND, *North Dakota State University*

This book presents a long needed reappraisal of traditional views and opinions regarding the Presidency. Questioned is the conventional wisdom on president-ranking, enlargement of presidential powers, executive-legislative imbalance, institutionalizing the office, centralizing the major party organizations and applying image-making to the executive process.

There is also a chapter on the nature of language difficulties that inhibit the usefulness of empirical studies, and another which discusses a mathematical formula to be used in assessing a president's actions from a more objective perspective.

The book ". . . offers a perceptive critique of literature dealing with the American presidency."—The Rocky Mountain Social Science Journal

The author ". . . argues cogently and readably that in the absence of objective criteria it is impossible to verify the conventional wisdom that the presidency is 'getting stronger' relative to the other branches."—The Journal of Politics

113 pages/$4.50

Useful as a supplement for courses on American national government and introduction to political science.

PHILOSOPHICAL LIBRARY, INC.

15 East 40th Street, New York, New York 10016

For new perspectives o

Democracy Under Pressure

An Introduction to the American Political System

MILTON C. CUMMINGS, JR., *The John Hopkins University*
DAVID WISE

An exciting, provocative, and highly readable textbook, *Democracy Und Pressure* offers a comprehensive introduction to the essentials of America politics and government. Throughout the book the authors, an eminent polit cal scientist and a professional writer, relate American governmental an political institutions to contemporary issues, examining many of the problem of American democracy that concern students and other Americans today— among them, the environment, minority rights, Vietnam, Black Power, th military-industrial complex, consumer protection, and the urban crisis. In addi tion, they explore the gaps between American myths and American realities— between the political system's promise and its performance—and raise critic questions concerning the structure and processes of government. The boo includes more than 50 boxed quotations; a brief, annotated bibliography fo each chapter; and an extensive illustration program of some 250 tables, graphs cartoons, and photographs. Accompanied by an Instructor's Manual with Tests
718 pages. $9.2

Why They Call It Politics

A Guide to America's Government

ROBERT SHERRILL

An exciting introduction to contemporary American politics, this unique textbook offers the student stimulating perspectives on how the political proces actually operates. The author's primary concern is with the daily realities o American political life; he examines the major centers of power—the presidency, and military-industrial complex, the Congress, the courts, the bureaucratic system, the economy, the press, and the political parties—and cites instance upon instance of failure within the system. Written in an informal journalistic style, *Why They Call It Politics* actively involves the student and encourages him to analyze political problems, recognize the need for change, and devise practical, constructive ways for achieving it. The book is imaginatively illustrated with ten chapter-opening cartoons by the talented political caricaturist Julio Fernandez. Paperbound. 306 pages. $3.95

the American political process

Toward A Democracy

A Brief Introduction to American Government

LOUIS W. KOENIG, *New York University*

Toward A Democracy analyzes both the institutions and processes of American government as a democratic political system, indicating the "defective reality" of the system and offering constructive proposals for moving it closer to its democratic ideals. Professor Koenig uses contemporary issues and anecdotes to illustrate breakdowns and improvements in the American political system, with frequent reference to the environmental and consumer movements, minority civil rights movements, and the major transformations now occurring within the Democratic party. Special emphasis is given to popular democracy, especially to non-elites—blacks, women, youth, and the elderly—and their effect on the political system. Student aids include a lively and contemporary illustration program of approximately 50 charts and graphs and 50 halftones, a list of suggested readings at the end of each chapter, and an Appendix containing the Constitution and the Declaration of Independence. An Instructor's Manual with Tests and Learning Objectives will accompany the book.

Paperbound. 540 pages (probable)
Publication: March 1973

The American Political System

ntroductory Readings

Edited by RICHARD E. MORGAN, *Bowdoin College*
and JAMES E. CONNOR, *Office of Economic Opportunity*

This authoritative collection of 32 secondary readings covers the basic topics of American government, including the urban crisis, the eruption of violence, and the dispute over foreign policy. Accompanied by a Test Booklet.

Paperbound. 481 pages. $5.50

HARCOURT BRACE JOVANOVICH, INC.
New York / Chicago / San Francisco / Atlanta

Pacifism in Europe to 1914

PETER BROCK

In a companion volume to *Pacifism in the United States,* Peter Brock surveys the history of the pacifist movement in Europe from the beginning of the Christian era to the First World War.

Cloth, $17.50. Limited paperback, $8.75

The Social Foundations of German Unification 1858-1871

Struggles and Accomplishments

THEODORE S. HAMEROW

Among the changes effected by the growth of an industrial society was the confrontation between the established order and the advocates of change. Mr. Hamerow shows that the German Empire was the product of an unwritten compromise between the two groups.

Cloth, $15.50. Limited paperback, $7.95

Jewish Nationality and Soviet Politics

The Jewish Sections of the CPSU, 1917-1930

ZVI Y. GITELMAN

In order to "Bolshevize" the Jewish population the Soviets created within the Party a number of Jewish Sections. Mr. Gitelman's analysis of the Sections examines the nature of the challenge that modernization and secularization posed, the crises they created, and the responses they evoked. *Written under the auspices of the Research Institute on Communist Affairs, Columbia University.* $20.00

Decentralization and Self-Government in Russia 1830-1870

S. FREDERICK STARR

After tracing the ideological sources of reform, Mr. Starr examines the legislative process by which administrative decentralization and public self-government were instituted and discusses the reasons why administrative concentration ultimately prevailed under the tsarist autocracy.

Cloth, $15.00. Limited paperback, $8.95

Princeton University Press • Princeton, New Jersey 08540



0,000 of life insurance costs less than $100 at age 30.

That's right! For a man, age 30, the annual premium for a 20-Year Home Protection policy providing $50,000 initial amount of insurance is $159.00. The first-year dividend, based on our current dividend scale, is $61.50, making a net payment of $97.50. Dividends, of course, are not guaranteed.

The Home Protection plan is level premium Term insurance providing its largest amount of protection initially, reducing by schedule each year to recognize decreasing insurance needs. *This is just one example of the many low-cost TIAA plans available.*

If you need more protection for your family, ask us to mail you a personal illustration with figures for a policy issued at your age. We'll also send the Life Insurance Guide describing other TIAA policies.

ELIGIBILITY

Eligibility to apply for this or other TIAA life insurance is limited to *persons employed at the time of* application by a college, university, private school, or other nonprofit educational or scientific institution that qualifies for TIAA eligibility.

TEACHERS INSURANCE AND ANNUITY ASSOCIATION
730 Third Avenue, New York, N. Y. 10017
TIAA
sG

Please mail the Life Insurance Guide and a personal illustration.

Name ______________________ Your Date of Birth __________

Address ______________________
Street

____
City State Zip

Dependents' Ages ______________________

Nonprofit Employer ______________________
college, university, or other educational or scientific institution

NEW perspectives on american government...

AMERICAN DEMOCRACY
in World Perspective
Third Edition

WILLIAM EBENSTEIN, C. HERMAN PRITCHETT,
HENRY A. TURNER, and DEAN MANN

More compact than the previous editions, the new Third Edition maintains the methodology and approach which contributed to the success of its predecessors. Stressing basic theory, with consideration given to pertinent historical information, institutional operations, and empirical political behavior, the focus is on the conflicting forces that shape the political process and on the current stresses the government is experiencing at home and abroad. New to this edition: expanded coverage of controversial issues; a new chapter on criminal punishment and the Constitution; more extensive treatment of authoritarianism and totalitarianism in politics; a full treatment of civil rights; and greater emphasis on "bread and butter" issues. Tentative: 448 pp.; $7.95: paper. February, 1973. *Instructor's Manual.*

HERESIES RIGHT AND LEFT
Some Political Assumptions Reexamined

REO M. CHRISTENSON

A heretical but nondogmatic book carefully reasoned and lucidly written in free-flowing prose by a political scientist who is unabashedly concerned with ethical values. The book challenges a variety of assumptions held by liberal and conservative political scientists. It advocates a revival of natural law and natural rights; the nature of the democratic idea and the liberties associated with liberal democracy are examined. The author contends that secession is a right and the Civil War was a mistake; he argues that federalism is obsolete and that atomic war is almost inevitable because, he believes, nations will not take the risks necessary for peace. Both students and professors will enjoy reading this supplementary book for introductory courses. Tentative: 250 pp.; $4.00: paper. January, 1973.

THE RULING ELITES

Elite Theory, Power, and American Democracy

KENNETH PREWITT and ALAN STONE

Much more than a general review of elite theory, this book examines how elite theory bears on the development of American democracy. The contributions of major classical and contemporary theorists, including Pareto, Mosca, Michels, Dahl, and Mills, are explained in detail; a basic understanding of the roles of business and capitalism in affecting American politics is provided; and the challenges posed to democracy by the presence of elites are considered. The book offers a balanced and provocative treatment that undergraduate students will easily comprehend. Tentative: 250 pp.; $3.50: paper. January, 1973.

PARTICIPATION IN AMERICA

Political Democracy and Social Equality

SIDNEY VERBA and NORMAN H. NIE

"A masterful blend of painstaking empirical analysis. . . . A classic that should dominate its area for years to come."—Philip E. Converse, University of Michigan / This book provides new information on the ways in which citizens take part in American political life and a new theoretical understanding of the role of participation in a democracy. The relationship of social class and political activity, the different ways in which blacks and whites participate, the impact of urbanization and the decline of the small community, and the extent to which participation furthers and hinders democracy are discussed. 428 pp.; $10.00. September, 1972.

THE MILITARY IN AMERICAN POLITICS

JAMES CLOTFELTER

This supplementary text for introductory American government courses covers the spectrum of civil-military controversies. It touches on both governmental institutions and nongovernmental political factors which are affected by or affect the military establishment and shows how the American system responds to this issue, in terms of economic resources and political consequences. The role of the military and defense policy in Congressional and Executive policy-making, the role the military plays in foreign policy and wars, the relationship of the military to business, the economy, scientists, and universities, and the place of the military in American society are examined. Tentative: 256 pp.; $2.95: paper. January, 1973.

THE POLITICS OF CIVIL LIBERTIES

JONATHAN D. CASPER

This distinctive text encompasses both the substance of Supreme Court decisions involving civil liberties and the politics surrounding these decisions and their implementation. Focusing on cases dealing with freedom of expression, equality (racial, economic, and reapportionment), and fair procedure (particularly in the administration of criminal justice), it emphasizes cases decided in the past two decades. To relate specific cases to developments within the broader political system, the text illuminates the general policies implicit in decisions handed down by the Court and looks at resulting trends. Also discussed is the politics of litigation. 322 pp.; $4.00: paper. September, 1972.

. . . from HARPER & ROW

10 East 53d Street, New York 10022

JOHNS HOPKINS
The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, Maryland 21218

The Politics of Soviet Agriculture, 1960-1970

WERNER G. HAHN Conflicts over agricultural policy have played a major role i determining the fates of Soviet leaders as prominent as Malenkov, Khrushche and Brezhnev. Through intensive study of the Soviet press and Russian languag sources, Werner Hahn offers the first in-depth study of Soviet agricultural politic during the past decade. His book adds a new perspective to our knowledge of th Soviet system. *$12.5*

The Myth of Liberation

East-Central Europe in U.S. Diplomacy and Politics Since 1941

BENNETT KOVRIG In the first comprehensive account of the evolution of U.S policy toward East-Central Europe, Bennett Kovrig focuses on the issue of Eas European self-determination. He analyzes postwar peace negotiations, policie of containment and liberation, the Hungarian revolution, and subsequent efforts a bridge-building. His book is a valuable case study of international politics in bipolar world. *$10.0*

The Berlin Crisis of 1961

Soviet-American Relations and the Struggle for Power in the Kremlin, June-November 1961

ROBERT M. SLUSSER Professor Slusser challenges the view that because traditional source materials are not available recent Soviet history cannot be written Using all of the sources that *are* available—newspaper reports, broadcasts speeches by Soviet officials, diplomatic records—he presents a detailed account o the internal sources of Soviet foreign policy during the 1961 Berlin crisis.
$17.50, $8.50 pape

The War Industries Board

Business-Government Relations during World War I

ROBERT D. CUFF Robert Cuff examines the goals and techniques of the businessmen who organized the War Industries Board, the chief agency of coordinatio in America's industrial mobilization for World War I. He shows how the Wa Industries Board interacted with business groups in the industrial economy an challenges the traditional interpretation of Bernard Baruch's role in industria mobilization. *$13.5*

Southwest Africa and the United Nations

An International Mandate in Dispute

SOLOMON SLONIM The South West African controversy has come to symboliz many of the crucial problems of the postwar world—colonialism, racialism, apartheid, minority rule. Dr. Slonim traces for the first time the legal and politica history of the dispute from its origins in the 1919 mandates compromise throug each stage of interaction between the United Nations and the World Court, including the 1971 Namibia opinion. *$13.5*

HOOVER INSTITUTION PRESS

A Chinese-English Dictionary of Communist Chinese Terminology

DENNIS DOOLIN AND CHARLES P. RIDLEY. 1973. This dictionary is intended for the reader or translator of current Chinese documents and is concerned primarily with words and phrases either coined or given new currency by the Chinese Communist Party and the government of the People's Republic of China. P124. 600 p. Hard. $27.50

Chinese Historiography on the Revolution of 1911

A Critical Survey and a Selected Bibliography

WINSTON HSIEH. 1973. Examines the 20th-century output of Chinese historians—both Republican and Communist—on the 1911 Revolution and shows that the interpretation of historical events has usually been colored by political ideology or political myth. S34. 100 p. Hard, $4.50

China's Khrushchev

A Political Biography of Liu Shao-ch'i

TIEN-MIN LI. 1973. The definitive biography of Liu Shao-ch'i. The book traces Liu's life as a Communist from 1921–70, along with the development of the Chinese Communist Party during those years. P123. 200 p. Hard, about $7.50

Race and Politics in Urban Malaya

ALVIN RABUSHKA. 1973. Offers a systematic analysis of the attitudes of the Malayan man-in-the-street towards questions of race and politics. This book is based on the author's own Gallup-type public opinion poll—the first such ever taken in Malaya. S35. 120 p. Hard, $6.50

Hoover Institution Press
Stanford University, Stanford, California

HOOVER INSTITUTION PRESS

Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development, 1945-1965

ANTONY C. SUTTON. 1973. This is the third volume of an analysis of the impact of Western technology and skills on the industrial development of the Soviet Union from 1917 until 1965. The hypothesis of the series is that the absorption of Western technology and skills has been by far the most significant factor in the development of the Soviet economy. P113. 500 p. Hard, $15.00

Industrial Management in the Soviet Union

The Role of the CPSU in Industrial Decision-making, 1917-1970

WILLIAM J. CONYNGHAM. 1973. Studies the role of a revolutionary political party during forced industrialization. The author concludes that the Party performed important functions of mobilization during the early phase of industrialization but that its role has become increasingly marginal.

P116. 370 p. Hard, $9.50

The Stalinist Terror in the Thirties

Documentation in the Soviet Press

BORYS LEVYTSKY. 1973. This book is a series of biographies of over 200 Soviet leaders liquidated during the Stalinist purges. P126. 500 p. Hard, $14.50

Memoirs of Nicolas de Basily

NICOLAS DE BASILY. 1973. Nicolas de Basily was a highly placed member of the Russian foreign service in the years before the 1917 Revolution and drafted the abdication statement of Tsar Nicolas II. His memoirs give a vivid impression of both domestic and foreign policy developments in Russia between 1900 and 1917, particularly in the last months of the monarchy.

P125. 150 p. Hard, $6.00

Guide to Hungarian Studies

ELEMER BAKO. 1973. A bibliography of extensive and diversified material intended to provide a well-balanced, reliable, and practical tool for the English-reading public, particularly scholars and college students.

B52. 1218 p. Hard, $35.00

Hoover Institution Press
Stanford University, Stanford, California

HOOVER INSTITUTION PRESS

World Communism; A Handbook, 1918-1965

WITOLD S. SWORAKOWSKI (ed.). 1973. The *Handbook*, covering the years 1918-1965, gives an encyclopedic treatment of past developments in the international communist movement through historical profiles of each of the national communist parties and international communist front organizations.

P108. 550 p. Hard, $25.00

Yearbook on International Communist Affairs: 1972

RICHARD F. STAAR (ed.). 1972. The only comprehensive, country-by-country survey of what is happening in the communist world.

P118. 708 p. Hard, $25.00

The Yearbook *is extremely valuable as a single authoritative source of an enormous number of facts which are otherwise scattered in all sorts of publications of varying reliability and accessibility, and its annual appearance will make it increasingly valuable in the future.*

The Times Literary Supplement

Biographical Dictionary of the Comintern

BRANKO LAZITCH. 1973. Over 700 biographical sketches of members of the Comintern, from its founding until its dissolution. Included are three hundred individuals who comprised the Comintern's overall directorate—its Executive Committee, Executive Committee Presidium, Executive Committee Secretariat, and Control Commission. P121. 500 p. Hard, $15.00

Marx's Theory of Exchange: Alienation and Crises

PAUL CRAIG ROBERTS AND MATTHEW A. STEPHENSON. 1973. This study shows that Marx was an organizational theorist who found the essence of capitalism to be exchange, which creates a separation between the production and use of economic goods. In this separation lies the source of economic crises and alienation. S36. 100 p. Hard, $5.50

Hoover Institution Press
Stanford University, Stanford, California

The International Political Science Association
Invitation to Membership

The International Political Science Association welcomes political scientists as members. The Association, founded in 1949, is composed of three categories of members: individuals, institutions and national associations.

Membership in the Association of $10.00 a year entitles members to receive the Newsletter giving information about IPSA activities and meetings; to purchase material published under IPSA auspices—including the International Bibliography of Political Science, published annually by Stevens in London and sets of papers submitted at IPSA meetings at reduced cost; and to register at IPSA meetings at lower rates.

Individual members who pay a higher membership fee of $12.00 a year are, in addition, entitled to receive either the International Political Science Abstracts published quarterly by Basil Blackwell at Oxford or the International Social Science Journal, the quarterly organ of the Department of Social Sciences of UNESCO. To join the Association send your name and check to the International Political Science Association, 27 rue Saint-Guillaume, Paris 7e, France.

JUST PUBLISHED BY APSA

A GUIDE TO GRADUATE STUDY IN POLITICAL SCIENCE
1972

The first authoritative compilation of Ph.D. and Masters programs in political science, containing information on admissions policies, costs and financial aid, and fields of specialization.

$2.50 (prepaid)

Available Direct From:

American Political Science Association
1527 New Hampshire Ave., N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036

NEW
for '73

Public Administration

THE EXECUTION OF PUBLIC POLICY

by Don T. Allensworth

Concise, yet comprehensive, this new book—an introduction to public administration—covers all major aspects, including the full range of recent developments and current trends. Those familiar with other texts in the field will find greater emphasis here on the administration of public policy, contemporary bureaucratic behavior and the politics of administration. Organization charts, tables, graphs, diagrams, maps, drawings and chapter-end summaries are included.

Special features include:

- **The *practice* of administration emphasized**
  Administrative processes in particular government agencies are examined, and the many constraints, pressures, decisions and problems facing administrators are considered.
- ***Principles* of public administration developed**
  Principles are advanced for activities such as administrative agency clientele bases, administrative power centers, administrative agency interests and bureaucracies as change-inducers.
- **Administration of *public policy* stressed**
  Administrative activity in specific policy areas is stressed, including transportation, environment and urban planning. Problems of policy coordination in the executive branch, and strategies to promote central direction and accountability are also examined.
- **Administration viewed in *political* terms**
  Administrative agencies are seen as centers of political activity, with links to key interest groups, legislative committees and others with important stakes in policy outcomes.
- **The *intergovernmental* nature of administration examined**
  Patterns of administrative interrelationships among the various levels of government are discussed.

about 250 pages/paperbound/March 1973

J. B. LIPPINCOTT COMPANY
College Department
East Washington Square, Philadelphia, Pa. 19105

1984 Revisited
PROSPECTS FOR AMERICAN POLITICS

Edited by **Robert Paul Wolff**
University of Massachusetts, Amherst

Interest your students by complementing what they have learned. This collection of social scientific prognostication, together with a basic text in Government, will help them forecast American political life and culture of the next dozen years at national and local levels. The six original essays demonstrate how an understanding of political and social realities reveals the probable shape of the future.

Todd Gitlin, *"The Future of an Effusion: How Young Activists Will Get to 1984"*
Gene L. Mason, *"The Future of Repression"*
Robert T. Nakamura, *"Congress Confronts the Presidency"*
Michael P. Lerner, *"The Future of the Two-Party System in America"*
Ira Katznelson, *"Urban Counterrevolution"*
Frances Fox Piven, *"The Urban Crisis: Who Got What and Why"*

Knopf, November, 1972
208 pages, $2.95 paperbound

Civil Rights and Liberties in the 1970's

Richard M. Pious, York University

Racism. Poverty. Sexism. Gay Lib. Corrections. Surveillance. Compelling issues are soberly examined in this anthology of court cases and articles. The focus is the struggle for identity by both demographic and clientele groups against an often manipulative, dehumanizing bureaucracy.

Random House, February, 1973
256 pages, $3.50 paperbound

American Politics and Public Policy

Edited by **Michael P. Smith**
Boston University

Pluralism vs. Populism
The theme of this anthology is that the pluralist-populist conflict explains the distribution of political power and the adoption of specific policy. Edited to offer the average undergraduate a manageable yet stimulating dose of American politics, the collection emphasizes American political culture and protest and administrative politics. It may be used as either a core or supplementary reader.

Random House, January, 1973
412 pages, $4.95 paperbound

Random House
Alfred A. Knopf
THE COLLEGE DEPARTMENT
201 EAST 50TH STREET NEW YORK 10022

The Legislative Process in the United States

SECOND EDITION

Malcolm E. Jewell,
University of Kentucky, and
Samuel C. Patterson,
University of Iowa

Each chapter of this successful text has been updated to include recent political illustrations and research into the legislative process on both national and state levels. More than traditional texts, *The Legislative Process in the United States* has a behavioral emphasis; it spotlights the legislature in relation to other systems and analyzes roles and norms in the legislature. Fifty-one tables and nineteen figures illuminate the political participant and the political process by tabulating information such as educational attainments of American legislators and activities of a Congressional office staff.

Random House, November, 1972
592 pages, $10.95

The Politics of Exploitation

Gene L. Mason, Franconia College
and **Fred Vetter**

Everyday people, everyday life, everyday corruption. *The Politics of Exploitation* is a radical anthology which spotlights the pervasive exploitation in American life on individual and institutional levels. The articles examine the relationship of victim and exploiter in areas such as race, sex, school, and youth. This collection may disillusion your students; it will certainly enlighten and enliven them.

Random House, 1972
320 pages, $3.95 paperbound

Patterns of Government

THE MAJOR POLITICAL SYSTEMS OF EUROPE

THIRD EDITION

Samuel H. Beer, Adam B. Ulam, and
Guido Goldman, all of Harvard University,
and **Suzanne Berger,** Massachusetts
Institute of Technology

Less a revision than a new book, this third edition prevails as the standard volume on the historical development, structure, and operation of the political systems of France, Germany, Great Britain, and Russia. The authors analyze the unique features of each polity and examine each system as representative of modern industrial states. The *Instructor's Manual* furnishes three complete syllabi with which the text may be used to teach the course from readings/documents, behavioral/quantitative, and cultural/structural approaches.

Random House, November, 1972
796 pages, $10.95

Random House
Alfred A. Knopf
THE COLLEGE DEPARTMENT
201 EAST 50TH STREET NEW YORK 10022

Politics Among Nations

THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER AND PEACE

FIFTH EDITION

Hans J. Morgenthau, City College of the City University of New York

Honored author. Distinguished classic. Professor Morgenthau has substantially updated his authoritative book taking into account changing balances of power and influence. He evaluates recent developments like the SALT talks as well as growing world concern with nuclear power and environmental problems. Renewed, *Politics Among Nations* remains one of the most influential books in international relations.

Knopf, October, 1972
615 pages, $9.95

The Might of Nations

WORLD POLITICS IN OUR TIME

FOURTH EDITION

John G. Stoessinger
City University of New York

Announcing: A New Edition
Available for Spring Adoptions
Now in Paperback

Extensively revised, the fourth edition of *The Might of Nations*, winner of the Bancroft Prize in International Relations on first publication, continues to be elegantly lucid and objective. The new edition argues that with the emergence of China the postwar era of bilateral confrontation is being succeeded by one of triangular opposition. Issues such as China and the SALT talks are studied because of immediate concern and long-range importance. The chapter bibliographies compose a most comprehensive reference source.

Random House, January, 1973
480 pages, $6.95 paperbound

Crisis and Continuity i World Politic

READINGS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

SECOND EDITION

Edited by **George A. Lanyi**,
Oberlin College,
and **Wilson C. McWilliams**,
Rutgers University

Comprehensive. Balanced. Interesting.
This anthology, useful as either a core or supplementary text, covers the abiding issues o international relations—nationalism, imperialis ideology, war, and the making of foreign policy—as scrutinized by political thinkers from Machiavelli to Mao. The authors' selection of articles and their annotations show a concern fo general questions of political philosophy not fou in similar texts.

Random House, October, 1972
544 pages, $5.95 paperbound

Random House
Alfred A. Knop
THE COLLEGE DEPARTMENT
201 EAST 50TH STREET NEW YORK 10022

Redgrave announces a new review journal

Reviews in American History

A Quarterly Journal of Criticism

Managing Editor: *Stanley I. Kutler*, University of Wisconsin
Associate Editor: *Stanley N. Katz*, University of Chicago

* * * * * **Editorial Board** * * * * *

John W. Blassingame, Yale University
Allan G. Bogue, University of Wisconsin
David B. Davis, Yale University
Carl N. Degler, Stanford University
Sidney Fine, University of Michigan
Frank Freidel, Harvard University
Lloyd C. Gardner, Rutgers University
Harold M. Hyman, Rice University
Winthrop D. Jordan, University of California, Berkeley
Merrill D. Peterson, University of Virginia
Harry N. Scheiber, University of California, San Diego
Anne Firor Scott, Duke University

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

Beginning in March, 1973, Redgrave will publish a new quarterly review journal in American history and directly related disciplines. **Reviews in American History** will be devoted exclusively to the publication of *lengthy* (1500-3000 or more words) and *timely* review-essays of scholarly, professional, and non-fiction trade books. Relevant textbooks, reprints, and teaching and research materials also will receive attention. In general, reviews will appear *within six months or less* after original publication, although *retrospective* reviews will be published on a more extended schedule.

Reviews in American History will appear in March, June, September, and December and will contain approximately 160 pages per issue in a 6″ x 9″ paperbound format; an NMA-format microfiche version will also be available.

Please address editorial correspondence to: **Reviews in American History**, Department of History, University of Wisconsin, 435 North Park Street, Madison, Wisconsin 53706 (608) 263-1835.

Subscription rates for *individuals* in the U.S. and Canada (others add $2.00):
1 yr. $12 2 yrs. $23 3 yrs. $34

Subscriptions are on a volume-year basis *only*; shipment cannot be made without payment.

Single issue and back volume prices, and microfiche and institutional rates on request.

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

A descriptive brochure is available—Please send orders and inquiries to:

rir REDGRAVE INFORMATION RESOURCES CORPORATION
Dept. PD
53 Wilton Road, Westport, Connecticut 06880
(203) 226-6963

Available for second semester

Culture Storm

Politics & the Ritual Order

H. L. NIEBURG, *State University of New York at Binghamton*

In *Culture Storm,* the author of *Political Violence* explores the nature and effects of the radical cultural changes which took place during the 1960's, especially as these changes are shaping and modifying political behavior. Dr. Nieburg argues that the new politics of the 1970's is the result of fundamental changes in values, behaviors, loyalties, symbols, groups, and organizations which characterized the Culture Storm of the 1960's.

Contents: Intro & Apologia; Forms & Functions; Apotheosis of the Act; Sacred & Profane; Political Thermodynamics; The Ritual Cycle; Rebellions; Manias & Seizures; The Dance of Death; The Arts; The Media; Last Rites; Bibliography; Index

Published, 1972 272 pages paperbound, $3.95 (probable)

The Political Experience

Readings in Political Science

edited by **MICHAEL A. WEINSTEIN,** *Purdue University*

"It would be a shame to see Weinstein's book merely as another anthology. It offers not only freshly formulated introductions but also selections precisely relevant to the structure of the book. The whole is an integrated work, serious without being ponderous and clearly designed to open up a perspective on political life."—*Henry Kariel, University of Hawaii*

The Political Experience provides beginning students with a framework for organizing and understanding the diverse, conflicting, and often ambiguous processes of contemporary politics. Professor Weinstein's general introduction discusses the reasons for studying political activity, examines some of the paradoxes and ambivalences inherent in contemporary experience, and introduces a four-phase model of the political process. The eight sections—each preceded by a brief introduction—deal successively with the quality of the human condition in the twentieth century, the nature of politics, approaches to the study of politics, policy alternatives, decision-making, administration, evaluation, and the prospects of political action.

"A more creative examination of the spectrum of politics than any general reader I know of."—*R. A. Fredland, Indiana University-Purdue University, Indianapolis*

"A highly useful compilation of key readings in the political science field. Its value is in both the range and quality of selections and the effective coverage of so many areas."—*Dr. Ralph Buultjens, New School for Social Research*

Published, 1972 388 pages paperbound, $4.50

The Federated City

Community Control in Large Cities

JOSEPH F. ZIMMERMAN, *Graduate School of Public Affairs,*
State University of New York at Albany

The Federated City is an examination of the movement toward neighborhood government and participatory democracy in large cities. Professor Zimmerman analyzes the causes of the movement; considers the methods proposed for creating neighborhood governments; and explores the claims of proponents and opponents of neighborhood government and the question of whether administrative or electoral reform, or a combination of the two, can serve as an effective alternative to neighborhood government. A model for the reform of large cities is then presented, and the problems of implementing the major elements of the model are examined.

Contents: Neighborhood Polity; Community Schools; Administrative Response; The Electoral System; The Federated City; Bibliography; Index

Published, 1972 128 pages paperbound, $2.95 (probable)

The Judiciary and Vietnam

ANTHONY A. D'AMATO, *Northwestern University,* and
ROBERT M. O'NEIL, *The University of Cincinnati*

The Judiciary and Vietnam is a case study of the American judicial process. Professors D'Amato and O'Neil analyze the concepts and workings of the judiciary in relation to the issue that in recent years has engaged American college students more than any other: the Vietnam War.

Among the topics which Professors D'Amato and O'Neil explore are the role of courts in constitutional litigation and the concept of judicial review; the role of a citizen as plaintiff in cases challenging the constitutionality of the Vietnam War; the unique case of an entire state going to court to challenge the war; the problems involved in determining whether the war is a political question and whether it is an undeclared war under the constitution; trends in antiwar litigation; and the impact of antiwar litigation on the judicial system.

Contents: Courts and Controversies; The Citizen and the War; Commonwealth and Court; Justice and Justiciability: The Problem of the "Political Question"; The Constitution and Undeclared War; Congress and Undeclared War; The Draft Resister and Undeclared War; The Continuing Struggle; Conclusion; Bibliography; Index

Published, 1972 128 pages paperbound, $2.95 (probable)

ST. MARTIN'S PRESS, College Dept.
175 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10010

RIVISTA ITALIANA DI SCIENZA POLITICA

Direttore: *Giovanni Sartori* - Redattore Capo: *Gianfranco Pasquino*

Anno II, n. 1, aprile 1972

Giovanni Sartori	*Cosa è « politica »*
Harry Eckstein	*Il rendimento dei sistemi politici*
Franco Cazzola	*Consenso e opposizione nel parlamento italiano*
Vincent E. McHale	*Mutamenti socio-economici e sistema partitico nella V Repubblica*
Stefano Passigli	*Proporzionalismo, frazionismo e crisi dei partiti: quid prior?*
Giovanna Zincone	*Accesso autonomo alle risorse: le determinanti del frazionismo*
Gianfranco Pasquino	*I gruppi di pressione*

Recensioni e segnalazioni

Summaries in English

Published three times a year by Società editrice il Mulino, Via Santo Stefano 6, Bologna (Italy). Annual subscription: Lit. 5.000 (Italy), Lit. 6.000 (abroad), or the equivalent in other currencies.

Redgrave announces a new review journal

THE WALL STREET REVIEW OF BOOKS

THE WALL STREET REVIEW OF BOOKS publishes timely, in-depth reviews of scholarly and trade books, reprints, government and foreign-language publications, and other works of special interest to the business, securities, and financial communities. Reviews average 1500 words, and appear *within six months* after book publication.

Editor: *Robert Sobel*, Hofstra University

Editorial Board:

George Benston, Professor of Management, University of Rochester

Michael Parrish, Professor of History, University of California, San Diego

Fred Siesel, Assistant to the Chairman, Weeden & Company

Melvin Tarr, Manager of Media Communication, American Stock Exchange

Sheldon Zerden, Account Executive, Bruns, Nordeman & Company

Published quarterly—*first issue March, 1973*; 6" x 9" paperbound, 160 pages per issue; NMA-format microfiche version available.

Subscription rates for *individuals* (outside U.S. and Canada, please add $2.00):

1 yr. $15 2 yrs. $28 3 yrs. $40

Subscriptions are on a volume-year basis *only*; *shipment cannot be made without payment.*

Please address editorial correspondence to: **THE WALL STREET REVIEW OF BOOKS**, Department of History, New College of Hofstra, Hempstead, New York 11550.

A descriptive brochure is available—Please send orders and inquiries to:

REDGRAVE INFORMATION RESOURCES CORPORATION
Department PD, 53 Wilton Road, Westport, Connecticut 06880
(203) 226-6963

Studies in the Libertarian and Utopian Tradition

The Defense of Gracchus Babeuf
Before the High Court of Vendôme
Edited and Translated by
JOHN ANTHONY SCOTT
With an Essay by HERBERT MARCUSE
"His eloquent statement, masterfully translated and edited by Scott, indicates the tremendous impact which Babeuf's words were to have on future social thinkers. . . . Herbert Marcuse has appended a perceptive analysis of Babeuf's role as a social thinker. Recommended highly."— *Choice*
paper $1.95

Pierre-Joseph Proudhon
His Life and Work
GEORGE WOODCOCK
paper $3.95

Utopia and its Enemies
GEORGE KATEB
Evaluates the main contemporary currents of attack on the utopian ideal and includes an analysis of modern utopian thought.
paper $2.95

The Luddites
Machine-Breaking in Regency England
MALCOLM I. THOMIS
Illuminates a crucial stage in the transition from a rural to an urban economy and in working-class and trade-union history.
paper $2.75

The Doctrine of Saint-Simon
An Exposition
Translated with Notes and an
Introduction by GEORG G. IGGERS
With a new Preface by the Translator
"A notable contribution to the history of political and social thought. . . . In his long introduction, itself a weighty historical essay, Iggers propounds the novel thesis that the basic instruments of the totalitarian state, 'the ideology, the movement, the party, and the leader—were all found in Saint-Simonian theory.' "
—*Journal of Contemporary History*
paper $3.95/cloth $7.50

of related interest

Ressentiment
MAX SCHELER
Edted with an Introduction by
Lewis A. Coser
Essays that describe the origins of the fascist personality.
paper $2.95

Examination copies are available when requested on academic letterhead. Write to Dept. 118

Schocken Books
200 Madison Avenue. New York, N.Y. 10016

Systems Analysis in Public Policy
A Critique
Ida R. Hoos

"Systems analysis has become one of America's big businesses. This book challenges with critical professional insight its mystique, methods and products. The result is a highly readable provocative treatise which should be of value to anyone who practices systems analysis, buys it or simply is interested in finding out how much real truth there is in one of America's most fashionable and profitable intellectual games."

—A. Alan Post, Legislative Analyst, California Legislature
LC: 79-170723 288 pages $10.00

Governing the London Region
Reorganization and Planning in the 1960s
Donald L. Foley

Mr. Foley analyzes the changeover to a completely new governmental structure for Greater London and discusses the planning mechanisms which permit more effective working relationships between several levels of government. A Lane Fund study, published for the Institute of Governmental Studies, Berkeley.
LC: 76-157822 272 pages cloth $8.50 paper $3.25

Wittgenstein and Justice
Hanna Fenichel Pitkin

This is an introduction for students of politics and society to the later philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein and some topics in "ordinary language" philosophy. Wittgenstein's works offer a revolutionary new conception of language whose implications for the social sciences and political action are wide-ranging and surprising.
LC: 76-138508 416 pages $12.50

Conspiracy at Matsukawa
Chalmers Johnson

Mr. Johnson uses his study of the Matsukawa incident of 1949—the unexplained death of the president of the Japanese National Railroads and the sabotage of a train—to analyze the Americans' efforts during the Occupation to introduce Anglo-American adversary proceedings into Japanese criminal trials. He also explores the change in Occupation policy when the Americans changed their emphasis from Japanese democratization to economic growth. LC: 73-161998 480 pages illustrations maps $10.95

New, expanded edition
Japan's New Middle Class
The Salary Man and His Family in a Tokyo Suburb
Ezra Vogel

"This book is highly recommended to anthropologists who are concerned about just how to represent modern urban life ethnographically. . . . to teachers . . . and to anyone who is interested in social and cultural changes in modern societies." —*American Anthropologist*
LC: 76-181439 300 pages cloth $9.50 paper $2.85

from California

New

Busing and Backlash

White Against White in an Urban School District

Lillian Rubin

Busing and Backlash was researched during the height of an intense busing controversy in Richmond, California, a town that is in many ways America in microcosm and whose agony reflects the pain in the land today. The author deals with the substance of conservative attitudes and arguments, and at the same time exposes the contradictions in the pro-integrationists' philosophy and the ineptitude of the liberal leaders. "With busing looming up as a key domestic issue in the November elections, this is an instructive case history of how one community botched it." –*Kirkus Reviews*

LC: 77-186115 288 pages $7.95

Law, Order and Liberty in South Africa

A. S. Mathews

Essentially a critical analysis of the controversial internal security laws of South Africa, but more than a descriptive legal study. "A stimulating and informative study and especially welcome in a field so long dominated by polemics . . . a work of clearly superior scholarship." –*Michael Barkun*

Perspectives on Southern Africa, 7 LC: 78-189223 318 pages $15.00

Lesotho 1970

An African Coup under the Microscope

B. M. Khaketla

This book, by the one-time Privy Councillor to the King of Lesotho, is an account of the steps leading to Lesotho's independence in 1966, a description of the men and groups that dominated the political scene through the independence period and the subsequent four years, and a chronicle of the chaotic events of January, 1970, when a losing candidate in a national election repudiated the results by staging a coup.

Perspectives on Southern Africa, 5 LC: 76-182278 320 pages $10.00

A Survey of Race Relations in South Africa, 1971

Compiled by **Muriel Horrell**

An annual survey published by the South African Institute of Race Relations and distributed by the University of California Press. It is an invaluable sourcebook that provides a factual summary of events, opinions, and statistics on South African race relations.

LC: 72-187746 300 pages paper $3.95

Now available in paperback

Japanese Society

Chie Nakane

"Miss Nakane has distilled into 150 pages a gin-crisp, clear, and fresh primer on what is Japanese about modes of human relating in Japan. . . . You need not be a social anthropologist to understand and enjoy *Japanese Society*. If you have time for just one book on Japan, try this one." –*Asian Student*

LC: 71-100021 157 pages cloth $5.00 paper $2.45

University of California Press • Berkeley 94720

Federal Judges *The Appointing Process*

Harold W. Chase

This study of the appointing process as it applies to federal judges below the level of the Supreme Court is based on Department of Justice records, observance within the department of pertinent negotiations, and extensive interviews with administrative officials, lawyers, judges, and others. The author makes some provocative proposals for changes to improve and strengthen the federal judicial system. $10.00

Cuba: The Measure of a Revolution

Lowry Nelson

A careful assessment of the economic, social, and political consequences of Castro's revolution which may upset common assumptions about its results and ultimate benefits. The author's earlier work, *Rural Cuba*, was a landmark study which suggested reforms that Castro, in 1959, said his regime would adopt. $10.00

The Communist States in Disarray, 1965-1971

Edited by *Adam Bromke* and *Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone*

Fifteen contributors provide a revealing analysis of the recent disintegration of the monolithic communist structure and the reemergence of separate national entities in Eastern Europe. $13.50, paperbound $4.95

Paternalistic Capitalism

Andreas G. Papandreou

A powerful and provocative critique of American capitalism and its relationship to government and foreign policy by the distinguished Greek economist and political leader. The challenging analysis and criticism and the author's wealth of experience academically and in political affairs, make this a book that will be widely read by social scientists and students. $7.50

Two books by E. A. J. Johnson . . .

The Foundations of American Economic Freedom

Government and Enterprise in the Age of Washington

A description of the process whereby the American system of political-economic pluralism was forged, showing how political expedients melded freedom and authority into a unique synthesis of government and private enterprise. $13.50

American Imperialism in the Image of Peer Gynt

Memoirs of a Professor-Bureaucrat

The autobiography of a distinguished economic historian whose world travels as an adviser enabled him to reach conclusions about why so many well-intentioned, well-equipped Americans have failed, in their efforts abroad, to realize their hopes of doing good. $12.75

University of Minnesota Press

Minneapolis, Minn. 55455

WILEY-INTERSCIENCE

1. SILENT POLITICS:

Polls and the Awareness of Public Opinion

by Leo Bogart

"The battle of the polls is warming up for the election; the author . . . takes a long, skeptical look at the polls, their uses and misuses. . . ."
—*The New York Times*

"For all—including public relations people—who are concerned with public opinion and the forces that alter it, Leo Bogart's newest book will provide a comprehensive view of opinion polls, their accuracy and their uses.

"*An eminently pertinent book for reading during the present presidential election campaign.*"—*Public Relations Journal*

1972 250 pages $9.95

2. COMPARATIVE LEGISLATIVE BEHAVIOR:

Frontiers of Research

Edited by Samuel C. Patterson and John C. Wahlke, *both of The University of Iowa*

A volume in the Wiley Series in Comparative Studies in Behavioral Science, edited by Robert T. Holt and John E. Turner

The frontiers of research in comparative political behavior require detailed studies of parliamentary institutions and behavior in a number of varying national settings. *Comparative Legislative Behavior* brings together the most sophisticated work of scholars in the United States, Denmark, Austria, the Netherlands, and Finland, who report on their original research in systematic analyses of legislative behavior.

1972 311 pages $14.95



3. THE ANALYSIS OF SUBJECTIVE CULTURE

By Harry C. Triandis, *University of Illinois*

In association with Vasso Vassiliou and George Vassiliou, Yasumasa Tanaka, and A. V. Shanmugam

The Analysis of Subjective Culture presents a new approach to cross-cultural comparisons in which standard psychological measurement procedures are used to extract the essential similarities and differences in human cognition across cultures. The author, in close cooperation with four leading behavioral scientists, applies this new approach to studies of stereotyping, role perception, cognitive bonds, and interpersonal attitudes.

1972 383 pages $16.95

4. THE LOGIC OF COMPARATIVE SOCIAL INQUIRY

By Adam Przeworski, *Washington University*, and Henry Teune, *University of Pennsylvania*

"This book gives to the reader both a discussion of some of the theoretical problems involved in comparative social inquiry, as well as a number of methodological proposals about how to conduct such inquiry. The book thus not only tells one 'how to do it,' but meritoriously takes pains to explain why one ought to do it in the proposed way. And the care with which this explanation is undertaken indicates that provincialism in American sociology will no longer be involucrate."—*Social Science*

". . . a conscientious and able attempt to develop new rigorous methods of comparative inquiry.

"This volume is a result of hard and honest work on the part of two dedicated social scientists."—*The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*

1970 153 pages $8.75

5. THE SOCIAL CONTEXTS OF RESEARCH

Edited by Saad Z. Nagi and Ronald G. Corwin, both of *The Ohio State University*

In this stimulating collection of original essays, ten recognized scholars of science and research join the editors in considering the social organization of research and its role in society.

Contents: The Research Enterprise: An Overview—*Saad Z. Nagi* and *Ronald G. Corwin.* Patterns of the Institutionalization of Research—*Roger G. Krohn.* Basic and Applied Research—*Howard N. Vollmer.* Politics and Research—*Don E. Kash.* Economics of Research—*Richard A. Tybout.* Research Settings—*Simon Marcson.* Agencies of Research Support: Some Sociological Perspectives—*Robert L. Hall.* Relations Among Scientific Disciplines—*Norman W. Storer.* Relations Between Researchers and Practitioners—*James P. McNaul.* Forbidden Knowledge—*William Petersen.* Public and Private Opinions: Social Situations and Multiple Realities—*Irwin Deutscher.* The Case of Educational Research—*Ronald G. Corwin* and *Saad Z. Nagi.*

1972 409 pages $13.50

wiley

Available from your bookstore or from Dept. 092

WILEY-INTERSCIENCE

a division of JOHN WILEY & SONS, Inc.
605 Third Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10016
In Canada:
22 Worcester Road, Rexdale, Ontario

Available for second semester

Reform and Responsiveness

Readings in American Politics

edited by **DENNIS S. IPPOLITO** and
THOMAS G. WALKER, *Emory University*

Reform and Responsiveness explores ways of increasing the ability of the American national government to respond to legitimate public needs and preferences. The introductions and readings analyze the functions and relationships of the various institutions through which the government and the public are linked, suggest needed reforms, and assess the prospects for reform.

"Clearly one of the top few readers for the introductory American Politics course."
—*Kenneth Sherrill, Hunter College, City University of New York*

"A very important book that students will find readable as well as informative."
—*Arthur C. Hill, Metropolitan State Junior College*

"I found the readings to be timely, informative, and interesting. A student reading them would gain a better insight into our governmental system than he would by merely reading about the structure of government."—*Robert W. Langran, Villanova University*

Contents: Introduction; Part One: Individual Participation; Part Two: Group Participation; Part Three: Leaders and Decision-Makers; Conclusion: Prospects for Reform

Published, 1972   462 pages   paperbound, $4.50

State Politics in the United States

KENNETH T. PALMER, *University of Maine at Orono*

Designed for introductory courses, *State Politics in the United States* uses a systems approach to provide students with analytical concepts for comparing the political systems of different states. Emphasis is given to political environments, political inputs, decision-making agencies, and policy outputs.

"Well-written, brief but thorough. The author carries out his design better than most who use the systems model."—*Bruce B. Mason, Arizona State University*

"The best short text on state politics I have seen."—*Paul C. Schmidt, California State University*

"Concise and penetrating analysis of the fundamental patterns of state politics."
—*Dr. Bill Jackson, Mobile College*

Contents: State Politics in Perspective; The Environment of State Politics; Political Inputs in the States; The Authoritative Decision-Making Agencies; Policy Outputs in the States; Notes; Bibliography; Index

Published, 1972   120 pages   paperbound, $2.50

Technology and Man's Future

edited by **ALBERT H. TEICH,** *Policy Institute, Syracuse University Research Corporation*

Technology and Man's Future deals both with philosophical views of technology's role in modern society and with practical views of how the dominance of human values can be maintained. The opinions in the first three sections range from the optimistic views of many scientists and engineers to the pessimistic views of those who believe that technology has transcended man's control. The final section on technological assessment suggests political and administrative mechanisms which governments might use to predict and control the effect of new technologies.

"An excellent collection of papers on all aspects of society-technology interaction; the section on technology assessment is especially valuable."—*Eric P. Godfrey, University of Vermont*

"An important, provocative work, particularly useful in the study of change." —*Avtar Singh, East Carolina University*

"One of the best readers in the field."—*James H. Huber, Akron University*

Contents: Introduction; Scientific Views of Advancing Technology; Philosophers of the Technological Age; An Attempt at Synthesis; The Movement Toward Control; Technology Assessment.

Published, 1972 274 pages paperbound, $3.95

Administrative Politics and Social Change

LOUIS C. GAWTHROP, *State University of New York at Binghamton*

Administrative Politics and Social Change analyzes the administrative process of the American federal government. It not only discusses important theoretical concepts but also shows how the administrative process has operated in dealing with such conflicts as the United Farm Workers' grape strike, the postal strike of 1970, and the controversy over the SST.

Contents: Preface; The Federal Vineyard; The Administrative Structure; The Strategy of Games; The Strategy of Analysis; Environmental Turbulence; The Future of Administration; Notes; Bibliography; Index

Published, 1971 120 pages paperbound, $2.95

ST. MARTIN'S PRESS, College Dept.
175 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10010

UN MONTHLY CHRONICLE

If you cannot visit the United Nations, subscribe to UN MONTHLY CHRONICLE. Every issue of the CHRONICLE contains a complete record of the month, describing the proceedings, decisions and resolutions of the main organs and committees in the political, economic and social, legal and administrative fields. There are articles by distinguished contributors on various aspects of the work of the United Nations in all parts of the world. The notes of the month include announcements of international meetings, book reviews and selected documentation.

Annual Subscriptions:

For the U.S. and Canada	$9.50
For other parts of the world	$4.75

United Nations Publications

Room LX-2300
New York, N.Y. 10017

or

Palais des Nations
1211 Geneva 10 Switzerland

RIVISTA ITALIANA DI SCIENZA POLITICA

Direttore: *Giovanni Sartori* - Redattore Capo: *Gianfranco Pasquino*

Anno II, n. 1, aprile 1972

Giovanni Sartori	*Cosa è « politica »*
Harry Eckstein	*Il rendimento dei sistemi politici*
Franco Cazzola	*Consenso e opposizione nel parlamento italiano*
Vincent E. McHale	*Mutamenti socio-economici e sistema partitico nella V Repubblica*
Stefano Passigli	*Proporzionalismo, frazionismo e crisi dei partiti: quid prior?*
Giovanna Zincone	*Accesso autonomo alle risorse: le determinanti del frazionismo*
Gianfranco Pasquino	*I gruppi di pressione*

Recensioni e segnalazioni

Summaries in English

Published three times a year by Società editrice il Mulino, Via Santo Stefano 6, Bologna (Italy). Annual subscription: Lit. 5.000 (Italy), Lit. 6.000 (abroad), or the equivalent in other currencies.

Eugene V. Rostow

“A lively, often witty and informed look at American foreign policy. Rostow writes with clarity and logic, presenting his basic thrust with coherence and force.”

—advance review in
Publishers Weekly

THE FUTURE OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY

Peace in the Balance

■ This brilliant “analysis and memoir” deals with the meaning of peace and the goals of U.S. foreign policy after Vietnam, particularly in relation to Russia and China. Eugene V. Rostow, Professor of Law and Public Affairs at Yale, analyzes the possible alternatives in foreign policy—including the rival “schools” of such leading critics as Chomsky, Alperovitz, Morgenthau, Fulbright, Galbraith and Schlesinger. He supports his critical conclusions with vivid personal recollections. His detailed reply to the revisionist critics — and his up-to-date defense of a balance of power as the key to peace—are bound to put him at the center of national controversy.

$8.95 • SIMON AND SCHUSTER

Election Year Resource Reading

AMERICAN POLITICS, 2nd Edition
Stephen V. Monsma, *Calvin College*

A new edition of this highly successful text will be ready in the Spring of 1973. The text matter has been significantly revised and updated. This edition strikes the same balance as did the First Edition and should be even more suitable for classroom use.
Feb. 1973 $8.00

ON CAPITOL HILL: Case Studies In the Legislative Process, 2nd Edition
John Bibby, *University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee*
Roger Davidson, *University of California*

The 2nd Edition of this book, like the First Edition, gives students an on-the-scene view of the internal operations of Congress and the relations between Congress and other political forces. The material is totally updated and includes events which occurred subsequent to the previous edition.
Published July, 1972 $4.95

PERSPECTIVES ON POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY: Marx through Marcuse (Volume 3)
James V. Downton, Jr., *University of Colorado*
David K. Hart, *University of Seattle*

The third of three volumes, this anthology contains secondary works on the great thinkers in western political theory from Marx through Marcuse — essays dealing with the political philosophers themselves, rather than the issues of political philosophy.
Published October, 1972 $6.95

AMERICAN POLITICAL DICTIONARY, Third Edition
Jack C. Plano, *Western Michigan University*
Milton Greenberg, *Illinois State*

This comprehensive dictionary contains approximately 1200 terms, concepts, Supreme Court cases, statutes, agencies, theories, and political ideas that relate to the American system of government and politics.
Published $6.00

MODERN POLITICAL RHETORIC
Milton Kotler, *Institute for Policy Studies*

This is a book which should be of immense interest to students in an electoral year, for it examines the distinction between citizens and political officials, looking at what each is seeking from the other and the practical considerations which govern communication between the two.
April, 1973 $3.95

DEMOCRACY'S ORDEAL IN AMERICA
Edgar Litt, *University of Connecticut*

This book provides a critical and radical view of the most pressing problems and concerns in American politics and society.
April, 1973 $5.00

POLITICAL SCIENCE AND THE STUDY OF THE FUTURE
Albert Somit, *SUNY at Buffalo*

The original essays attempt to present what has occurred in the political science futures movement; what has been the technical developments; a series of actual case studies of futures efforts; and critical analyses of basic issues involved in seeking to bring political science competence to bear on long range policy matters.
April, 1973 $5.95

A HISTORY OF POLITICAL THEORY, 4th Edition
George Sabine & Thomas A. Thorson,
Indiana University at South Bend

The 4th Edition of Professor Sabine's classic work has been revised and brought up to date to include the most recent in political thought including that of Mao Tse Tung. The book will appear in a new and larger format which will facilitate its ease of reading.
March, 1973 $12.00

THE URBAN POLITICAL SYSTEM
Eugene Lewis, *Hamilton College*

This book is an introduction to and an analysis of the urban political system. The book presents a summary of significant historical factors which presumably have great bearing on the structure and function of present day urban political systems. The discussion of bureaucratic power and the policy process centers around the major thesis of the book, which is that the effective control of the allocation of scarce public resources has, for the most part, become an attribute of functionally defined urban bureaucracies and the constituency and clientele groups with which they are inextricably linked.
February, 1973
Hardbound, $9.95
Paperbound, $5.00

STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS
Morris Levitt, *Howard University*
Eleanor G. Feldbaum, *American University*

Basic text for the state and local politics course. It clearly and succinctly analyzes these governmental units in terms of their function, power, and problems within an overall integrated framework.
March, 1973 $7.00

More New Titles

AMERICAN DEMOCRACY, 6th Edition
ESSENTIALS OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY, 6th Edition
Robert Carr
Marver Bernstein
Walter Murphy
Michael Danielson

DYNAMICS OF AMERICAN POLITICS
Stephen V. Monsma
Paul Henry

A FIRST BOOK IN POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT
Herbert Rosenbaum

PARTIES, POLITICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY IN AMERICA
William J. Keefe

The Dryden Press
901 North Elm Street
Hinsdale, Illinois 60521

CURRENT POLITICS:
The Way Things Work in Washington

Edited by John Bibby, University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee
and Robert Huckshorn, Florida Atlantic University

Current Politics is an illustrated collection of in-depth studies of Washington politics—the processes, issues, institutions and leaders. Designed for the undergraduate level, this new book brings together the best of interpretive reporting from the weekly National Journal, the authoritative periodical which has found top priority on the reading lists of Washington policy-makers.

The text is organized into seven sections, each containing an introduction prepared by the editors: 1) Political Parties and the Electorate 2) Pressure Groups 3) The Congress 4) The Presidency 5) The Administrative Process 6) Law and Justice 7) Public Policy Issues.

256 pages, illustrated $4.28 (list price), paper

Winston PRESS
25 Groveland Terrace • Minneapolis, Minn. 55403

Political Parties before the Constitution

by Jackson Turner Main

This study will be a model of the application and the possibilities of quantification in early American history and the use of modern technologies, including the computer, to analyze masses of hitherto intractable data. The author has performed roll-call analyses of the votes in the lower houses of the various state assemblies between 1776 and 1787 and correlated them with the known facts concerning the legislators who voted. Jackson Turner Main is professor of history at the State University of New York at Stony Brook. *$15.95*

Published for the Institute of Early American History and Culture at Williamsburg, Virginia.

THE UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA PRESS
Chapel Hill, North Carolina 27514

match your courses with Wiley's texts

American Government
Watson: Promise and Performance of American Democracy
Weissberg/Nadel: American Democracy: Theory and Reality

Ideologies
Groth: Major Ideologies: An Interpretative Survey of Democracy, Socialism, and Nationalism

Comparative Politics
Byrne/Pedersen: Politics in Western European Democracies: Patterns and Problems
Wesson: The Soviet State: An Aging Revolution

Constitutional Law
Grossman: Constitutional Law and Judicial Policy-Making

Political Development
Kautsky: The Political Consequences of Modernization
Finkle/Gable: Political Development and Social Change, 2nd ed.

International Politics
Romani: The International Political System: Introduction and Readings

Public Administration
Yarwood: The National Administrative System: Selected Readings

Soviet Politics
Wesson: The Soviet Russian State

Political Sociology
Finifter: Alienation and the Social System

For your professional library:
Singer/Small: The Wages of War, 1816-1965: A Statistical Handbook. A compilation of pertinent research on the causes, characteristics, and consequences of the wars that occurred between 1816 and 1965. 1972 419 pp. $13.95

Hamilton: Class and Politics in the United States. Criticizes unsupported theories and reinterprets data on the relationship between social stratification and political behavior. 1972. 589 pp. $14.95

For more information about these books, contact your local Wiley representative, or write Wayne Anderson, Dept. 2966, N.Y. office. Please include your course title, enrollment, and present text.

JOHN WILEY & SONS, Inc.
605 Third Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10016
In Canada: 22 Worcester Road, Rexdale, Ontario

The Polaris System Development

Bureaucratic and Programmatic Success in Government

Harvey M. Sapolsky

Success in government is a rare phenomenon. In a detailed analysis of the successful development of the Polaris submarine-missile system, Harvey Sapolsky examines the bureaucratic politics involved in the program and explores the requirements for success in government. $9.95

Education and Politics in India

Studies in Organization, Society, and Policy

Susanne Hoeber Rudolph and Lloyd I. Rudolph, editors

With contributions by Paul R. Brass, Carolyn M. Elliott,
Joan Landy Erdman, Irene A. Gilbert, Harold Gould, Janet Guthrie,
B. G. Halbar, T. N. Madan, Iqbal Narain, Susanne Hoeber Rudolph
and Lloyd I. Rudolph

How independent should and can education be of society and politics? How do educational institutions govern themselves and interact with their environment? For five years the editors and the other contributors directed themselves to such questions. Their answers, cast in comparative and historical perspective, emerge from the various empirical contexts studied. $20.00

Voluntary Associations

Perspectives on the Literature

Constance Smith and Anne Freedman

This is the most thorough survey available of the literature on voluntary associations. The authors sketch the major theories on the origins, growth, and functions of associations, discuss their place in political theory, and survey the findings on the role of associations in the political and social structure.

paper, $8.00

The Boundary Politics of Independent Africa

Saadia Touval

There have been numerous disputes but surprisingly few major disruptions over the boundaries which have emerged since the late 1950's when many African states gained independence. In analyzing and evaluating the disputes that did erupt, the author looks at the political interaction of the states involved—their motives, their domestic and external pressures, and their use of force or diplomacy. $12.00

The United States and India, Pakistan, Bangladesh

Third Edition

W. Norman Brown

This newest edition of "the best and most balanced account of India and Pakistan" (New York Times Book Review) reflects the important government, political, economic, and cultural changes of the last decade on the subcontinent. Pakistan's repudiation of advancing democratic processes led to civil war and the creation of Bangladesh. *American Foreign Policy Library.* paper, $4.50; cloth, $16.00

Contemporary Chinese Law

Research Problems and Perspectives

Jerome Alan Cohen, editor

The thirteen valuable essays collected here describe the methodology of studying the legal system of the People's Republic, investigating research materials, and analyzing the problems of terminology. They also explore the difficulties of comparing the Chinese legal system to the American and Soviet systems. *Harvard Studies in East Asian Law, 4.* $10.00

The People's Republic of China and the Law of Treaties

Hungdah Chiu

Since 1949 Communist China has concluded nearly 2000 treaties with more than 70 states. In the first comprehensive analysis of the theory behind these treaties, Mr. Chiu compares China's doctrines with those of the Soviet Union, the Western States, and the provisions of the Vienna Convention. *Harvard Studies in East Asian Law, 5.* $12.50

HARVARD

HARVARD UNIVERSITY PRESS, 79 GARDEN STREET, CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS 02138 for

the

Spring

oup . . .

roductory political sc
l american governme

Conflict and Consensu
Third Edition
Dan Nimmo
Thomas D. Ungs
both at University of Tennessee

American Political Patterns
courses in American govern
with contemporary America
has rendered this best-sellin
difficult
cloth approx. 600 pages

POLICY AND POLITIC
Six Case Studies
Allan P. Sindler
University of California, Berkeley

This unusual American gove
collaborative venture contai
case studies to provide stud
into actual policy practices.
paper Spring 1973

“Burns and Peltason serves the purpose of stimulating student interest better than other comprehensive textbooks.

“Our students find it an inviting introduction to American government.”

Keith M. Henderson, *Chairman, Political Science Dept., State College at Buffalo*

Burns and Peltason’s Government by the People, 8th Edition, 1972 uses the questions students are asking to examine basic structures of American Politics. The entire *teaching package*—the text, readings book, guide, teacher’s manual, and test booklet—is designed to encourage student self-teaching and to provide the instructor with a flexible approach to contemporary problems. The new BASIC EDITION is a core text of 20 chapters. The NATIONAL EDITION includes the same material as the BASIC, plus six chapters on government policies and functions—including a new case study on Vietnam. The 1972 NATIONAL-STATE-LOCAL EDITION contains all material in the NATIONAL version, and nine more chapters on state and local government—urban crises, education and state government, central cities vs. suburbs, state and city conflicts.

BASIC—495 pp., (013-360974-X) $7.95
NATIONAL—623 pp., (013-360990-1) $9.95
NATIONAL-STATE-LOCAL—777 pp., (013-360982-0 $10.95

the perfect supplement—

Readings in American Political Behavior, 2nd Edition, 1970

edited by Raymond E. Wolfinger,
University of California, Berkeley
1970, 448 pp., paper (013-755512-1) $4.50
cloth (013-755520-2) $8.50

“The instructor who does not consider using this volume in an introductory American politics course is, in my opinion, making a mistake.”

Randolph M. Siverson
University of California, Riverside

For information, write:

Robert Jordan
Dept. J-519
College Division
Prentice-Hall
Englewood Cliffs
N. J. 07632

Arno Press
Announces the
Publication of

WORLD AFFAIRS

National and International Viewpoints

A reprint collection of 41 titles selected from a bibliography prepared by the Council on Foreign Relations of the most significant books on foreign relations published since 1922.

The works included in this collection cover the entire spectrum of foreign affairs: international relations and geography; the causes of war and the prevention of violence; Eastern Europe, Ireland, the Middle East, India, and other troubled areas of the world; the two great wars of this century and the men who were their perceptive observers or influential participants.

Advisory Editor for the collection is Ronald Steel, a former foreign service officer and Congressional Fellow of the American Political Science Association. He has authored three studies of American foreign policy: *The End of Alliance*, *Pax Americana*, and *Imperialists and Other Heroes*. Mr. Steel is currently working on a biography of Walter Lippmann.

The **World Affairs Collection** is intended to provide information and insight for all those who — whether as scholars, writers, or concerned citizens — are trying to grapple with the complexities of a world that has withstood social upheaval, revolution and international war.

For a fuller description of this important new reprint collection, write to:

ARNO PRESS
A New York Times Company
330 Madison Avenue
New York, N.Y. 10017

COMPARATIVE POLITICAL VIOLENCE

Fred R. von der Mehden, *Rice University*

New—just published!

An in-depth analysis of domestic political violence in the world that assesses types of violence that have occurred, the rational given by perpetrators of violence, and some of the factors responsible for the incidence of conflict. Augmented with case studies and examples.
Nov. 1972, approx. 144 pp., cloth (013-153999-X) $7.25, paper (013-153981-7) $3.95

COMPARATIVE POLITICAL CORRUPTION

James C. Scott, *University of Wisconsin*

Now available

An analytical, cross national, historical study of the impact of various kinds of corruption on the workings of all levels of political systems. Treats corruption as an informal, often clandestine political arena.
1972, 166 pp., cloth (013-153924-8) $6.95, paper (013-153916-7) $2.70



COMPARATIVE LEGISLATORS

J. Blondel, *University of Essex, England*

Soon to be published!

The first presentation of the structure and role of legislators on a truly world-wide basis. An essential introduction to the understanding of legislatures, their influence on important and routine matters, and of the motives of the legislators.
April 1973, 200 pp. approx., cloth (013-153874-8) $6.95, paper (013-153866-7) $2.50

In the **Prentice-Hall Contemporary, Comparative, Politics Series—**
For those who teach,
those who learn about,
and all those who try
to understand politics.

Write to: **Robert Jordan**
College Division, Dept. J-518
Prentice-Hall
ENGLEWOOD CLIFFS, N.J. 07632

PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AS POLITICAL PROCESS

Comparative Federal Intergovernmental

John Rehfuss

Northern Illinois University

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. Politics, Administration, and Bureaucratic Policymaking
2. Bureaucracy in Action—Power, Organizational Goals and the Political Environment
3. State and Local Bureaucracies in Action
4. The Nature of Large Organizations and Traditional Views
5. Complex Organizations and Contemporary Views
6. Political and Career Executives
7. Policy and Decisionmaking in Public Agencies
8. Bureaucracies in Worldwide Perspective
9. Public Administration—Change and the Future

Index

1972. 288 pp. Scribners University Library, Paper, $4.95 tent.

CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS
597 Fifth Avenue, New York, New York 10017

Groupthink

— the psychological drive
for consensus at any cost
that suppresses dissent
among decision-makers
in the corridors of power.



VICTIMS OF GROUPTHINK: A Psychological Study of Foreign-Policy Decisions and Fiascoes
Irving L. Janis, Yale University
277 pages / paper / An October 1972 publication

Psychologist Irving L. Janis shows how groupthink interfered with the decision-making processes that resulted in some of the major U.S. fiascoes of recent decades: the Bay of Pigs crisis, the Korean War stalemate, the U.S. failure to be prepared for the attack on Pearl Harbor, and the escalation of the Vietnam War.

It is through documented portrayal of cases of the invasion and avoidance of groupthink that Janis builds his hypothesis and offers suggestions for prevention of this often disastrous, small-group phenomenon.

The leading supplementary textbook for state and local politics and government —

CAPITOL, COURTHOUSE & CITY HALL: Readings in American State & Local Politics & Government, Fourth Edition
Robert L. Morlan, University of Redlands
329 pages / paper / 1972 / $5.95

Presents ninety-three often conflicting viewpoints on a variety of topics, ranging from federal-state relations to citizen participation in the state-local process.

Houghton Mifflin
Publisher of The American Heritage
Dictionary of the English Language
Boston 02107 / Atlanta 30324 / Dallas 75235
Geneva, Ill. 60134 / New York 10036* /
Palo Alto 94304

*Effective March 1, 1973: Pennington-Hopewell Road,
Hopewell, N.J. 08525

Peasants Against Politics

Rural Organization in Brittany, 1911–1967

Suzanne Berger

Few political scientists and students of the modernization process have looked at the peasant-state relationship in the old nations of Europe. Suzanne Berger explores the impact of mass organizations on the politics of the peasants in Finistère and Côtes-du-Nord, two socially and economically similar but politically different agricultural departments in western France. $11.95

The Politics of Land Reform in Chile, 1950-1970

Public Policy, Political Institutions, and Social Change

Robert Kaufman

In recent years, Chile has achieved a high level of social modernization and political development. Mr. Kaufman focuses on Chile's efforts to implement land reform legislation and maps the conflicts surrounding the issue, the involvement of differing social groupings, and the building of coalitions in support of change. $12.00

Political Mobilization of the Venezuelan Peasant

John Duncan Powell

In Venezuela, 1935 to 1958 marked the decline of traditional dictatorships and the emergence of stable democratic government. This pioneering study traces the formation of a successful alliance between the peasants and a small urban elite, provides an empirical structural-functional analysis of the alliance, and develops a provocative new view of peasant mobilization. *Center for International Affairs.* $8.50

Lord and Peasant in Peru

A Paradigm of Political and Social Change

F. LaMond Tullis

In his analysis of the violent and moderate grassroots movements that are changing the peasant way of life in Peru, Mr. Tullis emphasizes the role of individual communities in effecting land reform and relates emerging social forces to village and national political development. *Center for International Affairs.* $10.50

HARVARD

HARVARD UNIVERSITY PRESS, 79 GARDEN STREET, CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS 02138

Introductory Texts from MARKHAM

AMERICAN GOVERNMENT PAPERBACKS

AMERICAN NATIONAL GOVERNMENT

An Introduction to Political Institutions

by Robert S. Ross

This is the brief analytic-dynamics emphasizing the core of American politics for which many of us have been waiting. Teachers can now be freed to use a wide variety of other materials with confidence that this engaging and well-written book will do the necessary job of conveying understanding of the basic institutions.

Kenneth M. Dolbeare
University of Washington

Paperback, $2.95

PUBLIC CHOICE IN AMERICA

An Introduction to American Government

by William C. Mitchell

This book represents a departure from the traditional, institutional approach students find so uninteresting. By emphasizing policy outcomes, the processes by which resources are allocated, and benefits and burdens distributed, students are encouraged to analyze various alternatives to present policies.

Paperback, $5.95
Instructor's Manual Available

AMERICAN IDEOLOGIES

The Competing Political Beliefs of the 1970s

by Kenneth M. Dolbeare and Patricia Dolbeare

A brief analysis of the major economic and political ideologies prevalent in the United States today, taking into account the difference in world views, values and goals, and beliefs about social change.

Paperback, $3.50

FOR INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

A Theoretical Overview

by William D. Coplin

Already adopted by over 300 schools, this book provides for the students a simple but comprehensive theoretical framework through which students can understand international politics.

Hardcover, $8.95
Instructor's Manual Available

A MULTI-METHOD INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

Observation, Explanation, and Prescription

edited by William D. Coplin and Charles W. Kegley

Paperback, $5.95

I am most favorably impressed by William Coplin's Introduction to International Politics. *This work represents a refreshingly new approach to the study of international politics. It is a penetrating and keen analysis of contemporary concepts and theories. Its companion volume,* A Multi-method Introduction to International Politics, *is an ideal supplement with selected excellent passages from the writings of leading scholars. The two volumes form a unity and fill a veritable need.*

Stephen D. Kertesz
University of Notre Dame

MARKHAM publishing company

3322 West Peterson Ave. • Chicago, Illinois 60659 • (312) 539-0626